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ABSTRACT
Economic and. political unrest among rank-and-file
people of the rural South reached an unprecedented level
during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Between

1877 and 1900, white farmers and sharecroppers became dis
illusioned with the conservative Democratic regimes which
had been established at the end of Reconstruction; Negro
agriculturists, in these same years, were grossly exploited
by their employers and by the political elite which ruled
the states of the late Confederacy.

The Greenback party,

the Farmers' Alliance, and, finally, the People's party,
attempted to unite in mutual action the disadvantaged rural
population of both races.

A number of historians have

already examined the pattern of post-Reconstruction agrarian
protest in most southern states.

However, a comprehensive

study of the subject in Louisiana has hitherto not been
attempted.
To understand the nature of agrarian protest.in
Louisiana, the basis for its grievances, and the causes of
its ultimate failure, a broad-gauged examination of the
social, economic, and political conditions prevalent in the
state in the 1877-1900 period was mandatory.

Louisiana

newspapers, both urban and rural, furnished key insights.

iv

The private letters of leading citizens which related to
political and economic matters revealed much about upper
class attitudes.

Legislative records, combined with regis

tration and election figures and United States census
reports, provided extensive documentation of the undemo
cratic methods and the conscious social neglect prevalent
in Louisiana in the years under discussion.

To provide a

flavor of contemporary life and emotions, and to avoid mi s 
interpretations, the narrative of this study has been inter
spersed with expressions of opinion by those persons who were
directly involved in shaping Louisiana's destiny during the
years after Reconstruction.
The Populist, or People’s, party, organized
nationally in 1891, was supported in Louisiana by the same
rural elements which also furnished the bulwark of Populist
strength in other agricultural states of the South and West.
But in no other state, the evidence suggests, was the Popu
list cause so hopeless.

Even though sixty per cent or more

of Louisiana's voting population supported the PopulistRepublican state ticket in 1896, the conservative Democratic
regime refused to bow to the wishes of the majority; the
customary methods of vote fraud, economic coercion, and out
right violence were intensified.

Leaders of the poor whites

threatened the planter-merchant oligarchy with class war,
but the threat was not carried out.
had been dealt a mortal blow.

Louisiana agrarianism

In the years following 1896,

vi
lower class whites became increasingly apathetic toward
politics; their Negro allies, meanwhile, were disfranchised
through legislative action and constitutional revision.
The attempt to unite poor white and poor Negroes
under the Populist banner in Louisiana was paralleled in
other southern states, but the biracial agrarian efforts in
the Pelican State had certain distinctive facets.

By 1898,

when Populist leaders in other southern commonwealths had
generally concluded that the Negro-poor white alliance was
hopeless, and that disfranchisement of the blacks would
benefit the white agrarians, Louisiana’s state Populist
platform spoke up for civil rights and bitterly opposed the
movement to eliminate Negroes from the registration rolls.
It is concluded that the severity of conservative Democratic
methods in Louisiana aroused a biracial class consciousness
in that state, temporary though it was, which is unequaled
in southern history.

INTRODUCTION
Louisiana's colorful but often tragic history gives
her a unique place among American commonwealths.

A strain

of irony seems to course through everything associated with
the Pelican State; it is fitting that'two of Louisiana's
leading products are sugar and salt, and that two of her
culinary delights are pecan pralines and hot peppers.
Certainly the years from the end of Reconstruction to the
end of the nineteenth century illustrate the irony of the
state's history.

In 1876 the disputed election returns from

Louisiana provoked violent controversy on the national level
because the outcome of the presidential campaign hinged upon
those returns, yet registration and election figures indi
cate that the Hayes-Tilden returns,

though rife with fraud,

more honestly represented public opinion than the official
totals announced in any state contest for the remainder of
the century.

In 1876 both sides stole votes.

Afterward,

this prerogative rested solely with the triumphant Bourbon
Democracy.
That the Pelican State was exploited b y v e n a l poli
ticians during the Reconstruction years few would deny; even
historians of such diverse opinions as E. Merton Coulter and
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W. E. B. DuBois agree that the Louisiana Carpetbaggers were
a corrupt lot.

But after 1876 Bourbon misrule replaced

Radical misrule.

Spectacular stealings at both the ballot

box and the State House continued, and no state in the postReconstruc.tion South permitted so disastrous a neglect of
schools and other public institutions as did Louisiana.
Ruling in the name of home rule and white supremacy, Gover
nors Nicholls, Wiltz, McEnery, and Foster were either unable
or unwilling to curb the more repressive and brutal elements
among the dominant oligarchy, and the disadvantaged majority
of people, both white and black, were economically exploited
and politically ignored.
Bourbon repression naturally provoked unrest among
the lower classes.

First in 1878, and then again with the

People's party of the 1890's, agrarian reformers came forth
to challenge the state Democratic regime.

Yet Louisiana

posed special and exasperating problems for any reform
movement.

Lower class interests were not only divided by

the racial antipathies common to all southern states, but
the ethnic, religious, and even language differences between
the poor whites of northern and southern Louisiana posed
formidable obstacles to any statewide effort of protest.
Moreover, the Democratic oligarchy, militant and shrewd,
dealt out severe treatment to any political or economic
dissenters.

Only once was Bourbon rule really threatened.

In the state election of the spring of 1896, poor whites and
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Negroes attempted to combine with dissident elements among
the upper class; the incumbent regime found well over half
the state's voting population aligned against it.
oligarchy proved equal to the emergency.

But the

The usual methods

of vote fraud, intimidation, and violence were intensified,
and Louisiana Populism was smothered with a savagery un
paralleled in the South,
Researching and writing on Louisiana of the late
nineteenth century has proved to be a demanding and de
pressing task.

Many times, preconceived notions or tenta

tive hypotheses had to be abandoned.

And, obviously, not

all questions have been answered in the following pages, nor
have all possible avenues of inquiry been explored.

But my

research thus far has compelled me to sympathize with the
agrarian reformers of that day, and to deplore the tactics
by. which the ruling Bourbons retained power and beat down
even mild and conciliatory efforts at reform.

That the re

formers themselves might have been equally vicious and selfseeking if given the reins of power is, of course, possible.
But the point is that they were denied the opportunity to
prove the sincerity of their words.

The Bourbons not only

refused to permit free elections, but heaped up unnecessary
thousands of fraudulent votes in order to drown out and dis
courage the voices of protest.

Nor is it necessary to judge

the Louisiana Bourbons by the standards of the present in
order to condemn them; their undemocratic and even pitiless

actions were atavistic in the nineteenth century, and re
pulsed, at the time, many persons who would normally be
allied with vested interests.

So as to avoid misinterpre

tation, and to provide a flavor of contemporary life and
emotions, the narrative of this study has been interspersed
with numerous expressions of opinion by those persons who
were directly involved in shaping Louisiana's destiny during
the years following Reconstruction.

CHAPTER I
POLITICS OF THE NEW DEPARTURE
April of 1877 was a month for celebration in Louisi
ana.

The Federal government had abandoned the Carpetbagger

government in the State House; military Reconstruction was
over.

Some scenes of revelry had grotesque overtones.

In

New Orleans, conservative Democrats welcomed a select
number of Carpetbaggers, Scalawags, and Negroes into the
"compromise" legislature which assembled, appropriately, in
Odd Fellows Hall.^

The solons cheered when a white suprema

cist named Captain Kidd presented a gold-headed cane to a
Negro Republican from a parish with the felicitous name of
Concordia*

2

Upriver, Baton Rouge residents greeted the

restoration of home rule in noisy fashion, and "the loudest
and longest ringing . . . was the bell of the Mount Zion
(colored) Baptist Church.

Long after the others had stopped,

its clarion notes sounded forth:

’Nicholls is Governor!

^•Nation. XXIV (April 19, 1877), 277; New York
Times. April 25, 28, 1877.
^New York Times. April 24, 1877; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. July 4, i879. Cited hereafter as Daily Picayune.
1

Louisiana is free!1"3
Five months earlier the state election had been
held.

At the same time, November of 1876, Louisiana had

joined with less turbulent commonwealths in the selection of
a President of the United States.

The national Republican

ticket was headed by Rutherford B. Hayes; Stephen B. Packard
represented Republican hopes to retain control of the state
government.

The Democratic presidential nominee, Samuel J.

Tilden, was less important to Louisiana partisans than
gubernatorial candidate Francis T. Nicholls.

The election

returns produced the anticipated imbroglio on the state
level.

Both Nicholls and Packard claimed victory.^

But

quite unexpectedly, the presidential vote in the fifty-seven
parishes took on decisive importance.

The outcome of the

national election hinged upon the electoral votes of Louisi
ana, South Carolina, and Florida:
under military Reconstruction.

the only states still

Hayes needed all their

electoral votes to achieve even the slimmest of victories in
the electoral college; yet first returns showed Tilden
leading in each of the three.^

But fortunately for the

3Pailv Picayune. April 28, 1877.
^Clarence Howard Nichols, "Francis T. Nicholls,
Bourbon Democrat" (unpublished Master’s thesis, Louisiana
State University, 1959), 46-55; Garnie W. McGinty, Louisi
ana Redeemed; The Overthrow of Carpet-baa Rule. 1876-1880
INew Orleans, 1941), 52.
5
C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The
Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction [Boston.
1951), 17.

Republicans, Louisiana and the other states in question per
mitted a special returning board to "review" election re
turns; in all three, the Hayes partisans who made up the
boards transformed an apparent Democratic victory into a
Republican victory.
The tangled web of negotiations between southern
Democrats and northern Republicans which smoothed the way
for the inauguration of Hayes need not be detailed in this
study.^

In brief, southern congressmen agreed not to join

diehard northern Democrats in a filibuster to prevent the
electoral commission's awarding of the disputed states to
Hayes.

In return, northern Republicans gave assurances to

the South that Hayes would withdraw Federal soldiers from
support of the remaining Carpetbagger governments; Hayes
himself had previously indicated (though not publicly) his
disapproval of military intervention in the South.

Economic

as well as political factors were involved in this famous
"Compromise of 1877."

Interwoven with the political dicker

ing, and perhaps even more important, was the fact that
northern Republicans began turning friendly ears to southern
demands for Federal appropriations to finance railroads,
levee construction, river and harbor clearance, and other
6 Ibid.. passim, for the best account of negotiations
on the national scene. For events in Louisiana, see McGinty, Louisiana Redeemed, passim; also, Ella Lonn, R e - "
construction in Louisiana After 1868 (New York, 191877 473525.

4
desired projects.^
Uncertainty and mutual distrust arose to plague the
secret negotiations of Hayes Republicans and southern Demo
cratic politicians during the winter of 1876-77.

The out

come, both for Louisiana and the nation, was frequently in
doubt.

In New Orleans, the state capital, both Packard and

Nicholls moved ahead as if assured of ultimate victory; each
Q
took an oath of office on January 8.
Packard and his
legislature occupied the State House with the help of the
outgoing Republican Governor, William Pitt Kellogg.

The

Nicholls government had to bide its time in Odd Fellows Hall.
But there was no doubt that the Democrats were in de facto
control of the state.9

Packard’s hope for Federal help in

overthrowing the rival Democratic government faded as the
inauguration of Hayes approached; United States troops in
New Orleans guarded Packard in the State House but made no
C.
Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South:
1913. Vol. IX of A History of tne South, eds. Wendell Holmes
Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (Baton Rouge, 1951), 23-50.
“It would be futile," wrote Woodward in Reunion and Reaction.
"to attempt to decide . • . which of the ’two forces'
[ political or economic factors 3 was the more effective in
winning the southerners over and breaking the filibuster."
Before his inauguration, Hayes did not publicly commit him
self on the question of maintaining troops in the South;
President Grant, however, on February 26, 1877, frankly
admitted that further use of the troops would be contrary to
popular opinion in both North and South. Grant also
promised southerners that the troops would soon be removed.
See Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, passim.
®New Orleans Times. January 9, 1878.
9Nation. XXIV (January 11, 1877), 19.

1877-

hostile move toward Odd Fellows Hall.

Packard's legis

lature began to dwindle as a number of the shrewder members,
"reduced to

[ their ] last chew of tobacco and . . . sup of

w h i s k e y , s e n s e d the drift of events and moved over to
seek recognition, or financial reward, in the Nicholls
K
house. 11

On April 5 the arrival in New Orleans of a special
commission from President Hayes gave proof that the national
Republicans were ready to carry out their part of the
bargain.

The President's, commission did nothing which a

simple withdrawal of troops would not have accomplished;
however, the presence of these dignitaries gave a moral
12
weight to the rather sordid proceedings.
With the aid of
a "contingent fund," a select number of Packard men were
bribed into entering the Nicholls house, thus giving the
Democratic legislature a quorum of members whose election
13
was undisputed by both parties.
Edward A. Burke, who
played such a leading role in the Compromise of 1877, re
marked years later that the Hayes commissioners were:

"No

more than a mere set of clerks to carry out the work that
.-^New York Times. April 24, 1877.
**Dailv Picayune. January 3, 14, 1877.
12Nation, XXIV (April 26, 1877), 241.
^ N e w York Times. April 22, 24, 1877.

had been commanded of them."
The phrase "New Departure" had again come into vogue.
First used in the Reconstruction South during the presi
dential campaign of 1872, it referred to a coalition of
practical-mended southern Democrats with the Liberal Republi
can movement in the North; both groups had hoped to end Re
construction and defeat President Grant's bid for re-e15
lection.
This first New Departure failed. But four years
later, in the tense months between November of 1876 and
April of 1877, political commentators revived the ex16
pression.
The second attempt at New Departure was more
significant; it referred not only to the acquiescence of
southern Democrats to the seating of Hayes, but to portents
of lasting political and economic change throughout the
South.
The Nicholls legislature pledged its good faith to
the bargain by resolving that, under Democratic home rule,
Negroes as well as whites would enjoy political freedom and
equality under the law; public education for both races
would be continued; and "kindly relations between white and
colored citizens on a basis of Justice and mutual
l4New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 15, 1887.
^ E . Merton Coulter, The South During Reconstruct
ion:
1865-1877. Vol. VIII of A History of the South, eds.
Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (Baton
Rouge, 1947), 344-45.
1&New Orleans Times. February 24, April 24, 1877.

confidence," would mark Louisiana*s history in the future.

17

In addition, worried local Republicans were assured of immunity from prosecution for "past political conduct."

18

*

This

promise of fair play from New Orleans must have eased Hayes’s
conscience.

For he surely realized his conciliatory policy

would be criticized in the North if, in the future, Republi
can blood was spilled in the state.
informed that Packard had said:

The President was soon

"How basely you [ Hayes ]

have betrayed the Republican party in Louisiana and with
what alacrity you have turned over the poor negroes to the
Democrats to be outraged and murdered by them."

ig

The New Departure, supposedly, was a two-way street.
Louisiana Democrats, for their part, expected fruits of the
new policy from Washington.

When the Daily Picayune

re

marked that "Louisiana . . . needs letting alone"2® the
reference applied to political meddling only; economic
intervention on the other hand, was not only desired but was
impatiently awaited.
sacred dogma.

Theoretically, States’ Rights was still

But in view of Louisiana’s choked

harbors

^ N e w Orleans Democrat. April 17, 1877.
18Nation. XXIV (April 19, 1877), 227.
19

George A. Sheridan to Rutherford B. Hayes, July 21,
1877, in Papers of Rutherford B. Hayes; Louisiana Politics,
Parts 10-23, Inclusive. (Microfilm copies from Hayes Me
morial Library, Fremont, Ohio, in Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress). Cited hereafter as Hayes Papers.
20Pailv Picayune. Ajari! 10, 1877.

and crumbling levees, strict construction of the Constitution must be "abandoned for the laxity of the present."

21

Enviously viewing Federal generosity in northern climes, the
South sought her share "as an act of justice."

22

Yet in President Hayes's mind, the most important
aspect of the New Departure was its implied reorganization
of the Republican party in the South.

The desertion of

Packard constituted a final abandonment of the whole theory
of Radical Reconstruction.

By 1877 the Republican party of

the North had shed its midwestern agrarian origins and was
dominated by the economic and social ideas of conservative
businessmen.

23

The Radical policy of using military force

in the South so as to keep poverty-stricken Negroes from
falling under the political domination of their white land24
lords and employers was clearly incongruous.
Moreover,
threats made against large property by some Carpetbag and
Scalawag leaders probably discredited them more in the eyes
of Northern Republicans than did their frequent and flagrant
acts of dishonesty while in public office.
Unrealistic as it might seem, the end of military
^ Ibid.. April 28, 1877.
^Shreveport Evening Standard. October 16, 1878.
^Woodward, Origins of the New South. 28.
24Vincent P. De Santis, Republicans Face the
Southern Question;
The New Departure Years.~I^77-1897
(Series LXXVll. No. 1. Johns Hopkins tJniversity Studies in
Historical and Political Science: Baltimore, 1959), 26-27.

Reconstruction was in fact an attempt to increase and stabi
lize

the voting strength of Republicanism in the South.

As

Hayes viewed it, the new appeal would be aimed toward the
"better class" of southerners whose economic views coincided
25
with those of northern Republicans.
Race issues were to be
pushed aside as irrelevant to the more significant business
26
interests.
A strong precedent for such an alliance did
exist.

The defunct Whig party of

ante-bellum days had,

until the mid-1850's given the South a vigorous two party
system; southern men of property in the Whig party had
joined with northern businessmen of the same political faith,
in common opposition to the supposed equalitarian tendencies
27
of Jacksonian Democracy.
Of the two men elected to the
presidency from the old Whig party, one came from Hayes's
28
state of Ohio and the other was a Louisiana planter.
Most
of the great planters of the pre-war South were Whigs.

One

competent authority estimated that from two-thirds to three29
fourths of the slave population was owned by Whigs.
25Nation. XXIV (April 19, 1887), 227.
26Ibid.. (April 5, 1877), 202.
27
Roger W. Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in
Louisiana; A Social History of White Farmers and Laborers
during Slavery and After. 1870-1875 (University. Lai. 1939),
121-27.
28
William Henry Harrison, elected in 1840; Zachary
Taylor, elected in 1848.
^ A r t h u r Charles Cole, The Whig Party in the South
(London, 1913), 69-70.

10
Close advisors and personal friends of President
Hayes supported him in the attempt to give southern Republi
canism a more respectable and Whiggish mien.

General James

M. Comley, described as the President’s “most devoted
30
friend,"
travelled down the Mississippi in May of 1877 to
sound out native white southerners on the hoped-for politi
cal New Departure.

"I find," he wrote Hayes, "that on the

river there is a sort of general feeling that the old Whig
.Party is to be revived.

. . .

The expectation that ’Henry

Clay Whiggery* is to live again. . . .
It seemed wonder31
ful."
Comley*s letter reinforced previous information that
leading businessmen in New Orleans endorsed the neo-Whig
32
aspect of the New Departure.
Curiously, some reasoned that the last state to be
free of Reconstruction might also be the first to embrace
the Whiggish New Departure.

"Louisiana is a peculiar

state," John B. Robertson of New Orleans wrote Hayes’s Post
master-General David M. Key:

"She contains so many heterog

eneous elements that it is not at all improbable she will be
30
Charles R. Williams, The Life of Rutherford
Birchard Hayes: Nineteenth President of the United States
IBoston, 1914}, II, 421-22.
'
31
James M. Comley to Rutherford B. Hayes, April 30,
1877, Hayes Papers.
32
Andrew J. Kellar to Rutherford B. Hayes, April 20,
1877, Hayes Papers.

11
the first to lead off in the reconstruction of parties in
the Union.”33
Secretary of War Richard W. Thompson believed a
change in party name would be necessary because of "the
prejudices existing in the South."

In accord with Thompson’s

idea, the Daily Nation of Washington, D. C. announced itself
O A

as the organ of "a new Whig Party."

As a practical poli

tician he surely realized the danger of alienating Union
veterans and southern Negroes accustomed to the Republican
designation.
As envisioned by the President, the new "respectable"
Republican party in the South should turn its back on most
of the old Radicals of military days but not, of course, re
nounce Negro votes.

National Republicans blandly assumed

the Negro would always herd toward the party of emancipation.
"The colored citizens," a group of neo-Whig enthusiasts in
New Orleans told Hayes, "are almost instinctively Republi
cans and nothing will drive them into the . . . Democratic
36
Party except coercion."
Ex-Congressman Chester B. Darrall,
33John B. Robertson to David M, Key, April 26, 1877,
Hayes Papers.
O A

St. Louis Republican, quoted in Daily Picayune.
April 26, 1877.
35

De Santis, Republicans Face the Southern Question.

47.
3f%
John Ray, John E. King, and others to Rutherford
B. Hayes, April 21, 1877, Hayes Papers.

12
a Carpetbagger merchant-planter of St. Mary Parish, wrote
to Hayes that although "fear and uneasiness" was prevalent
among rural colored people, it would "wear away as they see
that no harm comes to them and that you do not abandon them
or the party they have looked to for protection."

Darrall

also believed white Democrats had come to realize, by
Hayes's generous dealings with Nicholls, that the Republi
can party was no longer a revolutionary ogre.
37
have reached their hearts," he said.

" I think we

Visiting Louisiana in 1879, Republican politician
Stewart L. Woodford of New York gave the Daily Picayune a
frank statement of the ultimate purposes of the New De
parture:
The Republican party at the North comprises the
wealth, intelligence and respectability of the com
munity, and it is not strange then that it should
desire alliance with the same element in the South,
allowing the ignorant masses tg go where they belong,
to the Democratic party, . . ,38
When the New York visitor spoke of "ignorant masses"
he presumably referred only to the poor whites.

Since

Negroes were regarded by party leaders as unswerving
Republicans they were excused— politically, at least--from
such contempt.

Reduced to bare simplicities, the Republi

can argument proposed that Negroes should continue to vote
37
Chester B. Darrall to Rutherford B. Hayes, April
27, 1877, Hayes Papers.
^ Dailv Picayune. November 25, 1877.

13
for the party because it had once been liberal, and wealthy
whites should join the party because it was now conservative.
Hayes’s New Departure was an antithesis of the
original Republican approach in Louisiana.

Northern rule

first entered the state in May of 1862 with the ungainly
form of General Benjamin F. Butler, military administrator
OQ

of the captured Confederate city of New Orleans.

History

could not have selected a more suitable actor to play the
first scene in the drama of Louisiana’s Reconstruction.
Butler began his long political life as a workingman’s
advocate in the left wing of the Jacksonian Democracy in his
40
home state of Massachusetts.
This "rascally but
thoroughly intelligent"4 ^ politician-soldier, during his
stay in New Orleans, distributed food rations to the poor
and inaugurated a public works program which cleaned up the
pestilence-ridden city and gave government employment to the
heads of poor families.

42

Butler’s assumption of responsi

bility for the welfare of the masses was a bold, new concept
in a region hitherto dominated by a planter-merchant
^ James Parton, General Butler in New Orleans (New
York, 1864), 254.
, A recent biography of Butler is Hans
L. Trefousse, Ben Butler: The South Called Him BEAST! (New
York, 1957).
40
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson
(Boston, 1945), 342.
41Ibid.. 520.
4 ^Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 186.

oligarchy.
To conservative Louisianians, the words and deeds
of Butler “betrayed the soul of a dangerous demagogue" bent
43
on "humbling and ruining the upper classes."
The Union
General did not conceal his attempt to align the poor of
both races against the entrenched gentlemen-rulers of the
state; in fact, he apparently believed that he had inaugu
rated a great proletarian movement of protest in the Deep
South.But

the years of Reconstruction which followed

witnessed the quick submergence of welfare-state Radicalism.
Venal Carpetbaggers, Scalawags and Negro politicians, acting
under military protection, exploited both rich and poor.

In

truth, Butler's own conduct revealed the Janus face of
Louisiana Republicanism; his peculations in cotton and sugar
were foretastes of worse to come.

For over a decade, "poor,
45

distracted, downtrodden Louisiana"

suffered under a satur

nalia of corruption, moderated, to a slight degree, by half
hearted measures of reform.
The so-called Radicals did little toward economic
43
Albert Phelps, Louisiana: A Record of Expansion
(Boston, 1905), 313-14.
44
William Edward Highsmith, "Louisiana During R e 
construction" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana
State University, 1953),6.
45
.
Samuel H, Lockett, "Louisiana As It Is" (un
published longhand MS, 1873, deposited in Howard-Tilton
Library Archives, Tulane University), v.
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change in the state*

The Freedmen*s Bureau, set up by

Congress to take charge of abandoned and confiscable Rebel
land, made feeble and short-lived efforts to divide up the
46
great plantations*
The Bureau also distributed pro
visions to disaster-stricken areas, making no distinction
between the races, and provided relief work for the un
employed in the years from 1865 to 1868.

However, this work

came to an end in the latter year, when the Bureau turned
over its duties to generally unsympathetic local authori..
47
ties.
The Constitution of 1868, under which Louisiana ob
tained readmittance to the Union, gave the ballot to the
freedmen and erected the framework of a state-supported,
48
desegregated public school system.
But proposals to limit
the size of land purchases and place additional taxes on
speculative holdings were beaten down in the convention.

49

This destruction of hopes for economic reform through
political Reconstruction resulted partly from the misconduct
and hypocrisy of self-seeking Radical officials, but also
4^John Cornelius Engelsman "The Freedmen*s Bureau in
Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXXI (January,
1949), 204-13.
47Ibid,, 164-75.
4®Louisiana, Constitution of 1868. Arts. 98, 135.
4^Highsmith, "Louisiana During Reconstruction," 206.
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because the great majority of whites put racial issues above
any mutual class interest they might have with the Negro.
The largest majorities turned in for the Conservative-Demo
cratic party during Reconstruction often came from povertystricken white parishes.

However, at least a few of the

seeds of class protest planted during Reconstruction germi
nated years- later among the poor whites and Negroes of the
State; the Populist party of the 1890*s attempted to create
an economic and political

coalition similar to that en

visioned by Butler in the 1860fs.
The Whiggish New Departure of 1877 was not unani
mously endorsed by Louisiana Republicans.

In the dying

hours of Stephen Packard’s government, his authority con
fined to about one acre of the state, this Maine Carpet
bagger reverted to the language of economic Radicalism.
Packard fumed over his desertion by Hayes and the business
community of New Orleans.

His words sounded like Butler’s,

and like those to be used by Populist orators a generation
later:
The so-called Nicholls Government rests its claim
. . . on the support it receives from the rich and
aristocratic classes of this city. It is a threatened
oligarchy of wealth, and a menace to the middle and
poorer classes. . . .
A government established on
such a basis would tend to make the rich richer and
the poor poorer . • . white as well as black.50
(italics mine).
The conservative press of the city was horrified by
50Pailv Picayune."March 28, 1877.
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the ’’vicious spirit” of Packard’s address.

One newspaper

remarked that "Louisiana cannot afford a Government which is
prepared to experiment in Communism and organize raids upon
business capital under pretentious appeals to the . . .
51
lower classes."
Equally infuriating was Packard’s threat
to summon rural laborers for a march on New Orleans "to
52
scatter hand grenades instead of seed."
Outside New Orleans many Negro and Scalawag sup
porters of Republicanism gave evidence of dissatisfaction
with the new Hayes policy.

Editor W. Jasper Blackburn of

the Homer Iliad, an old foe of secession and a staunch
Unionist through the war, refused to concede the legitimacy
of the Nicholls government.5^

By the fall of 1877, in St.

Landry, Natchitoches and Avoyelles Parishes, a Workingmen’s
party was organized by former Republican politicians with a
54
view of appealing to the laboring classes of both races.
It is probably not coincidental that St. Landry witnessed a
series of lower class independent movements throughout the
51Ibid.. March 29, 1877.
52
Ibid.. March 28, 1877.
53

Vienna (La.) Sentinel, quoted in ibid.. April 5,

1877.
54

Washington (La.) Enterprise, quoted in Daily
Picayune. September 30, 1877; Natchitoches People*s Vindi
cator. quoted in Daily Picayune. October 6, 1877; Marksville
Bulletin, quoted in Daily Picayune. December 13, 1877.
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1880's^5 and, along with Natchitoches -Parish, successfully
united Negro and poor white voters under the Populist
banner in the last decade of the century.
One aged member of the Grange in Louisiana beseeched Hayes to reject the "Money Power" which had boarded the
Republican party during the Grant years; he advised that the
New Departure be transformed into an alliance with liberal
and independent elements in the South.

"Stand by the

Laborer and with Producers and Plow holders," Lewis Huber, a
retired farmer living in New Orleans, wrote the President,

57

He suggested that Hayes endorse the Greenback party platform;
such a move, Huber predicted, "will thoroughly bust up the
Democrat Party."

The President received similar letters

from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia;

58

however,

inflationary ideas were repugnant to Hayes*s hard money eco
nomic philosophy.
Th6 Conservative-Democratic party of Louisiana, in
53
''James E, Richardson to J. M. Currie, August 1,
1882, in William E. Chandler Papers (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
Cited hereafter as Chandler Papers.
56
Natchitoches Louisiana Populist. November 16,
1894. Cited hereafter a¥ Louisiana Populist.
57
Lewis Huber to Rutherford B. Hayes, April 22,
1877, Hayes Papers.
^ D e Santis, Republicans Face the Southern Question.
58-59.

the first months after Reconstruction, showed visible splits
over local and personal issues; but there appeared to be no
inclination to fuse politically with Hayes*s Republican
party.

Some northern observers of the Nicholls legislature

realized this fact from the beginning.

"From a political

standpoint," a correspondent of the New York Times observed,
the President's policy "is almost . . .
disastrous failure."

certain to be a

The Times man pointed out that though

Louisiana's Democrats were jubilant over Packard's collapse,
"that they should feel any gratitude to President Hayes . .
59

. has never entered their minds."

The same newspapermen

suggested that although many of the "old Whigs" of 1861 had
opposed secession, this did not necessarily indicate that
they would now join Republican ranks, even of the respectable
Hayes variety.

Property losses during the war and the social

upsets of Reconstruction had made "these rich men" ardent
Democrats.^0
In 1877 the Conservative-Democratic party of Louisi
ana, as in other southern states, obviously had the loyalty
of most native whites of all economic backgrounds.

Wealthy

planters and merchants were in the party because of their
distaste for high taxes, financial irresponsibility, and the
5^New York Times. April 26, 1877.
60Ibid.
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labor-upsetting actions which had characterized the Radical
regime.

Most poor whites supported Democratic candidates

because of inbred racial antipathy to the Negro, whose aspi
rations, now that he was free, seemed to pose a threat to
61
the white man’s place in society.
Thus, the "Conserva
tive-Democratic" appellation (sometimes the words were re
versed) was used to satisfy both the elite and the mass of
the home rule party*

But by 1878, within a year of Recon

struction’s demise, the party was self-confident to the
point of dropping the dual designation.

As a rule, Louisi

ana’s rulers relied thereafter upon the simpler name of
"Democrat.
Another term, "Bourbon Democracy," has often been
applied to characterize the leadership of the home rule
party of the South in the years after Reconstruction.
Northern newspapers such as the Chicago Times used it as a
political epithet in accusing southern leaders of reaction
ary tendencies; it was claimed that the southerners had
learned nothing from war and Reconstruction, and yet had
63
forgotten none of the bitterness of those years.
So
^Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South:
1865-1933 (University of California Publications in History.
Vol. LXIV: Berkeley, I960), 3-4.
^ D a i l v Picayune. January 11, 1878.
^°Ibid.. November 4, 1879. See also Francis Butler
Simkins, A History of the South (New York, 1956), 311-25.
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narrowly defined, "Bourbon" would not- apply to most of the
partisans who redeemed Louisiana from Radicalism.
learned from the past.

They had

Especially were some of them avid

students of the newer techniques in vote fraud, bond
swindles, and assorted other forms of peculation, which
Carpetbaggers such as Henry Clay Warmoth had brought to
Louisiana.

As one Democrat wrote, Warmoth taught "our

people as well as his . . . a great many things hitherto not
*
64
found in the books."
But the Pelican State had witnessed
wrongdoing in high places long before Warmoth1s time; his
methods were sometimes audacious and novel, but his purposes
were well understood by those familiar with ante-bellum
65
*
politics.
A northern observer submitted an interesting
hypothesis:

that it was Louisiana which corrupted the

Carpetbaggers, not the reverse.^
The dominant element in the Nicholls administration
had no desire to turn the calendar back to 1860; at least,
they did not wish to do so in an economic sense.

Louisiana’s

redeemers believed the state should seek out and encourage
business development.

Outside capital was eagerly invited.

Agriculture, of course, was not entirely forgotten; it
64Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 4, 1890.
65
See Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana.
121-56; T. Harry Williams, "The Gentleman from Louisiana:
Demagogue or Democrat," Journal of Southern History. XXVI
(February, I960), 3-6.
66

New York Times. February 2, June 25, 1878.
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could join in the new order by adopting more scientific and
67
businesslike methods.
Above all, the old planter-merchant
oligarchy of the ante-bellum period was being revised by new
ideas, new faces, and new money.
Yet if "Bourbonism" be equated to a feudalistic
state of mind, to the proposition that the privileged few of
one race deserve to dominate the incapable many of ell races,
then the home rule Democrats of Louisiana deserved the
appellation.

Business ideas of the post-Reconstruction

South retained overtones of plantation feudalism.

And a re

duction in state expenditures for social services, even
below the ante-bellum level, was justified on the dual
grounds of Louisiana’s poverty and the need for attracting
outside capital with low taxation.

68

Noblesse Oblige was

still considered the best philosophy for an orderly society.
"We must admit," said the official journal of the state
government in 1882, "we are . . .

Bourbon."

69

The upper echelon of the Louisiana Democracy of
1877 embraced the dogmas of neo-Whiggish economics, and in
private life engaged in mercantile or financial pursuits.
67

New Orleans,Democrat. August 26, 1877; St. Joseph
North Louisiana Journal. May 10, 1879. For a good defi
nition oi New South Bourbonism, see International Review. X
(March, 1881), 199.
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Nichols, "Francis T. Nicholls, Bourbon Democrat,"

17-18.
69
1882.

Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. March 7,
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However, the turbulent Reconstruction era was scarcely over
before those capitalists who were not directly engaged in
politics began to realize that business interests would be
compromised whenever political expediency or personal ambition
intervened.

As early as 1878 urban merchants were joining in

the chorus of complaints against the Louisiana Democracy.

70

By 1878, even the President of the New Orleans Cotton Ex
change protested the methods and aims of the men he helped
71
bring to power two years before.
Louisiana businessmen
were beginning to learn, much to their indignation, that
pothing in the state took precedence over the desires of
those who struggled for political power.
Three men were foremost in the ranks of the Demo
cratic party of Louisiana at the end of Reconstruction:
Governor Francis T. Nicholls, Lieutenant-Governor Louis A.
Wiltz, and the behind-the-scenes political manager,'Edward
A. Burke.

All three were Confederate veterans; or, in

Burke's case, claimed to have fought for southern inde
pendence.^
Forty-three years of age when he became governor,
Nicholls had lived quietly as a small slaveholder in
Assumption Parish before the war.
70
71

He attained the rank of

Daily Picayune. October 27-31, 1878.
New York Times. November 19, 1878.

7o
■^Woodward, Origins of the New South. 70.
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brigadier general in the Confederate army and served
bravely, losing an arm and a leg on the battlefields of
Virginia.^

Both Nicholls's political naivete and the vote

appeal of his heroically mangled body commended him to
shrewd Democratic managers.

Even the Republicans shrinked

Mj

from criticizing the man.

Yet the governorship proved to

be a severe disappointment to Nicholls; he soon discovered
that powerful elements within the party were thwarting his
moderate approach to racial and political problems.

"From

the very beginning," Nicholls wrote, "there were men around
me trying to injure me and break down my influence. . . .
Republican politicians shrewdly evaluated the Governor's
position.

Warmoth was moved to comment that "Nicholls is a

good man, but from the country. . . . T h e y are running over
him while they are using him."^*

And Warmoth added that

disreputable Democrats felt obliged to run "men of charac
ter" for office in 1876; but, once in power, these selfseekers had shoved the decent (Nicholls) element aside.
Alcee Fortier (ed.), Louisiana: Comprising
Sketches of Counties. Towns. Events. Institutions, and
Persons. Arranged in Cyclopedic Form (Atlanta. 1909). II,
^ N e w Orleans Republican. July 26, 1876, quoted in
Nichols, "Francis T. Nicholls, Bourbon Democrat," 36.
75

Barnes F. Lathrop (ed.), "An Autobiography of.
Francis T. Nicholls, 1834-1881," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly. XVII (April, 1934), 259.
^Cincinnati Enquirer, quoted in Daily Picayune.
November 22, 1878.
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Wiltz, thirty-four years old, had aspired to the
governorship at the state Democratic convention which nomi77
nated Nicholls.
He was of mixed German and Spanish
ancestry, and had married into a wealthy French family.
Wiltz had served as a captain in the Confederate army; after
the war, he became a banker-politician in New Orleans, and
78
was elected to the MayorTs office in 1872.
Beginning in
1877, Lieutenant-Governor Wiltz helped organize an anti7<j

Nicholls faction in the Democratic party.
able ally in this work was Edward A. Burke.

His most valu80

Burke, unlike Nicholls and Wiltz, was not a native
Louisianian.

Thirty-five years old in 1877, he claimed

Kentucky as his place of birth.

However, rumors of northern

origin were circulated by his enemies; they enjoyed calling
him "the Carpetbag boss."

Friends referred to him as

"Major" Burke, and claimed that he rose to that rank in the
service of the South.

A fawning newspaper article related

77McGinty, Louisiana Redeemed. 34.
78
Fortier (ed.), Louisiana. II, 654.
79
McGinty, Louisiana Redeemed. 126-28.
®^New York Times. November 19, 1879; New Orleans
Democrat. December 13, 1879.
81
New York Times. November 19, 1879. Professor C.
Vann Woodward believes that Burke was of northern origin,
but did become a major in the Confederate army. However,
Woodward, like other researchers, was unable to conclusively
in down Burke's career before he arrived in Louisiana in
870. Cf. Woodward, Reunion and Reaction. 191-93; Origins
of the New South. 70-71.
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that at age twenty-three Burke was chief of the Field Trans
portation Bureau of the Confederacy's Trans-Mississippi
Department, “with the largest property account of any
82
officer in the Confederacy. . . . "
Burke arrived in New
Orleans in 1870.

He worked as a common laborer, until he

obtained a salaried position on the New Orleans, Jackson
and Great Northern Railroad.83

Less publicized was his

business affiliation with Charles T. Howard's Louisiana
State Lottery Company.

84

The Major's activities, by the

mid-1870*s, had spread in all directions; he entered poli
tics, managed the Nicholls campaign against Packard in 1876,
and was a key figure in the negotiations with northern Re 
publicans in 1876-77.

Carpetbaggers envied and admired

Burke; ex-Governor Kellogg smiled when he told the Major
that the Democrats could not get along without him.

85

In

1878 Burke was elected State Treasurer and promised to be
"a safe custodian of the public funds. . . .
extravagance."

86

A foe to

But looking after Louisiana's treasury

required only a portion of this ambitious man's time; in
1879 he became Managing Editor of the New Orleans Democrat.
go

Shreveport Times. quoted in Winnfield Southern
Sentinel. July 23, 1886.
83Ibid.
8i%oodward, Reunion and Reaction. 192.
8^Paily Picayune. November 19, 1879.
88Ibid.. November 1, 1878.
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purchased it a year later, and then consolidated this paper
with another city daily to form the powerful Tlmes-Democrat
87
in 1881.
Probably as early as 1877 Wiltz and Burke saw the
advantages to be gained from joining forces against the
more upright Nicholls element of the party..

Certainly by

the time of the constitutional convention of 1879 a solid
political alliance between the two was concluded:

an

agreement which spelled the doom of the incumbent adminis88
tration.
With Wiltz presiding, the constitutional con
vention cut Nicholls's term short by calling for a new
gubernatorial election, and at the same time lengthened
Burke's term as treasurer to six uninterrupted years.
Nicholls, "the maimed and noble chieftain,

89

went back to

private life with the realization that Burke and Wiltz had
amputated his political career with a skill which exceeded
that of the Confederate surgeons who relieved him of an arm
and leg.
The factional quarrels which beset the Louisiana
Democracy seldom spilled over into national politics; at
®^Richard H, Wiggins, “The Louisiana Press and the
Lottery,“ Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXXI (July, 1948),
781, 785.
88

Daily Picayune. November 14, 1879; New York Times.
November 19, 1879.
89
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Governor Nicholls, auoted in Daily Picayune. November 3.
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least, not to the point of aiding the plans of President
Hayes for a revived Republican party in the state.

Hayes

never presumed that the Louisiana whites would come over
en masse to his remodeled party.

But he did classify the

Pelican State as one of seven ex-Confederate commonwealths
where his "pacification policy" was expected to bear
90
political fruit.
Democratic Congressman Randall L.
Gibson was closely associated with the Presidents plans;
for a time, Gibson had a large voice in selecting men for
key Federal jobs within the state.
received bad news from Louisiana.

91

Soon, however, Hayes

The Presidents political

emissary, James M. Comley, had arrived in New Orleans and
had suddenly reversed his estimate of the Whiggish revival
along the Mississippi.

"The *old Whig1 sentiment I spoke

of," Comley wrote Hayes, "petered out before we reached New
Orleans.

There is nothing here to hang an old Whig party on.

The truth is there does not seem to be anything except the
92
Customs House to hang anything on here. . . . "
Comley
also informed the President that local Republicans were
restless over reports that the administration planned to
shun Carpetbaggers in the distribution of Federal patronage.
^^Rutherford B. Hayes to William D. Bickham, May 3,
1877, quoted in Charles R. Williams (ed.), Diary and Letters
of Rutherford B. Haves (Columbus, 1924), III, 432.
91
John E. Leonard to Rutherford B. Hayes, May 12,
1877, Hayes Papers.
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James M. Comley to Rutherford B. Hayes, May 11,
1877, Hayes Papers.
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The Comley dispatch may have had something to do
with the Presidents decision to use more caution in his
attempts to bulwark Deep South Republicanism.

In addition,

White House mail was being flooded with tales of woe from
those who felt abandoned.

"Mr. President I give you my word

as a Christian woman," wrote Mrs. C. C. Antoine, wife of the
Negro ex-Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana, "some time we
have not a nickel in the house. . . . Mr. President . . . do
93
something for my husband. . .
Members of the returning
board of 1876 were especially clamorous in reminding Hayes
of their past labors in his behalf.

After some delay, Hayes

felt obliged to reward those Louisianians who had helped put
him in office; even Packard was given the lucrative consul94
ship in Liverpool, England.
In line with Hayes’s policy, dignified old Whigs in
Louisiana were soon forced to share Federal appointments
with less well-mannered white and Negro Radicals.

The re

luctance of many distinguished white applicants to proclaim
themselves Republicans irritated the President, just as his
insistence upon the point irritated the former.

Congressman

93
Mrs. C. C. Antoine to Rutherford B. Hayes, August
18, 1878, Hayes Papers. As Lieutenant-Governor from 1873 to
1877, Antoine held the highest office to which any Louisiana
Negro has ever been elected. But after Reconstruction he
slipped into obscurity.
In 1890, a brief report told of
Antoine’s arrest in Fort Worth, Texas, on a charge of public
drunkenness. Fined $5.00, and unable to pay, Antoine was
"sent to the rock pile." Baton Rouae Dailv Advocate* Julv
10, 1890.
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Gibson was "extremely pained" when Hayes angrily told him:
"My policy must not be mistaken.

My determination is to
95
appoint- none but Republicans to office. . . . "
Hayes*s
increasingly stiff attitude was also attributable to the
fact that his New Departure policies in Louisiana and else
where were coming under steady attack by the Stalwart
faction within his own party.

Led by Senators Roscoe

Conkling and William E. Chandler, the Stalwarts opposed
pacification of ex-Confederates because it interfered

with

the "bloody shirt" campaign tactics by which they won
political power in northern states, and because they felt it
96
would accomplish nothing in the South.
The troubles of Hayes in Washington and Nicholls in
Louisiana were analogous in many respects.

Just as »ayes

was opposed by the congressional Stalwarts, so, in Louisi
ana, did "unreconstructed" Democrats complain that Nicholls*s
"reconciliation of the Radicals was the silliest policy . . .
an insult to the intelligence and virtue of those who have .
97
. . so bravely carried on the war against wrong. . . ."
Dissident native whites felt the war against Radicalism was
/

Charles Gayarre to K. R. Rogers, June 12, 1877,
Hayes Papers.
96

De Santis, Republicans Face the Southern Question.

106-115.
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New Orleans Vindicator. June 11, 1878, clipping in
Daniel Warren Brickell Papers (Louisiana State University
Archives). Cited hereafter as Brickell Papers.
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not yet won; when the "compromise" legislature met again in
1878, there were sixty-two Democrats against fifty-two
Republicans in the House of Representatives, and twenty
Democrats against sixteen Republicans in the State Senate.

98

This margin, felt the Democratic extremists, was too slim.
Nor did the rejoicing over Reconstruction's end hide
the strong current of discontent among the articulate white
population of Louisiana.

Only the most naive could believe

that the Democratic party had emerged from Reconstruction
with pure hands, or that the political troubles of the state
were over because Governor Nicholls had been installed in
office.

The day that Federal troops left the vicinity of

the State House one conservative writer felt obliged to throw
a sour note into the festivities:
The era through which we have just passed has left
its impress. . . . There has not been a steal in the
past twelve years in which some of those who proudly
enroll themselves among the "oldest and best" have .
not had their hands.99
The role of the Louisiana State Lottery in Demo
cracy's victory was common knowledge.

Chartered by the

Carpetbagger legislature of 1868, the lottery managers
shrewdly drifted toward the Democratic party as the day of
Radicalism waned,.

The chief spokesman for the lottery,

^**Dailv Picayune. January 7, 1878.
99
New Orleans Times. April 24, 1877, quoted in New
York Times. April 28, 18777
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Charles T, Howard, was a former New Yorker who was not the
sort of man to ignore either politicians or public relations.
In seeking to gain respectability for his gambling concern
he purchased the services of two southern gentlemen of "un
blemished records and pure fame"; ex-Confederate Generals
P. G. T. Beauregard and Jubal A. E a r l y . T h e s e

worthies

supervised all lottery drawings, "really as representatives
of the people*" to see that all was honest.
Reformers within the Democratic party of Louisiana
were dismayed when, during the crisis of 1877, the lottery
contributed a sum of money estimated at from $34,000 to
$250,000 for the purpose of undermining the loyalty of the
102
Republican legislature.
The lottery, so it was said,
103
"purchased Packard's negroes like so many pigs,"
and
thereby placed the real beneficiaries, the Nicholls govern
ment, under a distinct obligation to the company.

It was,

wrote one ashamed Democrat, a marvellous opportunity for the
lottery, and "the buzzard nose and eye of Charlie Howard
104
smelt and saw the prey and seized it."
The lottery soon
^ 0Dailv Picayune. December 11, 1878.
101Ibid.

102
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had its reward.

A bill for repeal of its Carpetbagger

charter was tabled in the legislative session of 1877, and
again in 1878.105
The future of Negro suffrage in the state provided
another area of discord within the Democratic party.

Real

istic whites could not agree with an editor who cheerfully
opined that since Federal meddling had ceased "the negro
question is ended at last. . . .

He is lost in the great

mass of other voters. * . ,"106

^ow coui<j this be?

thirty parishes Negro voters outnumbered whites.

107

In
And

even though the 20,000 majority which colored voters held
in the last year of Reconstruction was cut severely by
Nicholls officials, registration figures in 1878 revealed
that Negroes continued to hold a slight majority in statewide
108
registration.
Thoughtful Democratic politicians viewed
the Negro majority as a danger but also as a tempting
opportunity.

As early as the passage of the first Recon

struction Act of 1867, prominent ex-Confederates in Louisi
ana, such as Duncan F. Kenner and P. G. T. Beauregard,
101=5

John Samuel Ezell, Fortunefs Merry Wheel:
Lottery in America (Cambridge, Mass.; 1960), 246.

The

106pajLiy Picayune. May 1, 1877.
^^Marguerite T. Leach, "The Aftermath of Recon
struction in Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly.
XXXII (July, 1944), 664.
*^®Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 546-47. This report contains a handy compendium of
registration and election figures from 1872 to 1900.
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realized that Negro voters might be put to conservative use.
"If the suffrage of the Negro," Beauregard said in 1867, "is
properly handled and directed, we shall defeat our adver109
saries with their own weapons,"
As Reconstruction ended the influential Daily
Picayune became enthusiastic over the vision of Negroes ac
cepting the advice of white Democratic patricians.

"Shake

off degrading prejudices," Negroes were told, "trust to
honor, and we who bear the grand old name of gentlemen will
show you how great a victory your defeat has been."^*"*

Con

servative editors diligently reported any word about Negroes
who cooperated with local whites, including the macabre ex
ample of bi-racial harmony in the town of Thibodaux, where a
"mixed crowd of negro and white" lynched a colored man sus111
pected of rape.
But events soon proved that the racial harmony and
political forgiveness which Nicholls and his legislature
proclaimed in April of 1877 was not underwritten by many
state and local officials.

Whites were naturally indignant

over the innumerable raids on public funds, the vote
stealing, and other high-handed activities which the alien
109

John Rose Ficklen, History of Reconstruction in
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Baltimore, 191(5), 1&5.
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Carpetbaggers and their Negro allies had engaged.in during
the Reconstruction years.

Once the Democrats took over,

retribution was not long in following.

Apologists for the

acts of vengeance which came in the summer and fall of 1877
explained that promises made to the Hayes commission should
be narrowly defined:

that immunity for "past political
112
conduct" did not include peculation and vote fraud.
Among

those jailed for theft were two members of the Nicholls
("compromise") legislature, Senator David Young of Concordia,
and Representative P.. J. Watson of Madison Parish.

Both were

m
•
11 3
Negroes.

The fact that Nicholls appointed a few well-known
Negro politicians to minor offices hurt him with ardent
Democrats and did little to reassure the majority of Negroes;
they claimed the Governor meant well but was actually power114
less.
A northern observer commented that "a large
portion of the colored people desire to leave the State.
They do not care where they go, but are puzzled to know how
115
to getaway."
The major target of Democrats bent on
vengeance was the unsavory

returning board. On July

5,

1877, the Superior Criminal Court of New Orleans ordered
112Nation. XXV (July 12, 1877), 17.
113
Daily Picayune. July 25, October 28, 1877.
^ ^ N e w York Times,
U W

June 9, 1877.
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the arrest of all four members of the board:

J. Madison

Wells, Thomas C. Anderson, Louis M. Kenner (rumored to be a
116
mulatto nephew of Duncan F. Kennerj, and Gadane Cassanave.
Wells and Anderson were white men.

"We donft care anything

about the two niggers," wrote a New Orleanan,. but the
white men "ought to be in the penitentiary. . . .

We presume
117
Nicholls will pardon Wells and Anderson, of course."
Without question, these arrests were instituted on
the part of anti-Nicholls forces for the purpose of em
barrassing the Governor and capitalizing on the growing dis
content with his pacific attitude.

The day before the re

turning board was arrested an unruly mob in Baton Rouge sup
posedly threw "100 rocks" at Nicholls while he visited the
118
town.
The New Orleans Times professed that the action
against the returning board also meant serious trouble for
President Hayes.

Information produced at the trial might

give Stalwart Republicans enough ammunition to impeach the
119
President.
The accused were released on bail and their trials
delayed until early 1878, a time which, significantly,
coincided with the next meeting of the Louisiana legislature.
HF—

—

——

116

...............

—

" —

i

■■■■ mp ■■■■■■

i in

ii

New Orleans Democrat. July 6 , 1877.

117New York Times. July 17, 1877.
llo

Ibid.. July 13, 1877.
* ^ N e w Orleans Times. July 12, 1877.

■

...■■II - i

■ —

—

37
Meanwhile, more blows fell upon the Hayes vision of a con
servative Republican party in the South*

Hayes had hoped

to overcome a slim Democratic majority in Congress by in
ducing enough New Departure southerners to support James A.
Garfield, a personal friend, for the speakership of the

120
House of Representatives.

Yet when Congress met in

special session in October, all Louisiana and most southern
Democratic members voted against Garfield.
narrowly defeated.

121

He was

Shortly thereafter, the President ex

pressed a "grave doubt" about the feasibility of federal aid
to the Texas and Pacific Railroad, a project much beloved by
New Orleans businessmen.

122

Late in November the United States Senate voted
thirty to twenty-eight to seat William Pitt Kellogg as a
123
member from Louisiana.
Kellogg was sent to Washington
¥

the defunct Packard Legislature.

His rival, old Whig

Henry M. Spofford, wras the choice of the Nicholls government.
The precarious majority which Republicans enjoyed in the
Senate provided the practical reason for seating a Carpet
bagger rather than taking chances with old Whigs; the
120
121

Woodward, Origins of the New South. 42, 46.

Congressional Record. 45 Cong., 1 sess., 797.

122,

Woodward, Reunion and Reaction. 234-35.

123
Congressional Record. 45 Cong., 1 sess., 797.
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Republican Senators, it was said, "drew in Kellogg as a dry
124
sponge draws in dirty water."
The new Senator was an
anathema to Louisiana conservatives, and the decision to
seat him drove another nail in the coffin of the New De^ parture.
The trial of the returning board gave ample proof,
if any be needed* that Louisiana was still hopelessly
imashed in the web of hatred spun during Reconstruction
years.

The fact that anti-Nicholls politicians were mani

pulating these emotions to have their way in the state was
recognized by at least a few observers.

President Hayes was

informed of the situation through the letters of General
Winfield S. Hancock, who arrived in New Orleans in February
to look after the interests of the national government and
125
act as "peacemaker."
Hancock’s messages were sent to
General William T. Sherman, and from there forwarded to the
White House.
Anderson, the first to go on trial, was found guilty
of gross vote fraud in the Vernon parish returns of 1876;
immediately thereafter, Hancock arranged a private meeting
with Governor Nicholls.

After this meeting, Hancock wrote

Sherman:
The Governor will pardon such members of the
Returning Board as may be tried and convicted. He
^ 4Pailv Picayune. December 13, 1877.
125
Winfield S. Hancock to William T. Sherman,
February 14, 1878, copy in Hayes Papers.
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fully recognized that there was a tacit understand
ing that political matters of the past were not to
be revived. [ The reason for delay in pardoning
Anderson ] is the matter of the Constitutional
Convention now before the Legislature. Gov.
Nichols [ sic ] is opposed to that scheme, which
. . . embraces a proposition to legislate the
Governor . . . out of office.126
The Hancock letter shows that Governor Nicholls
understood, as early as February of 1878, what was behind
the move for a new constitution.

But Nicholas enemies were

temporarily thwarted; the Louisiana State Supreme Court re127
leased Anderson on March 18, 1878.
This action took the
burden off Nicholls.

The legislature killed the move for a

convention and charges against Wells, Kenner, and Cassanave
were dropped.
Perhaps the most disturbing element in the imbroglio
was the aging but fierce ex-Governor, J. Madison Wells.

The

old Scalawag planter from Rapides Parish had been scheduled
to appear for trial after Anderson. At the end of the Ander
son trial, Wells dispatched a long and unbelievably vicious
account of Louisiana affairs and personalities to the New
York Times.

Among other things, he said the presiding judge

at the Anderson trial had once embezzled $600,000 and was
“in a beastly state of intoxication" during the trial; that
the prosecuting attorney was a known murderer; and that E.
126Ibid., February 15, 1878.
127
New York Times. March 19, 1878.
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A. Burke was really "A. E. Burk" who had stolen money from
his home town in the Midwest and had subsequently fled to
the South.

Then, as an afterthought, Wells added that

Congressman Gibson*s swarthy complexion was due to Negro
128
ancestors in Adams County, Mississippi.
Governor Nicholls could scarcely be considered as
an agrarian reformer.

His messages indicate an inability or

refusal to understand the needs of the poor of Louisiana of
129
either race.
As Dr. David Brickell so accurately ob
served at the time, Nicholls's "zeal for what is called
*state credit* and the welfare of the money power has blinded
130
him. . . . "
Yet Brickell admitted that Nicholls was an
honest gentleman who represented the best, and not the
worst, of Louisiana*s Democratic leadership.

And those re

formers who were critical of Nicholls soon had more deserving
targets for their attacks.

For the returning board affair of

1878, though it resulted in a Nicholls victory, only delayed
the inevitable.

A year later the "noble chieftaK^n'*, would

have his term cut short and the Burke-Wiltz Democratic
machine could legislate

in the name of home rule and white

supremacy.
128Ibid.. February 19, 1878.
129

Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of
Representatives. 1878. 7-14: Louisiana'. Official Journal of
the House of Representatives. 1879, 7-19.
■^^New Orleans Vindicator. July 20, 1878, clipping
in Brickell Papers.
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Slowly, Louisianians of both farm and city came to
learn that the overthrow of Radicalism did not mean an end
to the evils of the Reconstruction era.

A close study of

registration figures and election returns for the remainder
of the century will indicate that the election of 1876,
whether Republican or Democratic figures be taken, was the
most honest the state would know for at least the next
generation.

In 1876 both sides balanced each other by

stealing votes.

Afterward, this prerogative would be

solely the possession of white conservatives.
Civil war, followed by the social turmoil of Re
construction, impoverished and demoralized Louisiana to a
worse degree, perhaps, than in other southern states.

Even

Creole patricians such as seventy-two year old Charles
Gayarre'/ found themselves asking for political sinecures.

In

1877 Gayarre-mailed President Hayes a copy of his History of
Louisiana along with an embarrassed request for a place at
131
the New Orleans Customs House.
He suggested that the
President read certain pages in the book describing the
difficulty President Jefferson and Governor Claiborne en
countered in filling local offices in the Louisiana terri
tory.

Respectable inhabitants of that earlier day had

Charles Gayarre^to Rutherford B. Hayes, May 15,
1877, Hayes Papers.
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scorned the public payroll.
"Such," Gayarre' concluded, "was [ the Louisianians1]
original and native dignity of character.

If that character

has since been modified, it is due to circumstances which
they have not been able to control, and to influences which
they could not resist."

132

Thus did the aged recorder of

Louisiana*s past apologize for present failings in himself,
his class, and his state.

132 Ibid.

CHAPTER II
LAND AND LABOR IN THE WAKE OF RECONSTRUCTION
The Civil War and Reconstruction disrupted and then
depressed the economy of Louisiana.

In 1860 the state*s

$602,118,568 of property ranked her first in the South and
second in the nation in per capita wealth.
generation of disaster.

Then followed a

The first Federal census after

Reconstruction estimated the factual value of property at
$422,000,000, a plunge to thirty-seventh in wealth among all
1
states and territories.
One fact had not changed.

Louisiana after Recon

struction, as before, was fundamentally rural.

New Orleans,

with 216,090 inhabitants in 1880, was the tenth largest
community in the United States.

But beyond this one urban

center there was no city in Louisiana worthy of the name.
The census listed Shreveport as second in size, with barely
U.S., Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census of the
United States: 1880. Valuation. Taxation and Public In
debtedness. VII, 5, 12. The decrease in wealth was com
pounded by an increase in population, Louisiana had 939,436
inhabitants in 1880; an increase of 31.98 per cent since
1860. Some scholars have made the erroneous assumption that
Negroes, being slaves, were not reckoned into the per capita
wealth estimates for 1860, But they were, as a simple
application of mathematics will show. For an example of
this mistake, see Coulter, The South During Reconstruction.
192-93.
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8,000 inhabitants; four other towns reported more than
2,500 inhabitants.

2

Seventy-four per cent of the popu

lation lived in a rural environment.

Outside New Orleans

and its immediate environs, the percentage for the state
3
stood at an astonishing ninety-seven per cent rural.
The majority of Louisianians, of both races, re
turned to agricultural pursuits at the close of the Civil
War.

Lack of economic opportunities in New Orleans and

other communities discouraged any mass movement from
country to town.

Emancipation had altered the legal status

of plantation labor, but the Negro himself was still
present.

Some freedmen drifted into the towns, but the

great majority remained in the bottomlands; their knowledge
of agriculture, and lack of other skills, was in itself a
form of perpetual bondage.
were similarly immobilized.

Rural whites, for the most part,
Many old planters in the

bottomlands were ruined by exorbitant credit, high Recon
struction taxes, and labor troubles; but with cotton and
sugar selling for twice and over the 1860 prices, the
Ibid., Statistics of Population. I, 196-99. Be
sides the six towns above 2,500 there were only fourteen
other communities which had over 1,000 inhabitants.
3
The distinction between "rural" and "urban'1 used
in this study follows the rule first adopted by the census
bureau in 1910. That is, incorporated towns of over 2,500
population, plus densely settled fringe areas, are classi
fied as urban; all else, rural. U.S., Bureau of the Census,
Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910. Pooulation.
I, £i, 53.
!
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plantation system managed to survive.

4

Ownership might

change but, as much as possible, the old way of life was
retained,.

And thirty cent cotton was a potent lure in the

hill country, too.

Small landowning whites in the northern

and Florida parishes, after 1865, began reducing their
garden crops and came increasingly to pin their hopes for a
5
better life on the soft white fiber.
Necessity also played
a part in the yeoman and poor white shift to cotton.

Im

mediately after the war, many of them lacked even the rude
belongings they had possessed in 1860, and were on the
verge of starvation.

If only to restore their living

standard of ante-bellum days, they needed store credit.

And

merchants would not usually grant advances unless the pro
spective debtor could pledge a money crop.
Despite.high prices and fertile soil, prosperity
seemed to elude Louisiana agriculture.
census of 1880 starkly

Statistics of the

reveal the depths into which the

rural economy had sunk during the previous generation.

The

following figures give some measure of the decline:
4

James E. Boyle, Cotton and the New Orleans Cotton
Exchange: A Century of Commercial Evolution (Garden City.
New Vorkj 1934), 155; J. Carlyle Si tte rso n,Sugar Country:
The Cane Sugar Industry in the South. 1753-1950 (Lexington.
Kentucky; 1953), 171, 303.
5
U.S., Tenth Census, Cotton Production in the
Mississippi Valiev and Southwestern States. V, pt. I, 67;
Walter L. Fleming, **The Reconstruction and Southern Eco
nomic History," The South in the Building of the Nation,
eds. Julian A. C. Chandler and others {Richmond, 1909), VI,
9-10.
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I8606
Rural population:

18807

526,038

688,556

$204,789,662

$58,989,117

17,328

48,292

2,707,108

2,739,972

Cash value,
implements:

$18,646,225

$5,435,525

Ginned Cotton (lbs.):

311,095,200

241,570,275

221,726

171,706

Molasses (gals.):

13,439,772

11,696,248

Indian corn (bu.):

16,853,745

9,889,689

Sweet potatoes (bu.):

2,060,981

1,318,310

Rice (lbs.):

6,311,367

23,118,311

Livestock (except swine):

868,525

787,334

Swine:

634,525

633,489

$24,546,940

$12,345 r905

Cash value, farm land
and buildings:
Number of farms:
Improved acres:

Sugar (1,000 lb hhds.):

Value, all livestock:

Visibly, Louisiana*s agriculture emerged from
U.S., Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census of the
United States;
1860. Agriculture, II, 66-67. The census
of 1860 reported Louisiana*s cotton production at 777,738
bales of 400 pounds; the census of 1880 listed 508,569 bales
of 475 pounds. For the sake of comparison and clarity the
cotton figures in the above table are reduced to pounds.
7
U.S., Tenth Census. Report on the Production of
Agriculture. Ill, 3-9, 118-119. Estimates for the rural
population in 1860 and 1880 are based on the measurement
first used by the census bureau in 1910. Obviously, not all
rural people can be thought of as engaged in agriculture.
Yet, in the period discussed, practically all "rural non
farm" residents, such as merchants, lawyers, etc., had a
direct interest in the economy of their farming neighbors.
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Reconstruction with manifold ills.

Although the rural popu

lation in 1880 showed an increase of thirty-one per cent
since 1860, the production of cotton and sugar, the chief
money crops, actually declined.

Two major subsistence crops,

corn and sweet potatoes, had shrunk to almost half their
former bushel totals.
showed any increase.

Among the cereals only rice and oats
The number of swine remained about

equal to the ante-bellum figure, but all other livestock
had a collective decrease of about ten per cent.

Yet most

alarming of all was the plummet of farm land values.

The

amount of tilled land and permanent pastures (improved
acres) had increased by almost 33,000 acres since 1860; how
ever, the value of farm land and buildings showed a decline
of over seventy per cent.

In 1880 all the improved land in

the state was worth less than the land tilled in just
eighteen sugar parishes before the war.
was down fifty per cent.

Livestock valuation

Again, the decrepit condition of

rural Louisiana can be illustrated by dividing the amount of
.improved acreage into the value of farm implements (ma
chinery and tools) for both periods.

The cash value of

these assets averaged $6.88 per acre in 1860, and had shrunk
to a trifling $1.98 by 1880.
Much of this financial loss could be traced to the
shattered sugar plantations.

Before the Civil War, Louisi

ana produced ninety-five per cent of the total sugar crop of

48
the South.

8

The introduction of expensive steam machinery

in the 1820,s had eliminated most of the small producers;
dominating the region, by the 1840*s, were the great
planters who owned refining mills and possessed scores of
9
slaves.
The less than 1,500 planters who owned their own
mills in 1860 were as much industrialists as they were
agriculturists.^

But the war emancipated the planters'

source of labor, and the expensive machinery was wrecked or
confiscated.
Recovery in the sugar parishes was painfully slow.
At the end of Reconstruction, in 1877, only 127,000 hogs
heads of sugar were produced--less than one-third of the
output of ante-bellum banner y ea r s . ^

Agricultural re

formers, led by Daniel Dennett of the Daily Picayune.
believed that a division of the great estates into small
farms would solve the sugar country's problems.

12

Dennett

did not suggest a confiscation or forced sale of the sugar
lands; rather, he proposed that planters bring in white
labor from northern and western states and set up a system
Q
U.S., Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agri
culture for the Year 1878 (Washington. 1879). 275.
a
Paul Wallace Gates, The Farmer's Age: Agriculture.
1815-1860 (New York, 1960), 127, 284.
10Ibid.. 125-26.
^W i l l i a m C. Stubbs, "Sugar Products in the South,"
The South in the Building of the Nation. V, 193.
^•%>ailv Picayune. April 15, 1877.
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of tenant farming.

The thrifty among these white

tenants,

Dennett assumed, would eventually be able to purchase the
13
tracts of land they worked.
Then, the ex-planters would
14
engage solely in refining.
But most planters thought this
impractical.

Great estates continued to predominate, and as

new refining mills were built the men who owned the mills
also possessed the land upon which a majority of the cane
was grown.

Thus, by the lSSC^s, sugar factories and fields

continued on in much the same way as the ante-bellum period,
with poorly paid Negro gang labor as a substitute for
i
15
slavery.

Land ownership did undergo profound changes in the
sugar country after 1865, but by a process which kept the
plantations intact.

The fabulous profits of pre-war years

lured northerners with capital to invest into buying up the
old estates from impoverished planters.

One ante-bellum

owner who was able to hang on in the new era estimated that
nine-tenths of the sugar estates changed hands in the period
from 1865 to 1 8 7 7 . ^

Some of the new owners bought land

for purely speculative reasons; over thirty per cent of the
13Ibid.. March 18, 1877.
14Ibid.. October 21, 1877.
15
Sitterson* Sugar Country, p. 240, 261-62.
^ L e t t e r from "Rusticus" in Daily Picayune.
September 23, 1877.

50
former cane fields remained fallow and weed-choked through
out Reconstruction.

At least half the new proprietors were
T7
northern men, or men supported by northern banks.
Promi
nent among them were Republican politicians.

Ex-Governors

Henry Clay Warmoth and William Pitt Kellogg used their illgotten fortunes to become members of the sugar aristocracy.
Warmoth was particularly successful in achieving a status
18
of respectability among his neighbors.
Influential Demo
crats, whose conservative ideas on economic questions
harmonized with Warmoth's beliefs, wished him luck "in
19
everything--except his infernal politics."
In 1880 only eleven parishes returned sugar as
their leading crop in acreage--Plaquemines and St. Bernard
in the First Congressional District; Jefferson, St. Charles,
St. James, and St. John the Baptist in the Second; Ascension,
St. Martin, St. Mary, and Terrebonne in the Third; and West
Baton Rouge in the Sixth District.

These eleven parishes

produced seventy-four per cent of the state's total sugar
output.

20

All eleven had Negro majorities.

Sugar was also

the chief money crop (though not the leader in actual
17
18

Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 249.

James E. Richardson to J. M. Currie, August 1,
1882, Chandler Papers.
19
Daily. Picayune. November 24, 1879.
20
U.S., Tenth Census. V, 3-5.
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acreage) in four parishes of the Third Congressional
District:

Assumption, Iberia, Iberville, and Lafourche,,

Two of these, Assumption and Lafourche, had more white
inhabitants than Negroes.

Nowhere, however, could many

whites be found at work on the great plantations as
laborers or tenants.

As before the war, the majority of

whites in rural South Louisiana tilled their small acres,
tended livestock, or engaged in fishing and trapping.

Some

raised sugar cane on little plots and sold the stalks to the

21

planter-refiners.

King cotton, rather than sugar, retained first place
among the money crops of the state.

Cotton acreage in 1880

quadrupled the amount of land planted in cane.

22

In twenty-

nine parishes, half the districts of the state, cotton ex
ceeded any other crop in the number of acres planted.

In

addition, cotton led as .a money crop in six other parishes
where corn ranked first in the amount of tilled land.
The Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts, situ
ated north of the thirty-first degree of latitude, produced
23
78.5 per cent of the entire cotton crop of the state.
Every parish of Northeast Louisiana (the Fifth District)
returned cotton first among all crops in acreage.
21

Daily Picayune. June 11, 1879.

22u.s.

Tenth Census. V, 3-5.

23Ibid.. 33.

Tensas
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parish, in that region, led the state in production with
41,859 bales in 1879.

Concordia listed an astounding 91.8

per cent of her tilled land under cotton; East Carroll
topped every parish, and every county, in the South in
productivity: 451 lint pounds raised for each acre in
24
cotton.
In the land of Northwest Louisiana (the Fourth
District), cotton was listed first in acreage in seven of
the twelve parishes.

There, cotton production exceeded

10,000 bales in Bossier, Caddo, DeSoto, Natchitoches,
Rapides, and Red River Parishes.
Yet cotton was not entirely confined to North Louisi
ana.

Cotton also ranked first in tilled acreage in the

Sixth Congressional District, which sprawled westward from
the Florida parishes, across the Mississippi River, and into
the prairies of St. Landry Parish.

With the exception of

Avoyelles, all of the parishes of the Sixth lay below the
thirty-first parallel of latitude.

Avoyelles, East Felici

ana, Pointe Coupee, St. Landry, and West Feliciana raised
over 10,000 bales per year.

Other parishes in the Sixth

District raised considerably less.

Farther to the South,

cotton fields appeared at intervals in the Third Congress
ional District.

Tiny Lafayette Parish led this region with

3,489 bales; only two others, Iberia and St. Martin,
produced over 1,000 bales for the crop reported in the 1880
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census.

Overall, the geographic predominance of cotton

may be noted by the fact that only seven parishes in the
state reported no bales, whereas in twenty-five parishes
absolutely no sugar was refined.25

However, in nearly

every parish a number of farmers planted cane for home use
i
26
as molasses.

In one respect cotton was akin to sugar.

It, too,

was most at home in the alluvial soils along the rivers.
Parishes which bordered the great rivers of the state con
tinued, after the war, to lead in the number of bales pro
duced.

The tier of six parishes adjoining the Mississippi

River from the Arkansas border south to Baton Rouge contributed one-third of all Louisiana1s cotton.

27

These same

six parishes, in 1860, boasted some of the wealthiest and
most extensive landholdings in the South.

A generation

later, the plantations remained; but these plantations had
become patchworks of tenant farms where Negro occupants
rented or worked on "shares" for the few white landowners.
In these six parishes, in 1880, lived 12,247 whites and
25Ibid., 3-5.
Monroe Observer, quoted in Daily Picayune,
October 29, 1877.
27
'East Carroll, Madison, Tensas, Concordia, Pointe
Coupee, and West Feliciana parishes.
These six grew
167,265 of the 508,569 bales raised in the state in 1879.
U.S., Tenth Census. Ill, 118-19.
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77,116 Negroes.28
But the alluvial belt was not confined to the
parishes along the Mississippi.

Cotton culture was also

predominant along the fertile banks of the Red, Black, and
Ouachita Rivers--tributaries of the great stream.

However,

these bottoms were more narrow than the delta of the Missis
sippi.

A few miles away, oak uplands or unfertile piney

woods assumed command of the countryside.

The hilly oak

regions, covering most of ten parishes in the northwest and
northcentral portions of the state, included many varieties
of soils.

Some portions of the oak uplands ranked second
OQ
only to the alluvial bottoms in fertility.
Less esteemed were the longleaf pine hills and the
pine flatlands which prevailed in the poverty-stricken
parishes of Catahoula, Calcasieu, Grant, Vernon and Winn in
North and West Louisiana; and in Livingston, St. Tammany,
Tangipahoa, and Washington Parishes of the Southeast.

Along

with these parishes, for the purposes of this study, should
be included the coastal lands of Cameron and Vermilion.
From the standpoint of economies and politics, these latter
were similar to the piney woods areas.

The eleven parishes

listed above; nine of them pine and two of them marsh
parishes, may be considered as the "backland" of post
28Ibid.. V, 3-5.
29

Ibid.. 30.
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Reconstruction Louisiana.

In almost every respect this

immense backland represented an antithesis to the alluvial,
plantation districts along the Mississippi and its
tributaries.

But in all eleven backland parishes, after the

war, numerous small farmers attempted to emulate the
alluvial planters in the production of cotton as a money
crop.

Despite infertile soil, all ten, by 1880, listed

cotton as the chief money crop.

Only in Grant and Tangi

pahoa, however, did cotton exceed corn in total acreage.
These pine and marsh parishes had an overwhelming pro
portion of whites:

55,009 to 23,025 Negroes in 1880.3^

The backland region, making up over thirty per cent
of the total land area of the state, was also the most
thinly populated and the most meagerly tilled.

Some insight

into the poverty of the backlands can be gained by a com
parison of the value of farm and produce (sold, consumed,
or on hand) with the same values in certain alluvial cotton
parishes.

Four examples will suffice:

30Ibid., 3-5.
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-

White
PoDulation

Value of
Products z
$

60,601
1,268,136

Value of
Land33

Cameron
East Carroll

2,087
1,023

St. Tammany
Tensas

4,258
1,571

33,028
1,620,638

85,292
2,899,533

Vernon
Madison

4,783
1,261

150,969
853,635

153,602
1,834,295

Winn
Concordia

4,797
1,320

240,803
1,262,772

241,836
980,743

$

193,299
1,299,209

Although many parishes fit neatly into blanket
classifications as "alluvial," "oak upland," "piney woods,"
or "coastal marsh" regions, others defy such a simply de
scription.

For example, huge St. Landry Parish held practiQ

cally every soil type known to the state.

Jk

Catahoula,

Natchitoches, Ouachita, and Rapides offered other instances
of a great diversity of soil and terrain inside parish
borders.

Along the western edge of the Florida Parishes the

Mississippi River bluffs gave much the same appearance as the
oak uplands of North Louisiana; yet the original fertility
of the bluffs and certain historical and geographic factors
31Ibid.
32Ibid.
33Ibid. The above figures exclude Negroes, who
constituted the great majority in the alluvial parishes.
However, almost all land, and most of the farm products,
belonged to white planters in the alluvial parishes (Concoraia, East Carroll, Madison, and Tensas) listed.
3«St. Landry, in this period, included not only its
present borders but also the later-created parishes of AGadia
X1886) and Evangeline (1910),
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had prompted the growth of plantations and so gave the bluff
region the same kind of population and economy as the black
bottomlands.
ization.

Louisiana never did yield easily to general

But, in this regard, it should be noted that

parishes which contained marked variations in topography and
soil, such as Natchitoches and St. Landry, traditionally had
the most serious political difficulties of any in the state.
And racial conflict was not usually 'the issue.

It was a

well known fact of Louisiana politics that the hil] and
35
bottomland whites "do not get along harmoniously."
Especially was this true when abrupt changes in terrain threw
them in juxtaposition.
As previously stated, the poorer class of whites
came increasingly to participate in the raising of cotton
after the Civil War.

More was involved than the need for

credit and the temporarily high prices commanded by cotton.
The abysmal decline of land values everywhere in the South
encouraged those who possessed even a few dollars to expand
36
the size of their small farms.
Many hoped to purchase
Trinity Herald. July 6 , 1889.
36

The collapse of land values in Louisiana between
1860 and 1870 was more severe than in any other southern
state: a decline of sixty-seven per cent in one decade.
Fred A. Shannon, The F a r m e r ^ Last Frontier: Agriculture.
1860-1897. Vol. V. of The Economic History of the United
States, ed. Henry David and Others tNew York, 1945), 80.
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portions of old bottomland plantations.

37

But, as was

usually the case in the backlands, men without cash for new
land saw no way to obtain the necessary funds except by
first raising cotton for sale on their infertile hill acres.
No other crop offered quick returns.

It was the "only

product upon which the farmer can depend for money."

38

Louisiana*s Commissioner of Immigration expressed his
astonishment in 1867, at the great number of poor white
farmers who had undertaken cotton growing.

"In every part

of the state," he wrote, "as soon as you leave the great
plantations . . .

we find not only white men, but boys and

girls laboring all hours in the fields."

39

Cotton production in the hills was also stimu
lated by the relative decline of production in the bottom
lands.

Before the war the vast output of bales from the

^ T h e r e is no universally accepted distinction be- .
tween a "farm" and a "plantation.” Agriculturists during
the nineteenth century often used the terms interchangeably.
Perhaps the best distinction for Louisiana is the one used
by Roger Shugg. He broadly classified tilled holdings of
less than 100 acres as "farms," and over 100 acres, as
"plantations." Yet Shugg perceived that local variables
would result in numerous exceptions. He concluded that the
variants could be found in holdings between 50 and 500 acres.
Anything less than the minimum figure, regarless of fertil
ity, would almost always be a "farm" in which the owner and
his family worked the soil; any holding over 500 acres, when
tilled, would necessitate hired labor or tenants and would
thus be a "plantation." Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in
Louisiana. 7, 239.
^®U.S., Tenth Census. V, 67.
Watkins, Kino Cotton: A Historical and
Statistical Review. 1790 to 1908 INew York, 1908), 2(1)2.
J a m e s
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plantations had kept the price of the staple too low for
poor whites and yeoman farmers to engage in serious compe
tition.

But after the war the plantation system groaned

under innumerable handicaps.

Military destruction, in

efficient labor, and a host of other factors joined to keep
plantation production somewhat below the 1860 level.

As

late as 1880, cotton shipments from such ante-bellum leaders
as Concordia and Madison Parishes were only fifty-one per
40
cent of the 1860 total.
Though surviving, the plantations
seemed crippled.

It appeared that small farmers, for once,

might be able to produce cotton and make a profit.
Slowly, the poor and yeoman whites came to realize
how unfounded had been their hopes.
with themselves.

Some of the blame lay

Those who deliberately neglected their food

crops and livestock for the sake of cotton lost whatever eco
nomic independence they might have once enjoyed.

Overpro

duction of cotton was serious enough in the ante-bellum
South; after the war, small producers compounded the
41
problem.
For the great plantations were reviving, and
cotton production, during the 1870*s, began to climb back
toward pre-war totals.
40

A steady drop in cotton prices was

U.S., Eighth Census. II, 66-67; U.S«, Tenth Census.

V, 3-5.
41

Matthew Brown Hammond, "Cotton Production in the
South," The South in the Building of the Nation. VI, 88, 96.
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inevitable.
All too frequently, the small farmer made his situ
ation worse by carrying over into commercial farming the
same sloppy, haphazard mettfeods of earlier and less ambitious
days.

From his column in the Daily Picayune. Daniel Dennett

lashed out at the "ignorant, rough, unattractive farming" so
prevalent in the backlands.

He was most distressed by the

brutal effects such a life imposed upon the farm children.
He wrote of the life of a typical Louisiana farm boy:
He works
horse, a
to read,
grows up
teacher,
house.

all day in the field . . . with a half fed
dull plow. . . . Often there are no books
no newspapers, and no schools, and the boy
in ignorance, his ignorant father his only
and a poor old worn out farm his only school

Worse than the careless and slovenly farmers were
those who became too engrossed in the pursuit of cotton
profits, and attempted "to get rich too fast."

43

The

Farmerville Home Advocate described a man of this type in
Union Parish, who, "possessed with the insane idea that he
must ’own all the land that joins him,* makes slaves of
44
himself and family."
Men of such nature showed concern
45
for their horses but worked their wives to death.
Other
4^Pailv Picayune. May 2, 1877.
43
Ibid.. December 23, 1877.
44
Farmerville Home Advocate. May 22, 1885.

45ibid.
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small landowners, aping the planters, tried to live in
leisure by hiring one or two Negro families and expecting
from them prodigious feats of labor.
farmer admitted:

A Richland Parish

"Too many of us bait our hooks with a

digger* and set it [sic ]out and expect to catch a crop."4^
When results proved disappointing the upland employers
tended to blame the Negro.
attitude.

But not all farmers took this

One, in Grant Parish, felt that it was mis

treatment, not congenital laziness, which caused Negro in
efficiency.

"Treat them as human beings," he pleaded.

"Why

should they not have justice and fair dealing?"47
Although the shortcomings of Louisiana farmers were
doubtless numerous, it is, nevertheless, unlikely that
general prosperity would have ensued if all had been models
of husbandry.

Misery, like rainfall, fell upon the hard

working and honest as well as the lazy or avaricious.

Un

friendly forces, mostly beyond the farmer’s control, worked
relentlessly against the rural producers of both races.

The

advantages of cheap land and high farm prices during Recon
struction were somewhat illusory, and were offset by hostile
legislation, economic depression, transportation difficul
ties, and lack of credit facilities.

Then, after 1877,

^Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings
of Third Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1889), 8-9.
47Letter from "Old Hoss," published in Colfax
Chronicle. May 1, 1886.
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whatever advantages that had once existed were largely gone,
and only the malign aspects of postwar agriculture remained.
White and Negro farmers alike faced these burdens.
able to meet the test was the rural Negro.

Least

He bore all the

common ills, along with the added incubus of his race and
background of slavery.
Thirty cent cotton in the early days of Reconstruct
ion was as much a boon to Federal tax collectors as to
Louisiana's farmers.

The special levy which Congress placed

on cotton at the end of the war wrung $9,642,535 from the
48
state's producers.
This figure might be compared with the
information that as late as 1889 the total amount of bank
49
capital in the state was only $5,815,000.
The effect of
this tax upon a region trying to pull out of the quagmire
of military defeat was "disastrous and disheartening to the
extreme," remarked the Secretary of Agriculture of the United
50
States.
Wretched and costly transportation facilities
further undermined the margin of profit.

And, by the late

1870's, cotton prices had fallen below the figure commanded
51
in 1860.
Yet Louisiana's cotton crop was still twenty-two
48

Watkins, King Cotton. 201-202.

49

Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking History of Louisi
ana (Baton Rouge, 1935), 128-29.
^Simkins, A History of the South. 251.
51

Charles William Burkett and Clarence Hamilton Poe,
Cotton:
Its Cultivation. Marketing. Manufacturea and the
Problems of the Cotton World (New York. 1906). 23-25.
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per cent under pre-war production.

The future held bigger

crops and lower prices.
In certain regions of the South a shift in popu
lation took place early in Reconstruction, as thousands of
poor whites came down from the hills to purchase, or to
52
work, the war-shattered plantations.
However, little
such migration occurred in Louisiana.

Often the im

poverished planters were too proud to sell.

They still

associated the ownership of alluvial soil with wealth and
53

social position.

And whenever plantations did change

hands the result was usually the same as in the sugar
country; that is, the land was sold as a unit and the new
owners adopted the manner and outlook of their predecessors.
Some planters who were willing to break up their land for
sale advertised in vain.

Even at the end of Reconstruction

cotton plantations, whole or in fragments, practically went
54
begging, and the demand for sugar land was "very limited."
Hill families who wanted to possess farms in the bottoms
simply did not have the necessary cash.

Even so, planters

welcomed impecunious whites to the bottomlands.

They were

desired as laborers or tenants, to replace the "trifling
52

John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt; A History of
the Farmers1 Alliance and the People^s Party (Minneapolis.
1931J, 38-39.
'
53 ,
Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 261.
54
Daily Picayune. April 5, 1877.
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negroes, who go reluctantly through the forms of scratching
55
the earth for a living. . . . "
The planters of Louisiana
might wish for white labor, but they got little.

Especi

ally in North Louisiana was white labor unenthusiastic
about proposals to migrate to the lowlands.
perplexed some planters.

This refusal

"It cannot be," said a spokesman

for the landowners of Tensas Parish, "that these people will
remain on those barren hillsides when in sight of them lie
56
unlimited quantities
Nevertheless, few of
!S of rich land,"
57
the hill folk came.
Land in Louisiana was plentiful.

Only 8.60 per

cent of the state's 30,000,000 acres was tilled at the end
58
of Reconstruction.
Observers believed that at least
59
16,000,000 acres were quite suitable for cultivating.
Such
optimism, however, left many questions unanswered.

There

was not only the problem of fertility and capability of the
soil.

There was the question of how much money settlers

would need for implements and other necessities before the
vacant land could be broken for cultivation*

Accessibility

to markets was another serious factor; lack of
55Ibid.. May 1, 1877.
56
St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. October 30,
1880.
57
Ibid., Franklin St. Mary Banner. March 8 , 1890.
58
U.S., Tenth Census. Ill, 3.
59

Daily Picayune. March 22, 1877.

transportation facilities could make even the most fertile
land unprofitable to farm.
In 1866 Congress was told that 6,228,103 acres of
60
surveyed but unsold federal land existed in Louisiana,
The Southern Homestead Act, passed that same year, was sup
posedly designed to give this land "to all the poor people"
61
of both races.
Any citizen who was head of a family
could apply for eighty acres (later raised to 160) of
public land.

The homestead was to be free of all charges

except nominal service fees.

After improving the land and

residing on it for five years, the settler would receive
f\0

his final deed.
Homestead offices in Louisiana were located at New
63
Orleans and Monroe.
The federal lands were scattered
throughout the state.

Most of the available acres, however,

were located in the "pine flatlands" of Calcasieu, St.
Landry, Livingston, St. Tammany, and Tangipahoa Parishes,^
By 1880 alleged homesteaders had applied for 958,627 of
these acres.

Yet just a fraction over 200,000 acres had

^ Congressional Globe. 39 Cong., 1 sess., 715.
^ Ibid.. 717. Negroes and loyal whites were given
first choice. Confererate veterans could apply after one
year.
62Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public
Domain^. 1776-1938 (Princeton, New Jersey; 1942), 212-14.
63
Daily Picayune. May 4, 1877.
64
Ibid.
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65
received final proof of ownership.

Unfortunately, most

of the original applicants never intended to farm, and had
never so much as lived on the land.

Northern lumber

companies had induced their employees to take advantage of
the southern homestead privilege; a miserable shanty would
be set up as proof of "improvement," the land then stripped

66
of timber, and abandoned to the weeds.
of this sort dotted the state.

Vacant homesteads

Worse yet, bona fide farmers

who desired these denuded acres could not apply for a grant
because of the difficulty of proving that the first home
stead was fraudulent, or that it had actually been
67
abandoned.
Some lumber firms did not even bother to take
out dummy homesteads but boldly cut timber wherever they
found it.

When the Department of the Interior tried to

crack down on timber thieves in Southwest Louisiana in 1877,
Congressman Joseph H. Acklen of the Third District zealously
defended the prosecuted "Calcasieu sufferers."

68

The monopolization of Louisiana land by lumber and
65

St. George Leakin Sioussat, "State and Federal
Lands and Land Laws in the South," The South in the Building
of the Nation. VI, 28.

66

New York Times. October 3, 1878; May 30, 1879.

67

Ibid. Abuses of the Homestead Act in Louisiana
were similar in character and degree to practices in other
public land states. See Shannon, The Farmerfs Last Fron
tier. 51-75.
68Ibid.. October 3, 1878.

67
other nonfarming interests accelerated in the years after
1876, when Congress opened public acreage in the South to
cash buyers as well as homesteaders.
tragic.

The outcome was

Between 1880 and 1888 the great majority of Louisi

ana land sold went to fifty individuals or firms who pur69
chased over 5,000 acres each.
Of these fifty, forty-one
were northerners who obtained a total of 1,370,332 acres.
Six were Louisiana natives.

These latter purchased

99,278 acres.70
Meanwhile, the state of Louisiana owned vast lands
which remained almost untouched.

Ten years before -the Civil

War, Congress gave the state possession of all swamplands or
coastal marshes previously unsold, most of it inaccessable
or covered with water.

In 1888, over 5,000,000 of these
71
acres were still in the hands of the state land office.
Without doubt the greatest deterrent to homestead
ing, on federal or state lands, was that prospective,
settlers lacked initial capital.
Negroes unable to homestead.

Particularly were the

A claim itself was of no value

unless the settler could purchase tools, fencing, plow
animals, and other essentials.
69

In St. Landry Parish, to

Paul Wallace Gates, "Federal Land Policy in the
South, 1866-1888,* Journal of Southern History. VI (August,
1940), 318-20.
70
Compiled from figures in ibid.
71
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. April 15,
1888.

68

cite a typical example, a settler in 1381 would have to
spend an estimated $655 before the first crop was raised.
This figure included fencing for only ten acres.

72

But it was

a rare sharecropper or cane field worker who cleared, after
73
necessary expenses, as much as $20 per year.
A family-especially a Negro family--which cleared that much was con
sidered quite fortunate.

In theory, then, even a fortunate

family of sharecroppers would have to scrimp for thirtythree years before accumulating the wherewithal to set up
homesteading.

Most tenants and laborers would require a

period of double to triple their average life expectancy.
In North and Central Louisiana the problems of
homesteading were entangled with the notorious "Backbone
Railroad" land grant.

Congress, in 1871, authorized the New

Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Vicksburg Railway Company to build
a line diagonally across the state from New .Orleans, through
74
Shreveport, to Marshall, Texas.
The company was to
receive ten sections of land for each mile of track it laid:
a princely domain of over 2,000,000 acres.

The railroad

could select this land from a swath of territory eighty
'72
npailv Picayune. April 2, 1881.
73

Estimated from figures in the following:
U.S.,
Tenth Census. V, 83-84; Daily Picayune. April 27, 1877;
Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. May 28. 1886.
74
Congressional Globe. 41 Cong., 3 sess., 392-93.
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miles wide, though it could not disturb any prior, legal
landholdings.

Managers of the Backbone Railroad were given
75
five years, until 1876, to complete the line.
One dis
gusted commentator observed that Congress evidently assumed
"this railroad company had been since 1803 a joint owner
...

of the lands of Louisiana5?*^

The Backbone project,

like other iGaxpetbagger-inspired schemes, issued copious
stocks and bonds but laid not one foot of track.
77
grant was thereby forfeited in 1876.

Its land

Settlers, assuming the Backbone claim was beyond
78
hope of resurrection-, began moving into the territory.
They were mistaken.

In 1881 officials of the defunct

company sold all their "rights" to the New Orleans PacificTexas Pacific combine of Jay Gould, Russell Sage, and
79
80
others.
The price paid was exactly one dollar.
At the
time of the transfer the New Orleans Pacific was actually
constructing a road from New Orleans to Shreveport; it
75
76

Ibid.
Opelousas St. Landry Clarion. November 8 , 1890.

^ North American Review. CXXXVI (March, 1883), 253.
78
Colfax Chronicle. January 27, 1883.
79
Henry V. Poor. Manual of the Railroads of the
United States for 1881 (New Vork, 1881), i82-85.
80
Lewis Henry H a n e v . A Congressional History of
Railways in the United States: 1850-1887 (University of
Wisconsin. Bulletin No. 342. Tsconomics and Political Science
Series. Vol. VI, No. 1: Madison, 1910}, 132.
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would eventually join the Texas Pacific and link Louisiana
to San Francisco.

The Gould-Sage combine made progress

along another line as well; the entire Louisiana dele
gations in Congress between 1877 and 1881 signed pledges
"to maintain the integrity of the grant and secure it for
r
81
the I. New Orleans Pacific] company."
But the national
government refused to act for several years, holding the
old Backbone grant "in reservation."

82

Suddenly, in 1885,

the Secretary of the Interior approved patents for almost
1,000,000 acres of the controversial grant to the Gould83
Sage group.
The whole thing was "a fraud of the first
84
magnitude,"
and the hill farmers were furious.
The census of 1880 gave a distorted picture of land
ownership in Louisiana.

According to agents' reports, the

state contained 48,293 farms.

Of these, 31,286 were listed

as cultivated by owners, 10,337 were farmed on shares, and
85
6,669 were leased for a fixed money rental.
These
figures would indicate that 35.22 per cent of the agri
cultural families were sharecroppers and renters, and that
81

Letter from Newton C. Blanchard, published in
Colfax Chronicle. February 17, 1883.
82North_ American Review. CXXXVI (March, 1883), 253.
83
Winfield Southern Sentinel. March 27, June 5, 1885.
84
Colfax Chronicle. January 27, 1883.
85 U.S., Tenth Census. Ill, 28-29.
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the average size of farms in the state was 157 acres.
Seemingly, the plantation system was on its way to fragmen
tation and oblivion.

The 1860 census, showing almost the

same amount of land under cultivation, gave only 17,328
land units with an average size of 537 acres.

86

However,

the 1880 report was conducted on an unreliable and mis
leading basis.

Agents were instructed to enter each share-

cropping section as a separate farm.

Omitted was infor

mation as to who owned these section-farms.

As Roger

Shugg*s valuable study pointed out, the disconnected tracts
87
owned by a single planter were not registered as a unit.
Shugg carefully examined local tax lists in nine repre
sentative parishes.

He found, by grouping separate tenant

plots according to actual ownership, that in those parishes
nearly a threefold increase {290.1 per cent) in the number
of plantations had taken place since 1860, while the number
88
- of independent small farms declined 17.2 per cent.
But
Shugg failed to mention another serious flaw in the 1880
census.

Many large plantations, including some of over

1,000 acres, were listed as "cultivated by the owner."

89

86U.S., Eighth Census. II, 66-67.
87

Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana.

235-36.
OQ

Ibid., 240-41.
89U.S., Tenth Census. Ill, 28-29.
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This is a patent impossibility.

90

Plantations of such size

must have contained a number of Negro tenants not mentioned
by the census enumerators.

Four bales of cotton on eight

acres of land was frequently the limit that a tenant family
91
was able, or willing, to produce.
Freedmen in the cotton parishes were emancipated
from slavery only to fall into the peonage of tenant
farming.
"Very few" Louisiana Negroes owned the land they
92
tilled.
Reports from the alluvial belt and the more
fertile upland regions indicate that only two to five per
cent of the Negro farm families possessed land.

Negro

proprietors were most numerous in the least productive
regions; almost half the freedmen of St. Landry, Tangipahoa
93
and Winn parishes held their farms in fee simple ownership.
These three parishes were the only exceptions in a bleak
picture.

Louisiana appeared to fall somewhat below the

general estimate for the South that five per cent of the
Negro farm families, at the end of Reconstruction, were
90

Thomas P. Gill, writing in 1886, pointed to this
distortion.
In Gill's words:
"Can the owner of a farm of
1,000 acres and over* . . . b e called a working cultivator?"
North American Review. CXLII (January, 1886), 56.
91
U.S., Tenth Census. V, 84.
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Ibid.
three parishes.

Negroes were in a minority in each of the

73
landowners.^4
The tenant system that emerged after the war was a
crude but practical method of reviving production with
newly-freed Negro labor.
of tenants:

In theory there were two types

the sharecroppers, who received a portion of

the crop for their labor, and the tenant renters, who paid
a fixed money fee to the landowner.^

This distinction

might be important in some states, but apparently was not
in Louisiana.

Those who "paid" rent did so in the form of

a stipulated amount of cotton per acre rather than with
actual cash.

97

Though most renters owned their implements

and plow-animals, they differed from the sharecroppers in
no other important respect.

The sharecroppers, who had no

fixed rental, gave from one-half to two-thirds of their crop
to the landlord in compensation for land, cabins, teams, and
QA
7^Hammond, The South in the Building of the Nation.
VI, 90. The percentage of total acreage owned by Negroes
was probably lower yet. In 1882 a Negro State Senator said
his race owned less than one per cent of Louisiana1s land.
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. March 28, 1882.
95
Oscar Zeichner, "The Transition from Slave to Free
Agricultural Labor in the Southern States," Agricultural
History. XIII (January, 1939), 30.
96
97

Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 21.

New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. April 5, 1879; New
York Times, December 7. 1879: U.S.. Tenth Census■ V, 84.
Usually the rental charge was a specified amount of cotton
(e.g., ninety pounds for each acre rented).
In 1879 Madison
Parish planters reportedly charged renters $8.00 per bale for
ginning the cotton. Together with the rent, this meant the
Negroes were being charged $17.00 per acre for land which
had a market value not in excess of $25.00,

74
implements provided.

In some cases, where the landlord

made prior arrangement to furnish food and other necessities,
sharecroppers got as little as one-tenth of the crop.

98

But

renters, if the crop was poor, might have nothing.
It is hazardous to generalize about the tenant
systems.
ties.

Individual circumstances made for infinite varie

However, this much can be stated:

by 1880 only two

of the thirty and more cotton parishes used the wage system
go
in preference to shares and rentals.77 Also, the overwhelm
ing majority of cotton land tenants were Negroes.

In no

more than five parishes did whites outnumber Negroes as non
landowning farmers.

These five were Catahoula, Sabine, St.

Tammany, Vernon, and W i n n . * ^

Overall, in Louisiana, most

white agriculturists possessed the land they worked.
Negroes did not.

Most

A few colored sharecroppers managed to

become landowners, but the process was painfully slow.

As

late as 1928, Negro historian W. E. B. DuBois estimated his
race owned approximately 10,000 of the 135,463 farms of
Louisiana.
^^Zeichner, Agricultural History. XIII, 32.
98rhe wage system, as far as can be assessed from
conflicting reports, predominated only in Catahoula and St.
Tammany, among the cotton parishes* U.S., Tenth Census. V,
83.
100Ibid.
*0*Crisis, XXXV (September, 1928), 296, quoted in
Paul Lewinson, Race. Class and Party; A History of Nearo
Suffrage and White Politics in the South (New York. 1932).
2l5l
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In the late nineteenth century, the economic chasm
between Negro tenant and small white landowner appeared to
be closing.

But it was the white man*s fall that narrowed

the gap, not the Negro*s rise.

The chief equalizing element

was the crop-lien system, an incubus which pressed down
upon both races with impartial severity.

A crop-lien was

simply a merchant*s mortgage upon growing cotton--a legal
guarantee that store credit extended for food, clothing, and
other necessities furnished during the year would be paid
for by a proportionate value in cotton when the crop was
ready for shipment.

The crop-lien is usually associated

with the postwar era but in fact was much older.

Early in

the 1800*s New Orleans commission merchants and factors were
already sending cash advances and supplies to the cotton and
sugar planters.

This credit gratified the material wants of

the planters and facilitated the cultivation, gathering, and
shipping of their crops.

In 1843 the city merchants ob

tained legislation permitting them a prior line, or "first
privileges" on the crop.

This act protected merchants

against the misfortunes or bad faith of the planters.

l @n

After 1865, over the South, the crop-lien took on
new life, a shift in emphasis, and a broader base.

Funda

mental conditions in the post-war economy caused it to ex
pand.

First, the shortage of money and food made almost all
^ ^Dailv Picayune. October 9, 1877.
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rural people dependent upon store accounts until harvest
time.

Second, since rank-and-file white farmers as well as

Negroes grew the staple, the number of these credit accounts
throughout the state multiplied.

This fragmentation of the

lien system also shifted its retail aspect away from New
Orleans; country stores in the hills and bottomlands took
103
on a new importance.
Some of the larger planters, such
as the Bosley family of Red River Parish, continued to deal
104
directly with New Orleans factors.
These "factors and
commission merchants" who dealt with planters performed for
them essentially the same services that wholesale merchants
did for the country storekeepers.

And planters like the

Bosleys, who distributed food supplies to their tenants,
were acting the part of the rural storekeeper.

On the

other hand, country storekeepers in the crossroads villages
had two broad classes of credit customers.

First there were

the little proprietors who worked their own land and were
thus outside the tenant system, but whose need for equipment
and provisions drove them to seek credit.

Second, in cases

where the landlord did not distribute food supplies or set up
"plantation stores," the sharecroppers perforce had to deal
■^^New York Times. April 24, 1877.
104

Business statements from Chaffee and Powell,
Cotton Factors and Commission Merchants of New Orleans to
H. G. Bosley, Coushatta, December 18, 20, 1886, in Bosley
Family Papers (Louisiana State University Archives). Cited
hereafter as Bosley Papers.
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with outside storekeepers.
The lien system put all its debtors in a hapless
position.
the worst.

But by the nature of things, tenants suffered
Having already signed away up to two-thirds of

their crop to landlords, they had to pawn the third re
maining to the merchants for the necessities of life.

As

stated before, landlords sometimes distributed food or set
105
up plantation stores.
In such event the tenant dealt
with the one man who already owned most of the crop under
the share system, and now would have a credit lien on the
remainder.

But for both tenants and small landowners, the

crop-lien became a self-perpetuating fact of life.

When

the tenant1s crop was handed over to the merchant in the
fall, and the cost of supplies deducted, a deficit fre
quently resulted.

By law, the laborer was then obliged to

contract with the same merchant for the next year--and so
the cycle began again.
landowners.

The same rule applied to small white

And yet there appeared to be little alter

native to the lien system.

New Orleans bankers would not

advance money for mortgages on rural land, and so the farmer
106
had no collateral except the growing crop.
What about
X V

The nadir of the, lien system was reached in cases
where landlords bought supplies on credit from retail
country stores and then distributed these goods to their
sharecroppers. Thus, the already-inflated retail prices
were hiked again. Daily Picayune. Januaty 11, 1879; New
York Times, December 7, 1879.
^ ^ N e w Orleans City Item, quoted in Colfax Chronicle.
March 17, 1888.
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rural banks?

As late as 1886 there were no state or national
107
banks to be found outside of Orleans Parish.
Even when
small private banking institutions in Baton Rouge and
Shreveport are counted, fifty-five of the fifty-eight
parishes had no banking facilities whatsoever.
Credit merchants who kept books on an illiterate
clientele had limitless chances to practice dishonesty.
The system was, indeed, scarcely fair even under the most
honest of storekeepers.

But the cruelty of the crop-lien

arrangement was seldom intentional.

The country merchants

were themselves victimized by the system.
to buy their wares on credit.

They, to.o, had

Most rural storekeepers

(and planter-merchants) dealt with New Orleans wholesale
houses, commission merchants, and factors.

After collecting

the cotton, storekeepers often followed it by rail or river
down to the metropolis and settled accounts with their
108
creditors in the city.
These wholesale men, in turn,
were frequently in debt to northern or northern-controlled
banks.

Here, perhaps, was the key to the greatest evil of

the lien system:
encouraged.

the multiplication of middlemen which it

The banks lent money to wholesale merchants

(or factors) at eight per cent per annum.

These merchants

107

Louisiana, Official Journal of the Consti
tutional Convention. 1898, 207.
1Q 8Scribner1s Monthly. VII (December, 1873), 133.
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passed this interest along to the country retailers and
added seven per cent more as a fee for endorsing notes,
109
selling cotton, and other services.
Then came all the
shipping and handling charges on the cotton sent downriver,
and charges on the supplies sent up the river.

By the time

the country storekeeper (or planter-merchant) placed the
merchandise on his shelves he had already paid more than
the retail price a cash customer might pay for the same
goods in the city.
Next came the storekeeper*s turn to gouge.

Being

no better or worse than most men, he assumed that his time
and worry deserved a handsome profit.

He also felt that a

high rate of interest was due him for the great risk taken
in advancing supplies all year long to often untrustworthy
customers.

The storekeeper did not compute his interest

charge separately.

The credit price took care of that.

When debts were settled the farmer had paid anywhere from
20 to 200 per cent or more over the cash price in the
city.

110

One angry member of the Louisiana legislature

estimated the range of merchant interest rates in some parts
109

Chaffee and Powell to H. G. Bosley, May 11. 1877,
Bosley Papers; National Economist. Ill (July 19, 1890), 288.
•^^Dailv Picayune. January 11, 1879; New Orleans
Weekly Louisianian. April 5, 1879; Rayville Richland Beacon.
June 11, 1881; Shannon, The F a r m e r s Last Frontier. 91.
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of the state to run as high as 500 per cen t ! ^ *
It was an exceptional farmer whose crop did much
more than square his account at the store at the end of the
year.

Frequently the ledger showed a deficit.

Human bond

age before the war, observed a Catholic bishop of North
Louisiana, was not so evil as the "more grinding slavery"
of the crop-lien.

The old form of servitude chained only

half the population.

This "new form," said the bishop,

meant "slavery for both white and colored people.

119

Tenantry and its twin, the crop-lien, held the
cotton regions in a double vise.

But the sugar parishes

escaped their grip.

There, another form of economic organi

zation had evolved.

During and immediately after the war

the "share" system had been tried by numerous sugar
11o

planters.

The planters did not care for the system

since it did not afford opportunities for close supervision.
The tenant system did not catch on.

By the 1880's most

planters depended upon Negro laborers who were paid a stipu
lated wage.'*'^

Neither did the crop-lien have the same

H^-Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. May 28, 1886.
11 0

Natchitoches Enterprise. March 2, 1899.

^ ^Daily Picayune. June 23, 1877.
114
J. Carlyle Sitterson, "The Transition from Slave
to Free Economy on the William J. Minor Plantation," Agri
cultural History. XVII (October, 1943), 223.
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importance in the sugar country.

Many of the smaller

planters were jnmeshed in it, but the larger sugar planters
escaped because their personal fortunes permitted them to
avoid heavy indebtedness.
Most sugar plantations paid wages by the month.
few paid by the week or day.

A

Wages were naturally higher

when Negroes purchased their own rations--lower when the
employer supplied food.

Planters who feared that laborers

might wander off before the backbreaking harvest work
commenced resorted to the effective device of withdrawing
one-third of each month1s wages and holding this money until
115
the end of the year.
With all its drawbacks, Negroes
seem to have preferred the wage system to sharecropping.
Evidence of this is the fact that many thousands emigrated
from the cotton fields to the sugar lands during the Re
construction years.

Negroes were "more satisfied" when
116
they could see money in their hands.
Nevertheless, labor troubles did come to the cane
fields.

Wages, which ran as high as forty-five dollars per

month with rations at the end of the war, began to creep
downward before the decade of the 1860*s was over.
paid for labor took a more sudden plunge after the
^•^ D a i l y Picayune. December 21, 1877.
U 6 Ibid., April 28, 1877, June 15, 1879

Rates
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beginning of the nationwide depression in 1873.
prices declined, and wages sank accordingly.

117

Sugar

The drop in

wage rates was compounded by the oversupply of labor in
some parishes, caused by Negroes who had drifted in from the
cotton parishes.

Planters such as Donelson Caffery, Sr.,

hoped to lower wages as far as possible, reasoning that "if
118
labor is plentiful labor is cheap."
In October of 1877
Caffery organized the cane growers of St. Mary, the leading
sugar parish of the state, for the purpose of ending "the
119
ruinous policy of competition" for labor.
Wages in St.
Mary, for the January-October growing season, were there
upon set at fifteen dollars per month with rations and
eighteen dollars per month without rations.

Only able-

bodied Negro men were to be paid the specified rates.

Women

and children were used only during the grinding season, for
fifty cents or less per day.
engaged in strikes"

"Infamous laborers or those
120
were to be blacklisted.
Sugar

planters near the Mississippi river followed the example of
the St. Mary landowners, and by late November of 1877 a state
wide organization of large producers, the Louisiana Sugar
Planters* Association, began to take shape under the
^^Sitterson, Sugar Country. 245.
^ 8Pailv Picayune. October 3, 1877.
119
Ibid.
12°Ibid.. December 21, 1877.
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leadership of Duncan F. Kenner.

121

By 1880, with the depression over, pay scales rose
slightly.

Along the Mississippi River laborers received,

during the long growing season, $22.50 per month without
rations; that is, seventy-five cents per day.

122

The

Negroes complained, however, that rising prices in the
plantation stores kept them close to starvation and de
stroyed any hope of accumulating savings.

A laborer in St.

John Parish spoke for many when he grumbled:
123
year wid nothin' and end wid nothin!."

"I begin de

Though the majority of Louisianians of both races
remained close to the soil, other voices had the ear of
state officials, voices which urged that the Pelican State
join in the procession toward an industrialized "New South."
But the advocates of industry had to tread carefully.
Although the welcome mat was extended to northern capital
ists it was deemed essential to somehow adjust this economic
New Departure into the Procrustean bed of southern tradition..
The New South Bourbons could not entirely forget the rankand-file white voters who were depended upon to maintain
the state Democratic party in power.

Consequently,

emotional appeals on behalf of industrialization became
•^■^Sitterson, Sugar Country. 253.
■^^New Orleans Democrat. March 19*22, 1880.
123
Daily Picayune. March 29, 1880.
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common.

Industrialization was pictured as a sort of non

violent continuation of the Civil War; the idea was ad
vanced that although "we have lost the victory in the field
of fight, we can win it back in the workshop, in the
factory."124

Practical arguments were also used.

More

factories, more railroads, were supposed to end unemployment
and raise living standards.

The benefits of industry might

also extend to the countryside.

Sawmills set up in the pine

parishes would hire local men, and so bring the jingle of
money and the hum of civilization to the backwoods and
hills.

One textile mill was already in operation in rural

Claiborne Parish.

More mills, it was hoped, would locate in

the countryside if proper inducements were made.

But of all

lures to northern business, the one which was most stressed
was the abundance of cheap labor.
Promoters of New South business could pridefully
point out that with the exception of the sugar refineries,
Louisiana's infant industries showed great vitality in re
covering from the ravages of war.

Though the number of

manufacturing establishments decreased from 1,774 to 1,553
between 1860 and 1880, the actual value of products rose
from $15,587,473 to $24,205,183.

The amount of invested

194.
Columbus (Ga.) Reqister. auoted in ibid.. March
24, 1881.
"
125Bioqraphical and Historical Memoirs of Louisi
ana (Chicago, 1892), I, l1/, 135.
;
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capital showed similar growth.*2^

Fifteen hundred industrial

plants, most of them small, produced fifty-six per cent as
much wealth as all the crops raised on Louisiana*s broad
acres.

Only 12,167 men, women, and children created the

value of these manufactured items.

Yet the hundreds of

thousands of Louisianians who toiled in the wind and rain
of the fields could not double this amount.
The moral, to many, was obvious.

127

Since machinery

produced more in value than did the soil, it followed that
industry would regain for Louisiana her lost riches.

Capi

tal investment could "make the Pelican State more powerful
than Holland, . . .

build cities more beautiful than

128
V e n i c e . T e x t i l e mills were particularly desired.
Orleans was the world's chief cotton port.

New

By the late

1870's one-third of all the nation's cotton passed through
the city;

129

yet the number of bales remaining in the state

to be fashioned into textiles, was pitifully small.
Louisiana produced 560,000 bales of cotton.

In 1876

New Orleans

wharves handled three times that figure. But only 889
130
bales remained in the state.
Why, it must have been
*2^U.S., Compendium of the Tenth Census. II, 975.
127Ibid.. 928, 975.
^2^Scribner*s Monthly. VII (December, 1873), 156.
^29pailv Picayune. May 12, 1877.
■^^Watkins, Kina Cotton. 202.
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asked, did Louisiana grow so much but create so little?
Trade in fiber and produce was the’life blood of New
Orleans.

But despite the fact that her commerce relied upon

goods from the plantations and farms, the Crescent City was
the only spot in Louisiana not saturated with an agricultural
environment.

In 1880 two-thirds of all manufacturing plants
131
in the state were inside the city.
But the 9,504
industrial workers (7,666 of them adult males), made up only

a fraction of the total labor force of the city.

One year

after Reconstruction's end it was estimated that the city
contained at least 45,000 men over the age of eighteen who
132
worked for wages.
Occupations were as varied as the life
of the city itself.

Skilled workers--typographers, screw-

men, mechanics--all had formed benevolent and protective
labor societies long before secession; after the war, their
societies or unions were clearly the strongest among the
133
labor associations of New Orleans.
Somewhat lower on
the economic ladder, but still organized, were laborers in
the tobacco manufacturing plants and cottonseed oil mills.
But most urban workers had no skills and toiled for thirtyfive cents or less per hour.

These less fortunate workers

131U.S., Compendium of the Tenth Census. II, 928,
975, 1068-71.
^ ^Daily Picayune. November 10, 1878.
133
Arthur Raymond Pearce, "The Rise and Decline of
Labor in New Orleans," (unpublished Master's thesis, Tulane
University, 1938), 4, 17.
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occasionally grouped into ineffective associations.

Long

shoremen and the levee roustabouts formed a Laborers1 Union
Society and attempted to resist the hiring of degraded,
poverty-stricken newcomers to the city who were willing to
work for ten cents per hour. ^ 4
Skilled or unskilled, wage earners in New Orleans
were sinking into despair during the latter years of R e 
construction.

The economic depression touched bottom

between 1874 and 1878, during which time the cauldron of
Louisiana*s political troubles boiled over.
mosity among the workers was on the rise.

Racial ani
Bitter compe

tition for jobs combined with political issues to divide
135
Negro and white laborers into hostile camps.
Benevolent
and charitable associations seemed unable to provide food
for the unemployed and helpless.

Landlords and business

leaders tended to blame hard times on Carpetbaggism, and
few but the Carpetbaggers would disagree.
"Death is staring us in the face," a laborer wrote
in the last days of Reconstruction.

"How long! oh, how

long! will these poor men and women and children . . .

be

kept in bondage and misery in our distracted city and
state?"

1 *36

Under the circumstances, white labor in New

^34Pailv Picayune. November 4, 1877.
135
Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana.
303.
136

Daily Picayune. April 15, 1877.
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Orleans and farmers in the upcountry, joined hands with the
economic upper class of Louisiana during the dark days of
1876-77.

Underprivileged whites generally accepted the

conservative verdict that Radicalism and its social turmoil
had caused the hard times.

In truth, it did appear that

Republican pilfering and the continued political chaos was
halting any chance for economic recovery.

Whites, rich and

poor, united in a "common sympathy" of race and regional
pride to fight for home rule under the Democratic banner.

13'

The victory was won, but white unity would one day be
tested in the fire of class conflict.

137

New Orleans Issue. June 4, 1892. The Issue was
an organ of the Populist-Socialist coalition in New Orleans
during the 1890*s.

CHAPTER III
THE AGRARIAN BETRAYAL
"Agrarianism" is often related to an American demo
cratic ideal which took shape in the writings of Benjamin
Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Taylor of Caroline:
a belief that "those who labor in the earth are the chosen
people of God."*'

Accordingly, agriculture was eulogized

as the fundamental employment of man.
dependent.

Other callings were

The agrarian myth extolled the moral primacy of

hard working, self-sufficient rural folk:

the yeoman

middle class, who presumably represented the very apex of
American civilization.

2

From the beginning, the agrarian myth commingled
fiction.with reality.

Self-sufficiency was, more often

than not, gladly abandoned whenever the farmer had access
to transportation or markets.

He seemed as anxious to get

^Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, quoted in A.
Whitney Griswold, "The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas
Jefferson," American Political Science Review. XL (August,
1946), 667.

2

Paul H. Johnstone, "Old Ideas versus New Ideas in
Farming," Farmers in A Changing World. U.S., Department of
Agriculture Yearbook. 1940. 116-17.
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rich as any other American.
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3

Gradations of property and

sectional conflicts of interest precluded the development of
a homogeneous national class of agriculturists based upon
the yeoman stereotype.

However, all types of landowning

farmers in America had certain attitudes in common:

a

desire to own more and better land, an individualistic and
pragmatic outlook on life, a suspicion of urban ways and
especially urban politicians, and a tendency toward conser
vatism in times of prosperity.4 These rural feelings knew
no special class, or time, or place.
True political solidarity among the major sections
and classes of agriculturists in America was never attained.
The much vaunted ante-bellum agrarian alliance of South and
Northwest during the Jackson period was often vague and
paradoxical.

Moreover, conflicts of interest could be

noted among agriculturists within each state or region.
Although the Civil War tended to unify agrarian sentiment on
a purely regional basis, at the same time it smothered the
already feeble concept of national harmony among agri
cultural interests.

The conflict of 1861-65 decided far

3
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform:
to F.D.R. (New York, 1955), 37.

From Bryan

4Gates, The Farmer's A g e . 2.
5
An excellent discussion of conflicting interpre
tations of Jacksonian Democracy may be found in Charles
Greer Sellers, Jr., "Andrew Jackson versus the Historians,"
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. XLIV (March, 1958),
615-33.
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more than the fate of the Confederacy.

It ushered in a

period of business and industrial expansion at a time when
northern and southern farmers were politically and emotion
ally divided.
After the war the political dichotomy of agrarian
America continued.

Politicians North and South, of both

major parties, tended to divert public attention from those
economic issues which were of greatest importance to
farmers, and instead rehashed the emotion-packed "bloody
shirt" memories of the war.

Meanwhile, agriculture*s share

of the national wealth declined as business power in- .
creased.^*

Eastern banking interests, allied with monopo

listic-minded railroads arid industrial corporations, domi
nated Congress and dictated to most state legislatures.
Currency contraction made the farmer's debt load more
burdensome at the same time that farm prices were falling.
Faced with this situation, the more aggressive rural people,
North and South, began to organize for mutual defense.
Associations such as the Grange, the Greenback party, the
Farmers' Alliance, and the People's party were utilized to
align the hosts of agriculture against enemies both real
and imagined.
Two pathways of agrarian protest lay open.

The more

^Everett E. Edwards, "American Agriculture--The
First 300 Years," U.S., Department of Agriculture Yearbook,
1940, 258.
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conservative farmers veered toward businesslike organization
for specific goals; they wished to advance their economic
position as commercial producers and were not otherwise
interested in disturbing the status quo.

As capitalists,

they wished to modify the capitalist system only in so far
as to allow larger profits for agriculture.

Particularly

in the South, the conservative agrarians balked at joining
reform-minded third parties.

But the agrarian left wing,

drawing its support from smaller landowners and tenant
farmers, eschewed the rural businessman philosophy and
looked favorably upon political action along working class
lines.

The small landowner "was so poor and distressed that
7

he forgot he was a capitalist. . .

Consequently,

spokesmen for the agrarian left, reasoning that farmers and
workers were being placed in the same underdog economic
position, eventually sought to create a third party which
Q

would unite the disadvantaged of wshop and field"
great crusade against special privilege.

in a

Nor was the Negro

voter forgotten; third party agrarians in the South came .to
look upon the Negro as a partner in misery and thus a
potential ally in protest.
Negro agrarianism in post-Reconstruction Louisiana
7

Quoted in Woodward, Origins of the New South. 194.
O
°New Orleans Issue. December 30, 1893; Chester
McArthur Destler, American Radicalism. 1865-1901:
Essays
and Documents (Connecticut College Monograph No. 3: New
London, 1946), 15-31.
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had peculiarly futile and tragic overtones.

The aspirations

of poor whites and poor Negroes were similar, and in some
localities, leaders of the two were moderately successful
in arranging a united front against the Bourbon Democracy.
But prior to the Populist uprising of the 1890's such
efforts of biracial class unity in Louisiana were scattered
and infrequent.

Also, there were few parishes in the state

where lower class Negroes and whites could be found in large
numbers; the freedmen were concentrated in the alluvial
districts and were subject to political intimidation by the
conservative plantation owners, while the bulk of the poor
white population lived in the backcountry or the towns.
This degree of geographic separation, along with the tra
dition of racial antagonism common to both, hindered co
operation.

Therefore, Negro agrarianism makes up a

partially separate story, and when circumstances warrant
will be discussed separately.
Louisiana agrarianism in the years after Recon
struction was obviously not one concerted movement but
rather an amalgam of attempts by dissident out-groups to
wrest control of local and state government away from the
Bourbon oligarchy which dominated the economy as well as
the politics of the state.

The agrarian reformers came

from essentially three groups:

the producer-minded, middle

class white landowners; the more radical-minded rural
whites, most of whom owned infertile hill farms or worked

94
as tenants; and the mass of Negro tenant farmers and rural
wage earners, who were the most disadvantaged of the three.
The first group, although active in the Grange and the
Farmers* Alliance, generally refused to countenance third
party talk and would side with the great plantation owners
on questions pertaining to race or the Democratic party.
The second group, also active in the Grange and Alliance,
provided the bulk of support for the Populist party of the
1890*s; through that party they came to advocate a united
front with urban labor elements as well as the Negroes.^
The Negroes, for their part, appeared anxious to join hands
with the radical white agrarians whenever and wherever the
opportunity came.
The role of urban radicalism must also be considered.
Although not, properly speaking, an integral part of the
agrarian crusade in Louisiana, a politically militant laborite element did exist in New Orleans as early as the Recon
struction era.

In 1891 the People*s Municipal party was

organized as an urban affiliate of the Populist party for
New O r l e a n s . L o u i s i a n a ,

however, was overwhelmingly rural,

and any serious statewide reform program would necessarily
be agrarian in nature.

Although the New Orleans laborites

g
Cf. Daily Picayune. October 3, 1891; New Orleans
Times-Democrat. February 18, 1892.
■^New Orleans Issue. August 1, 1891.
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were instrumental in helping found the state Populist party,
urban Populism itself soon proved disappointing.^

For the

purposes of this study, the New Orleans radicals should be
thought of as rather ineffective urban allies of Louisiana's
left wing agrarians.

But the fact that political fusion

between the poor of town and country was seriously proposed
is in itself significant.

Their traditional antipathies ran

deep; their attempt at fusion would have been undertaken
only under extreme provocation,
Louisiana posed special and exasperating problems
for any reform movement.

In addition to the Negro-white

division common to all southern states, the ethnic, re
ligious, and the unique language barrier between the poor
of the northern and southern parishes presented a formidable
obstacle to any statewide organization of protest.

Louisi

ana's rate of illiteracy, being the highest in the nation,
also hampered attempts at communication among the poor.

But

the most formidable hurdle of all was the Bourbon'-controlled
ballot box.

In the years after Reconstruction, Louisiana

more than "lived up to its reputation of being the only
southern state perpetually corrupt."

12

Senator Kellogg's

grim jest that "after the polls are closed the election
•^Daily Picayune. October 3-4, 1891; Melvin J.
White, "Populism in Louisiana During the Nineties,"
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. V (June, 1918), 15.
*%imkins, A History of the South. 320.
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really begins,"

13

held much unhappy truth, because with

election laws and registration procedure under the control
of the conservative Democracy, candidates opposed to the
status quo were counted out with dismal regularity.

Perhaps

in no other American state did reformers wage such an uphill
fight.
Toward the end of the 1890*s, looking back on
Louisiana's agrarian reform efforts, a critic remarked that
they all "tried to rally the nondescript mass of people who
have everything to gain and nothing to lose."'*'4
true.

This was

But the man who made the observation was a spokesman

for the ultra-Bourbon element, and seemed unable or un
willing to understand why the "nondescript" should be weary
of the role in society assigned to them, or why they should
be angry at the vote frauds which perpetuated the system.
Spokesmen for the disadvantaged majority, on the other hand,
believed that the powers of government should, and could, be
used to ameliorate economic problems.

This was not in the

context of classic Jeffersonian agrarianism, but the state
and nation had changed considerably since the early days of
the century.

Left wing agrarianism in Louisiana, in the

years from the end of Reconstruction to the end of the
century, amounted to a futile series of attempts to
13

Congressional Record. 47 Cong., Special Sess.
Senate, 120.
^Natchitoches Enterprise. March 2, 1899.
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overthrow the state's corrupt Bourbon oligarchy and inaugu
rate a government which would truly represent farmers and
laborers, in place of the old system which permitted a
privileged few to run the state in the manner of a private
plantation.
In Louisiana, as well as other states, the fore
runner of post-Reconstruction agrarianism was the Patrons of
Husbandry, better known as the Grange.

First organized in

Washington, D.C., in 1867, the Grange soon became a nation15
wide fraternity of farmers.
Oliver H. Kelley, founder of
the Grange, believed its purposes should be educational and
social in nature.

He hoped the order would eradicate
16
sectional hatreds.
Through a union of northern and
southern agriculturists, Kelley assumed, the emotional
wounds of the Civil War might be healed.
The early Grange leaders did not appeal to any
special class of agriculturists.
be a general union of all.

They intended the order to

Kelley and his associates

avoided militant agrarianism; individual Granger units were
admonished to refrain from using the order for partisan
political purposes, and even political discussions at Grange
■^Edward Wiest, Agricultural Organization in the
United States (University of Kefrtuckv Studies in Economics
and Sociology. Vol. II, Lexington, 1923), 375.
16
Fred A. Shannon, American Farmers' Movements
(Princeton, 1957), 55: Carl C. Tavlor. The Farmers'
Movement:
1620-1920 (New York, 1953), 116-17.
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meetings were forbidden.

Inevitably, many Grangers chose

to ignore the ban on politics.

Railroads and special

interests pressured legislators and congressmen, why should
not the tillers of the soil protect themselves in the same
fashion?

The Grange also undertook numerous cooperative

enterprises.

The heavy profits made by middlemen who

bought and sold to farmers induced Grangers in many states
to set up cooperative stores, business agencies, and even
17
farm implement factories.
The original social and edu
cational aims of the Grange were shoved into the background.
The turmoil of Reconstruction delayed the entrance
of the Grange into Louisiana.

Not until March of 1872 was

a Grange unit established in the state.

Expansion was slow;

almost two years elapsed before a state organization was
effected.

Then, however, came a remarkable surge forward.

In f873 only 26 units with a total of 853 members were re
ported.

But by 1875 there were 315 subordinate units with
18
a membership of 10,078.
Credit for the spread of the
Grange in Louisiana belongs chiefly to two men:

H. W. L.

17
Amos G. Warner, "Three Phases of Cooperation in
the West," History of Cooperation in the United States
(Vol. VI, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical
and Political Science: Baltimore, 1888), 367-82.
18
Thomas C. Atkeson, Semi-Centennial History of the
Patrons of Husbandry (New York, 1916), 45-46; Solon Justus
Buck, The Granger Movement: A Study of Agricultural
Organization and its Political. Economic and Social Mani
festations. 1870-1880 (Harvard Historical Studies. Vol.
XIX, Cambridge, 1913), 58 ff.
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Lewis of Tangipahoa Parish, Master of the state Grange, who
joined hands with Daniel Dennett, then a resident of St.
Mary Parish, to stump the hill and bayou country in the
19
interests of the organization.
Lewis and Dennett did
their work-well.

By the time their two year tour was over,

Granges were established in almost every parish of the state.
Even urban Orleans had an active unit.

20

The social features of the Grange were exceedingly
important to rural white Louisianians during the unhappy
Reconstruction years.

Dennett wrote that the Grange "broke

the monotony of farm life . . . carried light into neighbor
hoods and to homes which would never have been enlightened
from any other sourceii*

The elaborate ritual of Grange

meetings added color to ordinarily drab lives, and instilled
in rural folk a sense of the importance of their labor,
"Agriculture was the first calling of man," the Patrons were
informed.

"No order or association can rank with the tillers

of the soil."
membership.

22

Farmers* wives were welcomed into Grange

Sometimes more women than men showed up at

■^Curley Daniel Willis, "The Grange Movement in
Louisiana" (unpublished Master's thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1935), 18-21.
20
Daily Picayune. March 23, 1877.
21Ibid.
22Manual of Subordinate Granges of the Patrons of
Husbandry (4th ed., Philadelphis, 1873), 48.
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23
meetings.
Inevitably, the Grange became involved in Louisi24
ana's partisan politics.
Most Grange members were native
whites and, therefore, almost without exception, foes of
the Carpetbagger government.

Some Granges crossed the

color line and admitted Negroes, but the real purpose on
such occasions seems to have been to woo colored people
away from Republican Union Leagues and kindred organi25
zations.
Biracial Granges, in Louisiana, appear to have
been the exception and not the rule.

Also, no evidence

exists of. any Republican-dominated Grange units within the
state.

Grange petitions denounced the "system of studied

plunder" of the Radical state administration and bitterly
26
protested the forced sale of farm land for taxation.
Dennett himself, the Grange's state Deputy, admitted to
27
being a member of the Knights of the White Camellia.
The Grange in Louisiana recruited its membership
almost entirely from the middle-sized to small landowners
who raised cotton, corn, and livestock.

The uplands of

22Pailv Picayune. May 30, 1877.
24
As one writer in the late nineteenth century ex
pressed it, Louisianians have a tendency "to drag all
things, all issues, into politics." Biographical and
Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. I, 138.
2^Willis, "The Grange Movement," 16.
26Ibid., 37-38.
^Highsmith,
249.

"Louisiana During Reconstruction,"
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North Louisiana and the Florida parishes were Grange strong
holds.

The organization was also quite active in the

southern parishes of St. Landry and Lafayette, for these
latter, like the uplands, were dominated by white landowners
of modest means.

Exceptions may be found; there were patrons

affluent enough to offer rent-free cabins and half the crop
to any "starving whites" of New Orleans interested in moving
28
to the country and becoming tenants.
Yet the great land
lords, the sugar barons especially, avoided the Grange.

Dr.

E. K. Branch of Avoyelles Parish, who became Master of the
Louisiana Grange in 1877, reported that large planters in
the southern portion of the state "have never taken any
29
interest in our organization,"
Economic activities of the Grange in Louisiana
followed the same path pursued by the Patrons in other
states.

Cooperative stores, owned by farmers, were set up

at two points in St. Helena Parish, at Clinton in East
Feliciana Parish, at Washington and Big Cane in St. Landry
30
Parish, and at Winnfield in Winn Parish.
A state whole
sale agency, with headquarters in New Orleans, was organized
2^Pailv Picayune. March 18, April 10, 1877.
29Ibid.. May 1, 4, 1877.
30

Journal of Proceedings, Fifteenth Session of the
National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry (Philadelphia.
1881). 59. quoted in Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the
South. 53.

102
to serve the Grange stores.

31

But poor management, plus

depressed business conditions, caused the demise of the
32
state agency in 1877.
Thus the cooperative movement ac
complished little.

Usually, local Grangers were too poor to

set up stores of their own.

The usual tactic was to confer

with a sympathetic local merchant and make group purchases at
reduced prices.

The few genuine cooperative stores soon met

the fate of the state agency.

The only survivor was the

Grange store at Winnfield, which was still doing business in
1885 under the management of George P. Long.

By that

time, Long had to deal with the regular New Orleans whole34
salers who sold to the private stores.
Unlike the Grange in many states Louisiana Patrons
did not engage in the bitter fight with the railroads.
reason was simple.

The

There were few railroads to denounce.

As late as 1875 there were just 539 miles of track in the
whole state; within the next six years only 93 more miles
^ Dailv Picayune. April 19, May 30, 1877; Winnfield
Southern Sentinel, December 11, 1885; Willis, "The Grange

Movemerit7"~So7^3T
32

Buck, The Granger Movement. 254; Willis, "The
Grange Movement," 60-62.
33
An older brother of Huey P. Long, Sr., and there
fore an uncle of Governors Huey and Earl Long. Henry E.
Chambers, A History of Louisiana; Wilderness-ColonyProvince-Territory-Siate-People IChicaqo. 1925). III. 184.
34
Winrifdeld Southern Sentinel. August 28, September
25, December 11, 1885.
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were added.

35

Louisiana ranked tenth among the eleven

former Confederate states in mileage by the latter date.
Only Florida, with one-third Louisiana*s population, had
36
less track.
Instead of hating railroads, the majority of
Louisiana’s farmers eagerly looked forward to the day when
rail lines might relieve them of the onerous rates charged
by steamship lines on the Mississippi and its tributaries.
Railroad hostility, it is true, existed to some degree in
parishes where tracks had already been laid, but deeprooted criticism was delayed until trouble over the Back
bone land grant developed in the 1880*s.

In the meantime

it was assumed that railroads would provide competition for
the river boats; competition was assumed to mean lower
charges.

Those who might point with alarm to the railroad

troubles in other states were assured that when new lines
were developed in Louisiana they would "always be held in
check by the healthy competition of water transportation."3"^
And so, while waiting for the railroads to come, Grangers
attempted to fight steamboat monopolies by contracting with
38
shipowners who offered lower rates for group shipments.
35Poor, Manual of the Railroads . . . 1881. 439.
36Ibid., 415.
37

Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 20,

1882.
OQ
Willis, "The Grange Movement," 55-56.
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None of these "Grange Boats," so called, appear to have been
cooperative enterprises.
The Grange displayed a laudable interest in edu
cation.

Adult Grangers were encouraged to read agricultural

journals and discuss scientific farm methods at the regular
meetings.^

Attempts were made to secure better schools for

rural children.

Dissatisfaction with public facilities

prompted the creation of "Grange schools" for white children
in Lafayette and St. Helena Parishes.4®

The Grange also

attempted to control Louisiana State Agricultural and
Mechanical College, as Grange leaders desired that the
college not be merged with Louisiana State University at
Baton Rouge.4*
school.

Some wanted direct Granger management of the

North Louisiana Grangers felt the agricultural

school should be located at a more "interior point" where
poor students might receive practical instruction without
"being brought in contact with the vices and^ extravagances
of the city [sic ] .«4^

The Nicholls legislature ignored

39

Buck, The Granger Movement. 325; Daily Picayune.
April 8 , 1877.
4 ®Willis, "The Grange Movement," 80; Daily Picayune.
May 30, 1877.
4 *Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 41.
4 ^Pailv Picayune. March 13, 1877. The Louisiana
Grangers took a remarkably provincial view of what consti
tuted a "city." Baton Rouge, at the time, was a sleepy
country town of less than 8,000 inhabitants. Even after it
became the state capital in 1882, hogs still ran wild in the
muddy streets and "formidably attacked" fruit peddlers.
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. July 27, 1882.
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the clamor.

In 1877 the two state institutions were merged

at Baton Rouge.
By 1877 the Grange was visibly dying in Louisiana.
Even in such a stronghold as De Soto Parish the order was
reportedly "played out."4*^ That year marked the nadir of
the great depression of the decade and saw the failure of
the state agency.

Politics proved distracting to Grange

members; tempers heated to the boiling point in the campaign
of 1876 and its aftermath; upcountry white farmers even
neglected their crops as they waited for news of the
Nicholls-Packard struggle in New Orleans.

44

Grange members

became "discouraged and careless," failed to pay their dues,
and by 1879 the state Grange was dormant.4^
Some few subordinate Grange units maintained a
flickering existence; however, outside of East Baton Rouge,
St. Helena, and Winn Parishes, little activity can be noted
after 1879.

Even there it was feeble.

Dennett, writing in

1881, complained that every other state in the South re
tained some kind of statewide organization.

He and a,hand

ful of others continued to agitate for a revival of "our
Louisiana Lazarus."4^

Their efforts had little result.

The

40 •
Daily Picayune. November 23, 1877.
44Natchitoches People*s Vindicator, auoted in ibid..
March 26, 1877.
4 5Pailv Picayune. February 18, 1881.
4^Ibid.. February 19, 1881.
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day of the Grange was over.

However, the next decade would

see new and more dynamic agrarian organizations which bore
the markings of a Granger heritage.

The Grange had intro

duced the concept of united action, the belief that farmers
must raise their voices in harmony to achieve economic and
political rights.

It was "the great pioneer." of agrarian
47
reform in Louisiana.
The Farmers' Alliance, the Populist
party, would list among their leaders men who joined the
Grange in the 1870*s.

They, especially, tried to avoid the
48
shoals which shipwrecked the parent order.
The moribund Grange played little part in the
exciting state and congressional elections of 1878.

Never

theless, the campaigns of that year mark a critical milepost
in the history of Louisiana agrarianism and, therefore,
deserve examination.

All six United States Representatives,

the State Treasurer, a majority of seats in the legislature,
and all municipal officials in New Orleans were to be named
40
on November 5, 1878.
Conservative Democrats excitedly
pointed out that the work of redeeming the state from Radi
calism was yet unfinished— nearly half the legislative seats
and one congressional district remained in Republican
4^Leesville People's Friend. March 21, 1889.
48
Colfax Chronicle. March 5, 1887.
49
New Y0rk Times. September 30, 1878; New Orleans
Democrat, October 26, 1878.
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hands.

50

Despite the slashing of registration lists, Negro

voters still held a slim statewide majority over the whites.
Conservatives revived the spectre of Republican rule, ex
tolled the virtues of white (Democratic) unity, and scoffed
at the proposition that any issue could possibly divide the
"harmonious and powerful combination" of rich and poor
K-+
51
whites.

Nevertheless, some Democratic leaders professed un
easiness.

Although the Negro Republican majority might be

reduced to a minority by intimidation, economic coercion,
and vote fraud, such tactics had a limit.

A wholesale dis

franchisement of the Negro was, for the time being, too
dangerous.

Northern public opinion had to be considered.

Absolute removal of the freedman from politics might goad
the national government into reviving the Reconstruction
measures; even the troops might be returned.

In addition,

black belt plantation owners already envisioned how their
laborers vote could be used as a lever to dictate policy
to the state Democratic party.

In the ante-bellum years

slaves were counted for the purposes of giving planters
disproportionate representation in the state legislature.
^ O t i s A. Singletary, "The Election of 1878 in
Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XL (January,
1957), 47.
5^Paily Picayune. January 11, 1877.
59
Louisiana, Constitution of 1852. Arts. 8 , 15;
Lewinson, Race. Class, and Party. 9-10.
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The Negro vote, if properly applied, would be of even
greater value.

Planters wanted an expanded voice in the

state government.

The Negro had given it to them once.

He

could again.
The real fear was the white vote.

There was little

concern over the possibility of a shift of white voters
toward the Republicans.
some possibility:

Nevertheless, there was one bother

the fragmenting of Democratic votes

through independent candidates, or by the emergence of a
third political party.

Other southern states, redeemed

from Radicalism in the early 1870's, had already experienced
such outbreaks of rural white insurgency.

The Louisiana

Bourbons read these warning signals and made preparations
to meet the approaching storm.

They tried to herd off any

agrarian movement by repeatedly warning that independency
would lend "indirect aid" to the Republicans by dividing
53
the white vote.
Dissension among "ourselves," it was
stressed, would balloon the importance of the Negro vote and
return Kellogg, Wells, and their friends to power.

Of

course, the truth of the matter was that Democratic leaders
realized the great advantages of a two party political
division along racial lines.

They wanted nothing to disturb

such a simple way of getting and holding office.
The working farmers and city artisans who helped
5^Pailv Picayune. January 14, 1877.
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place the Nicholls government in power expected much of it.
Somehow, it was naively assumed, the restoration of home
rule would bring back "peace, plenty and prosperity . . .
54
that with Nicholls for ruler nickels will be plenty."
But
by the fall of 1878 the Democratic redeemers had been in
power a year and a half and the millennium showed no signs
of coming.

The Bourbon-dominated legislature had further

restricted the meagre flow of money by slashing state, city,
55
and parish expenditures by $2,748,000 in its first year.
Local government suffered a blow when the legislature
authorized the executive to add appointed, members of the
previously elected police juries; this was done at the re
quest of black belt planters who wished to blunt the power
of Negro officials in their districts.^

But police jury

packing was not confined to parishes with a heavy Negro
majority.

The act applied to all.

Hill whites also had to

accept the governor's appointments.
Election laws placed on the statute books in 187778 were marvels of ingenuity but were hardly designed for
reform.

Police juries, appointed by the state administration

were empowered to select polling places and name the election
commissioners.

These commissioners, in turn, supervised

54Pailv Picayune. January 11, 1877.
^F ort ier (ed.), Louisiana. I, 427.
^ Congressional Record. 47 Cong., Special Sess.
Senate, 120; New York Times.~November 24, 1879.
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the elections, counted the ballots, and signed the official
tally sheets.

Ominously, the act of making false returns

was not declared a crime.
And the Bourbon program of reform through "rigid
economy" was beginning to take devious paths.

Large

property holders were favored by a reduction of tax rates
and a slashing of assessments.

Planters whose crops sold:

for $30,000 or $40,000 a year were assessed about half the
value of their mules and equipment; it was claimed that the
taxes of such wealthy men amounted to less than $250 per
year.

Even then they were not pressed to pay.^®

Governor

Nicholls, to his credit, spoke against these tax abuses.
Once he complained that people of small property usually
paid their taxes, but "men of large means and property"
deliberately abstained and nothing was d o n e . ^

But the

governor was powerless to force changes, and his outspoken
ness must have strengthened the resolve of the more con
servative Democrats to be rid of him.
Rumblings of discontent against the Bourbon govern
ment began to grow louder.

One farmer, in what must have

^7Daily Picayune. January 8 , 1879; New York Times.
November 24, 1879.
^®New York Times. January 19, February 5, 1879;
Daily Picayune. January 10, November 3, 1878; January 8 ,

18797

“

^Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of Repre
sentatives. 1879, 7-19; Daily Picayune. January 8 , 1879.
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been a typical complaint, noted that the "worthy gentlemen"
talked endlessly about improving the state’s credit among
businessmen but made no attempt to help the depressed
farmers of the state.

"It seems," the rural man grumbled,

that "the rulers" looked upon the earth of Louisiana and
the people who work it as part of "the same mass, and
beneath . . . respect or r e l i e f . T h u s

it was that a

growing number of farmers began to decide that the Demo
cratic party had no real interest in them,

Some turned

attentive ears elsewhere.
The Greenback party had already become well known
in the North and West by the time it entered Louisiana in
1878.

Proposing to lift the burden of agricultural in

debtedness and halt the decline of farm prices through a
program of currency inflation, the Greenbackers also
appealed to urban labor:

to the latter group they claimed

that the national depression

and unemployment were caused

by the deliberate congressional policy of currency con
traction.

Especially denounced .were the national banking

system and the Resumption Act of 1875.

But the Greenback

movement was primarily agrarian in its leadership and
appeal, even though a significant number of working class
people in the Northeast did join the p a r t y . ^

The

^ D a i l v Picayune. January 1, 1878.
^*John R. Commons and Others, History of Labour in
the United States (New York, 1918), II, 244.
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Greenbackers ran their first presidential candidate in 1876.
The South offered him little support.

Louisiana, absorbed

in the death-throes of Reconstruction, did not give the
62
Greenback ticket a single vote.
Greenbackers continued to gain strength in the
North, and in February of 1878 held an important convention
at Toledo, Ohio,

There, they attempted a closer union with

labor elements and renamed their party the "National
63
party."
Meanwhile, inflationist sentiment in the South
was on the rise.

By May of 1878 the National party began

taking shape in Louisiana, with its eye on the autumn
64
congressional and state elections.
Native white men, who
had heretofore been the most ardent of Democrats, were among
the first to join.

The editor of the Indianapolis Sun, a

Greenback paper, confided that an attempt would be made to
carry Louisiana by a coalition with Negro v o t e r s . ^

North

and South, the Greenbackers hoped to bury sectional differ
ences by agitating national economic reform.

Instead of

"bloody shirt" oratory they chose the "ragged shirt."

66

62

Edward McPherson (ed.), The Tribune Almanac and
Political Register for 1877 (New York, 1877], 128-30.
New York Times, February 23, 1878; Fred E. Haynes,
Third Party Movements Since the Civil War with Special
Reference to Iowa (Iowa City. 1916). 120-43.
""
^4Shreveport Evening Standard. May 10, 1878.
65St. Louis Evening Post. September 28, 1878.

66

'

Washington (D.C.). Post, quoted in ibid.
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As a bona fide third party, Greenbackism took
strongest root in the Fourth Congressional District of
Northwest Louisiana.

There, the Shreveport Evening Standard

was horrified to discover, some of those same white men who
had battled for home rule in the Reconstruction riots at
67
Colfax and Coushatta were advocating the new movement.

68

Robert P. Webb of Claiborne Parish,
Jesse Moore Tilly of
69
Bienville Parish,
and Rev. Benjamin Franklin Brian of
70
Grant Parish
were among the more prominent Greenbackers
of the region.

All three were Confederate veterans and up

land agriculturists.
Webb, who was also a lawyer, owned 2,000 acres and
71
was the wealthiest of the trio.
Brian was the poorest.
Born in East Feliciana Parish in 1833, he worked as a
blacksmith until the beginning of the Civil War, and then
served four years in the Confederate cavalry.

After the

close of hostilities he homesteaded near the village of
Pollock, in what was soon to become Grant Parish.

Having

"hewed his_ farm out of the forest," Brian then divided his
67

Shreveport Evening Standard. May 10, 1878.

68

Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest
Louisiana INashville, 1890), 457-58.
69Ibid.. 204-205, 662.
70
Colfax Chronicle. October 19, 1878.
71
Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest
Louisiana. 204-205.
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energies among farming, preaching, and politics.

72

He was

active as an ordained minister in the Missionary Baptist
Church, and his political career began in 1876, when he made
an unsuccessful race for the State Senate on an Independent73
Republican coalition ticket.
Benjamin Brian was destined
to become one of Louisiana*s outstanding agrarian reformers.
His career spanned every rural movement from the .rise of the
Grange to the decline of the Populist party.
Lack of funds and means of organization hampered the
growth of the National party in Louisiana.

One feeble news

paper, the Haynesville Greenback Dollar, propagandized to a
limited number of subscribers along the northernmost tier of
74
parishes.
In Alexandria, an organ called We. the People
emerged in 1878 as an alleged affiliate of the Greenback
movement, but its chief purpose lay in promoting the
congressional candidacy of that indefatigable Scalawag
75
Republican, J. Madison Wells.
In Northeast Louisiana a
series of fragmentary independent movements were organized
by native whites on the local level, notably in Tensas and
76
Morehouse parishes,
72

See Benjamin Brian*s obituary in Louisiana Popu
list, November 6 , 1896.
73
Colfax Chronicle, September 30, 1876.
74
Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana.
I, 169; Colfax Chronicle. November 15. 1879.
7b
Colfax Chronicle. August 31, 1878.

7ft

New York Times. November 4, 1878, January 20, 1879.
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The situation in Tensas offered a classic example
of why outsiders looked upon Louisiana politics in such
amusement and contempt.

A "Country People's ticket" was

organized in Tensas in 1878 by Confederate veterans and
Negroes, in opposition.to the regular Democratic candidates
for parish offices.

The political boss of the parish,

Judge Charles C. Cordill, was a Scalawag Republican who had
shifted with the winds in 1876 to assume control of the
77
local Democratic organization.
Cordill and his friends
were large planters.

They had used the Republican label

during Reconstruction for the most palpable of reasons:
Tensas Parish was over ninety per cent Negro.

When, in

1878, local Negro Republicans found they could no longer do
business with Cordill, they turned to the yeoman white
farmers of the parish.

The first proposal for this bi-

racial combination came from Arthur Fairfax, one of the few
colored landowners of the parish.

The result was the

Country People's ticket, with Confederate veterans for all
78
the local offices and the Negro, Fairfax, for Congress.
This interesting coalition was thus opposed by the large
planter (ex-Republican) Democrats of the Cordill machine!
Greenbackism seems to have played no part in the Tensas
struggle, and little wonder.

Local issues would have

77Pailv Picayune. November 1, 1878.

78Ibid.. January 8-9, 1878.
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plagued the wisdom of Solomon.
Greenback sentiment existed in South Louisiana;
however, a bona fide third party crusade failed to material
ize.

In its place were a number of independent political

disturbances which soon caught the attention of professional
politicians.

For example, around New Orleans a revival of

the old Native American, or Know-Nothing, party' was being
79

voiced about.

In New Orleans the Native Americans

managed an uneasy fusion with the Republican party and ran
Robert S. Howe for Mayor as an opponent of the Democratic
candidate, Isaac W. Patton.

At this moment two other -

political fragments, the Citizen's Conservative Association
(Made up of merchants), and the Tax Payers’ Union (mostly
landlords) broke away from the Democracy to run a slate of
candidates for parish and municipal offices in New Orleans.
These two parties of the extreme right wing condemned the
city machine of Patton, Burke and Wiltz for its corruption,
and agitated for a more drastic reduction in taxation, even
80
to the point of abolishing state taxes entirely.
The
regular Democrats in New Orleans thus faced three opponents
even more conservative than themselves.
A fifth political movement then began among the un
represented working class people.

It should be noted that

^ N e w York Times. July 23, 1878.
8QPailv Picayune. October 30-31, 1878.
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during the summer of 1878, prior to the elections, New
Orleans suffered one of its worst yellow fever epidemics.

81

A number of angry workingmen blamed the inefficient and
careless Democratic administration for the unsanitary
conditions which spread the plague.

In October these

laborers formed the Workingmen's party, and denounced the
Democratic as well as the other conservative parties.

John

C. Fleming, a self-styled "humble mechanic," headed the
ticket as a mayoralty candidate.

The Workingmen's ticket

issued a blistering manifesto which urged the poor of both
races to desert the old party banner.

Negroes were reminded

that President Hayes and his Republicans had deserted them,
and that "the Brigadier General, so-called Democracy, re
fused to recognize the manhood of their race."

The city and

state administrations were denounced as "imbecile," and as
"the vilest government that ever disgraced a civilized
community."

Moreover, the laborites raised the ghosts of

the epidemic victims, who "are crying aloud for retributive
justice upon those who by their neglect forced them to un82
timely graves."
But Fleming added that his party was non
violent.

"God knows," he said, "we have misfortunes enough

without bringing about others by . . . conflict."
81
Mabel Brasher, Louisiana:
(Richmond, 1929), 262.

He warned,

A Study of the State

82d ailv Picayune. October 30, November 1, 1878.
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though, that the patience of the "oppressed and neglected"
was wearing thin; that Louisiana could never prosper as long
as its working people continued to be "little better than
83
mendicants and slaves."
The Daily Picayune sneered at the
Workingmen*s party and called it "a half hearted communism,"
and opined it would not make much headway with the hard84
headed, practical population of New Orleans.
Conservative Democrats watched apprehensively as the
Greenbacker, laborite, and other splinter groups began to
take shape in the summer and fall of 1878.

At the state

Democratic convention in August, conservative leaders moved
swiftly to blunt the liberal-inflationist uprising.

For

what came out of the Democratic conclave was a classic Greenback party document.00

The platform implored Congress to

repeal the Resumption Act, which placed existing paper
money on par with gold; demanded repeal of the restrictive
national banking system; and advocated the issuance of
"treasury notes, commonly known as greenbacks."

These

greenbacks, said the Louisiana Democracy, should be used for
all legal tender purposes, including the redemption of United
States bonds.

Republicans were condemned for the "ruinous

financial policy" which oppressed working people.
83Ibid.. November 2, 1878.
84T, . ,
Ibid.
®5New York Times. August 8 , 1878.
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"warmest sympathy" was tenderly expressed for all laboring
i
86
classes.

After this outburst of pseudo-liberalism the party
delved, into more practical matters:

Major Burke was nomi

nated for state treasurer and Louisiana's need for a new
constitution was proclaimed.
Nicholls supporters, "it

However, to ease the fears of

[was]

not proposed to displace

or interfere with the incumbent officials of the state
87
government."
But the inflationary part of the platform
had considerable practical value.

The demand for monetary

reform was put to excellent use by those Democrats who were
forced to run against Greenbackers.

In Grant Parish, a hot

bed of inflationism, voters were told that "the Democratic
platform is as good a document as any Greenback man could

88

wish."

By their endorsement-of Greenbackism Louisiana's
new rulers drove yet another nail in the coffin of President
Hayes's hopes for a political New Departure.

Lverywhere in

the South, in 1878, the dominant Democratic party attempted
to placate the agrarian agitation.

But only the Louisiana
89
Democracy, "more reckless than the rest,"
expressed
88New Orleans Democrat, August 7, 1878.

87ibid.
88Colfax Chronicle. October 12, 1878.
89
New York Times. August 8 , 1878.
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inflationary doctrines with such uncompromising boldness.
The New York Times. a mirror of nothern Republican conser
vatism, was aghast at the platform which emerged from the
Baton Rouge convention.

It "contains about as mischievous

a series of demands as the most rabid of the Labor-Green90
back conventions," the Times fumed.
But Edwin L.
Godkin’s Nation probed deeper.

This magazine denounced the

document as "vicious and unprincipled," but understood why
it had been issued.

The "fine gentlemen of Louisiana,"

said the Nation, merely wished to conciliate "the mob," and
are "hoping that the platform will pass for buncombe outside
their own state, and that no mischief will result in
91
Congress."
Future events proved Godkin’s analysis to be
correct.

And something near the nadir of hypocrisy was

plumbed by the Daily Picayune, which condoned the platform
but hoped that the huge Democratic majority would not be
misunderstood by outsiders as an endorsement of Green92
backism.
Not to be left out when crafty politics was afoot,
the state’s Republicans eagerly joined in the betrayal of
agrarian demands.

The wounds suffered by Louisiana Republi

cans in 1876-77 were grievous but not necessarily fatal.
90Ibid.
91Nation. XXVII (August 15, 1878), 89.
9^Pailv Picayune. November 1, 1878.

121
Patronage from the national administration, after 1877,
gave party leaders a livelihood, and the presence of a Negro
voting majority allowed the more naive Republicans to hope
that the state government might someday be recaptured.

A

state Republican convention was held in September of 1878,
but the meeting broke up after the "Customs House faction"
shoved through a resolution which maintained that a quorum
93

was not present.
clear.

The purpose of this maneuver was soon

The dominant wing of the party, the Customs House

men, wished to fuse with the state convention of the
National party which was scheduled to meet in Baton Rouge
on September 18.

The Nationals, when they met, nominated

Dr. John S. Gardiner for State Treasurer and approved of
the following slate in the congressional races:

Henry C.

Castellanos, First District; E. North Cullom, Second
District; Robert 0. Hebert, Third District; J. Madison
Wells, Fourth District; John T. Ludeling, Fifth District;
Arthur Fairfax (short term) Fifth District; and W. L.
94
Larimore, Sixth District.
Only Gardiner, a Baton Rouge
physician, was listed on the ticket as a straight-out
"Greenbacker."

Castellanos and Cullom appeared on the

ticket as "Greenbacker-Republicans," Larimore as an
93W. W. Marks to Rutherford B. Hayes, December 10,
1878, Hayes Papers.
94
New Orleans Democrat. September 20, 1878; New
York Times. September 19, 20, 1878.
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"Independent," and the others were listed as "Republican.
Yet all had the endorsement of the so-called National party,
and, except for Larimore, the candidates were all ante
bellum residents of Louisiana.

Fairfax was the only Negro.

Even partisan Democrats admitted that the National Republi
can combination was under the "exclusive control of white
men."
Thus constituted, the National party of Louisiana
was hardly a bona fide Greenbacker movement.
transpired was rather obvious.

What had

Genuine inflationists,

headed toward a state organization, were thrown into con
fusion by the Democratic platform issued in August.

Into

this vacuum stepped the sharp-eyed Customs House Republi
cans who organized the National convention for the sake of
sailing Republicans under a false flag.

E. North Cullom,

an old Whig turned Republican, had dreamed up the project.^
He did it •’for no other ultimate purpose" than to make in
roads into the solid white vote.

As Cullom told President

Hayes, in confidence, "the Republicans knew perfectly well
they had nothing to gain by taking the field under a square
Republican banner."

White solidarity must be broken.

Otherwise, "the colored man may just as well not vote," for
^5New York Times. October 28, 1878.
96
Daily Picayune. November 10, 1878.
97
E. North Cullom to Rutherford B. Hayes, February
6 , 1878, Hayes Papers.
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his ballots would not be counted as cast,

Cullom assured

Hayes that all the National congressional candidates were
Q Q

simon-pure Republicans. *
Despite its name, the National party of Louisiana
was absolutely mute on the question of monetary reform.

Its

"Address to the People* blasted Burke and the "flock of
cormorants" of the Bourbon Democracy and compared them-correctly but hypocritically--to the Republicans "who
wallowed in the corruptions of the Warmoth and Kellogg
99
administrations."
Special attention was devoted to the
old Know-Nothing element.

National candidates, some of

them at least, lashed out at the foreign-born voters in New
Orleans.

Poor whites and blacks were informed that

foreigners should henceforth be kept out of the state;
otherwise, native labor would be deprived of its chance to
make a living.

Upstate, the Nationals added anti-Catholic

propaganda to the election b r o t h . B o u r b o n Democratic
spokesmen, seemingly jealous of this competition in the use
of prejudice, angrily reacted to the anti-Catholic propa
ganda.

They chided the National party for its

99

Daily Picayune. November 3, 1878. Obviously the
two ex-governors were not at the moment in control of the
Republican state party machinery, even though Kellogg still
held a seat in the United States Senate. But neither War
moth or Kellogg publicly denounced the "National" maneuver.
^■^New Orleans Democrat. October 21, 1878; Shreveport
Evening Standard. October 22, 1878.

124
"fanaticism."'^'*'
True Greenbackers and labor reformers were baffled
by the turn of events. . The Democrats took their platform.
The Republicans took their name.

In no other state was the

monetary issue so confused, for only in Louisiana did the
Democrats come out so strongly for inflation, and only in
Louisiana was the National party mute on the subject.
Adding to the muddle was the fact that quarantines against
districts infected with yellow fever halted the ordinary
means of communication between the hills and low country.
Some northern parishes were without mail service from early
August to late November.

109
^

Meanwhile the conventions and

the election had taken place.
While the campaign was underway the Democratic and
National candidates for Congress, as if by common consent,
avoided the monetary issue.

Nationals tried to stir up

religious and anti-foreign sentiment while the Democrats
stuck by their old reliable, the race issue.

However, both

parties tried to eat into each other1s bastion of strength.
Just as the so-called Nationals courted dissident whites,
so did Democrats ask for Negro support.

But the Democrats

seldom pleaded with the colored man--they insisted.
Appearing before a Negro rally in North Louisiana, a
^^•Dailv Picayune. November 1, 1878.
10^Coushatta Citizen, quoted in ibid.. November 29.
1878.
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Democratic candidate bluntly told his audience that con
servative whites had "all the intelligence," and "negroes
are ignorant,"

103

He said he was doing them a favor by

telling them to vote Democratic, since "we are going to
carry the election anyhow. . . .
you."
they

We can get along without

And the Shreveport Evening Standard warned:

"If

[ the Negroes ] do not appreciate these efforts and

still join the enemies of the State . . . they must take
the iconsequences."^^

Hill country Greenbackers who allied

with the Republicans were roughly handled.

Benjamin Brian,

running for the legislature on a coalition ticket, was
informed that he "was a good dog gone astray.

He was in the
105
company of sheep killing dogs and had to be killed."
The clever shifts of both Democrats and Nationals
made discussion of the currency question meaningless.

Con

sequently, some local agrarian condidates took a different
tack and lashed out at the planters and merchants for en
couraging the spread of the crop-lien system.
leaders were horrified.

Democratic

In Caddo Parish, Independents who

criticized the crop-lien to Negro audiences were denounced
as incendiary r a d i c a l s . A Democratic judge warned that
^ C o l f a x Chronicle. October 12, 1878.
104
Shreveport Evening Standard. October 15, 1878.
105
Colfax Chronicle. October 5, 1878.
^ ^ N e w York Times. January 20, 1878.
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if these malcontents won, "Grant and the troops" would soon
march through the streets of Shreveport, and "the place
would be made so desolate the bats and owls would roost on
107
our wharves."
Violence increased as election day of 1878
108
approached.
All Louisiana campaigns in the generation
following Reconstruction would draw blood, and 1878 set the
post-Reconstruction pattern.

Threats of murder were suf

ficient to persuade Republican campaigners to flee Natchit
oches Parish and to convince the entire slate of Independent
candidates in Morehouse Parish that healthier climates must
109
be sought posthaste.
More stringent measures were taken
in troubled Tensas, where eleven men were killed, and in
Caddo, where "up to twelve" Negroes, by Democratic count,
met d e a t h . T h e s e

outrages supplied convenient propaganda

for northern Republican journals.

The New York Times head

lined one Tensas story "KILLING REPUBLICAN VOTERS," which
neatly summarized the limit of theHmes's solicitude for the
^ ^Dailv Picayune. January 11, 1879.
^®®Fatalities were anticipated.
In September a
leading Democratic newspaper in North Louisiana predicted
"the deluded Negroes" would "provoke their white neighbors
to violence." Shreveport Evening Standard. September 28,
1878.
109
Daily Picayune. January 8 , 1878; New York Times.
November 4, 1878, January 8 , 1879.
^■^Natchez (Miss.) Democrat, quoted in New York
Times. October 18, 1878; Shreveport Times, quoted in Daily
Picayune. November 14, 1878; New York Times. Januarv 8 .
1879.
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freedmen of Louisiana.

111

For the state as a whole, at

least forty persons died in election disturbances.
of the dead were Negroes.

112

Most

Republican claims ran as high as
llO

seventy-five murdered Negroes in Caddo Parish alone.
Most dramatic were the events in Tensas Parish.
Fighting broke out when an armed band of planters tried to
capture Arthur Fairfax, the Negro leader who set the fusion
effort there in motion.

Judge Cordill claimed the fusion-

ists were "trying to excite the Negroes to violence," and
called in white militia from the surrounding parishes.
The leader of the rescue mission was General J. Floyd King
of Concordia Parish, who had a personal interest in the
affray since he was a Democratic candidate for Congress.
Nearby Mississippians, hearing that private property and
"the lives and honor of women and children were involved,"
reacted instinctively and came across the river by the
scores.
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After being told by white supporters of the

Country People*s ticket that it was "not a nigger’s war,"
H l N ew York Times. October 14, 1878.
^^Woodward, Origins of the New South. 57.
113Nation, XXVII (December 12, 1878), 358.
■^4New York Times. October 26, 1878; January 8 , 1879.
It is interesting to note that Governor Nicholls blamed the
Cordill group for starting the trouble. This fact was used
against Nicholls by the ultra-Bourbons. Cf. New Orleans
Weekly Pelican. May 11, 1889.
■^^New York Times. October 18, 1878. One hundred
armed Mississippians reportedly crossed the river.
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the Mississippi volunteers went home,-LJ-^

Indeed, they had

profaned the Holy of Holies— States* Rights.
Election returns from over the state gave mute evi
dence of intimidation and fraud.

The entire slate of

Democratic congressmen was elected, and Burke beat Gardiner
for the treasury post.

Rankest of all the frauds were those

occurring in certain parishes where Negroes constituted over
sixty per cent of the total population, but where Democrats
won with votes in excess of the white registration.

Returns

from these parishes, when compared with registration figures,
make interesting readings
117
Congressional Elect ion-*"*of November 5. 1878
(select parishes)
Demo
cratic
vote

Parish

Bossier
Caddo
Concordia
E. Feliciana
Morehouse
Natchitoches
Richland
Tensas
W. Feliciana
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1,401
1,815
1,037
964
1,102
2,811
1,008
2,795
1,796

National
Repub.
vote
45
279
955
1
19
0
8
90
98

White
Regis
tration
800
li476
294
743
646
1,830
643
318
440

Negro
Regis
tration
2,200
3,732
2,637
1,005
1,337
1,963
1,232
2,931
1,540

Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902,
546-49, 570-72; Daily Picayune. November 3. 1878.
Since
registration figures in Bossier parish were not submitted in
1878, the figures for 1880 are used.
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Close behind in the suspicious category were eight
other parishes listing a total Negro registration of 4,319,
but in which the National Republicans received the total of
one vote.

118

As the awesome returns poured in, even the

staunch New Orleans Democrat admitted that the "immense
majorities . . . are confusing--almost incomprehensible."

119

But, mused the Daily Picayune, since "frauds in Louisiana
elections are . . . things of the . . .

past," the only

logical explanation was that Negroes had suddenly and
sagaciously deserted their old Republican leaders.

Thus,

the harmonious returns of 1878, according to the latter
newspaper, offered convincing proof that race antagonism was
•
*
120
dying
out.
^

Such a schizophrenic explanation was contrary to
truth and common sense.

Ample evidence exists that the

overwhelming majority of Negro voters in the state would
have supported the National ticket if given the opportunity.
Many endured incredible hardships in attempting to do so.

191

*^®Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902,
546-48, 570-72.
H ^ N e w Orleans Democrat. November 9, 1878, quoted in
Philip D. Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana, 18771900" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State Uni
versity, 1950), 48.
•^^ D a i l v Picayune. November 9-10, 1878.
121
U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Committee
to Inquire into the Alleged Frauds and'Violence in the
Elections of i8'/6 . 46 dona.. 3 sess.. No. 655. passim.
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The Negro masses were illiterate and their political acumen
rather weak, but even the most ignorant of them knew full
well which of the two parties stood uncompromisingly for
White Supremacy,
obvious.

Some Democratic candidates admitted the

General King, the newly elected Congressman from

the Fifth District, was quoted as saying:

"I consider a

negro if he votes the Democratic ticket to be either a fool
1 00

or a hypocrite." ^

Probably a handful of Negroes did mark

ballots for the Bourbon Democrats of their own free will.
Probably in Ireland there were some Catholic peasants who
loved their English landlords and supported the Tory
ticket.123
On the local level Democratic opponents in 1878 met
with only meagre success.

Republicans, Nationals, and

Independents obtained twenty-six legislative seats.

104

Probably just one of the Nationals, C. H. Watson of St.
Helena, was a bona fide Greenbacker.

The Democrats elected

the municipal slate in New Orleans, but failed to gain a
clear majority*

125

John Fleming*s liborite ticket was

denied representation at the polls and recorded a mere 209
122Pailv Picayune. January 9, 1879.
1OO

North American Review. CLI (November, 1890), 594.
^ 4Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 205207.
125

New Orleans Democrat. November 9, 1878.
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votes.

Before the election, a Democratic paper estimated

Fleming’s strength at 2,000.

126

North of the Red River,

Republicans managed to salvage East Carroll and Madison, but
their Independent and Greenback allies in other parishes
went down to defeat.
Even so, the election of 1878 blazed a trail for the
more ambitious and relatively more successful PopulistRepublican combination of later years.

The New York Times,

looking over the 1878 returns, prophesied that "the experi
ment . . . probably will not be without its fruits in
Louisiana. . . . The ice is broken, and white Democrats have
led negro Republicans in a conflict with the ’regular*
127
machine."
But if the pattern for future agrarian protest
was set in Louisiana in 1878, so was the autocratic Bourbon
method for perverting or repressing such protest.

^■^New Orleans L ’Union, quoted in Daily Picayune.
November 1, 1878.
107
■ New York Times. January 20, 1879.

CHAPTER IV
"EXODUSTERS" AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1879
Among Louisianafs Negro population, dissatisfaction
with Bourbon rule entered an acute phase in the early
months of 1879.

An emotionally charged movement known as

"the Exodus," or "the Kansas Fever," suddenly seized the
imagination of the colored population of the lower Missis
sippi River valley.

Some who observed it compared the

Exodus of 1879 to the hegira of the Hebrew peoples from
Egypt.^

In Louisiana, at least 10,000 Negroes departed the

state that year, and perhaps 50,000 made futile efforts to
o
leave.
Since 1874 there had been vague talk of a Negro
migration.

At that time Benjamin "Pap" Singleton, a

^-International Review. VII (October, 1879), 373.
9
This estimate is based upon an evaluation of Exo
dus reports in the following newspapers: Daily Picayune.
March 1-December 30, 1879; New Orleans Weekly Louisianian.
March 15-December 15, 1879; St. Joseph North Louisiana
Journal. January 18-May 24, 1879; Shreveport Evening
Standard. April 22, 1879-January 4, 1880. It is possible
that the number of Louisiana Negroes who attempted to join
the Exodus exceeded 50,000, for all of the above sources
tended to minimize the migration.
132
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Tennessee Negro, began sending promotional literature to
colored preachers throughout the South which advertised a
freedman's colony he was planning to create in the state of
3
Kansas.
Even more distant was the journey proposed by a
Shreveport Negro group in 1877.

The latter tried unsuc

cessfully to arouse enthusiasm for a mass migration to
4
Liberia.
In 1878 a report from Pointe Coupee Parish told
of a Negro plot "to kill the leading white men of the
5
region and establish a nation of their own."
No whites
died but five Pointe Coupee Negroes were lynched.

Rumors

of a great migration, or other drastic action by the colored
population, persisted.
The Kansas Exodus of 1879 was born of confusion and
despair.

The reasons why it burst forth at that particular

time, and in Louisiana, are fairly clear.

The two years

which had gone by since the end of Reconstruction witnessed
an increase in economic oppression; landlords and merchants
were squeezing Negro sharecroppers and renters, now that
home rule had been restored, with greater impunity.

The

deaths and vote frauds which resulted from the congressional
election of 1878 boded ill for the colored people of
3
John G. Van Deusen, "The Exodus of 1879," Journal
of Nearo History. XXI (April, 1936), 119.
4
New York Times. June 9, 1877; Shreveport Herald,
quoted in Daily Picayune. January 5, 1878.
^New Orleans Democrat. June 7, 1878*
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Louisiana.

As the Negroes themselves realized, 1878 had

provided a foretaste of the wrongs to come."^
The fraud and bloodshed of 1878 prompted the
meeting of a subcommittee of the United States Senate in New
Orleans, under the chairmanship of Republican Senator Henry
7
M. Teller of Colorado, beginning January 7, 1879.
Hundreds
of Negroes flocked into the city to pour their tales of woe
into the willing ears of the Republican Senators.

Once

having testified, the Negroes feared the trip home might
terminate in the Great Beyond.

8

These disconsolate and

homeless people became the tinder for a flashfire movement
destined to sweep across plantations from Louisiana to the
Carolinas.
While the Teller sub-committee met in New Orleans,
Republican Senator William Windom of Minnesota arose in
Congress to inquire into the possibility of "promoting and
encouraging" a migration of maltreated southern Negroes to
the western states, where they might take out homestead
g
privileges.
Word of Windom*s resolution quickly reached

6

Daily Picayune. April 22, 1879.

7

New Orleans Democrat. January 8 , 1879.

®New Orleans Times. January 20, 1879. The Negroes*
fear of reprisals was justified. The Democratic press ad
mitted that two Shreveport Negroes who were on their way
downriver were taken by a mob, and "nothing more has been
heard of them." Daily Picayune, quoted in New York Times.
December 22, 1878.
9
Congressional Record. 45 Cong., 3 sess., 483.
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the freedmen of Louisiana, who did not seem to share the
white verdict that the proposal was "stupid and idiotic.
Within two weeks, thousands of Negroes in the alluvial
cotton districts of Louisiana and Mississippi were packing
their belongings for the journey to the West.

The first

group departed Madison Parish in February, to debark at St.
Louis, shivering, barefooted, and half-starved.^
Later "Exodusters," as they were called, followed
the route taken by the Madison Parish vanguard:

north by

steamboat to St. Louis, then west by rail to the plains.
Most selected Kansas as the final destination.

"Pap"

Singleton1s earlier agitation could have had something to do
with this choice; but more important, the very name of
Kansas had a special connotation for southern Negroes.
"Kansas," said one Exodus promoter, "with her freedom and
broad prairies, with the memories of John Brown and his
heroic struggle, seems naturally the state to seek."

12

The Exodus excitement might have cooled had it not
been for the action of the Louisiana legislature in setting
13
up the machinery for a constitutional convention in 1879.
Ever since the triumph of Nicholls, unreconstructed
J ^ D a i l y Picayune. March 17, 1879.
■^Van Deusen, Journal of Negro History. XXX, 119-

21 .
^ D a i l v Picayune. April 22, 1879,
13
New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. March 15, 1879.
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Democrats had clamored for an overturn of the Radicals1
constitution of 1868.

Organic law, it was said, must now

be written by "real people."

14

The constitutional con

vention began its work in April of 1879; it was dominated,
of course, by Democrats.

Exodus leaders perceived that the

"real people" meant to tamper with universal manhood
suffrage.

Among the Negro masses the fear was less well

defined, but it was generally understood that the convention
would produce nothing of benefit for dark-complexioned
15
citizens.
River, roads in the cotton parishes soon were
choked with creaking sharecropper wagons.

Some sold their

meager possessions for boat fare to St. Louis.

Others,

without funds, struck out on foot for "somewhar."'1'^

Kansas

people were advised by Louisiana*s Bourbons to keep their
hogs penned u p . ^
On April 18, 1879, as delegates to the consti
tutional convention were arriving in New Orleans, a less
formal assembly convened at the Free Mission Baptist Church
18
on Common Street.
This "Exodus convention," as it was
*4Pailv Picayune. November 9, 1877.
15
New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. March 15, 1879.
*^St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. April 12, 1879.
^ Dailv Picayune. April 30, 1879.
^®New York Times. April 18 , 20, 1879; New Orleans
Weekly Louisianian. April 26, 1879.
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called, had been organized by George T. Ruby, T. Morris
Chester, the Rev. Emperor Williams, and others.

Ruby

claimed the movement began as a secret organization in
Caddo Parish in 1874.
chief instigator.

19

A Negro named Henry Adams was the
He wandered from one plantation to the

next, quickening the pulse of resentment by asking the
field hands to tell him of their grievances against the
white landlords.

20

Now, said Ruby, this association had

grown to a membership of 92,800.

He claimed that above two-

thirds, 69,000, were Louisiana Negroes, the others being
from Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama.

Ruby attri

buted the growth and potency of the exodus idea to the fact
that "representative political leaders

[Negro and white

Republican politicians ] were neither intrusted
21
nor informed of its existence."

C sic ] with

Negroes were cautioned that the Exodus needed better
organization.

Ruby suggested that "head men" be appointed

to go to Kansas and search out the best locations for home
steads.

"Meanwhile," he said, "pending the formation of

.colonies, . . .

we advise an abandonment by the colored

people of all the turbulent, bulldozed
of this State."

[cotton ] parishes

He added that in the sugar lands of South

^ Dailv Picayune. April 22, 1879.
20Van Deusen, Journal of Nearo History. XXI, 122-23.
21Pailv Picayune. April 22, 1879.
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Louisiana "life and personal liberty are comparatively
secure," and that the wage system prevalent there would give
Negroes a better chance of accumulating the wherewithal for
the trip to Kansas and the purchase of farm equipment.

22

In effect, this was a proposal to the Negroes to
wait— to temporarily halt the Exodus to Kansas.

Ruby’s

advice about the sugar parishes as an intermediate stop for
the western journey did have some merit.

But the suspicion

arises that some of the Exodus leaders might have been in
the pay of sugar planters who were willing to depopulate
the cotton parishes in order to build up a bigger labor
surplus for themselves.

A convention of cotton growers of

Louisiana and Mississippi, meeting at Vicksburg on May 2,
evidently believed the sugar barons to have had something
23
to do with the exodus excitement.
State Senator Theophile T. Allain of Iberville Parish denounced the "Exodusters" but said if they simply could not remain in the
cotton parishes, "let them remove to the sugar belt."
Allain was a Negro.

24

He was also a sugar planter.

Worried Negro politicians, with few exceptions,
tried to break up the Exodus meeting.

Pinckney B. S.

Pinchback and James D. Kennedy, editors of the Weekly
22Ibid.
23Ibid., May 3, 1879.
24Ibid., April 24, 1879.
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Louisianian, endeavored to convince the assembly of its
error.

Pinchback called the Exodus a "wild goose chase,"

and blamed it on the "influence of an illiterate and misguided clergy."

25

Even Arthur Fairfax, who approved of the

Kansas migration, remarked that there were too many un
worthy Negro ministers in it.

Fairfax said the editor of

the Donaldsonville Chief told him that this one newspaper
shop printed and sold over 500 licenses to preach in one
26
month alone.
But preachers rather than politicians had the ear
of Louisiana’s colored people in 1879.

Illiterate or not,

the Exodus agitators showed an awareness of economic
issues, and a realization that politicians of both parties
and both races were insincere in their expressions of sym
pathy for working people.

One example of this was the

reception accorded David Young at the gxodus rally.

Young

was a State Senator and one of the least reliable of Negro
officeholders.

His appearance almost caused a riot.

He

was denounced as a "bloated capitalist" when he urged the
blacks to work out their differences with the land owners.

27

^ N e w Orleans Weekly Louisianian. April 5, 1879.
26
Daily Picayune. July 10, 1879. Fairfax, in addi
tion to being an unsuccessful aspirant to Congress in 1878,
was also President of the Negro Baptist Convention of
Louisiana. During the Exodus excitement of 1879, Rev. Fair
fax’s actions were somewhat hampered due to the fact that he
was awaiting trial for murder. St. Joseph North Louisiana
Journal. April 26, 1879.
^ N e w York Times. April 20, 1879.
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After Young was hooted down, the assembly listened to a
message sent from Frederick Douglass, a noted Negro leader
on the national scene.

Douglass asked that the Exodus

cease, "because it is an untimely concession to the idea
that colored people and white people cannot live together
in peace and prosperity."

28

The gathering was unimpressed.

Someone in the crowd perspicaciously asked "why Fred
Douglass had left the South, where he now advises his race
OQ

to stay?"^7

It seems there was no answer.

The New Orleans Exodus convention served to publi
cize the movement but did little more.

Money was supposed

to be raised for organizational purposes but the finance
committee reported a total collection of just $11.05.

On

the last day the audience listened to an address by a
certain Mr. Turcke, an agent for the Honduras Immigration
Society.

Apparently he praised the virtues of Honduras over

Kansas, but his speech was delivered in such a thick German
accent that his listeners were unable to ascertain what it
30
was all about.
Proceedings were closed by T. Morris Chester, an exmember of the Louisiana State Board of Education.

Chester

sounded a note of despair but urged that the Exodus
28
29
30

New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. May 10, 1879.
Daily Picayune. April 19, 1879.
Ibid.. April 22, 1879.
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continue.

"We have been systematically cheated and

plundered by planters and country merchants until starv
ation stares us in the face," he exclaimed.

"If we are

illiterate, it is because white men made it a crime to
teach us to read. . . .

If we are poor, it is because we

have been denied the right of property, life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness.

Our past in the South has been

an existence of sorrow, tears and blood, and under the un
christian and despotic public sentiment, the future is without a ray of hope."

31

Shortly after the disbanding of the New Orleans
gathering the Hxodus excitement reached its peak in North
Louisiana.

Dispatches from harassed planters revealed that

besides the 5,000 and more already departed, 3,000 others
were now assembled along the Mississippi between the towns
of Vidalia and St. Joseph.
Senator Young into service.

Influential whites again pressed
Young was from Concordia Parish

and presumably he would have more influence there than he
had shown at the New Orleans rally.

And so Young left his

seat at the constitutional convention to go to Vidalia and
persuade his fellow blacks to abandon their journey.

32

He

exhorted to the crowds along the levee; he needed them as
constituents just as planters needed them as laborers.

This

Negro Republican had hitherto been a favorite target for the
31Ibid.
32Ibid.. April 27, 1879.
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Bourbon press.

But as a reward for helping to stem the

fcxodus tide, the Daily Picayune ceased calling him names and
used the appellation "Mr. Y o u n g . W h e n

his work was done

and the Exodus fever had subsided, Senator Young*s value to
the Democrats was ended.

In 1880 some old charges concern

ing misuse of public funds were revived and Young was expelled from the legislature.

34

Re-elected in 1882, he was

again expelled.'*5
Whatever Young*s influence, the Exodus excitement
began subsiding in the cotton parishes by late May.

Colored

sharecroppers who earlier spoke of moving were now involved
36
in bringing their cotton crops to maturity.
Perversely,
however, the excitement had begun to spread to the sugar
parishes and hundreds of colored families from South Louisi37
ana started for "the promised land" of Kansas.
Ripples
33

Ibid.. May 3, 1879.

34

Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of
Representatives. 1880, 77-79, 88-89.
35
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. June 15,
1882. Young eventually became persona non grata to Republi
cans as well as Democrats. Probably his most grotesque
action came at the state Republican nominating convention in
1884, when he arose to move that Samuel D. McEnery, the
Negro-baiting Governor of Louisiana, be endorsed by that
convention for reelection.
"Dave Young," a Republican news
paper commented, "is cheeky enough to look Gabriel in the
face and demand his trumpet." New Orleans Weekly Pelican.
November 12, 1887.
36St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. May 24, 1879.
**^New York Times. July 16, 1879.
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were now spreading far over the South; Kansas fever was
being felt as far away as North Carolina and Virginia.

How

ever, Louisiana and Mississippi continued to supply the
majority of ragged migrants.

Figures vary, but throughout

the South perhaps 200,000 made efforts to go on the
38
journey.
How many actually reached the Sunflower State
is unknown, but about 40,000 were reported there at the end
39
of the year.
As late as January of 1880, "GWINE TO KANSAS"
reports appeared in North Louisiana newspapers.

The Shreve

port Evening Standard remarked that these latter unfortu
nates would reach their destination "in time to get the
cream of the winter,"4^

Truly, the climate and people of

the Great Plains were not proving to be entirely hospitable.
Some who reached Kansas immediately became dissatisfied and
made a footsore journey back to the cotton land; others, at
intervals during the following decade, moved out of Kansas
to seek greener pastures in Oklahoma.4 *LouisianaVs planters were very fond of complaining
about the general worthlessness of Negro labor.
38

Simkins, A History of the South. 515.

^F ort ier (ed.), Louisiana. I, 400-401.
4<-)Shreveport Evening Standard. January 4, 1880
^Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. January 7, February
6 , 1890.
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Traditionally, this topic ranked alongside the weather and
politics as a favorite topic of genteel conversation.

Yet

the conduct of landowning Louisianians during the Exodus
excitement indicates that the Negro as an agricultural
worker was not so despised, after all.

"What are our lands

worth without labor?," cried an anguished East Carroll
planter.

"Would we not be senseless idiots to drive away

our sole dependence.

AO

. . ?"^

A delta editor urged his

readers to "let no means remain untried" to stem the flight
of colored labor,4^

In Morehouse Parish these means

included a resolution to tar and feather anyone soliciting
44
or advising colored people to emigrate.
Planters in
veigled certain steamboat companies into refusing passage
for migrant Negroes, whether the latter had funds or not.
Boat captains on the Red River let it be known that emi
grants to Kansas "must walk, as they don*t intend to trans
port a single one of them."45

Negroes met this same obsta

cle along the Mississippi River.

At the latter stas am, how

ever, hundreds obtained passage by pretending they were only
going as far as Vicksburg or Memphis.

Once there, they

4^Letter from T. L. Van Fossen, an East Carroll
planter, published in St. Louis Republican, quoted in Daily
Picayune. April 12, 1879.
43
St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. April 1 2 , J879.
44Bastrop Morehouse Enterprise, quoted in Daily
Picayune. May 2, 18^9.
45
Daily Picayune. April 15, 1879.
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would wait a day or two, then continued their journey north
ward.4^
Various horror stories wer e'circulated among the
blacks.

Some Kansas towns, it was rumored, threatened to

shoot all colored people on s i g h t o t h e r Kansas com
munities supposedly refused to let any of "Uncle A b e ’s misguided children" inside the corporation limits.

4-8

An alarm

was spread that Negroes who did manage to get to St. Louis
were dying of smallpox.

49

Vivid pictures were painted of

the "wailing winds and drifted snowbanks" of the Kansas
50
winter.
And shame was heaped upon those who planned to
depart.

Even if they were mistreated, wasn*t fleeing the
51
state a poor way of asserting one’s manhood?
It was not

unknown for planters to journey to Kansas, pleading with
52
their ex-laborers to return home.
In the end, a few measures were taken to halt the
Exodus which showed wisdom and moderation.

In Concordia

^ International Review. VII (October, 1879), 378.
47

St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. April 12,1879.

48Lake Providence Carroll Conservative, quoted in
ibid.. May 10, 1879.
49
St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. March 22,1879.
Shreveport Evening Standard. January 4, 1880
5^Pailv Picayune. April 19, 1879.
52Ibid.. May 16, 1879.
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Parish, for example, planters stemmed the tide not only with
Senator Young1s oratory but also by equitably adjusting the
sharecroppers1 contracts and striking off all the back debts
53
At plantation stores.
Eventually, even the dreaded con
stitutional convention worked to placate the unhappy colored
voters.

In mid-July a coalition of rural Democrats and

Republican delegates beat down an attempt by the ultra54
Bourbons to restrict manhood suffrage.
Such economic and
political concessions were grudgingly given, but had bene
ficial results from the planter point of view.

Exodus ex

citement began to fade.
Events of 1878 and 1879 showed something of the
potential strength of white and Negro agrarianism.

But at

the same time, the congressional elections and the consti
tutional convention which followed also proved that farming
and labor interests had little-voice in the presiding
councils of the state government.

Generally, the consti

tution of 1879 was a triumph for the conservative planters
and businessmen.

Though the convention did not restrict the

right of suffrage, the fight to preserve it had been a
bitter one.^^
Delegates from the hill parishes joined with
53Ibid«. May 3, 1879.
New Orleans Times. July 16, 1879; Shreveport
Eveninct Standard. November 27, 1879.
55Pailv Picayune. July 10-12, 1879.
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Republicans in the convention to defeat suffrage re
striction.

A grim warning influenced the final vote.

If

the planters and businessmen tampered with the franchise,
delegates were cautioned, not only would the Kansas Exodus
be intensified, but a coalition would develop (at the
general election to ratify the constitution) "between the
poor whites and colored people, which would . . . inaugurate a reign of communism and secret societies."
kind of talk was not all idle vapor.
not unknown to Louisiana.

This

Marxist ideas were

New Orleans was one of seven

cities in the United States where a branch of the Inter
national Workingmen*s Association (or "Red International")
57
had taken root between 1867 and 1872.
Shortly before the
constitutional convention met, "the Socialists of New
Orleans" celebrated the anniversary of the Paris Commune,
hoisted a red flag, and exhorted working people "to liberate
themselves from the oppression of a small minority."

58

After much debate, the constitutional convention
59
voted down suffrage restriction eighty-five to thirty-four.
56Ibid.. July 10, 1879.
^ P h i l i p Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the
United States (New York, 1947), I, 4l3; Cf. Pearce, "The
Rise and Decline of Labor in New Orleans," 23-24.
^ D a i l v Picayune. March 20, 1879.
5^New Orleans Democrat. July 11, 1879.
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The extreme Bourbons were also forced to compromise their
demand that bondholders be permitted to retain the high
interest rate of seven per cent on the state debts which
had been piled up during Reconstruction.^

Conservative

spokesmen admitted that much of the debt was fraudulent in
origin.

Yet this fact was not important, they argued.

was the ‘•honor” of the state which mattered.

It

The original

virtue of the bonds was of no significance, so the argument
ran; these bonds were now private property, and therefore,
sacred.

Specious appeals were made about the "widows and

orphans” who would suffer if debts were repudiated or the
interest rate scaled d o w n . ^

The truth was that wealthy

Louisianians of the Democratic faith as well as Republicans
and foreign capitalists now possessed these bonds; conse
quently, businessmen in New Orleans joined with English in
vestors to urge the convention not to tamper with the
O
debt.
When the debt issue came up in the convention,
Republicans stood squarely with the business Bourbons to
oppose a scaling of the principal or the interest rate.
Republican unanimity was accounted for with the remark that
^Caldwell, A Banking History of Louisiana. 105.
During the Kellogg administration, in 1874, Louisiana *s
state debt was cut almost in half, in principal. But the
seven per cent per annum interest on the remainder was re
tained. .See also Benjamin U. Ratchford, American State
Debts (Durham, 1941), 183-92.
!
^ Dailv Picayune. May 14, 1879.
62London Times, June 10, 1879*
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"the party loved honesty."

But perhaps the secretary of the

convention came closer to the truth when he related the
story that a $200,000 slush fund had been distributed to
make sure the thirty-two Republican delegates saw things the
bondholders* way.
Country Democrats, joined by delegates from the
poorer wards of New Orleans, fought for a scaling down of
the interest rates and even hoped to slash the principal
down to $ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Leader of the repudiationists was
delegate E. E. Kidd of poverty-stricken Jackson Parish.
"Captain" Kidd, as the Bourbons called him, threw a fright
into New Orleans businessmen with his slashing attacks upon
the bonded debt.

65

Finally, a compromise was arranged.

Although the principal of the debt was not molested, the
interest rates on the bonds were severely reduced.

Thus,

what the New Orleans Times called the "communistic, spirit"
of the pine hills had won a partial victory.
Outside of the suffrage and debt issues, the Bour
bon program emerged from the convention triumphant and in
tact.

The state property tax was reduced to a paltry six
^ Dailv Picayune. July 1-2, 1879.

^4New Orleans Times. March 13, 1879; Nation.
XXVIII (June 5, 1879), 212.
65
Daily Picayune. July 4, 1879; Congressional
Record. 47 Cong., Special Sess. Senate, 145.
^ N e w Orleans Times. quoted in Woodward, Origins of
the New South. 91
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mills on the dollar; parish and local taxes were limited to
ten m i l l s . A l l

but the smallest manufacturing establish

ments were exempted from any taxation whatsoever for a period
of ten years, despite the cry of one country delegate that
"this effort -to overturn the agricultural character of the
state, and make it a manufacturing center, must fail."

68

In other action, the convention decided to vest inordinate
power in the office of governor, while the authority of the
legislature was so narrowed that its functions became
"almost mechanical."

69

The increase in gubernatorial power, especially in
the appointment of local officials, was politically the most
significant work of the convention.
were looking toward the future.

The Bourbon delegates

They had in mind the domi

nation of the entire state by the simple method of virtually
turning local government over to the executive office.
Therefore, in future elections, their task was greatly
simplified; they merely had to see to it that the proper
sort of man was nominated for this one office.
67

70

The

Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 209.

^®Ibid., Art. 207; Daily Picayune. July 26, 1879.
The ten year tax exemption for manufacturers was extended
for ten more years by constitutional amendment in 1888.
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian Advocate. May 12, 1888.
^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana.
I, 46.
70
Chambers, A History of Louisiana. I, 46.
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incumbent governor, Nicholls, was rapidly proving himself to
be recalcitrant and undesirable; and through some fast work
on the part of. Major Burke and Louis Wiltz in the closing
days of the convention, a provision was inserted into the
document which cut Nicholls*s term short by one year.
Theoretically, the Governor was eligible for re-election,
but it was common knowledge that he stood no chance at all
of being nominated at the next party convention.

All

elected state and legislative officials, except Treasurer
71
Burke, had their terms cut short along with the Governor1s.
Burke, by the way, was

presumed to be the mastermind

fight to halt outright

repudiation of the state debt at the

constitutional convention.

of the

"Verily," snapped the Colfax

Chronicle, "merit hath its reward, and the Major deserves
something for his service in the interest of the bond
holders."*^
The country Democracy also lost its fight against
the Louisiana State Lottery Company.

Charles Howard*s

powerful gambling concern had been greatly displeased when
the legislature, prior

to the convention, voted to repeal

the lotteryfs charter;

Governor Nicholls, after some
73
lation, signed the reform measure in March of 1879.
^Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 264.
72Colfax Chronicle. August 2, 1879.
73
New Orleans Democrat. March 28, 1879.

vacil-
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Howard's next move had been to train his guns on the up
coming convention.
The lottery question consumed eight days of debate
in the convention.

All the Republican delegates voted to

give the lottery legal status in the new organic law.74
But backland Democrats, as on the debt issue, parted
company with the business element of their party.

When

Democratic delegates caucused, mention of the lottery had
an effect similar to "tossing a firebrand into a powder
75
magazine."
William A. Robertson of St. Landry Parish led
the pro-lottery Democratic forces at the convention.
Harking back to the crisis of 1877, he reminded Democrats
of something many of them preferred to forget--that the
lottery had given much financial aid in the fight to over
throw

Radical rule.

In fact, he said, the present Demo

cratic governemnt "would never have been established" with76
out lottery money.
The alignment of planter-merchant
Democrats with the Republican delegates was clearly too
much for the hill delegates, but they fought on nonetheless.
Their churchgoing constituents in North Louisiana hated the
74Since the lottery had financed the Democratic coup
of 1877, the Louisiana Republicans' ability to forgive is
truly touching. Or perhaps some other consideration was
involved.
75Pailv Picayune. July 10, 1879.
76Ibid.. July 9, 1879.
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lottery and expected their representatives to fight on to
the bitter end.
Both sides in the lottery dispute agreed that public
sentiment was generally against Howard’s company; but, as
Robertson suggested, the people’s anger was directed prima
rily at the monopoly features of the old charter.

He then

introduced a proposal to continue the charter until January
1, 1894, for which the lottery would pay the state $40,000
per year, as provided by the original legislative act of
1868.

As a sop to public opinion the prior monopoly was
77
repealed.
Theoretically, future legislative sessions
could charter all the lotteries they wished.

But the Howard

lottery was the only one specifically named in the consti
tution.

And subsequent legislatures never chartered a

rival; lottery influence saw to that.

78

Curiously, another

article in the constitution declared gambling to be a vice.
As soon as the new organic law was ratified, company adver
tisements could boast:

"This is the Only Lottery Ever

Voted on and Endorsed by the People of Any State!"

79

On December 8 , 1879, election-satiated Louisiana
went to the polls for its third election in thirteen months.
77

Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 167.

78Robert Cinnamond Tucker, "The Life and Public
Service of E. John Ellis," Louisiana Historical Quarterly
XXX (July, 1946), 746; Forum. XII (January. 1892). 570.
7^Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. April 5,
1882.
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Ratification of the new constitution was a foregone con
clusion, and public interest in the state and local races
was at low ebb.

In truth, there was not much choice.

Louis A. Wiltz, Democratic gubernatorial nominee, was a
staunch conservative.
Taylor Beattie.

So was his Republican opponent,

Wiltz, a banker, a New Orleanean and a

Catholic, was not likely to arouse much enthusiasm among
upstate Democrats.

Judge Beattie was a large planter, an

ex-slaveholder, an ex-Confederate, and an ex-member of the
Knights of the White Camellia.

Colored voters were under-

standably "disgusted" with Beattie’s candidacy.
Republicans expressed a preference for Wiltz.

81

80

Some
When the

votes were counted, Wiltz had won the governorship by a
vote of 74,098 to 42,555.

82

The actual number of votes cast

was probably not sixty per cent of the total returned.
Never before this election was there "such a cold
ness and apathy" in Louisiana politics, wrote a Democratic
voter.

"The people do not know where to look for relief."

83

Feeble attempts were made to arouse third party enthusiasm,
but without notable success.

The "National party" title

®^W. E. Horne to Rutherford B. Hayes, November 10,
1879, Hayes Papers.
®^J.R. G. Pitkin to John Tyler, Jr., August 15, 1879,
copy in Hayes Papers.
QO
Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 5 6 L
83
Daily Picayune. November 15, 1879.
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had fallen into disgrace in Louisiana, and only in Natchit
oches Parish was there a full ticket of Greenback Labor
party candidates in the field.

They were all defeated.®4

The Workingmen’s party in New Orleans, which ran Fleming for
Mayor the year before, met, grumbled, and refused to endorse
anybody.®^

A "Temperance Alliance of Louisiana," centered

around New Orleans, decided shortly before the election to
run a state ticket dedicated to a platform of government aid
to agriculture and restriction on the sale of alcoholic
beverages.

86

Their candidate for governor was the old

Grange leader, Daniel Dennett.

At the time, Dennett was

residing in Mississippi and did not hear of his candidacy
until shortly before the election.

When he learned that he

had been placed in the field by the Temperance Alliance,
against Wiltz and Beattie, he accepted the challenge--but
only because "my defeat is certain."
campaign.

87

Dennett did not

Neither party paid any attention to his candidacy.

Exactly twenty-seven votes were recorded for Dennett in New
Orleans, and if he obtained any ballots in the rural
parishes, they were not reported.
The only noteworthy agrarian victory anywhere in
®4Colfax Chronicle. November 15, 1879.
®5Pailv Picayune. December 1, 1879.
86Ibid., November 15, 1879.
®^Ibid., December 4, 13, 1879.
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the state came from the hill country, in the Twenty-Fourth
Senatorial District of Catahoula, Grant, and Winn Parishes.
There, in his third try in three years, Benjamin Brian com
bined Negro and Greenbacker support to win a seat in the
Op
upper house of the state legislature,00 Brian*s election
indicated that the agrarian cause was not entirely dead in
Louisiana*s backcountry.

^Colfax Chronicle. November 22, December 6 , 1879.
Brian ran for the State Senate unsuccessfully in 1876 and
1878, and won in 1879. He was endorsed by the local R e 
publican organization all three times. Charles J. Boatner
of Catahoula Parish, who defeated Brian in 1876, moved out
of the Twenty-Fourth Senatorial District in 1878, which
necessitated the special election of that year.

CHAPTER V
BOURBON DEMOCRACY
Charles Gayarre', interviewed by a northern reporter
in 1873, remarked that Reconstruction had subjected the
white citizens of the state to such terror and misery that
they would gladly embrace any change in government, submit
to wany other species of d e s p o t i s m . T h i s
accepted.

invitation was

Bourbon misrule soon replaced Radical misrule.

An inner clique of professional politicians, taking credit
for steering the ship of state from under the black clouds
of Radicalism, soon claimed perpetuation in office as their
reward.

They declared the social stagnation around them to

be the only alternative to turbulence, and were quick to
hoist storm warnings against even the faintest wind of
change.
The heavy anchor of the new order was the consti
tution of 1879.

Under its provisions the Louisiana

Democracy stripped off its Nicholls facade, and revealed
the governing circle to be a closed corporation consisting
of Louis Wiltz, Edward A. Burke, and a few businessmen and
^Scribner*s Monthly. VII (November, 1873), 13
157
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planters whose social concepts had been fundamentally un
changed by the Civil War and the Emancipation Proclamation.
The victory of the Bourbon extremists received formal
consecration on January 14, 1880, when Wiltz took the oath
of office as Governor.

But it was Burke, the State

Treasurer, who emerged as the dominant figure, despite the
vast appointive powers of the Governor.

Wiltz, it appeared,

suffered from acute tuberculosis.

He failed to respond to
2
treatment, and died on October 16, 1881.
Henceforth,
Burke's new partner, the state's chief executive, was
Wiltz*s Lieutenant-Governor, Samuel Douglas McEnery of
Monroe.
From 1881 until 1888 McEnery occupied the Governor's
chair.

He served out Wiltz's term and was elected in his

own right, for a full four years, in 1884.

McEnery, by all

evidence, seems to have been a weak, affable man, possessing
most of the faults common to American politicians of the
day; unfortunately, he was called upon to preside over a
peculiarly corrupt and demoralized segment of the nation.
It has been said that the 1880*s marks the ebb tide of
statesmanship in American political history.

Certainly in

^NeW York.Times. October 17, 1881.
^Henry Steele Commaoer. The American Mind: An
Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the
Eighteen-Eighties (New Haven. Conn.. 1950). 346.
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Louisiana, under McEnery, the political water was low
enough to reveal the predatory activities of a variety of
offensive Crustacea.
McEnery leaned heavily upon his friends for advice.
And chief among his political cronies was State Treasurer
E. A. Burke.

During the McEnery years Burke achieved

greater power in Louisiana than any other politician of his
day.

His control over McEnery was scarcely concealed.

Even in public, speaking in defense of McEnery, Major
Burke could not refrain from relishing the fact that Louisi
anians really understood who ran the State House,

"I hear

it stated from one end of the state to the other," Burke
remarked, "that this poor weakling of a governor . . .

is

under the control and domination of Burke and some others."

4

The "some others" included three powerful businessmen:
Charles T. Howard and John A. Morris of the Louisiana State
Lottery Company, and S. L. James, chief lessee of the state
penitentiary, who was, in effect, the largest slaveholder of
post-bellum Louisiana.
Those who sought favors of McEnery showered him with
fulsome praise.

He was called "the levee Governor," the

farmer's friend," and "the executive Greatheart."

But not

^New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 15, 1887.
^Ibid.. August 6 , 1882; Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. December 7, 1887; Biographical and Historical
Memoirs of Louisiana, II, 62.
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all citizens joined in the chorus of adulation.

McEnery*s

numerous critics used yet another, and more appropriate
£
title for him— "McLottery."
Even staunch Democratic news
papers grew restive under the mounting evidence of fraud
and favoritism in McEnery’s administration; when someone
suggested a raise in salary for the Governor, because the
state's first family could scarcely get by on the doleful
pittance of $4,000 per year, the Daily Picayune snapped that
the "quality of the article paid for" should take first con
sideration.

Viewed in this light, Louisiana's $4,000
7
Governor was "the most expensive in existence."
But
official poverty, however, did not restrain McEnery from
entertaining, or being entertained by, the more important
families of the state.

And there were legions of farmers in

Louisiana to whom $4,000 represented unattainable wealth.
Vulpine individuals of the Burke, Howard, and James
type clustered around McEnery but they were by no means his
only confidants.

Men of personal courage and presumed

integrity also endorsed him.
tragedy of McEnery Bourbonism:

In fact, there lay the supreme
that gentlemen who possessed

the intelligence and capacity to give Louisiana enlightened
government, were so blinded by bitter memories of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, as to give unthinking allegiance to
^Bayou Sara True Democrat. February 21, 1892.
^Dailv Picayune. April 19, 1886.
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whoever bellowed loudest the shibboleths of southern con
servatism.

A case in point was Leon Jastremski.

personal friend" of McEnery1s,

A "warm

Jastremski was Mayor of

Baton Rouge, editor.of the official journal of the state,
and a leader in Confederate veterans organizations.

For a

time, at least, Jastremski fought the lottery and tried to
o
pull McEnery away from its influence.
The Mayor-editor
urged a‘ cleansing of the corruption which had crept into the
party of white supremacy.

But, he insisted, "all reform has

to be within the Democratic party.
to go?"^^

Where else do you have

His position had one fatal weakness.

If the

party was not purified, if venal elements still dominated,
Jastremski was nevertheless willing to stay with the party.
To do otherwise would be, he said, "like burning down the
house to destroy the bedbugs.
Jastremski, despite his un-southern name, became an
articulate spokesman for the group without whose support the
McEnery-style Democracy could never have survived.

His

virtues and faults would seem to be those of most
®Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian Advocate. May 9-12,
1882; Daily Picayune. October 4. 188^.
Q
7Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 9, 21,
25, June 15, 1882. Cf. New Orleans Louisiana Review.
January 6 , 18, 1892.
^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. November 7,
1882.
11ibid.
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Louisianians of the upper class and upper-middle class in
both city and country.

His social philosophy consisted of

equal parts Old South plantation tradition and New South
business opportunism.
"Bourbon.”

Jastremski gloried in the epithet

But he felt "Stuart" was perhaps more appropri

ate; that McEnery*s administration should be compared to the
restoration of that jolly monarch, Charles II.

Louisiana,

like England of the 1660*s, was "sick of profligate excess,
of rampant pseudo liberalism, and . . . prefer [ s ] the
safer conservative path."

12

He admitted the "reactionary

tendencies of the Democratic party" but insisted that its
apparent backwardness was justified by "the injustice of the
Civil War and Reconstruction."
Business enterprise, said Jastremski*s newspaper,
was what Louisiana needed most.

He was annoyed at bills

introduced by legislators from the "big woods"

13

designed to

regulate railroad and riverboat companies; for common sense
dictated that "capital shall always have in Louisiana all
the remuneration it can earn."^-4

Jastremski, and those who

applauded his sentiments, extolled the virtues of the
constitution of 1879.
crat proclaimed:

As the Lake Providence Carroll Demo

"all manufacturers in Louisiana are exempt

l^Ibid.. March 30, November 7, 1882.
13Ibid.. May 20, 1882.
14Ibid.
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from . . . taxation until 1899.

Come to Louisiana!

Northern millionaires were to be admired and emulated, not
denounced.

When Jay Gould, an object of national loathing,

visited Louisiana in 1887, the leading citizens of Shreve
port prepared an elaborate reception and seemed anxious to
make his stay in their city a pleasant one.

They wanted

Gould to build another railroad to their city.

But the wily

Gould disappointed his Shreveport admirers by demanding a
$50,000 subsidy, free depot grounds, and a free right-of-way
in and out of the city for a small branch line he proposed^
But Gould’s interest in Louisiana was not confined to
getting subsidies for railroads; between January and April
of 1887 he added 250,000 more acres to his timber empire in
North Louisiana.

17

His popularity did not extend to Grant,

Vernon, or Winn Parishes, where he was the largest landowner.

18

However, according to Mayor Jastremski, the

actions of men like Gould simply illustrated the wonderful
natural law of "survival of the fittest," and his newspaper
quoted scripture to prove it.

In Louisiana, as in ancient

Israel, God’s providence dictated "that the fathers shall
15
Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 11, 1888.
^Galveston (Tex.) Daily News. January 24, 26, 1887.
^ I b i d .. January 28, 1887; Colfax Chronicle. April
2 , 1887.
^■^Leesville Condenser, quoted in Winnfield Southern
Sentinel. March 20, 1885; Winnfield Southern Sentinel. July
3, 1885; Colfax Chronicle. April 2, 1887.
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eat the grapes, and the children's teeth shall be set on
edge."*^

Grumbling by the poor was futile, infantile, and

impudent.
Translated into Bourbon political terminology,
"survival of the fittest" meant that all whites, regardless
of economic status, must cooperate in repressing the Negro
voting majority.

Registration books in 1880 showed 88,024

colored voters, a majority of 2,573 over the whites.

By

1888 there were 128,150 Negroes registered; their majority
had increased to 3,743 over the whites.

20

Yet as Negro

registration increased, Republican voting strength mys
teriously declined.

The Democrats ran into trouble only in

the Second Congressional District, where a Republican
representative was elected in 1884 and 1888, and in the
Third District, which sent a Republican to Congress in 1880
and 1882.

21

Some of the wealthiest men in these two

regions, sugar planters and manufacturers, voted Republican
because of the party's national program of high tariffs and
fiscal conservatism.

22

These men were powerful enough to

19
7Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. February
18, 1882.
20
Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902,
548-53.

21

U.S., Congress, House, Biographical Directory of
the American Congress. 1774-1927, 69 Cong., 2 sess., No.
7837 ppT 833 880, 1044, 1171-72.

7

^Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 39-40,
103-105.
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prevent the local Democratic machinery from perpetrating
the gross frauds prevalent in other districts.

But elsewhere

in the state, Democratic opponents stood little chance.
The cotton raising Fifth District was denounced as
the most consistently dishonest region in the entire South.
"If you don ’t vote right we’ll count you right," Negro
voters were told, in 1880, by the District's Congressman.

23

By the latter part of the decade vote stealing in the Fifth
had become a fine art, particularly in the four plantation
parishes along the Mississippi River, where colored voters
outnumbered whites, 13,956 to 2,005 in 1888.

A comparison

of these figures with the election returns of that year
illustrates the thoroughness of Bourbon methods.

When sta

tistics from the following census are added the evidence of
fraud is compounded:
Totals for Concordia, East Carroll,
Madison, and Tensas Parishes^4
Gubernatorial
Vote in
1888

Voter
Registration
in 1888

Voter Population According
to Census of 1890

Democratic

15,056

2,005

(white)

Republican

543

13,956

(Negro)

1,665

(white)

12 ,454 (Negro)

^ N e w York Time s . November 2, 1880
24

Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 552-61; U.S., Bureau of the Census, Compendium of the
Eleventh Census of the United States: 1890” Population. I
782-83. There is no evidence that any decline in popu
lation occurred between 1888 and 1890; in all probability,
the reverse was true.

166
For that matter, a similar breakdown for the entire
state indicates that the cotton parishes listed above were
merely the darkest stains on a panoply of falsehood:
Gubernatorial
Vote in
1888

Voter
Registration
in 1888

25

Voter Population According
to Census of 1890

Democratic

136,746

125,407 (white)

130,748 (white)

Republican

51,993

128,150 (Negro)

119,815 (Negro)

Bourbon leaders made little effort to conceal the
vote frauds, and they explained the situation with dis
arming frankness.

Vote theft was absolutely necessary.

The elections of 1876-78 had only "strangled, and not
killed" the "monster" of Negro domination;^ to permit a
free ballot would admit "a mongrel government made up of
the worst elements of both races."
thoroughly agreed.

97

Governor McEnery

"It is time," His Excellency said,

"that the law shall be silent and [we shall] uphold our
liberty at all hazards."2®

Huge Democratic majorities in.

25Ibid.
26
St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. October 30,
1880.
27

Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. October 20,

1888.
28

New York Tribune, quoted in Uzee, "Republican
Politics in Louisiana,1* 84.
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the black belt parishes were equated to the chastity of
white women, the memory of the Confederate dead, and the
Divine Wisdom of Heaven.

"What recreant," thundered the

New Orleans Daily States, could possibly, remembering Re
construction, "stand up before almighty God and accuse the
wisdom or integrity or beneficence of the Democratic
party. . . ?w29

The fact that election frauds were undis

guised perhaps added to the enormity of the crime.

Men who

participated in vote stealing unquestionably did great harm
to their own standards of mor al.conduct, and the effect
upon children taught to believe that cheating was "patriotic
and right" can only be imagined.3^
But the Bourbon rationale for vote fraud in state
and congressional elections scarcely told the whole story.
Why, it might be asked, if Negro majorities were so menacing,
were Democratic registrars so liberal in adding colored men
to the voting lists?

The statewide totals showed white

registration as decently under the actual number of males
over the age of twenty-one; however, there were 8,335 more
colored men on the rolls in 1888 than showed up for the
census taker two years later.

Many who departed with the

Kansas Exodus remained on the voting list for the next
-*■
29
New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Lake Provi
dence Banner Democrat. January 25, 1896.
-

30Forum. XX (January, 1892), 597-98.

—

-
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generation, and colored cemeteries were bastions of strength
for the party of white supremacy.

The remark that " a dead

darkey always makes a good Democrat11 was a truism of state
31
politics.
Yet the supreme irony could be found in the
census returns of 1890, which proved the hue and cry over
the supposed "black menace" to be a Machiavellian sham.
Louisiana*s white males of voting age outnumbered colored
by 10,933.

A white majority had'been transformed into a

Negro majority of almost 4,000, through the counting of
8,335 fictitious Negroes, and the failure of about 5,000
whites to register.
But returns from the cotton plantation parishes were
not doctored for the mere purpose of insuring the election
of Democratic officials.

Most local officials were either

appointed, or could be easily removed.

And Republicans--

Negroes, at that--were sometimes permitted to hold office
in such parishes as East Carroll and Madison.

More im

portant matters than mere elections were involved.

Under

the convention system for nominating state and congressional
candidates, each parish was permitted to send a delegation
in proportion to the number of Democratic votes cast in that
parish at the previous election.

A parish might choose its

-own method of election convention delegates, but the size of
31Louisiana Populist. October 22, 1897.
Parish
assessors acted as registrars of voters. Assessors were
appointed by the Governor. Hence, all registrars were
Democrats.

169
the delegation depended upon the previous Democratic vote.
The swollen, false returns from the black belt, based on
Negro registration, allowed planters to throng into these
Democratic nominating conventions in commanding numbers.
The worst offenders in the packing of conventions,
as in ballot box stuffing, could be found in the Fifth
Congressional District of Northeast Louisiana.

The four

parishes along the Mississippi River, where lived only 11.3
per cent of the adult male whites of the District, were
able to go into the congressional nominating convention of
1888 with seventy-five delegates.

The other eleven parishes

of the District, with 88.7 per cent of the whites of voting
age, sent seventy-nine delegates.

32

And some of the dis

advantaged parishes had pockets of planter strength; these
latter would send a handful of delegates to the convention,
permitting plantation interests to have an absolute majority
in the naming of candidates and in the writing of the plat
form.

Much the same was true in Northwest Louisiana*s

Fourth District.

There, Caddo, Bossier, and Rapides parish

manipulated Negro majorities so as to dominate the other
nine parishes of the District, where the vast majority of
whites lived.

Though the Sixth District suffered less from

Bourbon rule, even so, East and West Feliciana, Pointe
^^Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 4, 1888;
Ruston Calioraph. quoted in ibid.. October 20, 1888; U.S.,
Compendium o^ the Eleventh Census. I, 782-83.
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Coupee, and West Baton Rouge parishes carried much greater
weight in Democratic conventions than their white population
33
justified.
The First, Second, and Third Congressional
Districts were comparatively free from the rampant vote
stealing for convention purposes so common to other areas of
the state; however, none of the latter three was entirely
free from frauds at the ballot box.
Local politics, more often than not, reflected the
undemocratic aspects of the state and congressional cam
paigns.

Few parishes, even where the Democratic and Re

publican parties were closely matched, used the primary
system in selecting party nominees.

Local politicians were

fond of the "mass rally" technique.

When time came for

making nominations to the legislature, the sheriff*s
office, or other court house positions, the local ring
called for the party faithful to assemble and make their
wishes known.

What could be more democratic?

The theory

was fine, but, grumbled the Crowley Signal. sometimes the
call was poorly advertised or held in an obscure place; the
result was "a sort of confidential limited mass
33

Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. November
1, 1887.
In the Sixth District parish of West Feliciana,
in 1882, the Democratic white minority apparently lost
control of the Negro vote. By some "strange misunder
standing, "as the Bourbon press termed it, the parish re
turned a Republican majority— for the candidate of that
party in the Third District! The Secretary of State's
office had simply sent up ballots for the wrong district.
Ibid., January 25, 1882.
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meeting."^4

McEnery partisans had a special trademark.

They

perpetuated themselves in certain North Louisiana court
houses by proclaiming open-air, free-for-all parish.nomi
nating rallies, but farmers up in the hills were given "a
notice as short as that which the hawk gives the chicken.^
Local self-expression was also stifled by the executive
appointment of police jurors.

Begun on a partial basis

under Nicholls, it was made universal during the WiltzMcEnery administrations.

Beginning in 1880, every police

36
juror in the state received appointment from the Governor.
The class of men appointed were certain to squelch any
proposal to raise local taxes, a fact which, to wealthy
planters and merchants, proved "the wisdom of this mode of
selection.
Republican leaders packed their "mass meetings"
also, but the evil was most pronounced in the Democratic
party, and most harmful, since the great majority of state
34Crowley Signal, quoted in ibid., March 6, 1888.
35
Shreveport Democrat, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily
Capitolian-Advocate. November 10, 1887.
^ Dallv Picayune. February 29, April 12, 1880;
Police Jury Code of the Parish of East Feliciana: Con
taining a i ^ q ^ ^ ^ T t h e State Laws Relative to Police
Juries (Clinton. 18831. 8-9.
37
H. Thompson Brown, Ascension Parish Louisiana.
Her Resources. Advantages and Attractions; A Description
of the Parish and the Inducements Offered to Those Seeking
New Homes tDonaldsonville. 1888). 11.
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and parochial officials would be selected at meetings of
the latter.

Drunken rowdies were often on hand at Demo

cratic ward and parochial meetings, so as to discourage
decent folk from attending; and whosoever raised his voice
in protest at the high-handed proceedings would be de^
nounced as "a crank, and . . . howled down accordingly."

38

Once the nominees were chosen and the party label applied,
a voter had this alternative:

support the ticket or suffer

denunciation as a traitor to the white race.
language was used.

Even barnyard

A white man who presumably cast a

Republican ballot was described as "sleeping with the
hogs."39
One student of southern politics has suggested that
the condition of public education may be the best criterion
40
by which to evaluate a governing oligarchy.
If this be
true, then the people of Louisiana suffered under the
South*s least enlightened, and harshest, Bourbon regime.
No other southern state, in the late nineteenth century,
allowed its public institutions to fall so low, or per
mitted its children to undergo a worse degree of education
al neglect*

The oligarchy used certain standard arguments

^®Arabi St. Bernard Voice, quoted in Colfax Chroni
cle. October 22, 1887.
39National Economist. Ill (July 19, 1890), 279.
V [ aldimer ] 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in
State and Nation (New York, 1950), 160.
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to justify its niggardly school appropriations.
was poor.

Taxpayers needed a breathing spell.

Louisiana
The state

must encourage manufacturing, railroads, and capital in
vestment; these would not come without the sort of assur
ances embodied in the constitution of 1879.

The Bourbon

Democrats were fond of calling their regime "a taxpayer*s
government.**

But apparently what they strove for was quite

the opposite; a government of should-be taxpayers who paid
no taxes.

By some occult process, adherence to a laissez

faire businessman*s philosophy had become the test of
loyalty to the traditions of an agricultural past.
The plea of poverty was grossly exaggerated.
Louisianians were poor, but by no means all.

Most

Individuals

and corporations of great wealth could be found within the
borders of the state, and these privileged few used the
poverty.of the majority as a specious excuse for avoiding
taxation upon themselves.

By 1892, according to the Times-

Democrat. thirty-five millionaires lived in New Orleans
41
alone.
Other immensely wealthy persons could be found in
the rural parishes, particularly in the sugar country.
Governor Nicholls, a rather benign conservative, denounced
those who made persistent efforts "to present Louisiana as
a pauper, unable to . . . carry out the duties of her
4*New Orleans Times-Demoerat. May 11, 1892, quoted
in Shugg, Origins of Class Struoafi~'in Louisiana. 291.
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statehood.**

Such claims, he said, were "utterly without

foundation."4^

Mendacity, however, knew no limits; even

the opulent lottery company claimed to be "almost entirely
profitless."4'* Howard and his associated were not inclined
to discuss company books with the public, except to say
that only seven per cent of the receipts in the monthly
44
drawings came from inside the state.
By 1890 the lottery
grossed from $15,000,000 to $60,000,000 a year, according
to various estimates.

One angry lottery foe, writing in

Forum magazine, said the company kept at least forty-seven
per cent of its gross take; the remainder went out in
prizes, advertisement, and bribes to public officials.

45

The charge of excessive profit making was corroborated by
evidence that, from 1868 to 1890, company stock soared from
a par value of $100 to $1,200 per share.

Since the

lottery reported 50,000 shares by the latter year, this
represented a capital value of $60,000,000.

And the net

ajmnual profit, by minimum estimate, was at least double the
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1890,
414.
4^Pailv Picayune. January 1, 1877.
44Forum. XII (January, 1892), 570.
45
Cf. ibid.. 561; Alwes, Louisiana Historical
Quarterly. XXVII, 1021-24; Ezell."Fortuned Merry Wheel.
250-54; Chambers, A History of Louisiana. I. W 5 .
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of
Representatives. 1890, 29, 321.

total amount of revenue taken in by the state government.
By comparison, all nineteen national banks in Louisiana in
1890 listed total resources of $14,359,000, and total de
posits in the six state banks stood at $7,486,000.4^
A look at state institutional and other official
reports in the 1880-1900 period reveals a melancholy
pattern of social neglect.

The six mill ceiling on state

taxation, and the ten mill limitation on local taxes
effectively stifled social legislation.
high places made the picture even darker.
ers was public education.

Indifference in
Chief of suffer

Only 1.25 mills went to the

current school fund, whereas 2.75 mills went to pay interest
on the state debt; and the latter excluded interest on edu
cational bonds, which had to be paid out of the 1.25 mill
school fund.4®
Ironically, ante-bellum Louisiana had shown more
interest in a free school system than had any of the
neighboring states.

At one time, in the early 1850*s, half

of the white children of educable age managed to obtain
rudimentary instruction.

40

After the war Louisiana*s school

4^Caldwell, A Banking History of Louisiana. 128-29.
4 ®Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 209.
^ F o r t i e r (ed.), Louisiana. II, 428-29. Among all
adult whites (age twenty and above, illiteracy shot up from
10.15 per cent in 1860 to 19.28 in 1890! In 1860, out of
175,238 adult whites, there were 17,808 illiterates.
In
1890, out of 269,556 adult whites, 51,989 could not read or
write. Cf. U.S., Eighth Census. I, 188-89, IV, 506; U.S.,
Compendium of the Eleventh Census. Ill, 316.
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system was revived under the hands of Carpetbaggers, and
Negro children were counted among those eligible for public
education.

Reconstruction schools were, by law, racially

integrated, and from 1872 to 1876 a Negro served as superintendent of the state’s educational system.

50

But, as

with everything else during the Reconstruction era, school
money was "squandered or misappropriated."5*

Expenses

quickly outran revenue; teachers were forced to hawk pay
warrants at a fraction of their face value; but even the
Daily Picayune agreed with the Radicals that New Orleans
"brokers and money lenders were the real recipients of the
greater part of the money appropriated for . . . education
in Louisiana for many years"

52

If judged alone by the results of their handiwork,
it would seem the Democratic party, after it came to power
in 1877, held Negro and poor white children personally
responsible for the failings of Reconstruction era schools.
Education funds were pruned immediately.
of 1879 allowed further emasculation.

The constitution

A similar program of

Bourbon retrenchment took place in other southern states,
but what happened to education in Louisiana after
50

Louisiana, Annual Report of the State Superin
tendent of Public Education to the General Assembly of
Louisiana for the Year 1875 (New Orleans. 16^61. 95.
51Ibid.
52Pailv Picayune. April 23, 1877.
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Reconstruction was fortunately without parallel elsewhere.
The following figures reveal, the outlines of a social dis
aster of the first magnitude:
‘S'}
Louisiana Public Schools in 1890 Compared with
Education in Poorer Southern States

Louisiana
Arkansas
Mississippi
South Carolina
Florida

True value of
property

State and local
taxes for schools

$495,301,000
455,147,000
454,242,000
400,911,000
389,489,000

$388,000
786,000
613,000
428,000
531,000

Educable white
children per
teacher
Louisiana
Arkansas
Mississippi
South Carolina
Florida

53

115
91
53
71
45

Educable colored
children per
teacher
309
107
103
191
104

U.S., Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the
Eleventh Census: 1890. pp. 205, 228- 29: U.S.. Compendium
of the Eleventh Census. I, 748. The educable child-teacher
ratio was found by dividing the number of public ufchool
teachers into the number of inhabitants of the five-throughtwenty year age group, which the Bureau of the Census con
sidered "educable."
It is true that Louisiana had more
parochial school teachers than the other states listed, but
even if they were added, the Pelican State would still
#.
retain bottom ranking in all categories. Especially would
this be true of Negro education. Counting public, parochial,
and private schools in 1890, there were only 828 teachers
for over 200,000 Negroes of school age. U.S., Compendium
of the Eleventh Census. Miscellaneous Statistics. II. 221.
223.
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States with Illiteracy Rate
Above Forty Per cent
(age ten and over)
1880:

Seven
States:
Percentage of
Native white
Illiterates

(l) South
Carolina
(2) Alabama
13) Georgia
(4 ) Missis, .
sippi
(5) Louisiana
(6) North
Carolina
(7) Florida
(national
average)
1890:

Percentage
of Colored
Illiterates

Average
Percentage
All Races

22.39
25.05
23.18

78.55
80.61
81.58

55.41
50.89
49.86

16.57
19.83

75.17
79.06

49.52
49.05

31.71
20 .-73

77.44
70.66

48.33
43.42

(8.75)

(70.00)

(16.97)

20.33

72.14

Three
States:

(l) Louisiana12) South
Carolina
(3) Alabama
(national
average)

45.83
*

18.11
18.44

64.07
69.08

44.95
41.00

( 6.23)

(56.76)

(13.34)

Louisiana "rose" from fifth to first place in
ignorance among all states in the nation between 1880 and
1890.

She was the only state, North or South, to show an

absolute rise in the percentage of native whites who could
not read or write, and the one state in the nation where
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Negro illiteracy continued above seventy per cent.

At the

end of the Reconstruction era, Louisiana’s Bourbons had
vowed to promote and encourage education for black and
white;54 but Governor Nicholls paid little attention to
public schools, and Wiltz and McEnery even less.

Those who

shouted loudly for white supremacy might well have pondered
the following statistics:

in 1890, Louisiana’s white

children, of native parentage, in the ten to fourteen year
55
age group, were 27,74 per cent illiterate.
By contrast,
colored children of the same age group were 19.69 per cent
illiterate in Missouri, 26.18 per cent illiterate in Texas,
and 26.18 per cent illiterate in Florida.5^
The youth of post Reconstruction Louisiana came
close to having no state school system at all.

"When the

intelligent classes . . . secured possession of the govern
ment,’' one official said, "there were many who said of the
public school,
ground?*"5^

’cut it away.

Why cumbereth it the

At the constitutional convention of 1879 a

serious attempt was made to abolish the office of state
54New Orleans Democrat. April 17, 1877; Nation.
XXIV (April 19, 1877), 227.
^U . S . , Compendium of the Eleventh Census. III. 314.
56Ibid.
^Louisiana State Public School Teachers* Associ
ation, Proceedings and Papers of Second Annual Convention
(Baton Rouge, 1894), 18.
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superintendent of public education; this backward step
failed to win approval, but other constitutional provisions
RO
were almost as malign.
For instance, parish superin59
tendents were limited to a salary of $200 per year.
The Bourbon Democracy scorned Federal aid to public
education.

The proposed Blair bill, debated in Congress

from 1883 to 1888, would have poured, over a period of ten
years, an estimated $4,000,000 into Louisiana schools.^
No state needed the money more.

But the same men who per

petually clamored for Federal aid to Louisiana*s levees
"raise

[ d ] their hands in holy horror” at the Blair

b i l l , ^ and denounced it as an infringement on States*
Rights.

Most of the newspapers in the state agreed with the

Shreveport Times:

Federal handouts to education would be

"humiliating” and "squinting too much in the direction of
centralization."

fsO

Perhaps it was true, as the Populists

alleged in the 1890*s, that the Bourbon Democracy
^^Dailv Picayune. May 28-29, 1879.
^Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 224.
^®Cf. Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Baton Rouge Weekly
Truth. April 16, 1886; Woodward, Origins of the New South.
64-65.
^Mortroe Bulletin, quoted in Baton Rouge Weekly
Truth. April 16, 1886.
^^Shreveport Times. quoted in New Iberia Enterprise.
September 23, 1885.
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deliberately sabotaged Louisiana’s school system, not so
much for the sake of economy, but in order to hold public
intelligence down to the lowest common denominator and so
63
keep rural people of both races docile.
In fact, there
was one miserable Louisiana school which epitomized the
system.

Its classes met inside a sheep b a r n . ^
The Bourbon fist fell hardest upon Negro education.

t

In 1890, colored children from nine to nineteen years of
age numbered 137,287; of these, only 51,645 were literate.
Even in Mississippi the blacks of this age group were
twenty percentage points ahead in literacy.

65

Negro

poverty depressed education for the race as much as did the
penurous policies of the Bourbon government.

School books

cost more than Negro parents were usually able or willing
to spend; consequently, they sent their offspring to school
“with almanacs in their hands, and old almanacs at that."
But governmental attitudes hurt the most.

The Superin

tendent of Public Education in St. Mary Parish bluntly re
marked that school funds in his district went to white edu
cation only.

The Negroes, he said, "must work out their own

^^Montgomery M a i l , quoted in Colfax Chronicle.
September 9, 1893; Louisiana Populist. June 5, 1896.
64
Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings
of Ninth Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1895), 28.
^^U.S., Compendium of the Eleventh Census.III. 3143.5 . .

66

Daily Picayune. March 27, 1881.
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salvation. . . .w^
Few Negro teachers had adequate training; in hast
Feliciana, for example, at the end of Reconstruction, white
inspectors found all teaching applicants for Negro schools
68
in the parish to be totally unqualified.
Southern Uni
versity, by grace of the constitution of 1879, was established "for the education of persons of color."

69

The

legislature appropriated a small fund but failed to provide
for one detail--construction.

70

Subsequently, the Board of

Trustees paid for a building by reducing faculty salaries
and borrowing additional funds by putting up future salaries
for collateral.

The faculties* money was still being used

in the twentieth century to pay off this mortgage, at eight
71

per cent per annum. x

The neglected university did not

turn out a single graduate until 1887,

72

and as late as

1898, had only ten students taking college-level courses.7^
There was unconscious irony in the statement made by
^ Q u o t e d in Betty Porter, "The History of Negro
Education in Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly.
XXV (July, 1942), 805.
^^Dailv Picayune. November 20, 1877.
^Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 231.
^Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902,
464-66.
71Ibid.
72Ibid.
73

Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. July 1, 1898.
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Governor Murphy J. Foster, in 1896, that "this institution
is a fair index to what is being done throughout the state
74
for the education of colored people."
The failure of
Negro higher education naturally hurt the quality of.
instruction at lower levels.

By 1893 there were 62,654

Negro children (out of approximately 200,000 eligibles)
enrolled in Louisiana’s public school system.
of their teachers had college training.
had college degrees.

75

Forty-six

Exactly fourteen

7 fi

Hostility against Negro education per se was always
present.

But it seldom reached print during the brief

period of the alleged "New Departure" immediately following
the end of Reconstruction.

Later, however, toward the

close of the 1880*s, the frankest sort of criticism of the
very idea of Negro education began to appear in editorials
and public speeches.

Colored people were out of place in a

schoolhouse, or so it seemed to a Catahoula Parish news
paper.

With divine insight, the Trinity Herald commented:

"God never intended the negro to be educated.

Like the

horse, he was destined to work for what he eats."

77

74lbid.. May 14, 1896.
7 p.

Louisiana, Biennial Report of the State Superin
tendent of Public Education to the General Assembly. 18921893, 19, 22.
76Ibid.
77
Trinity Herald, quoted in New Orleans Weekly
Pelican. September 21, 1889.
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Furthermore, the Negro should be "put where he properly
belongs, and to which the whites purchased him for--in the
field and the wood pile."
Weekly Caucasian agreed.

78

The aptly-named Shreveport

Ignorant Negroes, it concluded,

were a pesky problem, but "education is the most dangerous
remedy for the evil yet proposed.

That education is a long

stride toward social equality no sane man can doubt."

79

On

the other hand, the foes of white education were not so
impolitic as to publicize their views.

Besides, legislative

inaction, whether by accident or design, did quite enough.
Louisiana*s white children were already beneath the liter
acy level of Negro youths in other states of the late
Confederacy.
A decaying school system was the most far-reaching
of Bourbon failings, but it was by no means the only stain
on their social record.

Another pernicious ill concerned

the state*s method of disbursing money to public insti
tutions and employees.

Under McEnery, the general assembly

failed to provide for the order and priority of payments;
this had the effect of placing in the hands of the State
Treasurer, Major Burke, an arbitrary control over public
funds and over the payment of all warrants.

80

It was

"^Trinity Herald. June 13, 1889.
^Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. February 6, 1890.
80
ovShreveport Evening Standard, quoted in Baton
Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 17, 1882.
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charged, and repeated without denial in the official journal
of Louisiana*s state government, that Burke consistently
gave priority to bondholders, and by 1882 had deposited to
their credit over $1,000,000 in a New Orleans bank.

At the

same time he refused to redeem on demand the state warrants
issued to mere public institutions and employees, using the
excuse of an empty treasury.

Warrants sent to the insane

asylum at Jackson, according to the Superintendent, were
cashed by New Orleans brokers at thirty-five cents on the
dollar.

Later, these same brokers bundled up the paper,

sent it to Burke, who would suddenly discover that the
81
treasury had revenue for redemption.
Conditions in the Jackson asylum were deplorable.
In 1882 the Superintendent threatened toqpen the gate and
turn the starving inmates "loose on the highway" if he
received any more thirty-five-cent-on-the-dollar warrants.

QO

This prospect seems to have stirred the legislature into
action; henceforth, the commercial value of the warrants was
increased slightly by making them recievable for taxes due
83
the state.
But the most tragic examples of state neglect
^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 11,
1882. According to this source, Burke gave the brokers
sixty-five cents on the dollar.

IMsj** Ju3*Y
1882. A questionable reform, since
it had the effect of devaluing the adready inadequate tax
payments.
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of the insane were not to be found at the Jackson insti
tution; inmates, there it appeared, were considered fortu
nate by comparison.

More miserable were the mentally ill

from poor families in New Orleans.

These urban insane

were locked away in what the Louisiana Asylum Board blandly
QA
called a "city prison for crazy people."0^ There was no
room for them at Jackson.
Orleans compound, 69 died.

In 1881, out of 170 in the
And 1881 was considered a

healthy year for New Orleans, since no epidemics were re. . 85
ported.
A group of legislators, visiting the Jackson insti
tution in 1888, were plainly shaken by what they found.
Most wards had no furniture whatsoever, not even beds.

No

medical supplies of any sort could be discovered on the
premises.

Inmates went about in filthy rags; some were

almost nude, and practically none had shoes.

Inquisitively,

the legislators entered a cellar dining hall, but came up
86
again hurriedly--the stench was overpowering.
Their
blistering report to the General Assembly brought some im
provements; by 1890, steam heat was installed at Jackson,
whereas in earlier years attendants had to walk the inmates
84Ibid.. June 20, 1882.
85Ibid.
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1888,
330-33. The solons were also dismayed to observe racial
integration among the Jackson inmates.
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about during cold weather to keep them from freezing to
07
death.
But the insane were by no means the only unfortu
nates whom the state neglected, a fact which could be
attested to by the deaf, dumb, and blind, confined at Baton
Rouge.

Since all these latter were victims of serious

handicaps the legislature of 1888 logically concluded to
crowd them all under one roof.^®

Instead of two dilapi

dated buildings, the deaf, dumb, and blind, after 1888, had
one dilapidated building.

Governor McEnery, by the way,

disliked the idea of throwing all the handicapped together,
for the reason that "centralizing them" would "propagat [ e]
a race of deaf mutes."®9

But economy won out over McEnery1s

theories of genetics.
While the insane and physically helpless suffered
through indifference and parsimony, one other segment of
the bottom rung of society received considerable legis
lative attention.

The convicted criminals, unlike the

others, were capable of yielding a profit and thus came up
for frequent discussion in the General Assembly.

It was

decided that lawbreakers should pay for their crimes in a
literal sense; therefore, by renting penitentiary inmates to
®7Paily Picayune. January 14, 1877.
8®Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1888,
178-80.
89Ibid.. 15.
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private contractors, the state was not only relieved of the
financial burden of convict upkeep, but obtained a stipu
lated sum of money from businessmen who were willing to
lease, and work, the criminal population.
Louisiana pioneered the convict lease system in the
South.

In 1844 the state prison, which had earlier been

equipped for government-sponsored manufacture of cotton
bagging, was turned over to the management of a private
c o m p a n y . F o r a fee, the state leased out both convicts and
machinery.

During Reconstruction Louisiana continued the

lease system, but instead of working inside the penitentiary
walls, all able-bodied prisoners were shipped over the state
for levee and other construction work.

91

Carpetbagger

governments in other parts of the South also accepted the
idea that convicts should earn a profit for private con
tractors as well as the state.

In 1870, the Warmoth govern

ment in Louisiana made a long-term convict lease agreement;
S. L. James and two other contractors were granted per
mission to utilize the labor of all state prisoners for a
92
period of twenty-one years.
^ F o r t i e r (ed.), Louisiana. II, 296-97; Woodward,
Origins of the New South. 212.
^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana.
I, 43.
^^Dailv Picayune. June 15, 1877; Blake McKelvey,
"Penal Slavery and Southern Reconstruction," Journal of
Negro History. XX (April, 1935), 155.
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James emerged as the dominant lessee, and when the
contract was renewed in 1890, no other name but his appeared
Q3
on the agreement*7

James, in turn, sub-let a number of

convicts to smaller contractors.

A state "Board of Control"

was empowered to inspect and report on the treatment of
prisoners.

But the effectiveness of the board was somewhat

hampered by the fact that its members received their sala
ries, not from the state, but from Mr. J a m e s . ^

Thus, for

thirty years, James and his lesser partners, in exchange for
payments into the treasury ranging from $5,000 to $50,000
per year,

95

were given custody of the many thousands of

individuals who fell into Louisiana’s penal system.

This

lease agreement was designed entirely for profit, but it did
have incidental corrective value, of a grim sort.

A high

percentage of those under the care of Mr. James did not live
to commit other crimes.
According to Louisiana-born George Washington Cable,
the penitentiary lease in his home state was about the most
brutal and corrupt example of the system to be found anywhere
^^Louisiana, Senate Calendar:
1890, 11-12.

Thursday, July 10,

^Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of
Representatives, 1894, 14.
95
Cf. Daily Picayune. June 15, 1877; Louisiana,
Official Journal of the House of Representatives. 1894, 14,
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in the S o u t h . ^

So completely did the state neglect its

duties, Cable noted, that no official report on the lessees
and their charges was published.

But any traveller who

happened to observe convicts at work needed no document to
substantiate the evils of the lease system.

A Clinton news

paper described what was common knowledge:
The men on the [James] works are brutally treated
and everybody knows it. They are worked, mostly in
the swamps and plantations, from daylight to dark.
Corporeal [sic] punishment is inflicted on the
slightest provocation. . . . Any one who has travelled
along the lines of railroads that run through Louisi
ana’s swamps . . . in which the levees are built, have
seen these poor devils almost to their waists, delving
in the black and noxious mud. . . . Theirs is a
grievous lot; a thousand times more grievous than the
law ever contemplated they should endure in expiation
of their sins.97
Occasionally, information on the convict death rate
was released.

Fourteen per cent of all prisoners were known

to have died in 1881, and the annual death rate seldom
go
appeared much lower.7
Worst of all, in 1882, the death
rate climbed above twenty per cent; that year, 149 of 700
prisoners expired while under the care of James and the sub
contractors,^

In 1884, 118 of 850 prisoners d i e d . ^ ^

^ Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine. XXVII
(February, 1884), 582-99.
97
Clinton East Feliciana Patriot-Democrat. quoted
in Daily Picayune. March 22, 1886.
^ C e n t u r y Illustrated Monthly Magazine. XXVII
(February, 1884), 596.
QQ
Daily Picayune. June 11, 1882.
^ ^ B a t o n Rouge Weekly Truth. June 4, 1886.
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Later, it was apparently thought to be a wise policy to
conceal convict mortality statistics; Governor McEnery, with
customary aplomb, merely noted in his annual message of 1888
that the convicts "are well taken care of, humanely treated,
well fed and clothed, and not overtasked in their labor.
This cheerful news appears rather at variance with testimony
given a legislative committee which investigated charges of
"brutality and inhumanity" in the James work camps.

102

For

example, a Negro convict named Theophile Chevalier attracted
the committee’s attention because he had no feet.

During-

the winter of 1884-85 Chevalier labored outdoors, without
shoes, in a North Louisiana construction camp.

He soon

developed a severe case of frostbite, but was forced to
continue work.
rotted off.

Then gangrene set in, and one of his feet

After some delay, the camp superintendent

called in a local "physician" who removed the other foot
with a penknife.
sentence.

Chevalier was serving a five year

He had been convicted of stealing $5.00.

103

Three-fourths of James’s convicts, as a rule, were
Negroes.

Before the Civil War the statistics were re

versed; whites outnumbered Negroes in the Louisiana
^■^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1888,
23.
102New York Times. May 22, 1886.
103Ibid.
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penitentiary about three to one.

By a specimen piece of

Bourbon logic, this proved "very conclusively the improved
moral condition of the blacks during the slave regime."104
Under the James lease, prisoners were sometimes used, in
violation of the lease agreement, for plantation labor as
well as construction work.

Rural newspapers bitterly de

nounced the practice of putting white men to work, virtu
ally as slaves, in the sugar fields.

Lagona plantation,

in St. Mary Parish, was owned by S. L. James and used both
white and black prisoners.

105

Some of the most conservative

papers in the state--even the Shreveport Times— criticized
the convict lease system, since it tended to undermine the
idea of the dignity of labor.

Bringing the criminal class

into direct competition with free labor, said the Times, was
causing "intense dissatisfaction" among the working people
of Louisiana and was "hurtful to their pride.

Parti

cularly did farm people resent the competition of James’s
charges.

But whenever the lease system was criticized, its

inexcusably high death rate was almost always underscored.
Cable went so far as to say:

"the year’s death rate of the

convict camps of Louisiana must exceed that of any
^^Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisi
ana. I, 150.
^■^^Marksville Bulletin, quoted in Daily Picayune.
April 23, 1886.
■^^Shreveport Times, quoted in Winnfield Southern
Sentinel. July 24, 1885.
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pestilence that ever fell upon Europe in the Middle Ages.
. . ."

The state, he charged, had been seduced "into the

committal of murder for money.
All things considered, the state lost money under
the lease system.

Business arrangements between the state

and the lessee were highly favorable to the latter.

The

"penitentiary ring" was a power in Louisiana politics
second only to the lottery; humorists, noting the influence
of S. L. James and his friends, sometimes referred to them
1Oft
as the "James Gang."
By special dispensation, charged
the Daily Picayune. James was allowed to pay his annual dues
to the state in depreciated back warrants rather than cash,
and was also permitted to make lavish deductions for socalled "repairs" to the old penitentiary at Baton Rouge,
where convicts unsuited for hard work were kept.

In

1884 the Legislature gave the James firm a monopoly on
levee construction in Louisiana, at a fixed price.

James

and his partners sub-let much of this work, at a neat
profit, to small contractors; moreover, he was doubly pro
tected by being allowed to turn down any levee work which he
^ 7Centurv Illustrated Monthly Magazine. XXVII
(February, 1884), 597.
^®Farmerville Gazette. February 19, 1896.
^ ^ Daily Picayune. November 2, 1887.
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deemed unprofitable.**^

It would seem that the legislature

of the most water-logged state along the Mississippi be
lieved that a guaranteed profit for a private firm took
precedence over the need for adequate levee protection.
The nearest thing to a progressive idea endorsed by
Louisiana1s Bourbons was the cause of immigration.

Not

only northern capital, but northern settlers as well, were
encouraged to come and share in the potential eden of the
"New South."***

This kind of talk dated back to 1865.

It

was one point upon which Democrats and Republicans could
agree, during Reconstruction and after.

In particular did

the younger Bourbons of the 1880*s, such as Joseph E.
Ransdell of Lake Providence, extoll the burning need for
Yankee "pluck, energy, and money."

112

Immigration pro

moters could be heard in every southern state during and
after Reconstruction; but Louisiana*s tub-thumpers, it
would seem, felt compelled to bang the loudest.

They real

ized only too well that most northerners regarded Louisiana
Compendium of Legislative Acts R e 
lating to Levee Organization and Kindred Subjects;
1*8561918 (New Orleans. 1919). 156.
H ^ L o u i s i a n a ,

***Paul H. Buck, The Road to Reunion:
(New York, 1937), 155-58.

1865-1900

*12Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 18,
1888. Ransdell, in the 1880*s, was a young lawyer and real
estate promoter in Northeast Louisiana. He entered politics
in the 1890*s, entered Congress by defeating a Populist
opponent in a special election in 1899, and finally lost a
seat in the United States Senate to Huey P. Long in 1930.
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"as an extensive burying-ground, where mosquitoes, alli
gators and •niggers’ might thrive, but where ’white folks’
113
inevitably passed in their checks after a brief sojourn.lliAg
The state’s violent political system received extensive
space in leading northern newspapers.

And when the

Chicago Times remarked that Louisiana’s people were "differ
ent from , . . any other state in the Union," no compliment
was intended.

115

Prospective immigrants, reading these

"slanders,"*^ feared to come.
Louisiana's boosters tried to parry unfavorable
publicity with fabulous accounts of its potential wealth,
healthy climate and congenial citizenry.

The Mephitic odor

which clung to the state’s reputation had to be cleansed.
The perfume was applied with a heavy hand.

Northern farmers

were invited to "come and till where the south wind blows
softly," and were informed that "the small farmer . . .

in

a few years . . . will grow rich, and with but little severe
labor.*117

^ ncj

dilate!

For it, no praise was too

•^3Daily Picayune. May 2, 1886.
^ ^ F r o m 1877 to 1880, a day-by-day check of the New
York Times reveals that news from Louisiana, most of it un
flattering to the extreme, appeared on the front page with a
frequency second only to the states of the Middle Atlantic
and New England area.
115
Chicago Times, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capjtolian-Advocate. August 8, 1882.
lift
AOLake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 4, 1888.

117

Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 5, 1890.
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extravagant.

Louisiana's weather was "deliciously delight

f u l , " ^ ® since, by an imaginative reversal of seasons, the
winter was "warm* while summers were always "cool."^^

Even

epidemic-ridden New Orleans told the world that he health
and sanitation was "badly

m i s u n d e r s t o o d .

"120

Northern

skeptics who wondered about "old scores connected with the
war" received assurances from Tangipahoa Parish that southern
people "rejoice that slavery is wiped out" and were sorry
that the Civil War had occurred.121
Yet Louisiana's welcome mat was not out to all.
General Assembly in 1880 resolved:

The

"That the needs of the

State of Louisiana don't require Mongolian immigration at
this time."

199

And Negro immigrants, except to the large

planters, were generally considered personae non grata. There
were "too many colored people" as it was, believed the Rayville Beacon:

"Louisiana Needs Whitening."123

some went so

H®Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings
of Ninth Annual Meeting. 77.
119
X7Southern Homeseekers* Guide and Winter Resorts on
the Southern Division of the Illinois Central Railroad
IChicaqo. 1887). passim: Brown. Ascension Parish. 2.
Inofficial Souvenir and Program of the Louisiana
Industrial Exposition and Jubilee: May 8 to 31st. 1899 (New
Orleans, l8$9), 69.
191
Southern Homeseekers' Guide . . . Illinois Central
Railroad. 57.
l^ D a i l v Picayune. March 18, 1880.
^^Rayville Richland Beacon. May 26, 1888.
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to criticize the Negro for occupying space which might be
put to better use by industrious Yankees.
Leader suggested:

As the Hammond

MA11 that is needed down here to make

the country a veritable ‘gateway* to paradise is the
elimination

[sic 3 of the colored population."124

The

warning of George W. Cable, who

said that the only way to

make the South a good place for

white men to come in, was to

first make it a good place for black men to stay in, failed
to be heeded in his native state.

125

By 1886 the immigration societies, associations, and
conventions, on both the state and parish level, had been
engaged in fitful activity for a generation.

But for all

the windy resolutions and brightly colored pamphlets, there
was little proof of accomplishment.
were not much in evidence.

Industrious northerners

True, thousands of men had

moved into Louisiana since the Civil War, but most of them
were restless poor whites from the southeastern states, or
Negro laborers of similar origin.

These latter had been

lured in by the agents of large

planters. It was high

asserted the Baton Rouge Weekly

Truth, to face facts:

time,

For twenty years we have been crying for immigration.
We have been descanting upon the richness of our soil
- and the luxuriance of our climate, the vastness of
our material resources and our own inability to
^^Hammond Leader, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily
Advocate. February 5, 1&90.
1 0 ‘S

George W. Cable, The Nearo Question: A Se
lection of Writings on Civil Rights in the South, ed. Arlin
Turner (Garden City, New York, 1956), 231,
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develop them; forgetting , all the time, that the
very arguments we use are suggestive of some hidden
and inherent defect in our situation. . . .
Who would desire to settle in a State where trade
is affected with a palsy and the people are poor and
growing poorer. . . ? We are living under a mer
cantile system that corrodes and eats at the vitals of
our agriculture. . . .126
Suddenly, however, immigration prospects began to
brighten.

In 1886, the first trainloads of homeseekers

from northern and midwestern America arrived in Lake Charles
to investigate agricultural possibilities in the watery
wilderness of Southwest Louisiana.

They had been lured down

by the promotional activities of the Walkins Syndicate, an
association of northern and English investment corporations
whose Louisiana holdings were managed by a Kansas banker,
Jabez B. W a t k i n s . T h e Watkins syndicate had earlier
purchased 1,500,000 acres of marsh and prairie land from
Louisiana, paying from 12^ cents to $1.25 per acre.*-2®
With the help of the Southern Pacific railroad, tons of
pamphlets were scattered among the northern states, in
forming agriculturists of the great potentialities of this
new "Garden of E d e n . " ^ ^

Watkins induced the President of

^ ^ B a t o n Rouge Weekly Truth. November 26, 1886.
'127Edward Hake Phillips, "The Gulf Coast Rice
Industry," Agricultural History. XXV (April, 1951), 92-93.

129stewart Alfred Ferguson, "The History of Lake
Charles, Louisiana" (unpublished Master's thesis, Louisiana
State University, 1931), 68-71.
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Iowa Agricultural College, Seaman A. Knapp, to come to Lake
Charles and take charge of prairie land development and
sales.

130

A phenomenal land boom was soon underway.

By

1890, thousands of farmers had come down from Iowa, Illi
nois, Michigan, and other states to buy acreage from the
Watkins Syndicate.

Some of the earlier arrivals, noting

that rice crops flourished even under the primitive methods
used by native Acadian farmers, decided to apply midwestern
methods and machinery to the local crop.*3*

Their success

was so impressive that the later immigrants arrived with
the specific intention of planting rice; by 1892, Southwest
Louisiana was rightly regarded as "the great rice center of
America."

132
^

Land values within the next few years in

creased 1,000 per cent and over in the prairie country.*33
State politics also took a more promising direction
as the decade of the ISSO’s neared an end.

In January of

1888, Governor McEnery was defeated for renomination by a
coalition of reform elements, working inside the Democratic
party.

The reformers rallied behind the maimed war hero,

130joseph Cannon Bailey. Seaman A. Knapp:
School
master of American Agriculture (New York, 1945J, 114-15.
131Ibid.. 116-21.
*3%,ouisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings
of Sixth Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1892), 18.
*33Phillips, Agricultural History. XXV, 94.
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Francis T. Nicholls.

The change from McEnery to Nicholls

was a decided improvement; yet, unfortunately, this was due
not to any special virtue of Nicholls's, but because of the
extraordinary failings of McEnery.

To replace McEnery was

per se betterment.
Those who directed the Nicholls wing of the party
were often referred to as "the more respectable Democrats
of the S t a t e . " ^ 4

The Burke-Wiltz-McEnery machine, fi

nanced by the lottery and the penitentiary lease interests,
had cast a number of respectable gentlemen out of the inner
circle of power when Nicholls*s term was cut short by the
constitutional convention of 1879.

McEnery, for a brief

period after he succeeded to the governorship in 1881, made
vague gestures of conciliation to the old patrician c l a s s ^ ^
But his actions belied his words.

In 1884, efforts to stop

McEnery*s bid for the Democratic nomination to a full term
came to naught.

Later, as it became evident that McEnery

and Burke would seek yet another term in 1888, the grumbling
which had been heard from large portions of the gentry
turned into wrathful clamor.

"McLottery" was surrounded by

*^4New York Times. April 22, 1884. Chief among the
pro-Nicholls, anti-McEnery Democrats were: Edward Douglas
White, Randall Lee Gibson, Newton C. Blanchard, and Robert
N. Ogden. The venerable Daily Picayune, and about half the
rural press, expoused the pro-Nicholls cause.
l ^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Capjtolian-Advocate. May 10,
1882.
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"buzzards and parasites."136

j^e and his clique could no

longer be endured.
Unseating McEnery from the gubernatorial chair could
only be accomplished at the quadrennial party convention to
nominate state officials.

Both the McEnery "Regulars" and

the Nicholls "Reformers" devoted most of 1887, the year pre
ceding the convention, to the business of lining up parish
delegations.

It was a prolonged, bitter struggle.

In Union

Parish, to cite one instance of bloodshed, the two campaign
managers of the rival Democratic factions died in the streets
of Farmerville after a gun duel.

137

Nicholls was strongest

in the small farm districts and among the Democratically-in
clined portion of sugar planter interests.

McEnery*s support

came from the parishes of great cotton plantations.
Orleans held the balance of power.

New

1 88

This campaign offers some revealing, though hardly
edifying, information as to the moral tone of Louisiana
politics of the period.

McEnery partisans dwelt upon the

"imbecility and disastrous failure" of the Nicholls
^•^ D a i l v Picayune. October 26, 1887; Homer Claiborne
Guardian, quoted in Opelousas St. Landrv Democrat. January
15, 1887.
^■^New York Times. December 21, 1887.
l^®See Minden Democrat-Tribune. quoted in Daily
Picayune. January 24, 1887; Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. January 7, 1888; Henry Clay Warmoth. War. Politicsand Reconstruction: Stormy Davs in Louisiana (New York.
1930), 248.
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administration of 1877-80.^9

Burke took the lion*s share

of credit for ending military Reconstruction.-*-4^

Governor

McEnery, a Negro-baiter par excellence, equated the oppo
sition to Republicanism, softness toward Negroes, and sundry
other un-southern activities.

He solemly pronounced

Nicholls to be “unsound on the race question.H^4^

The

powerful Times-Demoerat. Burke's newspaper, kept up an edi
torial barrage on the theme that white supremacy and status
quo in the State House were indivisible.

McEnery knew how

to handle "bad and dangerous n e g r o e s . N i c h o l l s ,

on the

other hand, had proven himself in the Tensas troubles of
1878 to be "too honest [sic ] H about such matters as vote
fraud and intimidation.^4^
Nicholls partisans dragged out an awesome array of
skeletons from the McEnery closet.

A dying school system,

wretched conditions in the state institutions, the convict
lease-levee contract scandals, fraud in state lands in
volving brother John McEnery, the ignoring of local senti
ment in appointments to parish officers--a list of evils
^ ^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana.
II, 62.
^4^New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 15-16, 1887.
• ^ Dailv Picayune. November 4, 1887.
*4% e w Orleans Times-Democrat. October 14, 1887,
January 6, 1888.
143Pailv Picayune. October 14, 1887; St. Martinville Messenger, quoted in ibid., October 3, 1887.
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which enraged the hill farmers and embarrassed "the best
people of the state.”^44

The Daily Picayune wondered what

dark secrets Burke might be hiding in the books of the
treasury office; a change in administration would at least
give the public an examination of these records for the
first time in a decade.^4^

But one subject of mutual em

barrassment was not discussed.

The Louisiana State Lottery

Company, always a watchful fisher in political waters, had
contributed money to both factions.^4**
The "Reform" effort to oust McEnery was something
less than an immaculate crusade.

Although speakers at

Nicholls rallies rehashed the scandals of the incumbent
administration, it must be noted that they considered other
matters more significant.
with Negro-baiting.

They replied to Negro-baiting

Stung by the assertion that Nicholls

was "unsound on the race question," his friends were proud
to relate how their one-armed hero had once slapped a
l440pelousas St. Landry Democrat. January 1, 1887.
^•45Pailv Picayune. October 16, 1887. This news
p a p e r s hostility to Burke might be attributed to the fact
that it had been engaged in a circulation war with Burke’s
Times-Democrat since 1881.
In June of 1882, a duel between
State Treasurer Burke and C. H. Parker, editor of the Daily
Picayune, was fought behind the New Orleans Slaughter
House, which resulted in Burke being shot in both legs.
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. June 8, 1882.
l460pelousas St. Landrv Clarion. December 27, 1890;
Baton Rouge Daily Advocate,. December 3, 1890. Nicholls *s
supporters admitted later that their side accepted lottery
money in 1888.
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colored man's face.^47

Nicholls, for his part, did not

propose to end the mediaeval penitentiary lease, nor suggest
that local officials should be elected rather than appointed;
he criticized the harsh methods, rather than the underlying
principles, of Louisiana Bourbonism.

According to poli

ticians in the Nicholls movement, the only mortal sin com
mitted by the McEnery clique was that the clique was trying
to perpetuate itself in office.

This attitude was strik

ingly revealed in a pro-Nicholls speech by Robert N. Ogden.
Colonel Ogden told his audience:
When it is said that the McEnery officials are corrupt
and all that, it does not amount to much of an argu
ment, for you find corrupt officials everywhere; but
when it is said that Governor McEnery*s officials
intent to perpetuate themselves in office . . . it
is the truth, for that is their intention.148
On January 5, 1888, one week before the gubernatorial
nominating convention, Orleans Parish elected its delegation.
The city gave Nicholls a majority^ the stand-off between the
uplands and the cotton black belt was broken.
Enery*s old friend Jastremski then conceded

Even Mc-

d e f e a t .

^-49

^^Arcadia Record, quoted in Daily Picayune. Oc
tober 29, 1887. Jn spite of the animosity which both Demo
cratic factions displayed toward colored people, a few
Negroes expressed interest in the Nicholls campaign. A
Republican newspaper complained that these colored people
"even have the cheek to call themselves 'Reform Nigger
Democrats." New Orleans Weekly Pelican. September 10, 1887.
^48paily Picayune. October 4, 1887,
149

Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. January
7, 1888; New Orleans Times-Democrat, January f>-8f 1888.
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Major Burke, who saw his hold on state politics slipping
away, worked desperately to block Nicholls*s nomination, but
to no avail.

150

The convention stampeded to Nicholls and

made a clean sweep of the incumbent administration.

Next,

of course, came the presumably minor hurdle of the April
general election.

Nicholls*s opponent was none other than

"The Prince of Carpetbaggers," Henry Clay W a r m o t h . B u t
there seemed to be no cause for Democratic alarm.

Among

other portents, Nicholls*s revived popularity among rankand-file whites was attested by the news that a patent
medicine called "the Francis T. Nicholls Stomach Bitters"
was "the sensation of the h o u r . " ^ ^
Suddenly, Governor McEnery tossed out a bombshell
by announcing that a "fair count" of ballots would take
place in the general election.

This, thought the

Nicholls "Reformers," was a dastardly thing for McEnery to
say.

If the Governor’s planter friends took him at his

word, they might permit their Negro peons to vote, for
once unmolested.

And Louisiana’s colored people adored

^ ^ N e w Orleans Evening Truth, quoted in Bayou Sara
True Democrat. March 19, 1892.
■^1-Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. April 5,
1888.
152Ibid.. March 30, 1888.
l^^Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 82;
New Orleans Evening Truth, quoted in Bayou Sara True Demo
crat. March 19, 1892.
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Warmoth.
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Alarmed Nicholls supporters worked quickly to

placate the aggrieved McEnery, and a compromise was reached.
Nicholls promised the outgoing Governor a position on the
State Supreme Court.

155

count was called off.

The crisis was over.

The fair

On election day, the Democratic

commissioners in the bottomlands worked with customary zeal;
Nicholls swamped Warmoth, 136,746 to 51,993.^^
Nicholls*s first inauguration, in 1877, expelled
from Louisiana what one historial has called "a reign of
irresponsible lawlessness unequaled in the history of
civilized peoples."
victory.

1 R7

Time proved it to be a hollow

Eleven years afterward, the benign old Brigadier

was delegated to rescue this still unhappy commonwealth
from the depths of Bourbon misrule.

As Nicholls took the

oath of office in May of 1888, his second administration
began with one advantage which the first had lacked.
Burke was no longer a power in the party.

Major

Burke soon left

l54Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. April 5,
1888. According to this source, the Negroes of Baton Rouge
tended to confuse Warmoth with the Messiah.
^^Fortier (ed.), Louisiana. II, 115; New Orleans
Evening Truth, quoted in Bayou Sara True Democrat. March
19, 1892. Warmoth, in later years, claimed that he was
personally encouraged by McEnery to try and beat Nicholls
in the 1888 general election. See Warmoth, War. Politics
and Reconstruction. 251-52.
^■^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 561.
157
Coulter, The South During Reconstruction. 352;
Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 225-29.
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the United States to attend to Central American mining
stock, and his continued departure was assured by an investi
gation which revealed irregularities in the state treasury
1RO

totalling $1,267,905.

The intrepid Major preferred to

stay in Honduras, out of reach of Nicholls and S. L. James*s
deadly penal system.

Besides, Tegucigalpa bore a political

resemblance to Baton Rouge.

For Burke had discovered, in

the person of President Louis Bogran, another McEnery.

l^Louisi ana , Official Journal of the House of
Representatives. 1890, 20-21. According to Warmoth, McEnery, after being promised a place on the Louisiana
Supreme Court, pledged to see that "every ballot box should
be stuffed to the limit in favor of General Nicholls."
Warmoth, War. Politics and Reconstruction. 253.

CHAPTER VI
THE LOUISIANA FARMERS1 UNION
Every spring, after plowing and planting was over,
the upland farmers of North Louisiana had a few days for
relaxation and neighborhood visits.
in the local cemetery.

One day might be spent

By custom, on a designated morning,

family groups would assemble where their dead were buried
for a “cemetery working:"

an annual task of tidying up the
i
churchyard and the grave plots within.
At noon, picnic
baskets would be unpacked beneath the shade of nearby trees.
Along with the food came a swapping of news and a discussion,
of mutual problems.

If times were hard the faces would be

grim, and the talk would be bitter.
Near Bayou D'Arbonne, in Lincoln Parish, stood a
frame church and a cluster of weathered gravestones.

There,

the usual group of neighbors assembled in the spring of 1881.
A skimpy year was in prospect; credit in the stores was
tight because last year's cotton crop had proved to be a
personal observation. The custom of a neighbor
hood "cemetery working" survived, in portions of North
Louisiana, long into the twentieth century. This writer, as
a child, was present at several such events at a village
churchyard in Franklin Parish.
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failure.^

Conversation shifted to the need for an effect

ive organization of farmers.

Most of those present, re

membering the disappointment of the Grange, shrugged off all
suggestions.
later.

But ten or twelve of the men agreed to meet

They planned to create a new, secret society for the

promotion of agricultural interests.

Their minuscule so

ciety was first called the Lincoln Parish Farmers* Club.

By

1886 it had been transformed into the Louisiana Farmers*
Union.

Under the latter name, in January of 1887, it merged

with an organization of like purpose in Texas, to form the
National Farmers* Alliance and Cooperative Union--better
known as the Southern Alliance.

This largest agricultural

body of nineteenth century America, the Southern Alliance,
rose out of many sources, fed by countless wellsprings of
discontent.

The ultimate origins of the Southern Alliance

were often disputed by contemporary leaders of the movement.
Obscure men at obscure places were involved in its genesis.
But part of its mainstream can be traced back to a rustic
churchyard in North Louisiana, in the early spring of the
^Watkins, King Cotton. 204. Louisiana*s 1880
cotton crop was the smallest (359,147 bales) since the late
I860*s. Yet the price farmers received for the 1880 crop
remained on a level with the 1879 crop of over 500,000
bales. See Boyle, Cotton and the New Orleans Cotton Ex
change. 182.
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year 1881.^
Lincoln was only one of several parishes to witness
the creation of a farmers club in the early months of 1881,4
But the little society at Bayou D*Arbonne seemed more am
bitious than the others.

Especially did one.of its original

members, J. A. Tetts, hope that the club might be expanded
into a statewide organization of dirt farmers.

Louisianafs

small agriculturists, Tetts surmised, were, in their dis
united condition, "the natural prey of all kinds of specu
lation, and the subject of every class of fraud, from paper
sole shoes to adulterated fertilizers, and from lying
3
A mistake has been made concerning the date of
origin of the Louisiana Farmers* Union. All recent agri
cultural historians (John D, Hicks, Theodore Saloutos, Carl
C. Taylor and others) who mention the Union begin it one
year earlier, in 1880. Their source is the same in each
case: J. A. Tetts, one of the founders of the Farmers*
Union, was quoted in Nelson A. Dunning, The Farmers* Alliance
History and Agricultural Digest (Washington, 1891), 218-21,
as giving the spring of 1880 as the date of organization.
However, it can be verified that all other dates mentioned
by Tetts, in the information he gave Dunning, are errone
ously dated one year ahead of the actual event. For example,
Tetts cites January, 1886, as the date of the merger of the
Farmers* Union and the Texas State Alliance; however, news
papers carried the story in January of 1887, Another con
temporary account, W. Scott Morgan*s History of the Wheel
and Alliance and the Impending Revolution (Hardv. Arkansas,
1889), 3^0, records the date 1861 [sic] for the founding of
the Louisiana Farmers* Union. Morgan*s date, or course, is
a typographical error; it should have read 1881. Unfortu
nately, a close search of available Louisiana newspapers for
1880-81 yields no information as to the formation of the
Union in Lincoln Parish. At the time, only one newspaper
was published in that parish: the Vienna Sentinel. Copies
of it have not survived.
^Dailv Picayune. February 14, 17, 1881.
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advertisements to false market reports."
The constitution and by-laws of the Lincoln Parish
Farmers* Club stressed the need for political action on the
part of "the real farmers."

Members were urged to work for

the defeat of "all political rings and . . . machine candi
dates."

Better representation "in the halls of legis

lation" was called for, so that laws friendly to agri
culture might be passed, and unfriendly measures defeated.
Clubs in other parishes were requested "to write us and
. . . make permanent the organization throughout the State."
But only "practical farmers . . .
need apply.^

of good moral character"

In what may have been an oversight, Negroes

were not specifically excluded from membership.
The club soon ran into trouble over the question of
secrecy.

In the neighborhood lived a number of prospective

members who belonged to the Primitive Baptist Church, which
did not permit its adherents to join covert organizations.
Consequently, the original idea of secrecy was discarded.
The club met twice each month.

By the end of 1881 about

forty men, all from Lincoln Parish, had joined.

Apparently,

the feelers sent out to similar clubs in other parishes
elicited little or no response.

The proposed statewide

organization simply failed to materialize, and attendance
^Morgan, History of the Wheel and Alliance. 369-70.
^Dunning, The Farmers* Alliance History. 223.
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at the meetings in Lincoln Parish began to dwindle.

By the

summer of 1882, the club had virtually disbanded.7
Three years later, in the fall of 1885, Tetts, who
was secretary of the original club, happened to strike up a
conversation with Samuel Skinner, another bewiskered farmer,
on the streets of Ruston.

"He had just sold his short crop

of cotton for a short price," Tetts recalled later.

"I had

also disposed of my crop, and found that my receipts did
not meet my expenses."8

The two men decided that the time

had come to resurrect the defunct society.
Tetts and Skinner were, in many respects, typical of
the small landowner class of upland Louisiana.

Skinner,

fifty-eight years old in 1885, was a "hard-working farmer"
who lived only four miles from his place of birth.

He

lacked formal education, but laid claim to "a rich fund of
useful information."^
in the Grange.

During the 1870's he had been active

Disgusted by state and national politics,

Skinner considered himself an independent; he denied
allegiance to any political party,

Tetts was thirty-eight.

He had come to Louisiana, a decade earlier, from his birth
place in the unprosperous "sand hill" region of South
7Ibid.. 219.
8Ibid.
^Morgan, History of the Wheel and Alliance. 371-72,
Portraits of Tetts and Skinner, rather crudely drawn, appear
in this work.
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Carolina.

Tetts had some education, though he was pulled

out of school at fifteen and put to work in a grocery store
owned by a relative.
the Confederate army.

In 1864, at seventeen, he enlisted in
Tetts was destined for a long life

of chronic poverty and disappointment; the Confederacy was
merely the first of many lost causes he would espouse.
After the war he went back to South Carolina and spent four
years trying to learn the mechanics of building cotton gins.
Then he turned to farming.

In 1872 Tetts emigrated to

Louisiana, and selected a homestead in the red soil of
Lincoln Parish.

Like Skinner, he was an ex-Granger.*^

Early in March, 1886, the two men conferred again;
this time at Tetts's farmhouse.**

After making some changes

in the old club's constitution and by-laws, Tetts and
Skinner sent word to their acquaintances that an organi
zation meeting would, on March 10, be held in Antioch
Church; the place was located about fifteen miles from
Tetts*s home.

Only nine farmers attended.

Tetts and

Skinner went ahead with the meeting, however*
upon a secret ritual, and their motion carried.

They insisted
The Lincoln

Parish Farmers' Club had come to life again.
During the next three months, news of the order
began to spread throughout the hills of Lincoln, and a
*°Ibid.. 369-70.
**Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 220.
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number of subordinate unions were formed; then, in July, a
mass meeting was held at the village of Vienna, and a
"central parish organization" cr eat e d . ^

John M. Stallings,

a well-to-do farmer with political ambitions, took office as
President.

Tetts was assigned his usual role, that of

Secretary.

Just as the Lincoln Parish club of 1881 had

hoped to spread the organization into neighboring parishes,
so did the revived order of 1886.

The second effort, unlike

the first, had the spirit of perseverance.
The formation of the Louisiana State Farmers* Union
was proclaimed in August, 1886, one month after the mass
meeting at Vienna.

Stallings, and other officials of the

parish club, now made up the hierarchy of the state union.
A new constitution was soon drawn up, and 1,000 copies
printed for distribution.

Somehow, a copy of the Texas State

Alliance constitution had found its way into Lincoln Parish,
and many of its features were incorporated into the organic
law of the Louisiana order.
Grange ritual was adopted.

An abbreviated version of the
The impecunious J. A. Tetts

asked to be relieved of duty as Secretary, since he was a
working farmer "and had a large family to support," but the
other officials of the Farmers* Union persuaded him to stay
on in the new position of Corresponding Secretary.

. Back

woods farmer though he was, Tetts could write with a certain
12Ibid., 221.
J-3Ibid.
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picturesque vigor.

The chore of spreading word of the order

became his primary task.
made good use of his pen.

Beginning in August, 1886, Tetts
He composed and mailed out severdl

hundred letters, and described the Union in a series of
articles published in an agricultural magazine which had
considerable circulation in the lower Mississippi v a l l e y . ^
Tetts labored without salary.

But he had earned the right

to be pointed to, in later years, as "the founder of the
Union in Louisiana.
The Farmers* Union met again in October, 1886.

Four
16
parishes of Northwest Louisiana provided all the delegates.
Greenbacker influence was already beginning to show up in
the agrarian order; Jesse Moore Tilley, who figured in the
inflationist clamor of 1878-79, headed the Bienville Barish
Union.

17

Oddly, the nascent Farmers* Union had not yet

taken root in the Northcentral parishes of Catahoula, Grant,
^ T e t t s ’s articles appeared in Home and Farm,
published at Louisville, Kentucky. The only known copies
of Home and Farm for the year 1886 are located in the Duke
University Library, and even these are in fragments. Upon
request, a Duke librarian searched for the Tetts articles
but found no trace of them.
^•“’Louisiana Populist. September 25, 1896.
^ B y October, 1886, parish Unions were operating in
Lincoln, Bienville, Webster, and perhaps Union Barish.
Information on the initial spread of the Farmers* Union is
of a vague and conflicting nature. Cf. Biographical and
Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana. 26b. 690:
Colfax Chronicle. October 4. 1886 - April 30, 1887.
17
Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest
Louisiana. 205. 662.
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and Winn, the area where agrarian radicalism would, in suc
ceeding years, prove strongest in Louisiana.

By January of

1887 the Louisiana Farmers* Union claimed 10,000 members— a
gross exaggeration.^*®

Not more than six, or at best seven,

parishes had been organized by that time; the future heart
land of the order was still virgin territory.

Probably the

actual membership did not exceed 3,000 by the first month
of 1887, when the merger with the Texas State Alliance took
place.

Apparently, only white farmers were admitted.
Meanwhile, two farm organizations of greater member

ship were spreading across the neighboring states of
Arkansas and Texas.

And up in the Midwest, the National

Farmers* Alliance, with headquarters in Chicago, claimed to
be organized in at least eight st ates.^
titled itself the "Agricultural Wheel."

The Arkansas order
It arose from

origins similar to those of the Louisiana Union, beginning
as a discussion society in a Prairie County schoolhbus*
1882.

in

By 1885 the Wheel boasted of units in twenty Arkansas

counties, and had begun to spread into all neighboring
states except Louisiana.

In 1886, under President Isaac

McCracken, the Wheel listed 50,000 members; the following
year, by some fanciful arithmetic, it claimed 500,000 in
^•®National Economist. Ill (March 22, 1890), 15.
*^Roy V. Scott, "Milton George and the Farmers*
Alliance Movement," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review
XLV (June, 1958), 102-104.

eight states .^
The Texas Alliance dated back to the middle 1870*s.
Its economic concepts and internal arrangement borrowed
much from the Grange, and a good portion of the original
membership came from that fading fraternity.

According to

Charles W. Macune1s unpublished history of the Alliance, it
first emerged near Fort Worth, in 1876; stock raisers who
were having trouble with horse thieves founded the order. A
The Texas Alliance languished from 1878 until 1885 because
of political and personal differences among the leadership.
Some Alliancemen preferred to keep the order aloof from
politics; others, however, tried to tie it to the Texas
Democratic party, while a smaller number leaned toward indeO Q

pendency and Greenbackism.
In 1885 the Texas Alliance began to make rapid
strides in membership by harping on the need for economic
unity.

"Business purpose" became, for the moment, uppermost

Texas farmers, acting through the Alliance, concentrated
E. Bryan, The Farmers* Alliance;
Its Origin.
Progress and Purposes (Fayetteville, Ark., 1891), 21;
Taylor. The Farmers1 Movement. 205.
2J-C. W. Macune, "The Farmers Alliance" (unpublished
typewritten MS, 1920, deposited in University of Texas
Library), 3. Cited hereafter as Macune MS.
22commons and Others, History of Labour in the
United States. II, 462; Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the
South. 71-T2T
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their trade on one merchant in each locality who would offer
23
them the best terms.
Inevitably, politics again reared
its head.

Rumors spread that a strong faction of the Texas

Alliance hoped to reach an understanding with the urban
Knights of Labor, so as to create a proletarian block vote
which could force concessions from the Texas Democratic
party.

Word of this plan reached Louisiana.

The Weekly

Truth, in May of 1886, prophesied that the small farmers
and city wage earners of Louisiana would make a similar
coalition.^4
Eighteen eighty-seven marks a dramatic turning point
in the history of American agrarian movements.

Early that

year the Southern Alliance came to life at Waco, Texas.
From 1887 until 1890 it swept across the cotton states and
into the Great Plains with cyclonic fury; in fact, two
historians have suggested that "one must go back to Medieval
Europe, on the eve of the First Crusade, for an emotional
situation comparable.

. . .*

25

Unquestionably, the man most

responsible for the initial success of the Southern Alliance
was Dr. Macune, of Texas.

But Macune has also been

given credit for initiating the fusion of Louisiana and
^Macune, MS, 11.
^4Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. May 21, 1886,
Macune MS, 12-16.

Cf.

Ac

C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson; Agrarian Rebel (New
York, 1938), 137-38, quoting L ou i s M . Hacker and Benjamin B.
Kendrick, The United States Since 1865 (New York, 1934), 301.
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Texas farmers which marked the formal beginning of the
Southern Alliance.^

This point needs some clarification.

For it was the obscure J. A. Tetts, and not Macune, who made
the first overtures.
At the October, 1886 meeting of the Louisiana
Farmers* Union, Tetts, at his own suggestion, was authorized
to correspond with the President of the Texas Farmers'
Alliance to "try to bring about a consolidation."

27

The

copy of the Texas Alliance constitution in Lincoln Parish
carried the names of its officials, and Tetts wrote to the
man whose name appeared first, President Andrew Dunlap.

But

Dunlap did not answer Tetts*s letter; the political schism
in the Texas order had forced his resignation in November.
The powers of President had fallen to Dr. Macune, formerly
OQ

the Chairman of the executive committee.

Toward the end

of the year, Tetts received a note from Texas. .It was from
Macune.

He had discovered the Tetts letter in Dunlap's

files and, in Tetts's words:

"He saw no reason why the two

bodies should not unite and form a National as I had pro
posed. . . .

The Louisianian wrote back, asking Macune

^Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 73; Hicks,
The Populist Revolt. 108-109.
^Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 221;
Morgan, History of the Wheel and Alliance. 37^).
2®Macune MS, 16.
OQ

^Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History, 221.
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to send a Texas representative to the next meeting of the
Farmers1 Union, scheduled for January 11, 1887, in Ruston.
Macune sent Evan Jones to Ruston, with the news that the
Texans were anxious to have the Louisiana Farmers' Union
join them and begin the work of proselytizing the rest of
the South.

At the Ruston assembly, Tetts was selected as

Ha committee of one" to visit the Texas State Alliance,
meeting at Waco on January 18, with plenary powers to act
for the Union in completing the amalgamation.
Macune had two motives for expansion.

30

Not only

would spreading the order be a good thing in itself, but
also, he hoped, the vision of expansion would serve to get
the Texans' minds off their internal squabbles which were
threatening to dissolve the o r d e r . F r o m Tetts's stand
point, aside from the obvious need for interstate unity,
there was good reason for merging with the Texans.

Late in

1886 the Texas Alliance had infiltrated Louisiana territory.
About fifteen lodges in De Soto Parish had joined their
western neighbors rather than the Louisiana Union.

32

More

over, the Agricultural Wheel appeared to be considering a
move into Louisiana; President McCracken of Arkansas had
3®Bryan, The Farmers' Alliance. 12-13; Macune MS,
17.
3^Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 46-47.
3^Mansfield Democrat, quoted in Opelousas S t .
Landry Clarion. January 22, 1887; Biographical and Histori
cal Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 244.
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written to Tetts and made inquiries about the Union.33

Both

these organizations were larger than the Louisiana order;
all three inflated their figures, but the Texas boast of
100,000 members was proabbly closer to accuracy than Tetts's
claim of one-tenth that number for his organization.34
Tetts seemed to realize that the little Union was destined,
sooner or later, to be absorbed by one of the more powerful
orders.

To approach one of them first, as he did, must have

seemed the best course of action.
Attending the Waco meeting were 500 Texans and J. A.
Tetts.

35

At the closing session on January 21, the two

state orders merged into the National Farmers Alliance and
Cooperative Union of America— the Southern Alliance.

Macune

assumed the post of President; Tetts became First VicePresident.

The formidable task of extending the order

across the South now lay ahead.

Macune mapped out a plan of

action which would send organizers into every southern
state; also, he hoped to induce McCracken's Wheel into the
new order.

Prior to the merger with Louisiana, Macune gave

some thought to affiliation with Milton George's National
33Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 221.
34Bryan, The^Farmers' Alliance. 13; Taylor, The
Farmers* MovementV £ol.
3% a c u n e MS, 16-17; National Economist. I (April
13, 1889), 56.
"^Galveston (Tex.) Daily News. January 22, 1887.
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Farmers* Alliance*

But both the Texas and Louisiana agrari

ans disliked certain features of the midwestern order,
particularly its lack of secrecy, loose organization, and
37
policy of admitting Negroes.
Before the Waco group adjourned, an announcement was
made that the next meeting would be held in Shreveport, in
October of 1887.

Despite its significance, the creation of

the Southern Alliance aroused little

attention in the press.

Louisiana dailies mentioned it not at all, and

to the

Galveston Daily News, the only important information from
Waco on January 21 concerned one Jay Gould, who had, that
day, taken a forty minute tour of the town, escorted by a
group of prominent citizens.

The last paragraph of the same

story noted, laconically, that some Texas farmers had met
with J. A. Fitts

[ sic]

of Louisiana" to form a national

association of farmers.^®
Between January and October,
Alliance took root in eight states.

1887, the Southern
Delegates to the

Shreveport meeting included the distinguished North Carolina
agriculturist, Leonidas L. Polk.39

Since it was the first

37

Bryan, The Farmers* Alliance. 11-13; Dunning, The
Farmers* Alliance History. 109I
^Galveston (Tex.) Daily News. January 22, 1887.
39New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 13, 1887*
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meeting to include several states, an Alliance handbook
called the Shreveport gathering "the first national meeting"
of the Southern Alliance.4®

The Agricultural Wheel, im

pressed by the Alliance's growth, sent a delegation to
41
discuss consolidation.
Overtures were made by, and to,
industrial labor.

Tetts introduced the following resolution

at Shreveport:
The National Farmers Alliance . . . extends its
fraternal good wishes to all labor organizations
. . . and ask them to assist us in our battle for
the rights of producers, and that each work to
bring about a harmony of sentiment, and unity of
action between the different organizations of
labor.42
The resolution passed.

But its vague phraseology

gave evidence of the growing rift within the Southern
Alliance in regard to combining with urban laborers.
fundamental question was involved:

A

if the Alliance went

headlong into "unity of action" with city labor, such unity
would doubtless be expressed by political pressures on
political parties, perhaps even by independent political
action.

At least half the Southern Alliancemen were

small landowners, and most were relatively loyal
4®F. G. Blood, Handbook and History of the National
Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union (Washington. 1893).
37.
4*Paily Picayune. October 13-14, 1887; National
Economist. I (April 13. 1889). 57.
^ National Economist. I (April 13, 1889), 57.
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Democrats.

43

The more conservative elements, which in

cluded Macune, were willing to act with urban labor up to
a point; but they were adamantly opposed to the formation
of a proletarian third party.

The Knights of Labor was the

only significant order of wage earners in the South.^4

The

fact that Knights membership included not only urban workers
but wage earners in the small towns and countryside, gave
it a partially rural cast and seemed to encourage the idea
of Alliance-Knights cooperation;

45

on the other hand, the

Knights1 membership rolls took in rural Negro laborers,
which disturbed the more conservative Alliancemen.

But a

good percentage of the Alliance was too poor to employ
laborers--many were tenants or worked for wages themselves-and this substrata of the Alliance anticipated, rather than
feared, the economic and political possibilities of close
accord with the Knights.

Tetts spoke for the left wing of

the Alliance when he wrote:

"The labor in the field ought

to be a friend to the labor in the factory and the mine.
. .

.

They ought to unite to crush off the leeches that are

4 ^Cf. Forum. X (September, 1890), 35; Woodward,
Origins of the New South. 192-93; Saloutos, Farmer Move
ments in the South. 76; Macune MS, 11-14, 18-30.
^Frederick Meyers, "The Knights of Labor in the
South," Southern Economic Journal VI (April, 1940), 479,
482.
45
Commons and Others, History of Labour in the
United States. II, 492.
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sucking the life blood of all."4^
In Louisiana, by the time of the Shreveport meeting,
the Alliance had entrenched itself in all the upland
parishes north of the Red River.

Over 300 chapters were

meeting weekly; total membership was now probably close to
10,000, though claims ran much higher.47

Earlier, in

February of 1887, a newspaper which purported to be the
state organ of the association, the Choudrant Farmers1
Union, began weekly publication.

Choudrant, a tiny hamlet

in Lincoln Parish, did not even have a post office.4®

As a

mark of provincial pride, the name "Farmers' Union," rather
than "Alliance," continued in popular usage within Louisiana;
all state meetings into the 1890*s took the former desig
nation.4^

However, the allegiance of Farmers' Union members

to the Southern Alliance was understood by all.

In the

following year, 1888, the Farmers' Union spread among the
white farmers of Southcentral Louisiana, and crossed the
Mississippi into the old Grange strongholds of the Florida
^National Economist. Ill (September 6, 1890), 39899.
47Colfax Chronicle. March 5, 1887; Winnfield
Southern Sentinel. September 16, 1877; Daily Picayune.
November 16, 1687.
4 ®Colfax Chronicle. March 5, April 30, 1887.
4%innfield Winn Parish Democrat. September 11, 1888.
Hereafter, the term "Farmers' Union," rather than "Southern
Alliance" will be used whenever its activities on the state
level are described..
This will help avoid confusion, and
is in keeping with the usage in contemporary sources.
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parishes.

By 1889 no less than 15,000, perhaps 20,000,

Louisiana farmers in thirty-five parishes were enrolled in
local chapters; promotional literature in French had also
begun to be distributed among the Acadian farmers near the
Gulf coast.

51

A decade earlier the state Grange, at its

height, had numbered no more than 10,000^ The old centers
of Grange strength were now doubly organized in the Union.
Surviving pockets of Grange activity were quickly
swallowed up into the new order.

In 1881, after two years

of inactivity, the state organization of the Patrons of
Husbandry took on a flickering second life through the
efforts of its old leaders, including Daniel Dennett of the
52
Daily Picayune.
From 1882 through 1886, a prosperous
planter of East Baton Rouge parish, Daniel Morgan, assumed
charge of what passed for the state Grange.

53

Morgan*s

political affinity for the McEnery wing of the Democratic
54
party was common knowledge,
and this must have crippled
50
Crowley Siqna1 . quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. March 30, 1888; Colfax Chronicle. Sep-bember 29, 1888.
51National Economist. I (May 25, 1889), 155-56; III
(August 30, 1890), 383.
^ D a i l y Picayune. February 17-19, 1881.
53
Baton Rouge Daily Capitollan-Advocate. August 2,
1882; Willis, “The Grange Movement," 26-28; Winnfield
Southern Sentinel. December 18, 1885; Baton Rouge Weekly
Truth. July 16, 1886.
^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. December
7, 1887.
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chances for a Grange revival among rank-and-file farmers*
After 1883, a good majority of the active Patrons in Louisi
ana were to be found inside the borders of backwoods Winn
Parish*

In 1884, 1885, and 1886, Morgan came up from Baton

Rouge to preside over the annual "state" conventions of the
Grange in Winn.

By 1885, nine of the sixteen persons

elected to official positions in the Louisiana Grange lived
55
in Winn Parish.
But when the Farmers' Union entered Winn
in February of 1887, Grange activity, even there, virtually
ceased.

Morgan then forsook the Grange to play a minor

role in the Farmers' U n i o n , a n d at last Dennett was forced
to admit that the Grange "has had its day."5*^
The business program of the Farmers' Union-Alliance
in Louisiana followed, in the main, the path staked out by
the old Grange.

Between 1887 and 1890, about a score of

retail stores, owned by farmer-stockholders, operated under
the auspices of the U n i o n . B u t

often used was a simpler

^Winnfield Southern Sentinel. December 18, 1885.
^ C o l f a x Chronicle. September 29, 1888, January 4,
1890.
5^Pailv Picayune, quoted in Leesville People*s
Friend. March 21, 1889.
58
Grant and Winn had three cooperative stores each;
Sabine, two; Acadia, Caldwell, Claiborne, De Soto, Lincoln,
Livingston, Rapides, and Webster, one each. List compiled
from the files of the National Economist; Biographical and
Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, passim: Colfax
Chronicle. April 30. 1887-April 9. 1892; Daily Picayune.
June 30, 1887-April 12, 1890. Most of the Alliance stores,
and the state agency, had failed by the winter of 1892-93.
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device known as the "Farmers1 Trade Committee," made up of
delegates from a local Union or group of Unions within a
parish, which would meet with local merchants and agree to
throw all the order*s. trade to the merchant giving the best
terms.

A typical arrangement of this type could be found

in Grant Parish, where C. C. Nash, a merchant in the town
of Colfax, obtained the exclusive trade of six nearby Union
on his pledge to limit his net profit to ten per cent on
cash sales, and twenty per cent per annum on credit
accounts.

59

The fact that the farmers seemed satisfied

with this compact offers striking evidence of the severe
credit terms that most of them had endured up to that time.
Most important of all the cooperative activities
within the state was the creation of a Farmers* Union
Commercial Association of Louisiana; it was set up in 1888,
and its headquarters were located in New Orleans.^

Dif

fering little from the old state agency of the Grange in
the 1870's, the Association had both wholesale and retail
functions.

Louisiana products were sold to the outside

world, and Farmers* Union retail outlets were supplied with
provisions, along with individual farmers who managed to
ship their crops direct to the New Orleans office.

G. L.

P. Wren, formerly the publisher of the Minden Eaqle-Hve.
5^Colfax Chronicle. March 17, 1888.
^National Economist. I (April 13, 1889), 59;
Colfax Chronicle. October 6, 1888.
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presided over the Board of Directors.^

But actual control

of the Association's New Orleans office fell to State Agent
Thomas A~. C l a y t o n . ^

Clayton, a Scottish immigrant who had

settled near Opelousas in the 1880's, had been instrumental
in spreading the Farmers' Union into St. Landry Parish.
Beginning in 1888, he divided his time between the New
Orleans office and his farm.
Inherent in the Alliance economic program, in
Louisiana and elsewhere, was the farmer's conviction that he
was being deliberately victimized by the profit-mad business
interests--the "money power."

Monopolistic businesses, ac

cording to the agrarian dialectic, grew rich off the sweat
and agony of the "producers;" that is, the plain folk who
labored with their hands.

63

Despite the fact that most

Alliancemen were landowners, engaged in commercial agri
culture, their distress was. such, in the late nineteenth
century, that many viewed themselves not as rural capital
ists, but as part of the downtrodden mass which capital ex
ploited.^4

Mounting debts and declining cotton prices

formed the basis of their complaints.

A system of government

^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest
Louisiana. 663; Colfax Chronicle. October 6. 1888.
^ F o r a brief biography of Clayton, see Biographical
and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. I, 351.
^ H a r o l d U. Faulkner, Politics. Reform and Expansion;
1890-1900 (New York, 1959), 57-59.
^4Hofstadter, The Age of Reform. 47.
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(particularly in Louisiana), which catered to the desires
of the more predatory interests of the business world,
added to the farmer’s woes and intensified his belief that
a gigantic conspiracy was afoot against the common man.
The conspiracy theory was, of course, an oversimplifi
cation.

But it had some validity.

And Pelican State

farmers were a provincial lot; they did not travel much; it
was natural for them to believe that Wall Street was as
selfish and immoral as the Carondolet Street brokers of New
Orleans who joined Major Burke in robbing the state; that
the national Congress was simply an enlarged version of the
cesspool of corruption to be found at Baton Rouge.

Under

the circumstances, it is not surprising that some of the
more radical voices in the Southern Alliance were heard in
Louisiana.

J. A. Tetts was one such voice.

But most dis

turbing to conservative elements was the State Lecturer of
the Farmers1 Union, Thomas J. Guice of De Soto Parish.
Guice's origins were as obscure as his circumstances
were humble.

He had drifted into Louisiana from Texas,

where he was supposedly active in the Greenback party
during the 1870*s . H i s

poverty, and shabby clothes,

furnished much amusement for his Bourbon critics.^

But

^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. October 23, 1890.
^Mansfield Journal, quoted in Colfax Chronicle.
November 5, 1892.
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Guice1s utterances provoked some of the choicest of Bourbon
expletives.

Guice was characterized as a "dirty . . .
f ii 7
greasy . . . ignorant . . . " demogogue,
possessing a
"wide expanse of tobacco stained b o s o m . P o i n t e d

in

quiries were made in regard to his bathing habits.^
all admitted his ability to inflame rural audiences.

Yet
70

Guice carried the conspiracy theory to extreme lengths.
Once, while harranguing a crowd at Natchitoches, he argued
that the Civil War itself had been a plot to enslave the
poor white man under the pretense of freeing the Negro.

71

"The farmers and laborers should be the rulers," Guice in
sisted; otherwise, the "moneyed aristocracy" would increase
its power until "

[ we ] will be reduced to the condition

of the English and Irish peasantry."
Rural anger often exploded into violence.

To a

debt ridden farmer, the.village merchant might be looked
upon as a local manifestation of the Satanic Baron Rothschild described in Guice's orations.

The fact that so

67Ibid.. October 3, 1891.
ft

Colfax Chronicle. October 22, 1892.
69

Bastrop Clarion, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily
Advocate. June 17, i89l.
70

Daily Picayune. August 7, 1891; Bastrop ClarionAppeal, quoted in Shreveport Evening Judge. February 11,
1896.
^ National Economist. I (June 15, 1889), 198-99.
72Ibid.
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many of Louisiana*s rural merchants were Jewish made the
parallel even more plausible.

Beginning in 1879f years

before the spread of the Farmers* Union, attacks on the
lives and property of Jewish tradesmen became almost
commonplace in Louisiana.

That year, in St. Landry Parish,

the stores of Carl Wolff and P. Jacobs were destroyed by
arsonists, as was the residence of another merchant, Sam
Kaufman.

In 1881, Lazarus Meyer, a prominent Catahoula

Parish merchant was murdered— presumably by an irate
73
customer.
Five years later, to cite another example,
Simon Witkowski, a so-called "renegade Jew" who owned
60,000 acres and a number of stores in the Carroll parishes,
was forced to flee the region after his white tenants
burned one of his stores.
fire:

Two people were cremated in the
74
a clerk and a Negro woman who worked for Witkowski.
Toward the end of the 1880*s the number of reprisals

by rural debtors against their Jewish creditors increased.
The gun vied with the torch as a favored weapon.

During

the spring of 1887, rifles were discharged into the homes
of Jewish tradesmen in Avoyelles Parish, and arsonists in
7^Pailv Picayune. May 22, 1879; Rayville Richland
Beacon, October 8, i88l.
^4Floyd Messenger, quoted in Daily Picayune.
October 12, 1887; New Orleans Weekly Pelican. December 4,
1886. Witkowski was regarded as the political boss of West
Carroll, as well as its largest landholder. He repre
sented the parish in the state legislature, and, according
to the Floyd Messenger, was "one of Governor McHnery*s
satraps."
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Baton Rouge destroyed a gentile was well as a Jewish house
of business.7^

In 1889, during broad daylight, a "large

band" of white farmers rode into Delhi, in Richland Parish,
and shot up every mercantile establishment in town.
but one of Delhi’s stores were owned by Jews.

76

All

The

farmers had taken this action, it was said, "to clear off
old debts."

Two months later the same Delhi merchants

received a number of anonymous, threatening messages to
leave town posthaste.

77

A spectacular plan of agrarian violence was plotted
by Bienville Parish debtors during the spring of 1888.
They tried, unsuccessfully, to burn the entire business
78
section of the town of Arcadia.
It is instructive to
note that during the harvest season preceeding the fire,
16,116 bales of cotton were shipped from Arcadia and 15,000

7^Colfax Chronicle. March 19, 1887; Daily Picayune
November 12, 1887.
Vicksburg (Miss.) Commercia1 HeraId. quoted in
Rayville Richland Beacon. November 2, 1889.
77Shreveport Daily Caucasian. January 4, 1890.
78
Arcadia Record, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capi
tolian-Advocate. March 30, 1888.
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of these had passed through the hands of local merchants,
The Farmers* Union did not endorse such destructive out
bursts.

Hven the staunchest Bourbon papers seemed hesitant

to accuse the order of instigating the attacks.

But it is

more than probable that many of the rifles and torches used
against Jewish credit merchants were held in the hands of
members of the Farmers* Union.
The Southern Alliance did score one victory over
the "money power."

In 1888-89, the Alliance undertook a

boycott against the companies of the jute bagging trust.
This industry, which manufactured the covering for all
cotton bales, aroused the ire of southern farmers by raising
the price of the article, in 1888, to allegedly "unreasonable" heights.

80

A Farmers* Union convention held at

Opelousas in August of 1888, condemned the jute bagging
industry and proposed "to take measures for the intro
duction of cotton ba.gging to be used in wrapping bales
79
Arcadia Advance, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capi
tol ian-Advo cate. February 1, 1888. The extent to which
anti-Semitic feelings prompted Louisiana farmers into their
attacks upon Jewish merchants is difficult to assess.
Gentile tradesmen were also subjected to bullets and storeburnings, but not as frequently. Newspaper files of the
1879-90 period show that the great majority of merchants
whose person or property was harmed had Jewish names. But
this in itself is not positive proof of anti-Semitism, since
Jewish merchants often outnumbered those of other faiths in
Louisiana communities.
80

New York Times. quoted in Lake Providence Carroll
Democrat. July 28, 1888.
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. . . instead of jute."

Of

This proposed covering would

obviously serve a dual purpose; it would create yet another
use for cotton fiber, and provide cheaper covering for the
bales.

Farmers were jubilant when the Lane Company of New

Orleans responded with the news that their firm had suc
ceeded in manufacturing a cotton article which would meet
all the requirements for bale covering, yet would sell at a
cheaper price than jute.

82

Other state Alliances were

equally interested in cotton bagging.
cooperative mills.

83

Some established

At Birmingham, in May of 1889,

Alliance leaders from all over the South voted unanimously
84
to substitute cotton bagging for jute.
And even though
a number of important cotton exchanges refused to accept
bales wrapped in cotton bagging, the jute trust had been
thoroughly frightened.

By 1890 the price of jute bagging
85
had dropped from thirteen to five cents.
The triumph
over the jute monopoly, important in itself, also gave
Alliancemen a new feeling of power.
8^Colfax Chronicle. August 11, 1888.
®^Ibid., September 15, 29, 1888; National Economist.
(June 15, 1889), 208.
8:%oodward, Origins of the New South. 198.
84
William Warren Rogers, “Agrarianism in Alabama,
1865-1896“ (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
North Carolina, 1959), 279.
85Ibid.. 287.
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As the decade of the 1890*s began, the more extrava
gant claims of the Southern Alliance ran as high as
3,000,000 members.

However, an official census of the

order, compiled in 1890, listed 1,269,500 in twenty-two
states.®7

Louisiana’s membership was officially reported

at 40,000.®®

Though still popularly known as the "Southern

Alliance," the proper title of the National Farmers1
Alliance and Cooperative Union (NFACU), adopted at Waco in
1887, had been changed to the Farmers* and Laborers* Union
of America (FLUA) in September of 1889, when consolidation
89
with the Agricultural Wheel was achieved. 7

Finally, at

the third annual convention of the order, held at St. Louis
in December of 1889, the title was once again revised.
formal designation thereafter was:

The

National Farmers*

Alliance and Industrial Union (NFAIU).^
Efforts to unite the Southern Alliance with the
National, or Northern Alliance of Milton George, made at
®®Woodward, Origins of the New South. 192.
®7Haynes, Third Party Movements. 234-35.
®®Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. January 8, 1890. In
all probability not more than 25,000 of Louisiana’s white
farmers had joined the order by 1890. Smaller still would
be the number who regularly paid dues. But the number of
white farmers who sympathized with the work of the Farmers*
Union must have been double or more the actual membership.
®^Blood, Handbook and History of the National
Farmers* Alliance. 39-40.
^ Ibid.. N. B. Ashby, The Riddle of the Sphinx
(Des Moines, 1890), 437-39.
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St. Louis in 1889, failed for essentially the same reasons
that had prevented a fusion of the Texas Alliance with the
latter three years before.

91

The Southern Alliance, how

ever, had grown considerably more powerful than the northern
order.

And at St. Louis, the state Alliances of Kansas and

the Dakotas bolted George's association to join the stronger
Southern A l l i a n c e . ^

The year 1889 was also the end of

Macune1s two year career as President of the southern order;
Leonidas L. Polk, from 1889 until his death in 1892, served
as chief executive.

93

Macune turned to editing the official

organ of the Southern Alliance, the National Economist.
which had begun publication in Washington, D. C. some months
before the St. Louis convention.

94

But Macune still had a

large voice in the inner circle of Alliance leaders.
evangelical zeal continued undiminished.

His

The Alliance, he

insisted, "is a living, active . . . embodiment of the cause
of Jesus Christ."^"*
Just as the Alliance claimed affinity with Jesus, so
did a more worldly agency than either, the Democratic party
91

Herman C. Nixon, "The Cleavage Within the Farmers'
Alliance Movement," Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XV
(June, 1928), 22-33: Hicks. The Populist Revolt. 119-27.
.^Taylor,

The Farmers' Movement. 255.

^3Stuart Noblin, Leonidas La Fayette Polk:
Crusader (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1949), 212.

Agrarian

^ National Economist. I (March 14, 1889), 1-12.
^Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance. 260.
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of the South, assert that it was in communion with the cause
of the farmer.

Beyond question, most white Alliancemen in

the South--at least, before 1890— were dutiful Democrats.
But from the beginning, the Alliance had attracted political
heretics.

A significant minority of the Louisiana Farmers*

Union membership had a record of Independent, Greenbacker,
and even Republican activities in the decade between Recon
struction and the Waco conference.

The old Greenbacker-

Republican coalition in Grant and Winn parishes, led by
Benjamin Brian, wasted no time in joining the Union.

96

The

fact that Parson Brian, and a number of others like him
throughout the South, had gone into the Alliance movement
disturbed conservative elements both within and without the
order.
In the beginning, Bourbon chieftans scoffed at sug
gestions that the dirt farmers of the Southern Alliance
might someday rebel against the party of home rule and white
supremacy.

97

The real problem, as the more complacent

conservatives saw it, was to deftly forestall the efforts of
the Alliance to liberalize the Democratic party from within.
Benign platitudes and sympathy for the woes of the agri
culturist were expressed by Bourbon leaders in practically
^ C o l f a x Chronicle. November 19, 1887, May 5, 1888;
Daily Picayune. August 7, 1891.
97Forum. X (September, 1890), 35.
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every part of the South as the Alliance grew to formidable
size.

Yet the entrenched officeholders, with few except

ions, had no intention of aceedelng to Alliance economic
demands.

Nor were they willing to give dirt farmers a

larger voice in party councils.

Typical of the conserva

tive Democratic attitude was the following from the Daily
Picayune:

That northern agrarians, in Republican states,

had ample reason for political independency, but the Dixie
farmer already had f,a party which, while devoted to no
special cause, nevertheless afford [s] the farmers every
protection."9®
Not surprisingly, the ultra-Bourbon regime in
Louisiana felt compelled to take notice of the growing
spirit of agrarian unrest.

Before 1886, statewide agri

cultural organizations had lacked either the inclination or
the strength to disturb the Louisiana status quo.

The

Louisiana Sugar Planters1 Association, formed in 1887, took
into its ranks the great land barons of the southern
parishes, and its President, Duncan F. Kenner, was an "old
line Whig" presumed to be worth about $2,000,000.99

jn

cotton parishes, the National Cotton Planters1 Association
9®Paily Picayune. December 8, 1890.
99New Orleans Daily Pelican. July 9, 1887; Dumas
Malone (ed.), Dictionary of American Biography. X (New York,
1933), 337-38.
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(first known as the Mississippi Valley Cotton Planters*
Association) was founded in 1879.

Membership in the latter

order was also confined to great landlords, together with
bottomland merchants in the cotton p a r i s h e s . T h e

Grange

was too weak to disturb professional politicians.
Late in 1886 the flickering attempts to establish a
Louisiana Farmers* Union began to merit Bourbon attention.
As the renascent order started taking shape in the north
western parishes, an announcement was made in Baton Rouge
to the effect that His Excellency Samuel D. McEnery had
become interested in the subject of agricultural organi
zation.

On December 2, 1886, Governor-McEnery issued a

proclamation, which read, in part:
As Governor of Louisiana [ I ] do hereby request
the planters and farmers of Louisiana to meet at the
city of Baton Rouge, in the agricultural hall of the
State University [on January 26, 1887] for the purpose
of organizing a State Agricultural Society.101
McEnery was urged by a Baton Rouge "Farmers' and
Planters' Club" to issue this call.

102

It may be signifi

cant that Daniel Morgan, a supporter of the Governor, was a
leading member of the Club.

im

Morgan, who was also Master

lO^st. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. May 10, 1879;
Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 57-59.
^■^Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings
of First Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1887), 3.
10 9

Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. December 17, 1886.

103Ibid.. April 16, 1886.
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of the mordant state Grange, was in a position to have
knowledge of the upcountry Farmers1 Union, which up to that
time had failed to be reported in the New Orleans or Baton
Rouge newspapers.

Governor McEnery made no public mention

of the Farmers1 Union.

But suspicion attaches to the date

of McEnery*s proclamation, and to the date for which he set
the organization meeting of the Louisiana Agricultural
Society.

The former came during the time that Tetts and

his friends were discussing amalgamation with the Texas
Alliance; the latter missed by five days the birth of the
Southern Alliance at Waco.
An oration by Governor McEnery opened the first
session of the Louisiana State Agricultural Society.

"Labor

has organized," said McEnery, "and it is opportune, yea even
a necessity,

for agriculture to combine."^4

But the

nature of the association which the Governor visualized may
be gauged by the names of those who were subsequently chosen
to fill the Society's offices.

General Joseph L. Brent, a

conservative sugar planter and Democratic legislator from
105
Ascension Parish, served as President from 1887 until 1890.
■^4Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings
of First Annual Meeting. 6.
•^^Brent was succeeded by Dr. W. S. Frierson of De
Soto parish in 1890. John Dymond, a wealthy sugar planter
from Plaquemines parish, headed the order from 1891 to 1896.
Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings of Fourth
Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1890), passim: Ibid., Proceed
ings of Ninth Annual Meeting, passim.
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Brent was also president of his parish branch of the state
Sugar Planters1 Association.

1 f)A

Other sugar planters, also

active Democratic politicians, served under General Brent
as district vice-presidents or members of the Society*s
executive committee; the more notable of these were John
Dymond, Emile Rost, and Donelson Caffery, Sr.

107

None of

the Farmers* Union leaders were listed on the State Society^
committees.

Indeed, none of them were reported as attending

the organization meeting which McEnery had called.

McEnery

expressed keen disappointment that "every parish in the
state was not present,"

108

He obviously hoped to persuade

farmers into accepting the leadership of the large planters
who headed the Society; even more, in all probability, he
hoped to use the Society as a fulcrum to lift the farmers of
the state away from Nicholls and toward himself.
The Shreveport Times. temporarily at odds with Mc
Enery, made the snide observation that "such sturdy farmers
as Governor McEnery and Editor Jastremski" were at the State
Society*s first convention, along with Mayor Burke and
other "horny handed sons of toil."

The paper added that

these gentlemen were interested in cultivation, to be sure-l^Brown, Ascension Parish. 28.
107

Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings
of First Annual Meeting. 76-77.
108Ibid.. 6.

243
they wished to cultivate the farm vote for the incumbent
regime.More

frank was the Homer Claiborne Guardian,

which denounced the State Society as a "sinister" maneuver
by McEnery--"another contemptible rope-in."^^

And an

Opelousas editor prophesied that "the great mass of farmers"
would shun it . " ^ ^

However, none of the Farmers' Union

leaders publicly denounced the State Society.

While McEnery

was Governor, they simply kept away from its meetings.
After Nicholls's return to the State House in 1888,
a number of small farmers began participating in the Louisi
ana State Agricultural Society.

North Louisiana received

special attention from the State Society; in 1888 its
annual convention was held at Shreveport, in 1889 at Monroe,
in 1890 at Arcadia, and in 1891, at Alexandria.
planters remained at the helm.

But sugar

Once in a while, though, a

radical, slipped into the Society's sessions.

At the third

annual session, Charles V. Soniat was scheduled to read a
paper with the innoxious title:
try of Louisiana."

"Review of the Rice Indus

But he must have shocked staid Society

officials with his closing, off-the-subject tirade:
Arise, ye agriculturists. . . . The legislators
are against us. The speculators are against us. The
^-O^Shreveport Times, quoted in Daily Picayune.
January 24, 1887.
^ ^ H o m e r Claiborne Guardian, quoted in Opelousas
St. Landrv Democrat. January 15, 1887.
■^^■Opelousas St. Landrv Democrat. February 5, 1887.
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agriculturist is about turned beggar in the land of
plenty; the sweat of his brow is turned into pearls
by that grinding despot, monopoly. . . . The time is
now ripe for a leader to call us together and beckon
us to enter one grand association or party of agri
culturists, to control the destinies of this
nation.112
Conservatism, however, continued to be the watch
word of the State Society.

President Brent expressed
II O
horror at any proposal to form a "new party."
He also
defended that bane of the small farmer, the credit system.
"Credit," said Brent, "is the flower and blossom of good
government," and he argued that farmers who were hurt by
the system should blame their "individual frailty.

Brent assumed a friendly but cautious pose toward the
Farmers* Union.
explanation of

In 1888 he "expressed a desire to hear an
[its]

objects and purposes," and invited

"all Alliances, Unions, and Granges" to attend the next
state convention of the S o c i e t y . B y

1889, Brent had

reached the conclusion that the Farmers* Union was a "bene
ficent organization" and implied that it was in partnership
with the State Society.

"We," Brent proclaimed, "are so

•^^Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings
of Third Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1889), 39-40.
113
Gen. J. L. Brent, Annual Address Delivered Janu
ary 25, 1888. at Shreveport, Before the Louisiana State
Agricultural Society (New Orleans. 1668). 15.
^*4Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. January
28, 1888.
Ibid.

245
numerous that if we organize in politic [ s ] . . . all the
t

powers and functions of the State would pass under our
control."

Of course, he added, Louisiana's farmers should

not take advantage of their electoral majority.

Such a

course would be, he said, "inexpedient.
In the end, the Nicholls, or "Reform" wing of the
Democratic party proved more adroit than the McEneryites in
dealing with agrarian unrest.

The State Society accomplished

little in that direction for either McEnery or Nicholls;
however, beginning in 1890, a determined effort was made by
the gentry of the Nicholls faction to capture the Farmers'
Union.

To achieve their goal the Reform Democrats needed

a stalking horse within the Union.

They found him in the

person of Thomas Scott Adams.
Adams, a prosperous cattleman and planter of East
Feliciana Parish, came to Louisiana at the age of thirteen,
in 1853.

117

His South Carolina birthplace was not far from

that of J. A. Tetts.

A college graduate and an ex-Confeder-

ate officer, Adams was raised in the genteel tradition of
Noblesse Oblige.

He entered Louisiana politics in 1884.

Elected to the state legislature that year, Adams quickly
became "disgusted with the corruption" he found at Baton
^^Louisiana State Agricultural Society. Proceed
ings of Third Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1889$, 4-8.
117
Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisi
ana . I, 246-47.
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Rouge.
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When Alliance organizers visited the Florida

parishes, Adams was one of a number of substantial farmers
who joined.

He was elected President of the Louisiana

Farmers' Union in 1888, and was reelected at each of the
next three annual meetings.

By the end of his fourth term

in 1892 the Farmers' Union was all but dead.^*^

Through

ineptness and political naivetee, and perhaps a touch of
mendacity, Adams was largely responsible for its decline.
The Feliciana planter gave enthusiastic support to
most of the economic panaceas urged by the Southern
Alliance.

But in the all-important field of politics he

remained an unswerving Democrat.

More conservative than

most state leaders of the Alliance, Adams did not even
demand a change of personnel within the Democratic party:
"We ask for a change of measures, not of men," he told his
fellow Louisianians.^^

Adams was most anxious to put down

third party talk among the rank-and-file.
Bourbon language.

He spoke the

Gratefully, the Nicholls administration

sought him out.
In August of 1890, shortly before his second reelection as President of the Farmers' Union, Adams was ap
pointed state Commissioner of Agriculture by Governor
118Ibid.
119
New Orleans Times-Democrat. August 2, 1892;
Colfax Chronicle. August 13, 1892.
•^•^National Economist. Ill (August 30, 1890), 381.
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Nicholls.

Ominously, the Baton Rouge Daily Advocate, which

steadfastly opposed almost any conceivable sort of reform,
agrarian or otherwise, thought Adams*s appointment "an
excellent one."

1 91

But the Bourbon campaign to capture the

Farmers* Union had only begun.

By invitation, the Union

held its 1890 convention in the State Capitol,

Simultane

ously, a few blocks away, a number of "the leading citizens
of Louisiana" sat together in the first convention of the
Anti-Lottery League.

122

Edgar Farrar, Charles Parlange,

Donelson Caffery, Sr., Murphy J. Foster, and other wealthy
gentlemen from New Orleans and the sugar

parishes had

organized the League for the announced purpose of fighting
the Louisiana State Lottery's bid for constitutional recharter in the forthcoming state election of 1892.

Anti-

Lottery Leaguers implored the Farmers* Union to join forces
with t h e m . ^ ^
Essentially, the Anti-Lottery League crusade of
1890-92 was a continuation of the Reform Democracy campaign
of 1888 which ousted McEnery from the State House.

It was

expected that the lottery, in addition to seeking recharter
in 1892, would attempt to return its favorite, McEnery, to
1 91

Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. August 3, 1890.

122Ibid., August 7, 1890.
19^
Sidney James Romero, "The Political Career of
Murphy James Foster," Louisiana Historical Quarterly.
XXVIII (October, 1945). 1156-52: Daily Picayune. August
5-6, 1891.
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the executive chair.
the lottery.
nuisance,"

124

Respectable conservatives despised

It demoralized labor.

It "was indubitably a

Besides, the Farmers* Union had already

announced its firm opposition to the l o t t e r y . j f
patricians in the Democratic party did not come forth to
lead the fight against the gigantic gambling syndicate,
then the farmers might either capture the Democratic party
on an anti-lottery platform, or build a powerful third
party out of public hostility to the lottery.

These latter

possibilities may have distressed the gentry more than did
the lottery itself.'*’2^
Anti-lottery leaders proposed that the agrarian
order work with them to seize control of the approaching
Democratic state nominating convention.
the overtures.

127

The League made all

Many Unionmen were suspicious of League

motives and so were "far from friendly" to its proposals.

1 ?8

But when the League pledged the offices of Governor,
Treasurer, and Superintendent of Public Education to the
124

Thomas Beer, The Mauve Decade; American Life at
the End of the Nineteenth Century (New York. 1926^« 103-105.
^S'Baton R 0uge Daily Advocate. August 8, 1890.
^■^Cf. Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Colfax Chroni
cle, August 20, 1892; Shreveport Progress. November 20, 1897.
•^^Dailv Picayune. August 13, 1891.
l28Ibid.. August 6, 1891.
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Farmers' Union, the agrarians voted, at their annual meeting
in August of 1891, to join hands with the League.

By mutual

agreement, their candidate for Governor was announced as
Thomas Scott Adams.

Thus was born the "Lafayette Compact,"

named after the town where the Farmers' Union held its 1891
convention.

1 29
7

One Farmers' Union leader who was present at
Lafayette denounced the compact as an attempt to herd the
farmers "back into the old party to be robbed and enslaved
130
as yore."
Subsequent events gave weight to this
statement.

Late in December, 1891, the Democratic nomi

nating convention at Baton Rouge split in half.

"Pro

lottery" and "Anti-lottery" Democratic sessions were held in
separate buildings; each faction denounced the other as
131
being a rump convention.
The Pro-lottery nominee was,
as expected, McEnery.

And, as the farmers had been promised,

Adams was nominated for Governor by the Anti-Lottery LeagueFarmers* Union Democratic convention.

But after being

selected Adams arose to make an announcement.
decline the honor.

He wished to

"For the sake of the great cause," he

said, another man should be chosen.

At the top of his list

129

Lafayette Advertiser, quoted in Opelousas St.
Landry Clarion. August 15, 1891.
•^Qpailv Picayune. September 19, 1891.
1 31
New Orleans Times-Democrat. December 17-20, 1891;
Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII, 1156-58.
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of suggestions was the name of Murphy J. Foster.

132

As revealed later, the Anti-lottery League men had
held a number of "harmonizing conferences" with Adams just
prior to and during the convention.

133

They informed him

that he could not possibly beat McEnery in the general
election.

Governor Nicholls also reportedly brought

political weight to bear against Adams and urged instead
1 Q/l

the nomination of Foster.

Pointed questions were asked

about the ability of Adams*s agrarian supporters to provide
campaign f u n d s . R e l u c t a n t l y , Adams capitulated.
insisted, however, on a sham nomination.

He

Also, as part of

the bargain, the Farmers* Union President obtained a lower
place on the ticket:

that of Secretary of State.

Foster, known derisively as "the Saint from St. Mary,"

137

thereupon received the convention*s gubernatorial nomi
nation.

Foster went on to defeat McEnery in the April, 1892

general election.
l32opeiousas St. Landrv Clarion. December 26, 1891.
133
Chambers, A History of Louisiana. I, 709.
^^Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII,
1154.
■^^Chambers, A History of Louisiana. I, 709.
136

Baton Rouge Capital Item, quoted in New Orleans
Louisiana Review. February 3, 1892.
l^Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII,
1159.
138
21-22.

Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1892,

CHAPTER VII
NEGRO AGRARIANISM
The Kansas Exodus of 1879 took away only a small
fraction of Louisiana’s colored population.

Probably not

more than 10,000 managed to leave the state that year,
though a considerably higher number made efforts to do so.
By 1880 the "Kansas fever" had subsided.*

For the re

mainder of the century, the freedmen of Louisiana displayed
little interest in emigration, but their protests against
economic and political conditions within the state by no
means ceased.
In 1880, and again in 1887, colored wage earners in
the sugar parishes engaged in strikes which brought down
upon them the wrath of their employers and the state govern
ment.

Negroes upstate seemed more docile.

The tenant and

share crop systems prevalent in the cotton parishes held out
even less hope for economic advancement than did the small
wages paid cane field workers; however, the decentralized
environment of the cotton plantations restrained the possi
bility of unified protest by Negro tenant families.

Sugar

field workers, on the other hand, ordinarily worked under
*Daily Picayune. April 14, 1880, March 25, 1881.
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the gang labor system.^

Also, the sugar parishes had at

least a semblance of a two party system up through the
1890's; a significant number of sugar planters voted Re 
publican, and Negroes in the region were often allowed a
modicum of selection in politics as well as in place of
employment.

Black labor in the cotton parishes generally

had no choice in politics or anything else.
The 1880 strikes began in the cane fields of St.
Charles Parish on March 17.

Plantation owners immediately

accused the Negro ringleaders of trespassing upon private
property "and inciting the laborers to stop work in the
fields."

According to the parish judge, the ringleaders

were armed with sticks, bludgeons and pistols, and were
"forcing

[laborers]

threats."

to join their band by assaults and

Judge James D'Augustin admitted, however, that

most of the population of St. Charles was in sympathy with
the "rioters."

For that reason, the judge insisted that

the disturbance could not be handled by local authorities,
and he called upon the state government for militia.^
Richard Gooseberry, colored spokesman for the St.
Charles strikers, denied the allegations of violence.

The

^Sitterson, Sugar Country. 261.
^Cf. Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. June 4, 1886; New
Orleans Weekly Pelican. October 29, 1887.
4New Orleans Democrat. March 19, 1880; Daily
Picayune. March 19, 1880.

253
colored people, he said, "had simply struck for one dollar
a day, as they could no longer work for seventy-five
cents."

The planters, on the other hand, insisted that

Gooseberry*s mob threatened to kill white people, burn
dwellings, and seize control of the entire parish.

However,

no specific act of violence against the white minority of
St. Charles was actually reported.

And the Negro strikers

displayed great forbearance when they gathered, on March 19,
to listen to speeches by Judge D*Augustin and others who
"exponded the law to them."

One local official passed this

compliment on to the black audience:

"The great arm of the

great wheel of agriculture is the nigger.

Next is the

mule. . .
A battalion of state militia soon arrived in St.
Charles.

No resistance was met.

Twelve strikers were

arrested, sent to New Orleans, and each sentenced to serve
thirty days in jail on charges of trespass.

Up to that

date, March 21, no trouble had been reported in other
parishes and the strike in St. Charles appeared to be over.7
But labor discontent soon extended to other parishes
along the lower delta.

By March 29, the situation in St.

5New Orleans Democrat. March 18-21, 1880.
^Dailv Picayune. March 20, 1880.
7Ibid.. March 21-22, 1880.
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John the Baptist Parish looked more serious than the previ
ous disturbance in neighboring St. Charles.
was voiced:

The same demand

Negroes refused to continue working for

seventy-five cents.

But the St. John strikers took a more

militant attitude.

They proclaimed that "the colored people
Q
are a nation and must stand together."
To emphasize this
idea, the ringleaders set up a provisional government of
their own, complete with a constitution.

All strikers in

the parish reportedly took an oath to obey the constitution,
which declared that none would work for less than one dollar
a day, and any who violated the oath "shall be punished with
a severe thrashing."

The correspondent for the Daily

Picayune, though hostile to the strike, was impressed by the
earnestness of the Negroes.
q
they have kept sober."

"Strange to say," he wrote,

Governor Wiltz responded to the pleas of St. John
landowners by a proclamation which warned "these evil doers
and mischievous persons to desist from their evil doings,"
He also sent in the state militia.

The troops, it was ex

plained, were to be used to "protect the laborers" from
harm.

Despite a number of arrests, the disturbance in St.

John continued several days.

Negroes paraded along the

parish roads, carrying banners which read:
8Ibid.. March 29, 1880.
^Ibid.. March 31, 1880.

"A DOLLAR A DAY
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OR KANSAS," and "PEACE— ONE DOLLAR A DAY."

But no violence,

outside of the whipping of Negroes by Negroes, was re
ported. ^

One of the ringleaders, when arrested, said that

he was "glad to go to jail," for at least there he would get
"enough to e a t . " ^
The St. John strike took place the same week that
ex-President Ulysses S. Grant paid a visit to Louisiana.
Strike leaders knew of it, and apparently timed their
activities accordingly.

Grant arrived in New Orleans at

the peak of the trouble in nearby St. John.

"The deluded

laborers," one report noted, anticipate that "Grant will
19
come up and make the planters pay the extra wages."
It
soon developed that Grant was, in one sense, concerned with
Negro affairs in Louisiana.

Remaining in New Orleans, he

attended a reception at the home of P. B. S. Pinchback,
where he met "the cream of Negro society."

13

Pinchback and

a number of his guests were scheduled to be delegates to
the forthcoming Republican national convention.

And Grant

hoped to return to the White House in 1 8 8 1 . ^
■^New Orleans Democrat. March 27-April 2, 1880;
Daily Picayune, March 29-April 4, 1880.
^ Dailv Picayune. March 31, 1880.
12Ibid., April 1, 1880.
^'Hjzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 97.
^ W h e n James A. Garfield, rather than Grant, was
nominated by the Republicans in 1880, Louisiana's Negro
population expressed marked disappointment. Rank-and-file
colored voters had heard of Garfield and asked "who
Sarfish' was." Ibid.. 100.
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Shortly after Grant1s departure from New Orleans,
the strike in St. John was broken.

Later in the month of

April, however, dispersed strikes by cane field laborers
were reported in Ascension, St. James, St. Bernard,
Jefferson, and Plaquemines parishes, respectively.
these districts the militia was not needed.

But in

Local authori

ties broke up the strikes by quick arrests of the ring
leaders.

Wages remained at seventy to seventy-five cents

for "first class" adult males, during the growing season
for the next few years.

The busy harvest and grinding

season (from mid-October or early November to the end of
the year) usually brought wages of ninety cents to one
dollar per day.

15

Localized labor disturbances, poorly organized and
barren of results for the laborers, continued to crop up
in the sugar country in the years from 1881 through 1886.
Until the latter year, Negro workers were affiliated with
no recognizable labor organization.

Even in the rela

tively serious strikes of 1880, there seemed to be no effort
to unify the Negro workers of the several parishes.

Workers

in one parish might have taken their cue from events in
another parish, but no attempt at interparish coordination
was observed by correspondents on the scene of the 1880
*5Sitterson, Sugar Country. 248, 319.
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troubles
In April of 1886 white men representing the Noble
Order of the Knights of Labor came into the sugar parishes
and began organizing the Negro workers of the countryside. ‘
The Knights, as a national order, dated back to 1878.
Their doctrine of interracial solidarity, along with their
drive to combine all skilled and unskilled wage earners,
male and female, into one national order, identifies the
Knights as one of the most ambitious organizations in
18
American labor history.
In 1883 came the first report of
Knights membership in Louisiana.

For the next three years

the Knights were confined to the city of New Orleans.

19

There, they were overshadowed by the Central Trades and
Labor Assembly.

The latter organization, born in 1880,

rather loosely federated the multitude of skilled and semiskilled labor societies of the city.

20

Local knights in

New Orleans had their own district assembly.

21

^ C f . Daily Picayune. March 18-May 2, 1880; New
Orleans Democrat7 Marcn 17-Mav 1, 1880.
•^ D a i l y Picayune. April 17, 1886.
1ft
Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (2d ed.,
rev.; New York, I960), 126-27; Foner, History of the Labor
Movement in the United States. II, 47, 56.
^Meyers, Southern Economic Journal. VI, 483.
20

Pearce, "The Rise and Decline of Labor in New
Orleans," 25.
^ Dailv Picayune. March 26, 1886.
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By the summer of 1886 the Knights1 nationwide
membership stood at 700,000.
so s t r o n g . ^

Never again would the order be

Yet, contrary to the national trend, the

Knights developed new strength in the rural South during
the late l S S O ^ .

Membership losses in northern cities were

partially offset by fresh adherents from the southern small
towns and countryside.

Especially did the order grow in

North Caroline and Louisiana.^

New Orleans provided most

of the leadership for the Knights1 program of expansion in
Louisiana.

At least 5,000 New Orleaneans were in the order

by mid-1887, and a Knights newspaper, Southern Industry,
had begun weekly publication. ^ It was from this urban
center that Knights organizers fanned out into the lower
delta parishes in 1886, to impress upon cane field Negroes
the need for unity in obtaining concessions from their em
ployers.

Higher wages and payment in “United States money

instead of commissary past board“ were the major rallying
25
points.
The Knights also recruited white and Negro
^ B y 1888, national membership in the Knights of
Labor had declined to 210,000. Forum. VII (July, 1889),550.
‘‘■‘^Meyers, Southern Economic Journal. VI, 485-86.
^4New Orleans Southern Industry was edited by
William I. O^onnell.
It was one of Twenty-one Knights of
Labor newspapers published at that time in the United States.
Philadelphia Journal of United Labor. April 9, 1887; New
Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 9. 1887.
^Covington Hall, “Labor Struggles in the Deep South1
(unpublished typewritten MS, n.d., deposited in HowardTilton Library Archives, Tulane University), 31. Cited
hereafter as Hall MS.
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artisans in the South Louisiana towns.

Early in 1887 the

Knights were strong enough in Morgan City to run a slate of
candidates in the municipal election, and every man on the
labor ticket won office.

26

Louisiana*s sugar planters, after experiencing a
poor crop in 1886, reduced wages for the following growing
season to sixty-five cents per day, without rat ion s.^
Most workers averaged twenty days out of every month in the
fields.

The large planters paid wages in commissary notes,

redeemable in marked up goods at the plantation stores.
Thus, a Negro family with one employed member received what
amounted to six or seven dollars in real wages for every
month of the ten-month growing s e a s o n . Although no rent,
as a rule, was charged for the tiny living quarters, those
workers without rations had to feed and clothe their fami
lies out of this meagre pay.

Wages for the grinding season

of 1887 were set by the planters at rates varying from
seventy-five cents to $1.15 per day for "first class" adult
males; for six hours of overtime night work, called a watch,
the planters offered fifty c e n t s . ^
^ Dailv Picayune. January 4, 1887.
27Cf. Philadelphia Journal of United Labor. Septem
ber 17, 1887; Sitterson, Sugar Country. 319. Some, planters
hired only adult males. But a number also hired "first
class" females for about fifty cents per day.
28flew Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 19, 1887.
^ C f . New Orleans Times Democrat. November 6, 1887;
New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 19. 1887; Sitterson,
Sugar Country. 319-20.
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In August of 1887, ten weeks before harvest, the
Knights leaders requested a conference with local branches
of the Louisiana Sugar Planters1 Association.

They wished

to discuss wages for the approaching busy season.
ation officials sent no r e p l y . O n

Associ

October 24, the Knights

District Assembly 194 addressed a circular letter to
planters in Iberia, Lafourche, St. Martin, St. Mary, and
Terrebonne parishes, insisting that wages be raised for the
two months of harvesting and grinding.

The scale drawn by

the Knights listed $1.25 per day without rations, or $1.00
per day with rations.

For a night watch, no less than sixty

cents would be accepted.

Further, instead of monthly

payments of wages, the Knights insisted that payment for day
work must be received every two weeks, and "watch" money
each week.

The District Assembly which issued these demands

comprised about forty locals in the five parishes.

Planters

were informed that they must meet the terms by November 1,
or face a general strike.

31

An estimated 6,000 to 10,000 male laborers went on
strike when the deadline date arrived with no sign of ac
quiescence from the planters.
were Negroes.

Nine-tenths of the strikers

All virere said to be members of the Kftights of

^ D a i l v Picayune. October 29, 1887.
31

Philadelphia Journal of United Labor. November
26,1887; New Orleans Weekly Pelican, November 5, 1887.
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Labor.

qo

The planters, though refusing to negotiate, were

visibly disturbed by the strike.

The growing season for

1887 had been one of near-perfect weather, and a large crop
qq
yield was in prospect.
Conservative newspapers portrayed
the strikers* demands as "reprehensible," and insisted that
the current low market price of sugar precluded any advance
in wages*^4

Weekly paydays, said the planters, "would de

moralize labor."

It was "a well known fact that as long as

the average laborer has money he will not work."

35

Local officials of the Knights, white men and a
number of "fairly well educated blacks ,"^ received the
brunt of landowner wrath.

Particular bitterness was ex

pressed toward the white agitators in Lafourche Parish; J.
R. H. Foote and D. Monnier, "two of the prime movers in
this uncalled for strike,"

37

were common laborers in

^ H a l l MS, 32; New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November
5, 1887.
33William C. Stubbs, Sugar Cane: A Treatise on the
History. Botany and Agriculture o£ Sugar Cane and the
Chemistry and Manufacture of Its Juices Into Sugar, and
Other Products' (Baton Rouge. 18$?).~I. 37-38; Daily Picayune.
October 2^>, 1887.
^4Baton Rouqe Daily Capitolian-Advocate. November 4,
1887; New Orleans Times-Democrat. November 3-6. 1887.
^5Pailv Picayune. October 29, 1887,
^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana.
I, 133.
^ I b i d .. November 9, 1887; New Orleans Weekly Peli
can, November 26, 1887.
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Thibodaux, the parish seat.

Other leaders among the La

fourche Knights included Henry Cox, George Cox, and P. 0.
Rousseau.

The Cox brothers were Negro artisans; Rousseau,

a white man, had formerly been a planter but "times
changed" for him.

38

[ had]

As a group, the ringleaders in La

fourche were depicted as "the most worthless set of men" in
the

p

a

r

i

s

h

.

i

n

led the strike.4^

Terrebonne, a "griffe" named Jim Brown
In St. Mary, colored men took the helm

of labor agitation in 1887.

They, together with Negroes

who encouraged the strike in other parishes, were categor
ized by Major Burke's Times-Democrat as "bad and dangerous
• . . relic [ s] of Radical days."4 ^
Planters also expressed anger toward the New Orleans
Knights who had first organized the lower sugar country.
These urban "communists," as the Daily States termed them,
were blamed for arousing "passions" among the usually
tractable Negroes.4^

As for the attitude of rank-and-file

laborers, it was obvious that they placed great faith in
38lbid.. November 9, 1887; New Orleans Weekly Peli
can. November 26, 1887.
3^Paily Picayune. November 9, 1887.
40Hall MS, 32.
fourth Negro blood.

A "griffe" being a person of one-

4 ^New Orleans Times-Democrat. November 6, 1887.
4^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Capitolian-Advocate. November 24, 1887.
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the Knights of Labor.

One wealthy planter, W. W. Pugh,

used the word "veneration" to describe Negro attitudes
toward the labor society.

When directives came down from

Knights headquarters, said Pugh, the workers "generally obey
at whatever sacrifice it may prove to their own welfare.
. . ."43

.

Qne ringleader remarked, as the strike began, that

the white employers "had never met the negroes united
before," and he prophesied that every one of the 400 labor
ers in

his group would die before conceding anything to the

planters.4^
On the morning of the first day of the strike a
battery of state militia arrived in Lafourche Parish.
Members of the Sugar Planters1 Association--not the local
government— had requested these troops.

The landowners

perceived that "serious trouble" would result from their
announcement that all laborers who refused to work must
vacate the plantation cabins.

By the 10th of November

Governor McEnery had ordered ten companies and two batter
ies of

state militia into action. At least one unit brought

^ L e t t e r from W. W. Pugh,
yune. November 20, 1887.

published in Daily Pica

^ Daily Picayune. November 2,- 1887.
A E.

New Orleans Mascot, quoted in New Orleans Weekly
Pelican. November 12, 1887; Philadelphia Journal of United
Labor. November 19, 1887.
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along a gatling gun.4^
work of eviction.

These militiamen were assigned the

White critics of Governor McEnery claimed

that he "had acted hastily" in sending out the militia; the
New Orleans Mascot suggested that His Excellency’s action
"was caused by his eagerness to curry favor with the . . .
wealthy sugar planters in the hopes that he can transfer
their allegiance from Nicholls to himself."47

Major Burke’s

newspaper, on the other hand, dwelt upon McEnery*s alleged
knowledge "of the negro character," which allowed the
Governor "to appreciate the danger."

48

This trouble in the

sugar country, philosophized the administration organ, was
not a labor dispute.

It was a race problem.

The first report of bloodshed came on November 2
from Terrebonne Parish.

According to pro-planter sources,

the Negroes shot down four laborers who refused to join in
the strike.

49

More serious was the disturbance which fol

lowed in St. Mary Parish; near the town of Berwick, on the
night of November 4, Negroes fired upon and wounded four
unidentified white men; the next day, militiamen killed
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1888,
22; New Orleans Mascot, ‘quoted in New
Orleans
Weekly Pelican, November 12, 188^.
4?New Orleans Mascot, quoted in New Orleans Peli
can. November 12, 1887.
48

New Orleans Times-Democrat. November 6, 1887.

4^Ibid., November 3, 1887; Daily Picayune. November
3, 1887.
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"four or five** Negro strikers outside of Pattersonville
c o m m u n i t y . E a c h side had its own version of the St. Mary
shootings.

Spokesmen for the Knights claimed the troops

shot without provocation; other reports from the scene said
the troops were forced to act in self-defense.

A St.

Mary newspaper accused "leading colored men" in the Patter
sonville area of making "incendiary speeches . . . that
would put the Chicago anarchists to shame."
quoted one colored Knight as saying:

The same source

"If the planters do

not come to our terms we will burn the d-n sugar houses."

c;o

Elsewhere, by November 20, at least one Negro laborer was
killed and several wounded in Lafourche Parish.53
The sugar strike reached its violent climax during
the fourth week of November.

Predictably, the worst blood

shed occurred in the town of Thibodaux.

For Thibodaux had

taken on the appearance of a refugee center as hundreds of
Negro families, evicted from the plantations where they
refused to work, crowded into its dingy backstreets.

A

50

Philadelphia Journal of United Labor. December 3,
1887; Daily Picayune. November 3, 1887.
51

Cf. New Orleans Daily News, quoted in New Orleans
Weekly Pelican. November 19^ 1887; New Orleans TimesDemocrat. November 7-8, 1887.
5^Morgan City Free Press, quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Capitolian-Advocate. November 12, 1887.
53Pailv Picayune. November 21, 1887.
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Daily Picayune correspondent thus described the scene:
Every vacant room in town tonight is filled with penni
less and ragged negroes. All day long a stream of
black humanity poured in, some on foot and others in
wagons, bringing all of their earthly possessions which
never amounted to more than a frontyard full of babies,
dogs and ragged bed clothing. . . . On many of the
plantations old gray-headed negroes, who were born and
have lived continually upon them, left today.54
Knights of Labor leaders in Thibodaux attempted to
provide shelter and food for the homeless Negroes.

One

observer, sympathetic to the refugees, said they behaved
peaceably and tried to avoid incidents with local whites.
But a critic of the strike wrote that a number of the male
refugees were armed and that the women "made threats to burn
the town down."

55

The atmosphere grew more tense each day.

Judge Taylor Beattie, acpondam defender of Negro rights who
had been the Republican candidate for Governor in 1879, took
the lead in organizing a committee of local planters and
Thibodaux property owners for the purpose of keeping the
town’s new inhabitants under control.

Beattie described the

black refugees as "ignorant and degraded barbarians."56
On November 21 Judge Beattie declared martial law in
Thibodaux.

The militia had recently been withdrawn.

In

their place were armed bands of white vigilantes, composed
54Ibid.. November 3, 1887.
55Cf. New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887;
Daily Picayune. November 25, 1687.
^ H a l l MS, 42; Letter from Taylor Beattie, published
in Daily Picayune. December 3, 1887.
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of local "organized citizens"^ together with a number of
grim-visaged strangers to the community.

These newly

arrived men were alleged to be "Shreveport guerrillas, well
CQ
versed in killing niggers."
Reports of what then trans
pired are conflicting.

All dispatches from the scene agreed

that shooting began on the night of the 22nd; but the pro
planter account, that the trouble commenced when two "white
visitors" to a Negro barroom were beaten and shot,5^ should
be placed alongside the more explicit pro-Knights version.
The latter report would have it that the Shreveport mercen
aries, having failed to provoke the blacks to violence in
flicted superficial wounds on two of their own men.
the cry went forth:

"To arms!

To arms!

Then

The negroes are

killing the w hit es!"^
When the firing ended at noon the next day at least
thirty colored people were dead or dying in Thibodaux.

The

Weekly Pelican, a New Orleans Republican paper, claimed
thirty-five refugees were killed outright, including lame
men and blind women.

Conservative journals, for the most

5^Pailv Picayune. November 25, 1887.
New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887.
5^Pailv Picayune. November 25, 1887.
^®New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887;
Philadelphia Journal oi United Labor. Pecember 3, 1887.
^ N e w Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887.
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part, tended to minimize the casualty list.

But the ultra-

Bourbon Daily States listed twenty-five dead Negroes and
called the encounter "one of the most bloody battles in the
history of the S t a t e . T h e

Times Democrat agreed that the

final death total at Thibodaux might reach t h i r t y . ^
Another conservative source told of more bodies being found,
the next day, in nearby swamps, and carried the ugly story
about a large dark-haired canine which one vigilante was
supposed to have shot by mistake, because ” [ it ] looked
like a negro lying down,"^4
The Thibodaux massacre virtually ended the sugar
strike of 1887.

No less than thirty-six Negroes had been

killed in the troubled parishes during the month of November;
this total includes the four killed near Pattersonville, the
thirty in the Thibodaux shooting, and the two Cox brothers,
who were taken from jail on November 24 and shot by the
vigilantes.
five.

Possibly, the total Negro dead reached forty-

An unpublished history of Louisiana labor disputes

estimates that the total number of casualties in the sugar
^^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Capitolian Advocate. November 24, 1887.
^ N e w Orleans Times-Demoerat. November 24-26, 1887.
^4Pailv Picayune. November 24-26, 1887.
^ N e w Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887.
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parishes, killed and wounded, was "500 to 6 0 0 . " ^

But even

if half that number be taken (and the total could hardly
have been less), the sugar strike of 1887 would still rate
as one of the bloodiest labor conflicts in American history.

67

All the dead were Negroes.

injured.

So were almost all those

The violent repression of the strike stimulated a

short-lived revival of Exodus talk among Louisiana's colored
population.

A few actually did leave the state late in

November, seeking, as they said, more humane surroundings.
Their destination was the state of Mississippi.^®
Most sugar workers returned to the fields by the
early months of 1 8 8 8 . ^

Planters now attacked what they

considered the root of trouble by zealously eradicating the
Knights of Labor organization from the region.

As the

66Hall MS, 40.
®7The Louisiana sugar strike of 1887 receives no
mention in the standard work on American labor history,
Commons and Others, History of Labour in the United States.
II, passim. In fact, the Philadelphia Journal of United
Labor, the national organ of Terence V. Powderly's knights
of Labor organization, had little to say concerning the
bloodshed in the sugar strike. But the Journal of United
Labor, on December 3, 1887, did congratulate the white
knights of New Orleans for "using their influence to pro
tect the rights as well as the lives of the colored
brethren." The Knights District Assembly in New Orleans
angrily denounced the actions of Governor McEnery and the
planters. The New Orleans Knights resolved, even before
the trouble at Thibodaux, that the shootings earlier in
November amounted to "assasination, . . . AND WE WILL AT
ONCE APPEAL TO OUR MILLIONS OF WORKINGMEN TO ASK AT THE
HANDS OF CONGRESS THE REPEAL OF THE DUTIES ON SUGAR."
Daily Picayune. November 13, 1887.
68New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887.
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Jeanerette Teche Pilot pointed out:

"The darkey who steers

clear of that organization will always find himself better
off in this section."

70

Those who held membership in the

Knights were likely to find their household goods uncere
moniously dumped on the levees and themselves blacklisted.7^Minor strikes broke out in four sugar parishes in 1888 but
were quickly put down.

Whites in these parishes, and else

where, had meantime put in motion a "Regulating Movement"
which discouraged economic or political assertiveness on the
part of Negroes.

7o

And so failed the attempt to unionize

the field hands of rural South Louisiana.

By 1891, state

membership in the Knights of Labor was not significant out70

side of its original base in New Orleans.
Viewed in perspective, the sugar country blood
letting of 1887 was merely a deadlier-than-usual example of
a much deeper phenomenon.

The lot of the Louisiana Negro,

never really good, was growing harder.

Throughout the

South, during the late 1880*3 and early 1890*s, contempt for
and hostility toward the colored race was on the rise*74
70
71

Jeanerette Teche Pilot. May 5, 1888.
New Roads Pointe Coupee Banner, quoted in ibid.

7^New Orleans Weekly Pelican. May 11, 1889; Sitterson, Sugar Country. 321 -2£*.
^ Daily Picayune. August 7, 1891.
74C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow
(ed ed. rev.; New York, 1957), 51-56.

271
Nor was this trend confined to the states of the late Con
federacy.

As the American nation took up imperialistic

adventures in the Pacific and the Caribbean, the doctrines
of Anglo-Saxon superiority were seconded by northern public
opinion.

No doubt the expatriate Louisianian George W.

Cable was grieved to discover that his pleadings on behalf
of the freedman, which had fallen upon deaf ears in his
native state, now received little better attention in the
North.
Editorial diatribes and mob outrages against the
black population grew to such proportions, by 1890, that a
few whites thought that the time for a moratorium had
arrived.

"Heavens," exclaimed the Welsh Crescent, "how we

would enjoy a rest on the 'nigger* question!"^

Authorities

on the subject have written that the poor white class of
southerners tended to be the colored man's worst enemy;
patricians, on the other hand, were credited with a more
benign attitude on matters of race.

Though believing the

Negro to be inherently inferior, the white gentry sup
posedly felt that colored people should be treated more
75
Cable, The Negro Question, xix-xx.
76

"It seems, grumbled the Crescent, "that fourfifths of the State press can't come out without a longwinded article • . . with the negro as their target; and
what's more, they've been at it for the Lord only knows how
long." Welsh Crescent, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Advo
cate. March 4, 1890.
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humanely and not be hurt or degraded for the mere sake of
inflicting pain.

77

However, the above generalization,

.whatever its value elsewhere, was hardly valid in Louisi
ana in the late nineteenth century.

A mass of evidence

points to the conclusion that the ruling class of the Peli
can State took an extraordinarily circumscribed view of
Negro human rights.

For the most rabid Negrophobes in the

state were as consistently rabid in defense of upper class
white privilege.

78

Some of Louisianafs white elite did, of

course, truly uphold the ideals of Noblesse Oblige.

But, as

Daniel Dennett once remarked about honest politicians in the
state,"they

[ were ] lonesome."

79

Lynching in Louisiana, according to a Chicago
Tribune survey, accounted for 285 deaths between 1882 and
77Cf. Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Cr ow. 29;
Simkins, A History of the South. 509-11: Coulter. The South
During Reconstruction. 16^-64. However, a twentietK
century sociological study of a presumably typical southern
community presents evidence that Negroes themselves believe
that middle class whites were the "real antagonists" of the
colored people in the South. John Dollard, Caste and Class
in a Southern Town (3d ed.; Garden City, New York, 1957), 57.
7®The following daily journals claimed to speak for
the landowning and business elite of Louisiana. And the
ferocity these papers exhibited toward the Negro, in the
late nineteenth century, far outdistanced the Negrophobia
visible in any other body of public opinion in the state;
Baton Houge Daily Capitalian-Advocate (Daily Advocate after
1889); New Orleans Daily States: Shreveport Eveh&nq (and
Sunday) Judge.
7^Pailv Picayune. February 19, 1881.
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the year 1903.

Of this number, 232 victims were Negroes.

80

Records kept by Tuskegee Institute corroborate the Tribune
figures.®*'

Not included are the numerous deaths resulting

from the sugar country trouble of 1887, but even without
these Louisiana ranked third in the nation in total lynch- .
ings for the period.

Also, the suspicion arises that the

above statistics fail to include many cases which could not
be classified as anything but lynch-killings.

For example,

the Tuskegee records for 1888 show seven lynchings in the
state.

82

But a contemporary report that year from just one

parish, Iberia, told of no less than ten colored men
murdered by vigilantes. The Negroes were described as
83
"vagrant and lewd."
Some lynchings were simply not re
ported.

The Monroe Bulletin refused to print lynch stories

in Ouachita Parish because white citizens in the area re
garded such matters "not only with indifference but with
1
*4.
H
levity."

80

James Elbert Cutler, Lynch-Law: An Investigation
Into the History of Lynching in the United States (New York,
1905), 179, 1
8
3
.
1
81
Tuskegee records begin with 1885, but bear out the
Tribune figures quoted in ibid. for 1885-1902. Cf. Monroe
N. Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook: An Annual Encyclopedia of
the Negro. 1918-1919 (Tuskegee, Alabama. 1919). 374-7*5.
82Ibid.
®®Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 25, 1888.
84
Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Daily Picayune. Septem
ber 28, 1886.
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Lower class whites, in particular the "shiftless
85
. . . Acadians"
of South Louisiana, were clearly responsi
ble for a substantial percentage of the acts of violence
committed upon Negroes.

But contemporary accounts of lynch

ing episodes indicate that poor whites were not involved in
a majority of the cases.

Middle class landowners or

merchants, or younger members of the elite families, more
often than not, instigated and participated in the outrages.
For instance, in 1890 a reign of terror was conducted
against "industrious, reliable" Negroes near Baton Rouge by
white landowners; only colored people who had managed to
accumulate property were shot, whipped, or other wise mo86
lested.
Their persecutors claimed that possession of land
by Negroes "was tending toward negro equality."

The colored

farmers were told to sell their property cheaply or be
killed.87
On another occasion "hundreds of the most prominent
S^New Orleans Weekly Pelican. September 28, 1889.

86

Letter from Anna M. Harris, published in Opelousas
St. Landry Clarion. February 14, 1891.
87Ibid.: Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. November 26-27,
1890.
The latter newspaper was, as it said, "always con
servative" on racial matters, but thought the attacks upon
Baton Rouge Negro landowners to be "a disgrace . . . a re
proach to our manhood." The Farmers* Union in East Baton
Rouge Parish expressed great indignation over the outrages
influcted upon local Negroes, and resolved "that the Union
would do all it could to bring the villains before the bar
of justice, whether they be members of the Union or not."
However, the authorities made no arrests.
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citizens in Bossier Parish" conducted a dual lynching near
oo
the town of Benton.
Worse yet, a New Orleans report told
of "three nigger boys" who were whipped to death because
"they refused to make targets of their heads for [ sporting ]

gentlemen. . . . "

89

A Tangipahoa Parish group known

as the "Phantom Riders" molested colored families without
fear of punishment because, it was claimed, "good" citizens
rode with the band.9®

When eleven Italians were lynched in

New Orleans in 1891, the press reported that "the better
91
element" of the city had done the killing.
Also worthy
of attention was the suggestion in one of Louisiana's most
aristocratically inclined journals, the Bastrop Clarion.
that more "little 'neck tie* parties" were needed by the
colored people around that town.

92

But it took a Shreveport

paper to describe a lynching as "beautiful."

This was "the

right way," the Evening Judge concluded, "to deal with every
such black brute.

Before the war they kept their places

like other beasts of the field."9^
^Natchitoches Enterprise. December 8, 1898.
®9Quoted in New Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 2, 1887.
90Ibid.. July 16, 1887.
^ Q u o t e d in Philadelphia Journal of the Knights of .
Labor. March 14, 1891.
(formerly the Journal of United
Labor.)
92

Bastrop Clarion, quoted in Daily Picayune. August

10, 1891.
^Shreveport Evening Judge. March 23, 1896.
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Shreveport was unequivocally a city of New South
"energy, push, and vim."

94

At the same time, its business

man elite supported or aondoned the most pitiless forms of
social injustice to be found anywhere in the state.
"Shreveport plan" was an archetype specimen.

The

Conceived in

1889 by a local publication, the Daily Caucasian, the pro
posal revolved around the old concept that the Negro was a
sub-human species and should be treated accordingly.
cifically, Negroes were not to hold "easy jobs."

Spe

Under

this heading were listed the occupations of bootblacks,
waiters, porters, cooks, clerks, and teachers.
also implied intimidation of whites.

But the plan

For "no white man" was

to "be permitted to employ a colored man . . .

in any other
QC,
manner than at the hardest and most degrading tasks."
Apparently an exception was made for the staff of Shreve
p o r t ^ Negro newspaper, Bailey’s Free South.

They were con

servative Democrats. ^
One spokesman for Louisiana’s Negroes, hearing of
the plan, described it as "an old mummy" exhumed from "the
Shreveport pyramids."

He added:

The pernicious idea must be limited to the mean Id
eality in which it had its origin. It would not live
94

Shreveport Times, quoted in Daily Picayune. March

21, 1887.
^5Shreveport Daily Caucasian, quoted in New Orleans
Weekly Pelican. July 1*7, August 17, 1889.
96
7 Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. February 18, 1892.
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in more generous soil, and there are few places in
this wide world so sterile in noble sentiments as
that which immediately surrounds the publication
office of the [ Shreveport] Caucasian. The propo
sition is only useful as showing the deaths to which
uncurbed selfishness will . . . go.97
"White supremacy, first, last and all the time," was
the proud motto of Shreveport, an approving commentator
wrote in 1896.

"And they prove their faith by their

Q Q

works."

Nevertheless, claims were made that Shreveporters

generally acted out of Christian charity.

Whites in the

North Louisiana city were said to be generous "to a fault;"
"if St. Paul were
green with

e n v y .

[ here]

"99

today he would positively turn

But evidence warrants the assumption

that the local gentry often acted in a barbarous fashion
toward helpless whites as well as Negroes.

This fact was

impressed upon two white men who appeared in municipal court
on a charge of vagrancy.

Both were one-legged.

The Judge,

97New Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 27, 1889. The
extent to which the "Shreveport plan" was actually practiced
in the area is problematical. Obviously, however, many
Shreveport businessmen continued to hire Negroes for tasks
which were proscribed by the Daily Caucasian. See Shreve
port Sunday Judge. February 2, 1096.
QQ

Shreveport Evening Judge. February 24, 1896.
White supremacy was seldom questioned in the Shreveport area,
even during Reconstruction. Henry Clay Warmoth described a
group of local Negroes who turned out to hear him, when, as
governor of Louisiana, he visited the city in 1870: They
"did not seem to have spirit enough to declare that their
souls were their own," he observed. Warmoth, War. Politics
and Reconstruction. 98.
In 1879, a baseball club in Shreve
port named itself "the Caddo Bulldozers." Daily Picavune.
May 29, 1879.
99shreveport Sunday Judge. February 23, 1896.
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who was also Mayor of Shreveport, enjoyed a grotesque sense
of humor.

He gave the crippled derelicts a sporting chance.

If they could hop outside the city limits within twenty-five
minutes they would not have to serve one hundred days in
jail.100
Elsewhere in Louisiana, well-to-do conservatives,
such as Henry G. Goodwyn of Colfax, occasionally complained
that Negroes "were shamefully and needlessly bulldozed, and
could hope for no legal redress.

But the more explicit

pleas for biracial justice were voiced by men who repre
sented lower class whites.
Arnaud.

Among the latter was Aurel

In 1886, as a legislator from St. Landry Parish,

Arnaud stood up in the State House to deliver a speech re
garding the Louisiana public road system.

The speaker was

a political independent and of poor Acadian ancestry.

102

His opening remarks were aimed at a law of 1830 which
instructed parochial officials to assess twelve days of road
work, or a stipulated cash assessment, upon all adult males.
He pointed out that this law worked a special hardship upon
Negro tenants and laborers, since most colored families
seldom had as much as forty dollars a year to spend on
clothes, medicine, and fresh meat.

Arnaud expanded upon his

■*-^Shreveport Evening Judge. March 4, 1896.
^■^Colfax Chronicle. January 9, 1892.
^ ^ B a t o n Rouge Weekly Truth. May 21, 1886.
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theme with blunt language:
Can you not see that this amount is not sufficient to
support the laborer? And every day you divest him of
from a chance of earning something is a robbery of
his daily bread? Should any one . . . be surprised
to hear that negroes steal? I am only surprised that
they do not steal m o r e . 103
Arnaud raised the possibility of another, more suc
cessful, Kansas Exodus of Louisiana’s colored population if
their sufferings continued.

What would happen then?

"These

very men," he predicted, "who have been clamoring so loudly
against the negroes . . . would pack up and follow in their
tracks--play carpetbagger in . . . turn-have to steal or starve themselves."

[or]

would soon

Arnaud hastened to add

that he was not a "leveller"; he offered no radical pro
posals.

He merely felt that Negroes "must be treated with

as much consideration as we treat our mules."

He indicated

that this would be a vast improvement over present con
ditions.

Finally, in what must stand as among the most

candid words every uttered in Louisiana legislative halls,
Arnaud said:
I have treated the subject entirely as from a
negro standpoint . . . but are there only negroes in
volved. . . ? And if there were only negroes in
volved, would I be here defending their cause? That
is a question I have often asked myself, but I have
never dared to probe my heart sufficiently to answer
it, for fear I would perhaps find myself selfish
enough to answer: No, because they are negroes. . . .
But in what way is the white laborer treated with more
consideration? Does the law give him any more
103Ibid., May 28, 1886.
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protection? Is he paid better wages? Does he get
more or better goods for his money? Do his children
get more schooling? Yes, there is an immense dif
ference between the two [ races ] , but this differ
ence exists only in the fancy of unscrupulous and
rascally politicians:
in every respect the white
laborer stands exactly on the same footing as the
negro. . . .
I cannot deny that it is with the saddest feel
ings I have seen myself forced into this tirade, and
I can draw but one consolation for it. The hope that
the sad facts I have had to submit to you today will
save me the trouble of submitting sadder ones in the
future.104
Not so frankly phrased, but to the same point, were
statements made by certain men in the Louisiana Farmers1
Union.

Notably, J. A. Tetts and Thomas J. Guice spoke up for

the Negro.

"What we want distributed to all men," Tetts

wrote, "regardless of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, is the opportunity for the pursuit of happiness."
Tetts believed that the Alliance movement was doing what
"the sword, the press and the pulpit" had failed to do; that
is, forcing the "half Ku Klux and half desperado" cotton
farmer of the South out of his provincial shell, and into an
awareness of class interest which transcended racial or
regional boundaries.

"The horns of the Ku Klux [ are]

knocked off," Tetts assumed.
he went on to write:

In typically quaint language,

"The shirt that has been waved so

Ibid. Rep. Arnaud1s outspoken conduct naturally
irritated the defenders of the status quo. The alternative
for Arnaud, a conservative paper in his home parish believed,
was either "prison garb," or "a straight jacket." Washing
ton (La.) Argus, quoted in Shreveport Times. May 29, 1887.
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faithfully has been torn up . . . and cast into the Missis
sippi, and by this time no doubt [ i s ]

in the maw of some

cat fish, or making a nest for some mud turtle of a politican who will have to crawl into his shell when he seems the
result of the next election."^5
of class protest.

Guice took a similar view

According to this rustic orator, the

"spirit of fairness" required that poor whites include poor
blacks in their efforts to ameliorate economic and politi
cal evils.

Guice believed that working people, "be they

white or black," must act together.^ 6
The Louisiana Farmers* Union, however, was exclusive
ly a white man*s organization.

Neither were Negroes ad

mitted to the Southern Alliance p r o p e r . H o w e v e r ,

a

subsidiary association, the Colored Farmers* Alliance,
emerged in the late 1880*s as a means of bringing the darkskinned agriculturists of the South into the Alliance move
ment.

As early as 1882, a Negro "Alliance" was chartered in

Arkansas under the aegis of Milton George’s ambitious
^ ^National Economist. Ill (April 12, 1890), 64.
^ ^ Dailv Picayune. October 3, 1891.
l^Dunning, The Farmers* Alliance History. 109;
National Economist. IV (December 2*7, 1890), 234-35. How
ever, the Southern Alliance permitted individual state
orders to determine just how tightly the color line would be
drawn within each state. Negroes were specifically barred
from membership in the Supreme Council of the Southern
Alliance.
See Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 82.
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northern o r d e r . K i n d r e d
elsewhere.
emerge.

groups may have been established

However, a large organization was slow to

According to the most authoritative source, the

origins of the Colored Farmers' Alliance can best be traced
back to the Negroes of Houston County, Texas, who inaugu
rated a state order in the winter of 1886-87.

A white man,

Robert M. Humphrey, became General Superintendent.

Within

a year, the Colored Alliance was rooted in a number of
southern states; by 1890, the order claimed 1,200,000 as
its total membership.

Humphrey reported that "colored

people everywhere welcomed . . . the Alliance as a sort of
second

e m a n c i p a t i o n .

"^9

though separate, the white and

colored Alliances of the South pledged "fraternal regard"
for each other.

Both orders held their annual meetings at

the same date and in the same city, beginning at St. Louis
in December of 1889.

The following December, both met at

Ocala, Florida.
Fifty thousand Louisiana Negroes were reported in
the membership rolls of the Colored Farmers' Alliance by the
time of the Ocala c o n v e n t i o n . m

In 1891, at their peak of

^^Scott, Mississippi Valiev Historical Review.
XLV, 107 n.
109

Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 289.

110Ibid., 291-92.
^•^Western Rural and American Stockman. XXVIII
(December 13~ i8^0). 769. quoted in Saloutos. Farmer Move
ments in the South. 81.
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activity* the state’s Negro Alliance claimed to be organized
in twenty-seven parishes.

112

Detailed information regarding

the Louisiana branch of the Colored Alliance is lacking, but
it is safe to conclude that the reported 50,000 membership
was far above the actual number.

Possibly, the Colored

Alliance entered the state as early as 1887; however, the
first report yet found tells of a Grant Parish lodge which
11O

was set up in October of 1889.

Colored Alliancemen were

most numerous in cotton parishes along the Red River.
Apparently the white landowners of the Mississippi River
delta of northwest Louisiana managed to keep their laborers
114
out of the order.
Few Negroes in the sugar parishes
joined.

The suppression of the Knights of Labor in 1887-88,

plus the absence of white Alliancemen who might be

sym

pathetic to a similar Negro organization, precluded the
entrance of the Colored Alliance into most sugar parishes.
South of the Red River, it was strongest in St. Landry
Parish, and did not take root there until the summer of
1891.115
H^Qpelousas St. Landry Clarion. October 10, 1891.
113

Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest
Louisiana. 503.
114

The two leading journals of the northeastern
delta parishes, the Lake Providence Carroll Democrat and the
St. Joseph Tensas Gazette, have no account oi Negro Alliance
activity between 1&88 and 1892. These two papers were not
in the habit of ignoring signs of unrest or organization
among local Negroes.
1
xx'J0pelousas St. Landrv Clarion. June 27, 1891.
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L. D. Laurent, an Alexandria Negro, was the first
state Superintendent of the Colored Alliance.

He held the

post until succeeded by Isaac Keys of Catahoula Parish in
1891.^^

Another significant Negro Allianceman was J. B.

Lafargue, the state Secretary.

These men were rather

circumspect in their activities; the Bourbon press seldom
noticed their existence.

The mass of Louisiana Negroes, in

or out of the Alliance, gave indications of increasing
caution in their dealings with local whites, and Laurent,
Keys, and Lafargue were probably no exceptions.

The race

troubles of the late 1880*s hampered efforts at biracial
agrarian protest.

White Alliancemen who came to offer

advice at Negro farmers1 meetings were received "with great
courtesy," but likely with suspicion as well.

117

Many

Negroes in St. Landry refused to participate in Alliance
activities because they feared white "regulators" were involved.

118

Of course, Louisiana*s Bourbon element did what

it could to sow racial ill feelings within the Alliance
119
movement.
And the Farmers1 Union President, Thomas S.
Adams, did not help the situation when, in 1889, he selected
U 6 Ibid.. June 27, October 10, 1891.
^ ^Ibid.. August 15, 1891.
11ft
Ibid.. August 8, 1891.
119
7Cf. Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. December 11,
1890; Daily Picayune. September 10, 1891.
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the Shreveport Weekly Caucasian as the official organ of the
white agrarians.

120

Yet the possibility of poor white-poor Negro unity
was by no means dead.

Before the year 1890 was over, a

third party revolt against the conservative leadership of
both the state Democratic party and the Farmers* Union had
begun to reverberate among the hills of North Louisiana; the
upland whites who led the revolt immediately sought the help
of the Colored Alliance.

191

And officials of the Colored

Alliance did more than merely follow.

At Ocala, in Decem

ber, three of the seven Louisianans present signed the call
for a national third party convention which would meet the
next year in Cincinnati:

L. D. Laurent, J. B. Lafargue,

^ Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. January 24, 1890.
In the 1890 session of the Louisiana legislature, most of
the solons who were members of the Farmers* Union (in
cluding ex-President Stallings and G. L. P. Wren) voted for
a bill which made racial segregation compulsory on all rail
road coaches within the state. Actually, segregation in
public facilities had, with certain exceptions in New
Orleans and along the lower river towns, always been the
custom in the state. The law of 1890 merely legalized what
was already a fact in most of Louisiana. However, Negro
legislators denounced the move to legalize segregation,
feeling that it would help perpetuate Jim Crowism and was,
in any case, an added "humiliation." Representative C. F.
Brown of Jefferson parish, a Negro Republican, denounced the
upper class Democrats as being the prime movers for the
introduction of the bill. Louisiana, Official Journal of
the House of Representatives. 1890, 200-204. For a discussion of segregation in the Pelican State during the early
1880*s, see Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 19,
1882.
^•^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 5, November
18, 1890; Daily Picayune. November 8. 1890.
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and L. D. Miller.

All were officials of the Negro order.

Louisiana*s white delegation at Ocala, dominated by Presi
dent Adams, refused to sign this birth certificate of the
Populist party.^ 2

^Alexandria Farmers* Vidette. quoted in Colfax
Chronicle. January 10, l89i. The white delegation to the
Southern Farmers* Alliance convention at Ocala included
Thomas S. Adams, A. D. Lafargue, J. M. Hancock, and Thomas
J. Guice. None of them signed the Cincinnati call, and only
Guice, of the four, later became a Populist. A. D. La
fargue was sometimes confused with the Negro Allianceman J.
B. Lafargue.

CHAPTER VIII
THE POPULISTS
During the twelve years which followed the abortive
Greenback uprising of 1878, Louisiana*s Bourbon office
holders faced no serious third party challenge.

The decline

of the Greenback Labor party in the state was rapid; in the
presidential election of 1880 their candidate, James B.
Weaver, was credited with less than 500 votes out of 100,000
in the official returns.^1884.

But the crowning blow came in

Benjamin F. "Spoons" Butler, whose very name had

Satanic connotations in Louisiana, headed the Greenbacker
national ticket that year; even such a confirmed third party
man as Robert P. Webb of Claiborne Parish could not stomach
O
the nominee.
Butler received just 120 votes in the Pelican
State.^

Finally, in 1888, after a decade of feeble life,

the Greenback Labor party of Louisiana held a final meeting
^•New York Times. November 16, 1880; Edward Stanwood,
A History of the Presidency: 1788 to 1897 (New York, 1898),

jvr.

o

Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest
Louisiana. 45^.
^New York Times. November 1, 1888.
287
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in New Orleans and announced its own demise.

4

Replacing the Greenback organization was the equally
ineffective Union Labor party.

Nationally, the Greenbackers

had merged with the newly established latter group in 1887.
That same year a Union Labor party committee took shape in
New Orleans under the chairmanship of J. E. Sweeney, a
Knights of Labor leader.5

Talk of running state and con

gressional candidates by the Union Laborites in 1888 came to
naught in Louisiana.

The presidential candidate of the

party received a mere 39 votes out of 115,000 in the offL
ficial returns.
Probably the Union Laborites did have a
thousand or more supporters in New Orleans whose votes were
simply not counted.

At any rate, Louisiana was an exception

to the general third party pattern in 1888; in most states,
the Union Laborites drew what strength they had from rural
areas, for third party politics in northern cities had
7
reached a state of near-collapse.
The apparent lack of third party interest in rural
4New Orleans Times-Democrat, September 20, 1888.
^Dailv Picayune. November 13, 1887.
^See Jeanerette Teche Pilot. October 3, 1888; Louisi
ana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 573; Frank L.
M c V e y T The Populist Movement (Studies of the American Eco
nomic Association, Vol. i, No. 3: New York, 1896), 197.
7
Commons and Others, History of Labour in the United
States. II, 469; Haynes, Third Party Movements. 211.
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Louisiana during the decade of the 1880*s afforded much
Q
comfort to Bourbon Democratic leaders.
But agrarian unrest
was, in fact, seldom far below the surface.

Hill country

whites frequently demonstrated their anger against Demo
cratic officeholders by voting with the Republicans, either
directly or through the medium of Independent candidates for
local offices.

Governor McEnery's Republican opponent

carried four upland white parishes in 1884, and greatly ex
ceeded the total of Negro registration in a number of
others*^

On the local level, Catahoula, Grant, St. Helena,

St. Landry, St, Tammany, Washington, and Winn Parishes— all
with white majorities— elected Republicans or pro-Republican. Independents to legislative or parochial offices on more
than one occasion between 1879 and 1 8 8 8 . ^

By the latter

date, the Farmers* Alliance movement was well underway.
Cf. Colfax Chronicle. April 21, 1888; Lake Provi
dence Carroll Democrat. June 23, 1888; Many Sabine Southron,
quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. February
22, 1888.
^Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 54653, 561. In 1884, a northern correspondent described the
gubernatorial anti-Democratic vote in backwoods parishes as
"astonishingly large." McEnery lost Grant, LiviPgston, St.
Helena, and St. Tammany parishes to the Republican candidate
John Stevenson. The Republicans came near carrying other
white parishes that year. See New York Times. April 23,
1884.
^ C f . Daily Picayune* December 2, 4, 15, 1879; Colfax
Chronicle. December 6, 1 8 ^ , May 3, 31, 1884; Baton Rouge
Daily Ca~pitolian-Adyocate. April 25, 28, May 7-9, 1888; E.
North Cull om to kutherford B. Hayes, February 6, 1879, Hayes
Papers; James E. Robertson to J. M. Currie, August 1, 1882,
copy in Chandler Papers.
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Politically, the Farmers* Union-Alliance had a dual nature.
At first, it provided a safety valve for agrarian discontent
and held out to farmers the prospect of talcing over the
reins of the state Democratic party\ at the same time, it
constructed a framework for a potential third party revolt
in case the Bourbon officeholders refused to make room for
agrarian demands and candidates.
"A New Party, or Not?,** J. A. Tetts questioningly
wrote in the summer of 1890.

Tetts, like many others, had

come to recognize the dilemma facing the Farmers* Alliance.
He pondered the alternatives:
The question can easily be settled by both or either
of the two existing parties. . . . The mouthpieces of
both these old organizations give us to understand
that it is our duty to . . . redress our grievances
in our present parties, but in every case discourage
the hope of relief through the methods proposed. . .
. . In this dilemma what shall we do?
The Alliance was not organized as a new party,
but . . . our principles should be paramount. . . .
Conditions, for which both parties are responsible,
are fast driving us into serfdom, and the only heri
tage we can promise our children is a lifelong struggle
with powers they can never conquer without bloodshed
and anarchy.
During the months of 1890-91 the Louisiana version
of the People’s party came to life.

The circumstances which

led to the founding of this newest party in the Pelican
State rose out of a generation of mass frustration and
poverty, but three proximate reasons can be given for its
^ Q u o t e d in National Economist. Ill (June 28, 1890),
237-38.
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emergence at that particular time.

One was the refusal of

Louisiana*s Democratic congressmen, with one exception, to
endorse the favorite panacea of the Alliance--the subtreasury plan.

12

Introduced by Dr. C. W. Macune in 1889,

the plan in brief called for the establishment of a govern
ment warehouse for non-perishable farm products in each
county of the United States which annually offered for sale
at least $500,000 worth of such products.

With the storage

facilities would be a sub-treasury office where the farmer
could obtain, through a negotiable certificate of deposit,
a loan bearing one per cent interest per year.

The farmer

would have until the next harvest to sell his crop on the
open market; he would thus be free from merchant or bank
credit, and free from speculators who depressed market
prices at critical times.
money in circulation.

13

Moreover, the plan would put more
An estimated 817 counties in the

United States sold enough produce to qualify for a subtreasury.

Twenty-nine of these would be in Louisiana.*-4

Conservatives throughout the United States deprecated the
^^Cnly Congressman Samuel M. Robertson of the Sixth
District endorsed the Alliance sub-treasury plan. Cf. Baton
Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. October 1-3, 1890; Colfax
Chronicle. August 16. £3. 1896: National Economist. Ill
(June 14, 1890), 204.
lo

Bryan, The Farmers* Alliance. 94-99; Hicks, The
Populist Revolt. 186-204: Saloutos. Farmer Movements in the
South. Il9-l2l.
l4National Economist. Ill (April 19, 1890), 72.
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plan as paternalistic class legislation— "hayseed social
ism."

ly

The official journal of Louisianats state govern

ment lashed itself into near-apoplexy over the "crackbrained" sub-treasury "monstrosity," and then fumed that all
"the complaints of the downtrodden are simply bosh and non
sense. . . ."I6
A second proximate contributor to the birth of
Louisiana Populism was the gradual capture of the Farmers1
Union by the Nicholls administration and its extra-official
arm, the Anti-Lottery League.

The appointment of Union

President Adams as State Commissioner of Agriculture, and
the subsequent Farmers1 Union-Anti-Lottery League compact
at Lafayette, baited the trap which was sprung at Baton
Rouge in December of 1891, when Murphy J. Foster, rather
than Adams, emerged as the gubernatorial nominee of the
reform wing of the Democratic party.

As early as the fall

of 1890 a number of hill country Farmers* Union lodges were
ignoring Adams*s conservative political dicta.

But the

rupture within the Farmers* Union was most clearly revealed
during its Lafayette meeting in August, 1891.

As mentioned

previously, a minority of the order angrily refused the
proffered political partnership with the Anti-Lottery, or
Reform Democrats;

Seventy-three delegates voted to accept

i5New York Sun, quoted in ibid.

(March 22, 1890)^ 1.

^ B a t o n Rouqe Daily Advocate. SeDtember 30. November
11, 1890.
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the offer; the dissenting minority cast twenty-two votes.
Nearly all the twenty-two were, or would soon be, active in
the People’s p a r t y . ^
The third catalytic agent for Louisiana Populism
arrived in Baton Rouge one midsummer day in 1890.

Charles

Vincent, roving reporter and subscription agent for the
Winfield (Kan.) American Non-Conformist, came to deliver a
speech before the annual convention of the state Farmers*
1Q

U n i o n . C o n s e r v a t i v e Democrats knew of the man and feared
him.

For though Vincent "disclaimed that he was the agent

19
for any political party," 7 the American Non-Conformist.
published by his two brothers, was recognized far and wide
as a potent vehicle for left wing agrarian ideas.

The

Vincents’ paper was the principal Union Labor organ in
Kansas.

20

More important, Union Labor strength in Kansas

surpassed that of any other state.

21

But in the months of

^ C o l f a x Chronicle. August 15, 1891; New Orleans
Times-Democrat. February 19, 1892; Louisiana Populist. Janu
ary 24, 1896. Farmers’ Union delegates from Acadia,
Calcasieu, Catahoula, Grant, Natchitoches, Vernon, and Winn
voted against the League-Union compact at Lafayette.
18
For additional information on Charles Vincent and
the American Non-Conformist, see Elizabeth N, Barr, "The
Populist Uprising.** A Standard History of Kansas and
Kansans. ed. William E. Connelly (Chicago, 1918), II, 1140w.
19
Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. August 7, 1890.
^Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 154-55.
21
Haynes, Third Party Movements. 211.
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1889-90, the Kansas third party men jettisoned the laborite
name in favor of one more attractive to rural voters.

While

Charles Vincent spoke in Louisiana, his brothers in Win
field, Kansas, were placing the new name in print:
oo
People’s party.

"The

Charles Vincent soon confirmed the worst of Bourbon
suspicions.

After the farmers* convention in Baton Rouge

closed on August 8, 1890, the Kansas man spent several weeks
visiting and lecturing among Farmers* Union leaders in the
Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts of North Louisiana.
The Daily Advocate, having warily observed him at the recent
convention, wondered if it was possible that the “conserva
tive spirit,H of the sturdy Anglo-Saxon yeomanry was being
perverted by "the rantings of lecturer Vincent.

. . .

But Vincent’s exhortations were falling upon eager ears.

In

a number of upland parishes, particularly Catahoula, Grant,
and Winn, conservatism had already become a rather scarce
commodity.

Winfield, Kansas and Winnfield, Louisiana were

akin in more than name.
Thomas'J. Guice and Benjamin Brian were among those
-v

22Winfield (Kan.) American Non-Conformist, quoted in
National Economist. Ill (August 16. 1890), 355. Union
Labor!tes (the Vincents and others), furnished the leader
ship for the emerging People’s party in Kansas during the
months of 1889-90. Union Labor headquarters in Kansas were
at Winfield.
23Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. September 3, 1890.
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who eagerly discussed Populism with Charles Vincent in the
late summer and early fall of 1 8 9 0 . Another participant
was one of Reverend Brian*s sons, Hardy Lee Brian.

Born in

1865, Hardy Brian had seen his father challenge Democratic
candidates in every state senatorial election since Recon
struction; the youth had been "rocked in an *Independent *
cradle."

25

After a rude education in the public schools of

Grant Parish, Hardy Brian moved to neighboring Winn in
1885, married, and set about farming and schoolteaching
near the town of Winnfield.^*

In 1888, following the family

^ C f . Colfax Chronicle. September 20, October 4, 11,
25, 1890; Winnfield Comrade, quoted in ibid., October 11,
1890; Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 30, 1890.
^ C o l f a x Chronicle. September 12, 1891. Hardy Lee
Brian was one of nine children. Born near Pollock (in what
later became Grant Parish) in 1865, he died in Shreveport in
1949. Hardy Brian became the outstanding Populist leader in
Louisiana. His writings, chiefly newspaper articles, reveal
him as an intelligent young man who was rather hampered by
his provincial background. For Louisiana of the 1890*s,
however, Brian had serious faults as a third party leader.
Though quick to anger at injustice, Brian was, essentially,
a gentle natured man; he was unequal to the task of organ
izing a truly statewide political organization, or of fight
ing the Bourbon regime with the sort of vigor and ruthless
ness that Huey Long later employed. Those who met Hardy
Brian late in life found him a cheerful old man with no
apparent regrets or bitterness about his futile venture into
Louisiana politics. Biographical data on him is scanty,
although some useful information may be found in the follow
ing sources: Louisiana Populist. October 14, 1898; Joseph
ine Harris, "H. L. Brian Looks Back on Life of Stormy
Politics," published in Shreveport Times. March 13, 1939.
^ S e e Winnfield Southern Sentinel. February 19,
1886; Winrffield Comrade, quoted in Louisiana Populist.
October 14, 1898.
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tradition, twenty-three year old Hardy Brian ran for State
Representative, as an Independent.

The elder Brian was then

making his fifth campaign for the State Senate in a district
which included Winn.

The father and son ticket lost to

Democratic candidates; out of about 1,250 votes cast in
27
Winn, Benjamin Brian received 409 and Hardy 270.
But
within two years, a distinct

leftward shift in sentiment

among the rank-and-file farmers of the region could be ob
served.

According to Hardy Brian, the 1890 visit of the

Kansas spellbinder, Charles Vincent, did much to stir the
farmers to action.

He "was the first to break the ice for

a new party," Brian later wrote.

28

In particular were farmers in the Fourth and Fifth
Congressional Districts angry over the stand taken by
Congressmen Newton C. Blanchard and Charles J. Boatner
against the Alliance sub-treasury plan.

In August of 1890,

Blanchard in the Fourth District and Boatner in the Fifth,
won out over strong Farmers' Union opposition in the Demo
cratic party nominating conventions.

Thereupon, the Winn

Parish Union called for delegates, representing the agrarian
order in each parish of the Fourth District, to meet in
Natchitoches on October 1 for,the purpose of nominating a
^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 7-9,
1888; Colfax Chronicle. Mav 5. 1888.
^Louisiana Populist. September 28, 1894.
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man to oppose Blanchard in the general election.

29

This

hostility toward Blanchard involved more than the sub
treasury plan.

In Congress since 1881, Blanchard had

scarcely overworked himself to defend the claims of upland
homesteaders against the notorious "Backbone" land grant of
30
Jay Gould's New Orleans Pacific Railroad.
Blanchard was
a wealthy Shreveport lawyer.

The fact that he could, and

did, sojourn in Europe "for his health" excited angry
feelings among "those of his constituents who have to
scuffle around peartly to get a quarter to buy a box of
Wright's pills to work the malaria out of their systems."

31

Seven of the twelve parish Unions of northwestern
Louisiana sent delegates to the Natchitoches assembly.

Five

parish delegations then voted in favor of independent
political action.

Frantically, State Union President Adams

wired them:
Do not,
under any circumstances, nominate an
independent
candidate for Congress.
Your honor .
. . is pledged to the support of the Democratic
nominee. . . . Go forth like men and rally your
entire forces to the flag of the Democracy.
Stand
by the colors of the party, and bide your time with
patience.
T. S. Adams, President*^
29colfax Chronicle. September 20, 1890.
30
Cf. Letter from Newton C. Blanchard,published in
ibid., February
17, 1883; New Orleans Times-Democrat.quoted
in Farmerville Home Advocate. October 30, 1885.
^ B a t o n Rouge Capitol Item..quoted in Louisiana
Populist. September 14, 1894.
^^Quoted in Colfax Chronicle. October 4, 1890,
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Delegates from Grant, Rapides, Sabine, Vernon, and
Winn ignored Adams's plea and selected a Farmers* UnionIndependent candidate for Congress.
33
their nominee.-

Thomas J. Guice was

Immediately, Guice was hit by a flood of.

conservative bile; the Democratic organ in Grant Parish
described him as "afflicted with a diarrhoea of words and a
constipation of ideas," and opined that the "bolting
farmers" who selected him were influenced by that meddle
some outsider, Vincent of Kansas.^4
vacillation, declined the nomination.

But Guice, after some
He still held the

position of State Lecturer in the Farmers* Union.

President

Adams put heavy pressure on Guice, and the fact that only
four parish Unions--the Rapides group having changed its
mind--were endorsing him, sobered Guice*s obvious desire to
3b
make the race.
The Daily Picayune had previously referred
33

The term "People's party" was not used by Louisi
ana third party men until after the Cincinnati convention of
May 19-21, 1891. Cf. Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 5,
17, 1890; Colfax Chronicle. June 27, 1891.
^4Colfax Chronicle. October 11, 1890. Editor Howard
G. Goodwyn of the Chronicle was also chairman of the Grant
Parish Democratic party organization. As editor of the
Chronicle from 1877 until his death in 1920, Goodwyn closely
observed and caustically criticized all left wing political
movements in Grant and neighboring parishes--the heartland
of rural radicalism in Louisiana, The microfilmed files of
the Chronicle, fortunately complete, provides one of the
best single sources for Pelican State agrarianism in the late
nineteenth century. For a short biography of Goodwyn, see
Chambers, A History of Louisiana. Ill, 102.
^^Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. October 11,
1890; Opelousas St. Landry Clarion. October 18, 1890.

i
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to him as plain "Guice," but after he declined styled him
36
"Colonel Guice."
Not to be outdone, the official journal
of the state offered the title "General Guice.
On election day, November 4, Blanchard received
8,307 votes.

Guice was credited with 277 protest ballots.

But discontent was, nonetheless, apparent in the 1890 re
turns; two years before, Blanchard had garnered 16,302 votes
against a very weak Republican opponent.
Winn Parish merited special comment.

The returns from

There, in 1890, ex

actly ninety-five per cent of the electorate agreed with the
suggestion in the Winnfield Comrade and stayed away from the
polls.38
In northeastern Louisiana, attempts to run a strong
Farmers' Union man against the ultra-conservative Congress
man Boatner met with similar disappointment in 1890.

A

wealthy lawyer and planter, and a staunch McEnery man, Boat
ner occupied his seat by courtesy of the disproportionate
strength given the plantation parishes in Fifth District
Democratic conventions.

39

Hill people were haughtily told

JODaily' Picayune, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Advo
cate. October 14, 1890.
^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. October 14, 1890.
Report of Secretary of State. 1902,
573-74; Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Baron Rouge Daily Advo
cate. October 31, November 18, 1890.
^ ® L o u i s i a n a ,

^Winnsboro Franklin Sun. March 2, 1884; Biographi
cal and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. I, 301. Boatner
began his political career in Catahoula parish in 1876, when
he defeated Benjamin Brian for the state Senate. Boatner
moved to Quachita Parish in 1878.
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to "quit grumbling" at Boatner4^ and the system which managed
to foist him upon the region.

At least Blanchard spoke

kindly of the Farmers' Union; Boatner scored it as a "secret
political organization" which no true Democrat should
join.4 *" A convention of "dissatisfied farmers" of the Fifth
District met in Monroe in October of 1890 but failed to name
an opposition candidate.
entirely clear.

40

Yet Boatner's path was not

The President of the Lincoln Parish Union

urged members to "ignore Mr. Boatner"4^ in the coming
election, and throughout the District Boatner's strength
declined from his 1888 level by about 10,000 votes.44

The

Union in Catahoula Parish, dominated by "the poorer class of
farmers," felt that negative protest was not enough and
brought out T. E. Pritchard as a candidate.
carried Catahoula, 587 to 435 for Boatner.45

Pritchard
The local

Colored Farmers' Alliance ignored the Republican congress
ional candidate and voted for Pritchard.46

Thus, in the

4^Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. October 27, 1888.
4^Pailv Picayune. September 4, 1891.
4^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 3, 1890.
4% u s t o n Progressive A g e , quoted in Lake Providence
Carroll Democrat. September 4, 1890.
44Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902,
573-74.
45

Trinity Herald, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. August
1, 1891; Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State, 1902, 574.
4^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 30, 1890;
Daily Picayune. November 8, 1890.
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only parish in the state where a Democratic Congressman
faced an active agrarian opponent in 1890, the Democrat lost.
Third party sentiment in Louisiana, as expressed in
the congressional races of 1890, seemed almost nonexistent
outside the northern hill parishes and, as has been seen*
was quite disorganized even there; small farmers in South
Louisiana districts put up no opposition to the Democratic
candidates.

In New Orleans, Union Labor candidate Carson

Mudge drew less than one per cent of the recorded vote in
the First Congressional District.4"^
Nevertheless, the more astute Bourbons soon mani
fested uneasiness.

The tide of political agrarianism seemed

to be rising, as was indicated by the growing attention
throughout the state paid to a third party newspaper in Winn
Parish.

The Winnfield Comrade had begun publication on

October 3, 1890, and soon had readers in distant parishes.4 ®
Hardy Brian was the editor.

Brian claimed that the Comrade

was the first Populist newspaper in the South.4^
4*^Dailv Picayune. November 16, 1890.
4 ®Colfax Chronicle. November 8, 1890, July 11, 1891;
Baton Rouge Dally Advocate. December 30, 1890; New Orleans
Times-Democrat. August l6. 1891.
^ Louisiana Populist. December 7, 1894. Brian’s
Winnfield Comrade may well have been the first People’s party
newspaper in the South.
But the evidence is inconclusive.
The Comrade did not, apparently, use the People’s party label
until after Brian returned from the Cincinnati convention in
May of 1891, though the paper had been an avowed third party
organ since its first issue on October 3, 1890. The Comrade
was published until 1911. Regretably, no copies are extant
prior to 1910; by that time the paper was in Democratic hands.
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The Comrade was owned by the Winn Parish Farmers1
Union.

Special circumstances had led to its unique name.

Prior to purchase by the Union, the battered old press and
type cases had been used by the Winn Parish Democrat, which,
after the sale, ceased publication.

The new management was

now plagued with the problem of renaming the paper.
title simply would not do.

The old

But an order for new nameplate-

size type might take weeks to arrive, and besides, money was
scarce.

Recalling the situation a half century later, Brian

quoted himself as saying, his first day on the job:
see how we can change the title we already have."

"We*!!
Fortu

nately, all the letters in ’’Democrat"' were upper case.

By

shuffling these letters, and discarding the "t," Brian dis
covered a combination which at least was not jibberish:
"Comrade."5^
The Ocala conventions of the Southern Farmers1
Alliance and the Colored Farmers* Alliance met one month
after the elections of 1890.

Many states in the South had

gone through gubernatorial as well as congressional cam
paigns.

The Alliance, it seemed at the time, was well under

way in its plan to take over the Democratic party of the
^ S e e Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisi
ana . II, 168; Colfax Chronicle. October ll. 1890: Shreveport
Times. March 13, 1939, quoted in James S. Penny, "The
People's Party Press During the Louisiana Political Upheaval
of the Eighteen-Nineties" (Unpublished Master's thesis,
Louisiana State University, 1942), 64-65.
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South.

Four new governors {in Georgia, South Carolina,

Tennessee, and Texas) had won with Alliance backing.

Eight

southern legislatures were said to be under Alliance control.
About forty-four congressmen in the South endorsed the subtreasury p l a n . ^

By comparison, Louisiana seemed woefully

behind her sister states in Alliance political victories,
but President Adams, who took the chastened Guice along with
him to Ocala, was still pinning his hopes on the 1892 state
election.^
Conservative Alliancemen at Ocala hailed the sup
posed victories of 1890 as proof of the efficacy of remaining
in old party l i n e s . B u t

the Kansas delegation, the Negro

Alliance, and a handful of southern white Alliancemen took a
contrary view.

The new People’s party in Kansas was booming.

Less than six months old as a state organization, it had
elected a majority to the legislature, five congressmen, and
a United States senator.^

Prominent among the Kansas dele

gation at Ocala were the three Vincent brothers.

They were

^lfaulkner, Politics, Reform, and Expansion. 144;
Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 178: Saloutos. Farmer Movements
in the South. 116: Roscoe C. Martin, The People’s Party in
Texas: A Study in Third Party Politics (University of
Texas Bulletin No, 3308: Austin, 19^3), 36.
^Alexandria Farmers’ Vidette. quoted in Colfax
Chronicle. November 29, 1890.
^Woodward, Origins of the New South. 235.
54Haynes, Third Party Movements. 240, 251.
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credited with drawing up and circulating among the assembled
farmers the call for a subsequent "National Union Confer
ence" at Cincinnati, destined, in 1891, to set in motion the
national People’s p a r t y . ^

About 75 of the 500 or more

individuals present at Ocala signed the call--mostly Kansas
men and members of the Colored Farmers* Alliance. D

Dr.

Macune and Southern Alliance President Polk tried to arrange
a compromise which would delay any decision on a third party
until February of 1892.^

But the militant minority refused

to wait.
The National Union Conference brought 1,412 dele
gates from over thirty states and territories to Cincinnati
in May of 1891.

Naturally, the three Vincents were on hand.

So were such inveterate reformers as Ignatius Donnelly of
Minnesota, James B. Weaver of Iowa, and Anson J. Streeter of
Illinois, together with a number of labor leaders who were
there as interested spectators.

Among the latter were

Terence V. Powderly and Samuel Gompers.

58

But the attendance

“^N ew York Times, December 5, 1890; Barr, A Standard
History of Kansas and Kansans. II, 1159.
“^Philadelphia Journal of the Knights of Labor.
December 11, 1890.
^Noblin, Leonidas LaFavette Polk. 268; Blood, Hand
book and History of the National Farmers* Alliance. 66-67.
“^Cincinnati Enquirer. May 19-21, 1891; Noblin,
Leonidas LaFavette Polk. 269.
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at Cincinnati was geographically lopsided.

Midwestern and

Plains states made up the overwhelming majority--Kansas
alone sent 411--and only 36 were on hand from the entire
S o u t h . T w o of the southerners were from Louisiana:

Hardy

Brian of.Winnfield and I. J. Mills of Lake Charles.
Young Brian was described by one correspondent as
"the temporary lion of the hour" on the opening day of the
Cincinnati convention.^

The Comrade editor seemed to be a

more outspoken third party man than any other southerner
interviewed; in fact, most of those who had come up from the
South followed the lead of Congressman Leonidas F. Living
ston of Georgia, who said he was present "to fight this
AO
third party move."
Brian’s credentials also attracted
comment.

The Winn Parish agrarians, in authorizing Brian as

their representative, had attached 1,200 signatures, a
number just 131 shy of the total adult male population of
the parish!

Around Winn Parish, Brian told reporters at

^Cincinnati Enquirer. May 21, 1891; Saloutos,
Farmer Movements in the South. 122-23.
^Cincinnati Enquirer. May 18, 1891.
^Philadelphia Journal of the Knights of Labor. May
21, 1891. For one thing, Brian entertained the more urbane
delegates to the Cincinnati convention by telling of his
departure; he left Winnfield riding on a pony, and rode it
fifty miles to catch the nearest train which would make
connections to Cincinnati.
^^Cincinnati Enquirer. May 19, 1891.
ZL o

Philadelphia Journal of the Knights of Labor. May
21, 1891; U.S., Compendium of the Eleventh Census. I.~~782-83.
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Cincinnati, the people would not be intimidated by Bourbon
outcries over "the negro menace" and the need for white
solidarity inside the Democratic party.

"The race cry

doesn’t scare us," he said.^4
After officially proclaiming the birth of the
national People’s party, the Cincinnati convention adjourned
on May 21.
ment.

The Populist platform was not an original docu

It embodied the Farmers’ Alliance program as stated

in the "Ocala Demands" of 1890, the major planks being the
sub-treasury plan, free and unlimited coinage of silver at
a ratio of 16 to 1 to gold, abolition of the national
banking system, prohibition of alien ownership of land, a
graduated income tax, government control (or ownership) of
communications and transportation facilities, an eight hour
day for labor, and the direct election of United States
Senators.

The Cincinnati convention was cleverly managed.

It permitted professional third party warhorses such as
Donnelly to be "in on the ground floor"
party emerged.

as the People’s

And the majority element of the Southern

Farmers* Alliance, which had wished to delay the third party
decision, was quickly and carefully placated.

The managers

at Cincinnati set up a national committee to smooth the way
^Cincinnati Enquirer. May 19, 1891.
65Ibid., May 21, 1891.
^Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 217.
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for a union of midwestern and southern agrarian forces at
the proposed St. Louis convention in February of 1892.

fs*7

By that latter date President Polk and many other Southern
Alliance leaders were ready for Populism.^®

The Demo

cratic party of the South had not been and was not likely
to be, captured by the agrarians.
were proving hollow.

The victories of 1890

The sub-treasury plan had been sabo-

taged in Congress by southern Democrats.

69

Henceforth, the

fight would be between Bourbon Democracy and the People*s
party.
Within a month after Brian’s return from Cincinnati,
by July 1, 1891, the majority of Farmers' Union members in
Catahoula, Grant, and Winn Parishes had formally renounced
all ties to the Democratic party,and, while assembled at
Union meetings, pledged their support to the People's
70
party.
Soon, Populist stirrings were noticeable among the
Unions of Calcasieu, Natchitoches, Rapides, Sabine, and
Vernon Parishes.

71

Bourbon spokesmen grew increasingly

^ Ibid.. 214-17; Philadelphia Journal of the Knights
of Labor. May 28, 1891.
^®Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk. 270-73.
^ Ibid.; Woodward, Origins of the New South. 239.
^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. June 21-23, 1891;
Colfax Chronicle. June 20, 27, 1891.
"^Winnfield Comrade. quoted in Colfax Chronicle. July

11, 1891; Lake Charles Echo, quoted in Colfax Chronicle.
August 1, 1891; Daily Picayune. October 3, 189TI
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disturbed and angry over these mass defections, and the
choler of the Daily Caucasian was raised several degrees by
the news, in late July, that “Professor Vincent" of Kansas
had returned "to preach his third party heresy to Louisiana
farmers."

79

The Populist groundswell attracted a number of
shabby, pathetic misfits.

L. A. Traylor, a small, almost

dwarfish man whose political history was said to include
Radical Repbulicanism and Greenbackism, was one such individual.

73

Traylor was an ordained Baptist minister.

He had

also taught school in a number of hill parishes, and, at
various times, sold insurance for the Famous Life Associ
ation or peddled "some sort of-patent medicine."'74

During

the summer of 1891 Traylor took to the road as an organizer
for the People’s party in North and Central Louisiana.

He

seemed to be quite effective in swaying Negroes from Republicanism to Populism.

75

Accused by the Colfax Chronicle

of preaching "communistic ideas," Traylor replied:
^Shreveport Daily Caucasian, quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Advocate. July 28, 1891. See also Hicks, The Popu
list Revolt. 217.
TO
'JFor information on L. A. Traylor, see Baton Rouge
Daily Advocate. October 5, 1890; Homer Guardian-Journal.
quoted in Colfax Chronicle. August 1, 1891; Colfax Chroni
cle. January 30, 1892.
Homer Guardian-Journal. quoted in Colfax Chroni
cle. August 1, 1891.
^ F o r Traylor’s activities among Negroes, see
Colfax Chronicle. August 8, 1891.
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Educational institutions . . . open their doors to
the rich. Magnificent church buildings with splendid
embellishments are being erected . . . and the wealth
of the country, like the oil from the Standard Oil
Trust, flows through a thousand pipes into the vaults
of capitalists, making the rich richer and the poor
poorer. . . . It is unnatural, unrighteous and dam
nable, and if I must preach the doctrine of commu
nists to arouse the people from their lethargy, then
make the most of it.76
Traylor's Populist activities made him an object of
attention, probably for the first time in his life.

He was

appointed President of a so-called "college" in Grant
Parish.

77

He was elected Chairman of the Committee of

Organization of the Louisiana People’s party.

78

Even the

Daily Picayune took note of him and described him as "promi
nent."^

In September of 1891, when Grant Parish Populists

raised money to start a party organ at Colfax, Traylor
became the editor.
80
Demand [sic] .

This paper was christened The Ocala
Traylor then had the opportunity to use

his acid pen on what he called the "vindictive, villainous
and arrogant . . . Louisiana aristocrats," and he cited the
editor of the Colfax Chronicle as a prime local example.

81

^ L e t t e r from L. A. Traylor, published in ibid..
August 1, 1891.
77Colfax Chronicle. August 1, 8, 1891.
7ft
Daily Picayune. October 4, 1891.
79Ibid.. October 3, 1891.
^ C o l f a x Chronicle. September 19, 1891.
0*1

17, 1891.

Colfax The Ocala Demand, auoted in ibid.. October
~
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Traylor portrayed the Chronicle* which often reprinted antiPopulist diatribes from other papers, as a chamberpot into
which was emptied "the filth and slush" of the state's
QO
Bourbon press.
But Traylor's days as a crusader were
numbered.

Late in 1891 money from the Louisiana State

Lottery Company began to trickle into Colfax,®^ and The
Ocala Demand suddenly underwent a reversal of policy;
Traylor implored his Populist readers to "enlist under the
banner" of Samuel D. McEnery in the current gubernatorial
campaign.

84

party career.

On this sour note did Traylor close his third
85

Obscurity again claimed him.

From the summer of 1891 until April of 1892, politi
cal activity in Louisiana, Populist or otherwise, revolved
around the question of who would succeed Francis T. Nicholls
in the governor's mansion at Baton Rouge.

The Populists at

first offered qualified support to Thomas Adams.

As Hardy

DO

Hardy Brian confirmed reports that the lottery was
at work among Populist leaders in Grant Parish, and he
angrily denounced those who accepted lottery money. Brian
later called Traylor "the arch traitor and cats-paw." Winn
field Comrade, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. February 6, 1892;
Louisiana Populist. August 2, 1895.
84

Colfax The Ocala Demand, quoted in Colfax Chroni
cle. January 9, 1892.
®~*Colfax Chronicle. January 30, 1892. Goodwyn ob
served that Reverend Traylor was "but a fraction physically
and morally."
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Brian explained it in the Comrade, the Louisiana Populists
desired most of all a governor and state legislature sym
pathetic to the Southern Alliance program; if Adams would
stand by the Ocala Demands and not become a mere tool of
the Anti-Lottery League patricians, then the third party men
would vote for an Adams-headed state Democratic ticket in
1892.88
visos.
plan.®^

But Adams fulfilled none of these Populist pro
He even expressed doubts about the sub-treasury
It was at the Lafayette convention of the Farmers*

Union, in August of 1891, that the break between Adams and
the left wing agrarians became irrevocable.

Not only did

they foreseethe outcome of the Adams-Anti-Lottery compact,
but they also resented the fact that Adams's speech before
the Lafayette gathering made no mention of the Ocala
Demands, but rather was confined to two main topics:

the

lottery evil and the unwisdom of straying from the DemoQQ
cratic party.
A number of hitherto faithful Adams men
(including Thomas J. Guice) then proclaimed themselves
Populists.89
QZ
Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily
Advocate. July 30, 189X7"
87
°'New Orleans Times-Democrat, quoted in Colfax
Chronicle. October 31, 1891.
88
Daily Picayune. August 8-9, September 17, 1891;
Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Advocate.
August 13, 1891.

890pelousas St. Landry Clarion. August 15, 1891.
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One angry upland farmer wrote about Adams and the
state Democratic party in such quaint style that the Colfax
Chronicle published it verbatim.

The agrarian's letter con

cluded with the following (spelling and grammar unchanged)
words:
I dislike to be called a chronic grumbler but I would
like to know what kind of gall a man can have within
him that will advocate a party that has formed a body
simular to that of a crockadile and equally as danger
ous with a thousand tubes extending from its eyes nose
mouth and ears between its ribs and from under its
tail that can at any time squrt the Dye . . . into the
eyes of the industrial masses and while they are in
their blinded condition rob them of the fruits of
their toil then return home singing hymns of Joy for
the Success they have had upon their pilfering tour
Oh if Thomas Jeffrson could rise from the grave and
take only a side look at the Present sistems of the
democratic party he would no doubt regret bitterly
that . . . he was the Founder of democracy.90
The first state convention of the Louisiana People's
party was slated for October 2, 1891, at Alexandria.
list organizers were meanwhile busy.

Popu

Hardy Brian, Guice,

and Traylor spent much of September conversing with working
men's organizations in New Orleans; the Daily Picayune, ob
serving their progress, reported that the Knights of Labor
"are in hearty sympathy with the m o v e m e n t . T h e

People's

Municipal party, as Populism's New Orleans affiliate was
designated, had been holding meetings since midsummer.
^ L e t t e r from S. W. LaCroix, published in Colfax
Chronicle. September 12, 1891.
^ Daily Picayune. September 16-20, October 3, 1891
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Moreover, the New Orleans Issue. a laborite weekly founded
in the spring of 1891, was now endorsing the Populist
92
cause.
Thomas A. Clayton, manager of the Farmers' Union
Commercial Association of Louisiana, supposedly provided the
funds for the party in the New Orleans area.

93

Seventy-eight delegates from seventeen parishes were
present at the Alexandria convention.
the size of the urban delegation.

Most surprising was

No less than thirty-five

of the total seventy-eight Populists assembled had come up
from New Orleans.^4
five seats.

Winn Parish, by comparison, occupied

All those present at the morning session were

white men; however, President Isaac Keys of the Colored
Alliance, along with another Negro Allianceman, arrived late
in the day and the two were admitted to the speaker's plat95
form.
Presiding over the convention preliminaries was
Benjamin Brian.

The elder Brian, looking over the assembled

farmers and laborers, expressed "great satisfaction" at
seeing the movement he had worked "for the last fifteen
9^New Orleans Issue. August 1, 1891. The Issue was
owned and edited by J. B. Cameron and J. R. Hoening, Jr.
Both were active third party workers in the city and at
state Populist conventions.
^ C o l f a x Chronicle. October 31, 1891; Amite Florida
Parishes. quoted in ibid.. November 7, 1891.
94
Daily Picayune. October 2-4, 1891; Opelousas S t .
Landry Clarion. October 10, 1891.
^5Pailv Picayune. October 3, 1891.
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years" to create finally organize on a statewide basis.

96

He also spoke of the rising Populist sentiment among Negro
people.

The big planters, Reverend Bridn prophesied, would

try to stop their colored tenants from joining this mass
movement; yet he felt confident that this obstacle "would
be attended to at the proper time."

His curious statement

of confidence was not well rooted in reality.
The convention adjourned without making nominations
for state office.
1892.

That would be done later, in February of

A state organization, however, was set up:

Thomas

Clayton was named as chairman of the state executive com
mittee; Hardy Brian was named secretary of the p a r t y . ^
Also, on October 3, the public could read the potent
"Address to the People of the State of Louisiana . . .
Irrespective of Class, Color, or Past Political Affili
ation."

This first platform of the state People’s party

read, in part:
Nonei can yet tell whether this revolution shall be
accomplished by peaceable means, by appeals to the
reason of the dominant element of our population .
. .. or whether a deaf ear will still be turned . .
. until . . . the people rise in their mighty wrath,
and with swift retributive strokes, beat down the
96Colfax Chronicle. October 10, 1891; Daily
Picayune. October 3, 1891.
97

Daily Picayune. October 4, 1891. Thomas J. Guice
was absent from the first Populist party convention in
Louisiana; he claimed illness in the family as his excuse,
but it may be that he could not afford to travel. A news
paper in Guice’s home parish said the tax rolls did not
report him as owning as much as one dollar’s worth of
property. Mansfield Journal, quoted in Colfax Chronicle.
November 5, 1892.
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gates of . . . monopoly . . . and corruption,

, , ,

You colored men . . . you must now realize that
there is no hope of any further material benefit to
you in the Republican party, and that if you remain
in it you will continue to be hewers of wood and
drawers of water in the future as you have been in
the past.
Democrats. . . . Have you not the experience of
uninterrupted Democratic rule in this state? What
has it done for you? Are your children growing up
better equipped for the battle of life than you were?
Are your institutions equal to the demands made upon
them? Have your public finances been honestly ad
ministered? The spectre of negro supremacy has been
used to keep you in the toils of the scheming machine
politicians as effectively as the voudou is employed
to terrify the credulous negroes themselves.
But now the machine politicians have put a new
slide in the magic lantern . . . and show you on
their screen the hideous figure of lottery rule, to
intimidate you and prevent you from grasping the hand
held out to hfclp you escape from your political
dungeon. Must a man be bound hand and foot in Demo
cratic fetters before he can be trusted to vote against
the lottery. . . ? Cast your ballot against this
lottery and all . . . gambling on the product of your
labor.
Will you still remain the willing serfs of machine
politicians? Shall Louisiana not join in that ringing
shout for liberty and reform that started in Kansas. .
■ ?98
After studying this platform and examining the
signatures suffixed thereto, the Daily Picayune, headlined:
"IT MAY BE RIDICULOUS, BUT IT IS REVOLUTION."99

Nothing

like the Populist convention, said the old New Orleans daily,
had ever been witnessed in Louisiana before; "it is a
98

Daily Picayune. October 4, 1891

" ibid.. October 5, 1891.
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gathering of all the discontented, dissatisfied and unprosperous elements of the population. . . .

It is easy to

laugh at, but . . . there is nothing absurd in the fact that
half the delegates at the Alexandria conference were from
this city.
serious."

When the city and country unite, results may be
Said an upstate Bourbon paper, in noting the

Populist platform:
demagogism

[it]

"For unabashed impudence and unblushing
has no parallel in the history of revo

lutionary manifestos.
But the Alexandria conference lacked one bewhiskered
face that had been present at almost every significant
agrarian gathering in the state for the past decade, in
cluding the dismal little gathering near D'Arbonne Church in
1881.

J. A. Tetts was in Alexandria in October of 1891.

But he stayed away from the Populist convention.

Tetts,

since 1889, had steadily fallen under the conservative in
fluence of Thomas Adams; late that year President Adams ap
pointed Tetts editor of the "Union department" of the news
paper selected as the official journal of the Farmers'
Union, the Shreveport Weekly C a u c a s i a n . Shortly
Catahoula News, quoted in Colfax
Chronicle. October 31, 1891.
^^Harrisonburg

•^■^Shreveport Daily Caucasian. January 8, 1890;
Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. January 30, 1890, The Choudrant Farmers' Union, the first organ of the Louisiana order,
moved its offices to Monroe in 1888 and had ceased publi
cation by 1891. In fact, the Farmeri* Union had ceased
being the state organ of the Union as e arlyas 1888.
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thereafter, Adams and Tetts decided that a journal "wholly
owned and controlled by the Order" was an imperative need.

102

This decision led to the founding of the Alexandria Farmers*
Vidette; its first issue came off the press on October 22,
10 3
1890. Tetts was at first co-editor, then editor-in-chief.
The Farmers* Vidette evidently boomed Adams for the
governorship and praised the Anti-Lottery League more than
it dwelt upon the problems of small farmers.

Tetts also de

nounced the third party movement, as it spread out of Winn
Parish, in unmeasured t e r m s . T h e

Populists returned his

fire; Tetts was even accused of being the prime fulorum
behind the Farmers* Union-Anti-Lottery League compact;

105

L. A. Traylor referred to the Farmers* Vidette as "Tetts,
Adams & Co.," and vowed to "eat up Tetts . . . bloddy
raw."^^

But Tetts, whatever his designs might have been,

was not equipped to hold his own in the Machiavellian atmos
phere of Louisiana Democratic politics.

On April 21, 1892,

•^O^National Economist. Ill (August 30, 1890), 382.
im

^Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest
Louisiana. 533; New Orleans Louisiana Review. January 27,
1892.
■^4Alexandria Farmers* Vidette. quoted in Colfax
Chronicle. November 7, 14, 1891.
^^Mansfield De Soto Democrat, quoted in New Orleans
Louisiana Review. January 27, 1892.
It was alleged that
Tetts believed the state printing contract would be thrown
to the Farmers* Vidette if Foster became Governor.
^•^Dailv Picayune. October 3, 1891; Colfax The Ocala
Demand, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. November 14, 1891.
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three days after the state election, Tetts resigned as edi
tor of the fading Farmers* Vidette,

His usefulness to

Adams and to the Anti-Lottery League had terminated.

Tetts,

along with his wife and three unmarried daughters, prepared
to move to the village of Robeline, in Natchitoches Parish.
He had saved enough money to buy some newspaper equipment,
probably second hand.
Flag appeared.

107

One month later the Robeline Battle

Tetts had become a Populist.

If a Louisiana voter did not wish to support a
particular ticket in the April, 1892, state election, he had
(in theory at least) four other choices.

The fragmentation

of state parties that year confused the most seasoned
political veterans.

The pro-lottery Regular Democrats were

running a ticket headed by ex-GOvernor McEnery; the AntiLottery Democrats had Murphy J. Foster at the top of their
slate; the Republicans also.put out two state tickets, with
Albert H. Leonard as the pro-lottery and John E. Breaux as
the anti-lottery Republican candidates for Governor.

108

Finally, on February 18, the People*s party placed Robert L.
Tannehill of Winn Parish, in the gubernatorial race, along
with a full slate of candidates for the lesser state
^^ Colfax Chronicle. May 7, 1892; Penny, "The
People*s Party Press," 50.
^ ® B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. December 16-20, 1891;
New Orleans Times-Democrat. January 20, February 18, 1892.
Leonard was allied with ex-Senator William P. Kellogg;
Breaux was a member of ex-Governor Henry Clay Warmoth’s
faction of the Louisiana Republican party.

"Political nomenclature," observed the St, Landry
Clarion, "is becoming numerous and complex.

Also com

plex were the postures taken by the various nominees.

The

McEnery Democrats, heretofore exponents of the rawest sort
of Bourbonism, were now wringing their hands in pious dis
may over the wretched condition of state schools and insti
tutions.

For this same election would decide upon the

lottery recharter amendment.

The McEneryites, supporting

the lottery offer to pour $1,250,000 per year into the state
coffers in exchange for a twenty-five year constitutional
renewal of life, denounced the Foster Democrats as cruel
"rich men" who cared nothing for the poor school children
who would gain from the proffered lottery l a r g e s s . Y e t
the fact that the Foster ticket included three members of
the Farmers' Union prompted one McEnery enthusiast to cate
gorize the entire slate, including Foster, as "red revolutionists."

112

Foster Democrats, on the other hand,

lO^The Populist state ticket in 1892 offered:
Governor, Robert L. Tannehill of Winn; Lt. Governor, I. J.
Mills of Calcasieu; Secretary of State, D, McStravick of
Orleans; Treasurer, John Mahoney of Orleans; Auditor, John
Hendricks of Caddo; Superintendent of Education, J. D.
Patton of Grant; Attorney General, Wade Hough of Concordia,
New Orleans Times-Democrat. February 19-21, 1892.
^■^Opelousas St. Landry Clarion, quoted in Penny,
"The People's Party Press," 29.
^^•Dailv Picayune. August 24, 1891; New Orleans
Louisiana Review. January 6, 1892.
l^B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. February 12, 1892.
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hammered away on the moral evil of the lottery and its
Carpetbagger origins; they suggested that a McEnery victory
might bring Major Burke back from H o n d u r a s . M e a n w h i l e ,
the Leonard and Breaux Republican tickets were much too
absorbed in their intercine squabble to bother the Democrats.
"This newborn babe," as Hardy Brian termed the
Louisiana People’s party, hoped to benefit from the family
fights going on in the Democratic and Republican houses. H-4
The Populist state platform in 1892 made a special bid for
the Negro vote.

"We declare emphatically," said the docu

ment, "that the interests of the white and colored races of
the South are identical. . . . Equal justice and fairness
115
must be accorded to each. . . . "
Of the 171 delegates
present at the Populist nominating convention in February
of 1892, at least 24 were colored m e n . ^ ^

Two of the

Negroes present were placed in nomination for a position on
the state ticket.

C. A. Roxborough of New Iberia and L. D.

Laurent of Alexandria were both candidates for the Populist
■^^Bayou Sara True Democrat. March 9, 1892; Ope
lousas St. Landrv Clarion. January 2, 23, 1892.
^ 4Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Lucia Elizabeth
Daniel, "The Louisiana People’s Party" (Master’s thesis,
Louisiana State University, 1942), 32. The Daniel thesis
was published in the Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVI
(October, 1943), 1055-1149.
115

New Orleans Times-Democrat. February 19, 1892.

U 6 Ibid
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nomination to the office of State Treasurer.

Other colored

delegates, however, urged them to withdraw their names; "it
was not the proper time," the more cautious Negroes ex
plained, for colored Populists to run for o f f i c e . T h e
Times-Democrat correspondent indicated that the white Popu
lists did not take part in the argument, preferring to let
the Negroes settle it themselves.

Shortly before the con

vention was due to ballot, both Negroes withdrew their
candidacy.

But Laurent and Roxborough did receive organi

zational positions within the party; they became members of
the Populist state executive committee.
Robert L. Tannehill, the only bona fide Populist the
party ever nominated for Governor of Louisiana, was a rela
tively prosperous resident of Winnfield.
and a cotton gin.

Forty-four years of age in 1892, Tannehill

had previously held one public office:
Parish.

He owned a saw mill

sheriff of Winn

He served as treasurer of the Louisiana Farmers*

Union and presided over the parish Union from 1887 to
117

Ibid. Laurent was state President of the Colored
Farmers* Alliance of Louisiana in 1890-91. Roxborough had
been expelled from the Republican party in 1887 after he had
been accused of stealing votes for the Democrats.
In fact,
a mob of Negroes in the town of Plaquamine once tried to
lynch Roxborough.
New Orleans Weekly Pelican. April 23, May
28, 1887.
^®Laurent, immediately after the Alexandria con
vention, joined a number of white Louisiana Populists at
the national third party conference which opened at St. Louis
on February 22, 1892. Jack Abramowitz,"The Negro in the
Agrarian Revolt," Agricultural History. XXIV (April, 1950)
94.
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Yet Tannehill was virtually unknown outside of

Winn. The other members of the ticket were equally obscure.
McEnery and his followers tended to' ignore the Popu
list candidates, assuming correctly that the little agrarian
party would draw most of its votes from men who would have
otherwise supported Foster.
also.

The Fosterites understood this

Consequently, the Populist ticket was treated most

hostilely by the Foster Democracy; claims were made that
lottery money financed the Populist campaign, and that the
third party was making the race "in order to help the
lottery as much as possible."

120

However, the Fosterite

charge that the Populist platform failed to condemn the
lottery was patently untrue.

Tannehill^ supporters took

the view that the gambling syndicate was a great evil, but
not the only one which plagued the unhappy state.

The New

Orleans Issue. Populismfs urban advocate, suggested that
the Foster Democrats had taken up the anti-lottery crusade
merely to herd working people away from other fields of
reform.

In other words, the lottery was a sacrificial

wolf being thrown to the lambs.
That Foster would be the next Governor became
^••^Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest
Louisiana. 492; Winnfield Southern Sentinel. August 28,
1885, September 16, 1887.

120

Alexandria Town Talk, quoted in Opelousas St.
Landry Clarion. October 3, 1891.
^•^New Orleans Issue. June 4, 1892.
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evident weeks before the election.

The Federal government,

by February of 1892, had forced the lottery to discontinue
100
its use of the United States mail. ^
McEnery*s obvious
lack of popularity convinced lottery officials that their
cause within the state was also hopeless.
drew its request for recharter.

123

The company with-

Foster obtained 79,388

votes against 47,037 for McEnery in the general election on
April 19.

The two Republicans divided 41,818 votes.
Popu124
list Tannehill brought up the rear with 9,804.
Natu

rally, official returns from any Louisiana election were
subject to question; everyone but the Fosterites claimed
that.gross frauds had occurred.

One fact, though was clear;

Populist sentiment had not yet made much headway either in
the rural parishes or the city.

Six per cent of the state

vote was not an encouraging beginning.
Tannehill ran ahead of his Democratic and Republican
opponents in just four parishes:
and Winn,

Catahoula, Grant, Vernon,

These four gave the Populist ticket 2,903 votes.

One-tenth of Tannehill*s total state vote came from his home
parish, where he received 1,001 against 305 for all four
opponents; but, as one Bourbon observer jokingly noted, when
all fifty-nine parishes were added up it became quite clear
^^Ezell, Fortune*s Merrv Wheel. 266-67.
^^Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII,
1160.
1 24

21.

Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1892.
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that "Tannehill didn’t Winn."125

The Populist candidate

made a respectable showing in nine other parishes; Bien
ville, Calcasieu, Caldwell, De Soto, Jackson, Natchitoches,
Rapides, Red River, and Sabine,
discouraging to the extreme.

But the urban returns were

Out of almost 40,000 ballots

counted in New Orleans, Tannehill received 71.12^
Four People’s party men were elected to the state
legislature in 1892.

Benjamin F. Brian was the sole Popu

list member of the upper house; the seat he had once held
(1879-84) as an Independent, and had run for a total of six
times, would now be his for the remaining years of his
10 7
life.
Hardy Brian, his son, represented Winn Parish in
the lower house.

Albert Shelby of Grant, an ex-Republican,

and John Franklin of Vernon were the other Populist, repre
sentatives.12®

Their legislative record was undistinguished.

125Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. April 30, 1892.
12®Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1892,
21. The Populist vote in New Orleans in 1892 was, in all
probability, considerably higher than the official returns
would indicate. The city administration was notorious for
counting third party votes in the Democratic column; in no
New Orleans precinct were the Populists permitted to have
commissioners in 1892. Cf. New Orleans Times-Democrat.
April 18-22, 1892; George M. Reynolds, Machine Politics in
New Orleans; 1897-1926 (New York, 1936), 24-25.
^ ^ B e n j a m i n Brian died in 1896, at the age of 63.
Louisiana Populist. November 6, 1896.
12®The Official journal erroneously listed all but
Senator Brian as Democrats. Cf. Louisiana, Official Journal
of the House of Representatives. 1892, 698-700; Colfax
Chronicle. April 23, August 6, 1892.
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However, it was clearly the strategy of the four Populist
legislators to support bills introduced by Democratic
members of the Farmers' Union; measures introduced by nonDemocratic members had little chance of ever reaching the
floor for a vote.

But at best, the agrarian coalition of

Populists and Farmers' Union Democrats could count on a mere
four senators out of thirty-six in the upper house, and
twenty-two out of one hundred members in the house.

120
7

The

session was notably lacking in reform legislation.
During the summer and fall of 1892, as the presi
dential and congressional races drew near, the People's
party of Louisiana came to realize the enormity of the task
which confronted them.
party was fading.

Factionalism within the Democratic

The lottery question was settled, and

Governor Foster's conservatism on matters of economics and
race began to win plaudits among the old McEnery clique.

1

United, the Bourbon Democracy of Louisiana scrutinized
their agrarian challengers and found them puny but potenti
ally dangerous; as one of McEnery*s friends phrased it:

"A

spirit of political insubordination" was abroad in the
land.

131

Foster's handling of the New Orleans general
^Shreveport Times. March 13, 1939.

^-3^Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII,
1164-66; Baton Rouae Dai rvAdvocate. October 7. 1892.
^3*Lake Providence Banner Democrat. September 10,
1892.
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strike in November of 1892 increased his popularity among
upper class Louisianians.

Luckily for the new Governor, the

25,000 or more striking laborers confined their protests to
matters of hours and wages and, with few exceptions, were
apathetic toward the notion of political union with the
rural Populists.
A meeting of the People*s party executive committee,
on October 1, 1892, resolved to set up permanent state head
quarters in New Orleans, and Andrew B. Booth of that city
was named chairman of the executive committee.

A young and

rather nondescript man, Booth served more as a clerk and
■J O O

errand-boy for the party than as a moulder of policy.
Booth continued on as chairman until 1896.

His work in the

shabby New Orleans office was hampered by an almost total
lack of money; often, he was unable to mail out Populist
literature because the office could not buy the postage
stamps.

134

Booth earned his living, not as a professional

132por a discussion of the New Orleans general
strike of 1892, see Roger W, Shugg, "The New Orleans General
Strike of 1892," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXI (April,
1938), 547. The effect of the strike upon urban Populism
appears to have been virtually nil. The third party ran no
candidates in New Orleans in 1892, and obtained less than
500 votes (officially, at least) in 1894. The New Orleans
Issue, by 1894, was more Socialist than Populist. See
Pearce, "The Rise and Decline of Labor in New Orleans," 30;
Hall MS, 10-29; New Orleans Issue. December 10, 17, 31,1892.
■^^Colfax Chronicle. October 15, 1892; Louisiana
Populist. July 12, 1895.
l34Louisiana Populist. July 12, 1895.
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Populist, but rather as a lecturer for an organization known
as the Knights of Honor, which had no political affiliation
but appeared to be an insurance company disguised as a benevolent and fraternal lodge.

135

Hardy Brian, who served as

state secretary of the agrarian party, resided in Winnfield
until 1894, when he moved to Natchitoches.1^6

j^e chairman

and the secretary seldom had the chance to meet and plan
strategy.

An effective statewide organization did not exist.

Shortly before the national election of November,
1892, Populist candidates announced for Congress in four
Louisiana districts.

The news provoked a torrent of Bourbon

abuse which surpassed all previous expletives used against
the agrarian rebels.

The Daily Advocate and the Daily

States led the attack.

Populists, according to the former,

were "political hermaphrodites," and their party "a bastard
organization. . . .

We appeal to the patriots of Louisiana

to shun this monstrous political gangrene as they would a
leper at the gates."137

Moreover, the Daily Advocate was

"quite tired" of the Populist "mouthings and whinings" about
v

vote fraud; "if . . . they . . . can*t protect themselves
from being 1counted out,1 they should move out . . . and go
^■^Lake Providence Banner Democrat. February 1,
1896.
136

Louisiana Populist. December 28, 1894.

137
1, 1892.

Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 5, November
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to some place where people don't 'count out.'"l3®

Henry J.

Hearsey, editor of the Daily States. whose adoration of the
status quo was perhaps surpassed only by his love for
whiskey,

13Q

felt that Brian, Guice, and their ragged fol

lowers were "sore heads, demogogues, agitators, . . . rain
bow chasers"; in sum, "miserable excrescence of the Demo
cratic and Republican p a r t i e s . H e a r s e y advocated dic
tatorship as the most suitable form of government for
L o u i s i a n a . H e was otherwise known for his lachrymose
eulogies to the memory of General Robert E. Lee.

14O

Open Populist-Republican cooperation in Louisiana
was inaugurated in October of 1892.

One month prior to the

election, Thomas J. Guice journeyed to New Orleans to open
political negotiations with both the Warmoth-Breaux and the
Kellogg-Leonard factions of the G.O.P.^43

By October 20 the

*33Ibid.. October 6, 1892.
139
7See Homer Claiborne Guardian, quoted in New
Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 16. 188*fr.

l ^ N e w Orleans Daily States, quoted in Colfax Chroni
cle. August 13, 1892.
*4^For Hearsey*s espousal of dictatorship, see New
Orleans Daily States, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Advocate.
August 27, 189^.
142

Shreveport Sunday Judge. January 26, 1896. Major
Hearsey was originally from Shreveport, and conservatives of
that city were proud to claim him as a native son. In fact,
a more fitting place of origin for Hearsey could not be
imagined.
143Colfax Chronicle. October 22, 29, 1892; Uzee,
"Republican Politics in Louisiana," 125-26.
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bargain was sealed.

Populists would nominate candidates in

the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Congressional Districts; the
Republicans would run their men in the Second and Third; an
Independent in the First District would be supported by
both parties.

Where the Republicans had no candidate they

would endorse the Populist nominee; the Populists were to
return the favor in the Republican districts.
agreement was reached on presidential electors.

Also, an
A fusion

ticket would be issued; four Populist electors pledges to
James G. Weaver and four Republican electors pledged to
Benjamin Harrison were to be listed on the ballot.-I44
Apparently, national leaders of the Republican party were
much in favor of the Louisiana fusion arrangements,^*4^
though some Republicans inside the state had misgivings; the
national Populist party, on the other hand, criticized the
arrangement.

People’s party National Committee Chairman H.

E. Taubeneck said the Louisiana fusion was made "against my
protest.w^4^
Elsewhere in the South in 1892, the Populists and
Republicans tended toward informal agreements in local,
state, and sometimes congressional races; but only in
*44White, Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. V,
9-11; New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 21-23, 1892.
^45Robert Lowrey [ ?] to J. Ernest Breda, October 14,
1892, in Breda Papers (Louisiana State University Archives).
^■4^Quoted in New Orleans Issue, December 10, 1892.
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Louisiana were the presidential electors joined and the
congressional agreement so positive.

1/17

The fact that the

first statewide Populist-Republican fusion in the South
occurred in Louisiana was another indication that the Peli
can State had an unusually oppressive Bourbon Democratic
regime.As

one Republican grimly observed, the state’s

rulers had devised a cunning substitute for government.
was, he said, "an oligarchy by arithmetic."

It

149

The fusion agreement of 1892 was, of course, not
without precedent in Louisiana.

The National party move

ment of 1878 had attempted a combination of yeoman white and
Negro Republican voters under a similar organization; how
ever, that effort, falling as it did under conservative
white Republican control, was a standing lesson to the Popu
lists of the 1890's.

Warmoth, Kellogg, and the other

remnants of Carpetbaggism were not the most trustworthy of
allies.

Many Populists displayed a lack of enthusiasm for

the 1892 fusion.

Hardy Brian, though he accepted it, re

vealed a sense of shame when he asked his upland neighbors
^ T a I g x M. Arnett, The Populist Movement in Georgia
(New York, 1922), 152-53; Martin. The Peopie*s Party in
Texas. 77; Rogers, "Agrarianism in Alabama," 390-99; Hicks,
The Populist Revolt. 245-47.
148

Professor Key suspects that "the ruling oli
garchy of Louisiana really pressed down harder than did the
governing groups of other [southern ] states." Key,
Southern Politics. 160.
149
^Quoted in New Orleans Weekly Pelican. January 5,
1889.
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to share their votes for a "plutocrat" like President Harri150
son.
But however different their aims and economic phi
losophy might be, Louisiana*s Populist and Republican
leaders had one thing in common:

a mutual enemy.

As long

as the Democrats denied all opponents the right to a free
and fair election, cooperation among the out-groups offered
the only hope, thin though it might be, for success.
Thomas J. Guice obtained the Populist nomination in
the Fourth District.

He now made the race against Congress

man Blanchard which the Farmers* Union-Independent party had
invited him to make two years before.

Guice*s stature among

the Populists had risen sharply since midsummer of 1892.
Then, at the Farmers* Union annual state convention, held in
Monroe, he captained the third party forces in a takeover of
the Union organization.

President Adams, who recently had

been sworn in as Secretary of State under Governor Foster,
resigned his leadership of the Farmers* Union and walked out
of the Monroe convention.

Populists thereupon took over

four of the six state offices in the agrarian order.
150

Winnfield Comrade, auoted in Colfax Chronicle.
October 29, 1892.
151

John Pickett, a recent Populist convert, was
elected President of the Farmers* Union in August, 1892.
Pickett was a member of Governor Foster*s official family;
he had been elected Treasurer of Louisiana on the Foster
Democratic ticket in 1892. However, he had broken with the
administration by the time of the Farmers* Union convention
in 1892. Daniel, "The Louisiana People’s Party," 42-43;
Colfax Chronicle. August 13, 1892.
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As expected, Guice's congressional candidacy aroused Demo
cratic ire;

“Greasy Guice,1' "Garrolous Guice," "the ignor

amus candidate," "veritable scum,", were a few of the epithets applied.

152

Hardy Brian, who was no stranger to

Bourbon invective himself, once remarked that no other
agrarian reformer of his acquaintance was ever subjected to
153
as much slander and personal abuse as fell upon Guice. ^
Robert P. Webb, the veteran Greenbacker from Clai
borne Parish, ran as a Populist against Congressman Boatner
in the Fifth District.

Also in that race was an Independent

candidate with a Populistic program;

Andrew Augustus Gunby,

publisher of the Moniroe Bulletin.^54

In the Sixth District,

Josiah Kleinpeter, East Baton Rouge planter, accepted the
Populist congressional nomination but did not wage an active
campaign. ^

The Republicans having decided not to make

the Third District race against Democratic Congressman
Andrew Price, Populist I. J. Mills announced his candidacy.

X 56

In the metropolitian First and Second Districts,

Populists pledged their support to Independent James
*5^Colfax Chronicle. July 30, September 3, November
5, 1892; Lake Providence Banner Democrat. September 10, 1892.
*53Louisiana Populist. September 2, 1898.
154
Mer Rouge Vidette. quoted in Lake Providence
Banner Democrat .^October 29, 1892.
^■^Bayou Sara True Democrat. October 22, 1892; New
Orleans Issue. December 10, 1892.
^“^New Orleans Issue. December 10, 1892.
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Wilkinson and Republican Morris Marks, respectively.
Shortly before the election Populist presidential
candidate James B. Weaver toured Louisiana and several other
southern states.

The fact that Weaver had been a Union

general during the Civil War was dragged out by the Bourbon
press; his anti-southern activities were described as
"merciless . . . brutal . . . cruel."

158

After this theme

was exhausted, the Daily Advocate went on to call Weaver an
anarchist and a "prostitute."159

Meanwhile, the state's

Democratic spokesmen flayed away at the already-dead "force
bill."

A Republican measure which had been placed before

Congress during the 1890-91 session, it would have provided
for Federal supervision of elections and Federal control of
registration of v o t e r s . T h e

bill had failed to pass.

But it had summoned up the spectre of military Reconstruct
ion.

Though defeated in Congress, the force bill performed

a valuable function for southern Democratic leaders; "force

*5®Colfax Chronicle. August 13, 1892.
^ ^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. October 7, 1892.
Forty-eight Louisiana Populists attended their party's
national nominating convention at Omaha, Nebraska, in July
of 1892. The Pelican State delegation cast a unanimous
vote for the men nominated, James B. Weaver of Iowa and
James G. Field of Virginia. Colfax Chronicle. July 23,
1892; Daniel, "The Louisiana People's Party," 42.
160Forum. X (September, 1890), 23-26
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bill and nigger domination"-*-^ became a potent shibboleth
in coming elections.

Louisiana's Populists were accused of

supporting a revival of the measure in Congress.
quoted as saying:

"Bourbonism is doomed.

Guice was

If they don't

give us a fair count, they'll get the force bill or hell."
None of the four Populist congressional candidates
managed to unseat a Democratic incumbent in the November 8
election; in fact, the official returns showed a topheavy
Democratic victory in all six districts of the state.
the Populist leaders discovered a few bright signs.

But
Tanne

hill 's vote in April had been less than 10,000 for the
entire state; seven months later, the party, though it
listed no candidate in two congressional districts, amassed
17,752.^^

Little of this gain could be attributed to

i63-Louisiana Populist. December 20, 1895.
l ^ L a k e Providence Banner Democrat. November 5, 1892.
Populist candidates for Congress carried seven
parishes in 1892; Grant, Jackson, Lincoln, Sabine, Union,
Vernon, and Winn. Guice received 5,167 votes in the Fourth
District, Webb received 4,301 in the Fifth, Mills 3,123 in
the Third, and Kleinpeter 2,043 in the Sixth. The total
credited the party for the congressional races of 1892 also
includes the 3,119 cast for the Independent, Gunby, in the
Fifth District. Gunby*s program was Populistic and he soon
joined the party. Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State.
1902, 575-76.
In the presidential election, Cleveland
electors polled 87,922 against 26,132 for the HarrisonWeaver electors in the state. No equitable division of this
vote is possible, as Burnham points out; how much of the
Harrison-Weaver vote was Populist and how much Republican
can only be guessed at. W. Dean Burnham, Presidential
Ballots:
1836-1892 (Baltimore, 1955), 487, 918.
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Republican support.

The Republican sugar planters in the

Third District supported the protectionist-minded Democratic
Congressman rather than Populist I. J. Mills

and else

where, in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts, the Demo
cratic machine refused to relax its grip on the ballot box
in the Negro parishes.

The Republican organization in these

latter regions, though apparently willing to aid the Popu
lists, had little help to offer.
in North Louisiana.

Especially was this true

No Republican Congressional candidate

had exceeded 1,756 votes in the Fourth District since Re
construction; in the Fifth, 1,151 had been the highest G.O.P.
i

/

c

total in recent years.

Said the New Orleans Issue. with

only slight misstatement:

"We owe nothing to the Republi

cans."^-^
Populism in the Pelican State next awaited the con
gressional races of 1894, and the gubernatorial election of
1896.

In the meantime, the lot of the ordinary man, white

or black, grew worse as the effects of a disastrous national
depression were felt with increasing severity; Foster*s
Bourbon administration drifted deeper into reaction; and
widening political and economic schisms within the upper
■^^Hjzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 125.
l ^ N e w Orleans Issue. December 10, 1892; Louisiana,
Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 572-76.
^•^New Orleans Issue. December 10, 1892.
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class began to shake the self-assurance of the governing
oligarchy.

It was then that the Bourbons of Louisiana would

face their most serious challenge in the half century be
tween Reconstruction and Huey Long.

CHAPTER IX
BOURBONISM TRIUMPHANT
During the early summer of 1894, Governor Foster's
regime made a crucial decision:

the time had come to put

down, once and for all, the bothersome agrarian menace.
Foster himself launched the Bourbon offensive.

The Gover

nor's message to the 1894 session of the legislature urged
fundamental changes in Louisiana's suffrage and election
laws;^ it was imperative, he explained later, to dis
franchise "the mass of ignorance, vice and venality without
any proprietary interest in the State."

2

The proposed

legislation was plainly aimed at the poor of both races.
But until such time as these laws could be enacted, the
attempted coalition of poor white and poor black under the
People's party banner must be held in check at all costs;
therefore, the usual methods of vote fraud and intimidation
were intensified during the elections of 1894 and 1896.
Populism in Louisiana -was repressed with a violence

^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1894,
28.
% a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. May 19, 1896.
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o
unparalled in the South.0
The constitution of 1879 had placed no unusual re
strictions on manhood suffrage.

In many parishes its liberal

provisions were grossly perverted from the beginning; how
ever, to change the organic law itself meant either a consti
tutional amendment or a new constitution.
of 1894 decided upon the former course.

The legislature
Following Foster*s

recommendations, a bill was passed which placed before the
electorate, at the next state election in 1896, a proposed
constitutional amendment which would restrict the franchise
to adult males who "shall be able to read the Constitution
of the State in his mother tongue, or shall be a bona fide
owner of property . . . assessed to him at a cash valuation
4
of not less than $200."
An ominous proviso was attached.
The subsequent legislature, in 1896, would be specially em
powered to rewrite the suffrage amendment; after the solons
made whatever changes they saw fit, the amendment would then
become a part of the constitution, without resubmission to
the people.

Hardy Brian denounced the whole proposal as
5
"infamous, damnable and hell born."
Though young Brian

exaggerated when he predicted that the legislature might
3Key, Southern Politics. 160.
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of Repre
sentatives. 1894, 835-36.
^Louisiana Populist. May 17, 1895.
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raise property requirements up to $10,000, some degree of
upward revision was, without doubt, the end in view.

Nation

magazine believed the clause for legislative rewriting in
the suffrage amendment to be "the most extraordinary way of
changing a constitution ever proposed.
The suffrage amendment passed the House of Repre
sentatives 74 to 9, and was approved by the Senate 27 to 0
(Populist Senator Brian was absent). Only two Democrats in
7
the House opposed the measure.
The People*s party repre
sentatives supported instead a change in the state1s
election laws, based upon an Australian ballot; their bill
was bandied about from committee to committee, and finally
tabled without action.

Ballot reform, Governor Foster in

sisted, should wait until the "standing menace" of ignorance
g
was relieved of the privilege of voting.
Important seg
ments of the Democratic press, however, agreed with the
Populists in urging ballot reform and condemning suffrage
restriction.

The Alexandria Louisiana Democrat called the

assembly which passed the suffrage proposal "the worst
^Nation. LXII (April 30, 1896), 334.
7
Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of Repre
sentatives . 1894, 836; Louisiana. Official Journal of the
Senate. 1894, 361.
Louisiana, Calendar of the House of Representatives.
1894, Bill No. 133.
g
Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 340.
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legislature” in the state's history, Warmoth's and Kellogg's
regime notwithstanding.

The paper warned:

There must be a change and speedily, or the people,
so long defrauded, will reassert their political
rights even if it entails revolution and bloodshed.
They have long been suppliants, on bended knees, at
the throne of power. Their just demands have been
periodically scorned with the utmost contumely.
Patience and forbearance will cease to be virtues,
and more stringent measures will be resorted to. A
word to the wise ought to be sufficient.10
Even Goodwy.n of the Chronicle, one of the staunchest
conservatives in the state, attacked the suffrage measure as
"bristling with injustice and harshness.”

Louisiana, he

felt, should at least have provided school houses before she
set about punishing ignorance and poverty.^
of all were the Populist leaders.

But angriest

Hardy Brian described the

suffrage amendment as a "stepping stone to perpetually place
this government in the hands of the rich, depriving the poor
of any rights except to eke out their lives in hovels.......
■."12

.^e proposal received unmeasured praise from

Hearsey of the Daily States.

He, along with most of the

ultra Bourbons,, favored anything which would keep "ignorant
negroes and whites" from the ballot box.

In the words of

^Alexandria Louisiana Democrat. June 27, 1894,
quoted in Louisiana. Official Journal~of the Senate. 1894,
418-19.
^ C o l f a x Chronicle. January 4, 1896.
•
^ Louisiana Populist. May 17, 1895.
l^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Colfax Chroni
cle. January 4, 1896.
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Governor Foster, the time had come to eliminate “this force
of brute numbers" from representative government.^4
Significantly, nearly all of the journals which
catered to the cotton planters endorsed the proposal.

The

Negro vote had been used to advantage by these planters ever
since Reconstruction.

In promoting restriction, it would

seem, the cotton barons would be minimizing their own influ
ence in state politics; the huge Democratic majorities
turned in from such parishes as East Carroll and Tensas were
based almost entirely upon illiterate and propertyless (and
often nonexistent) Negro registrants.
realistic men.

But the planters were

They apparently had reached the conclusion

that the potential danger of the Negro vote outweighed its
temporary advantages.

Hearsey's bland explanation, that

vote stealing "has become tiresome" to the planters,
not accurately state the case.

did

Fictitious or real, the

Negro voter was never a boring subject in Louisiana politics.
Populist influence, by 1894-96, was working its way
into the black belt; colored men who had not voted in a
dozen years began to maike inquiries as to the location of
the registrar's o ffice.^

Negro Populists in Baton Rouge

^ Q u o t e d in Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. May 19, 1896.
■^New Orleans Daily States* quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Advocate. December 5, 1897.
1ft
wBastrop Clarion-Appeal. quoted in Lake Providence
Banner Democrat. March 7, 1896.
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were reportedly making the night "hideous” with their "yells
and howls."

17

The registrar in Opelousas locked himself in

jail to avoid the crowds of Negroes who clamored to be added
18
to the rolls.
In Grant and Natchitoches Parishes, a
peculiar fusion of Democrats and white Republicans

19

was

effected in hopes of stopping the rush of Negroes into the
Populist camp, but to little avail; the "colored Populists"
of Grant even committed outrages upon members of their race
who attended an anti-Populist rally.

20

Conservatives poked

fun at the sight of white Populists in the uplands holding
picnics and inviting their Negro neighbors to come and eat
with them, but such un-southern events surely frightened
the Bourbons.

21

Racial animosity seemed to be losing its

grip upon numerous poor whites; class consciousness was
taking its place.

"We can no longer depend upon the soli

darity of the white race," grumbled the Tensas Gazette.

The

alternative, therefore, was "either a limitation of suffrage
or a continuation of the present methods, which

[will]

mean strife, bloody riots, and the degradation of society.
17

Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 4, 1896

^ I b i d .. February 28, 1896.
^ C o l f a x Chronicle. May 4, 1895; Louisiana Populist.
November 1, 1895.

20

Letter from Mark Brazeal, published in Colfax
Chronicle. March 28, 1896.
^ C o l f a x Chronicle. October 17, 1891, August 5, 1893.
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22

A diminished voice in Democratic affairs, to.the

planter mind, was infinitely preferable to class war.
The People*s party made a serious effort to capture
two Louisiana congressional districts in 1894.

The silver

issue had, meanwhile, replaced the sub-treasury plan as a
favored agrarian panacea for economic ills.

Macune*s plan

had failed to win many adherents outside of the cotton belt,
and its defeats in Congress finally discouraged Southern
Alliancemen.

The depresion, beginning in 1893, focused

agrarian attention on the need for an expanded currency.

By

promoting the "free and unlimited" coinage of silver, Popu
list leaders hoped to lure inflationist-minded Democrats into
the third party camp, and also expected to obtain increased
campaign contributions from the wealthy silver mine owners
of the West.

But the Democratic party of the South and West,

by 1894-95, also began to hop on the silver bandwagon.

In

Louisiana, as in other agricultural states, a Democratic
free silver movement commenced.

However, Governor Foster

and most of the inner circle of state Democratic leaders, in
1894, still adhered to President Cleveland^ conservative
gold standard policies.

23

The Populist congressional candi

dates of the Fourth and Fifth Districts harped upon the
^ S t . Joseph Tensas Gazette. March 13, 20, 27, 1896.
1167.

20

.

^Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII,
See Also Hicks, The fcopulist Revolt.' 198-204. 301-
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silver issue:

Alexis Benoit, a Ouachita Parish businessman

and legislator who had recently joined the third party, ran
against gold standard Congressman Boatner in the latter
District; Bryant W. B 3iley, who campaigned for the seat of
Fourth District Democratic Congressman Henry W. Ogden, was
limited by the fact that Ogden had yielded to popular senti
ment and "hoped and prayed" for the cause of free silver.2^
Bailey, an earnest young man of twenty-eight, was
" strict member of the Baptist Church" at Winnf ield.25^

His

education amounted to a few months spent in the inadequate
Winn Parish schools.

He had been a third party man since

1890, when he began working under Hardy Brian as associate
editor of the Comrade.

During the summer of 1894, when Brian

moved from Winnfield to nearby Natchitoches Parish, Bailey
26
became the editor of the Comrade.
moderate sized farm.

Bailey also owned a

He was able to purchase the paper from

the Farmers' Union stockholders; Brian, on the other hand,
had been editor but not publisher.

Goodwyn of the Chronicle
07
at first scoffed at Bailey, calling him a "simpering dolt,"
24We st Monroe Alliance Forum, quoted in Louisiana
Populist. September 21. 1894: Louisiana Populist. October 5,
1894; Chambers, A History of Louisiana. II, 204. Former
Congressman Blanchard of the Fourth District went to the U.
S. Senate in 1893.
25
Louisiana Populist. September 7, 1894; Shreveport
Sunday Judge. January 5, 1896.
2^Colfax Chronicle. September 8, 15, 1894.

27Ibid.. October 27, 1894.
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but it soon appeared that the youthful Populist was a power
ful stump speaker.
MBellowing Bailey"became the Democratic
28
nickname for him;
Bailey invited local Democrats at each
place he visited to come up and engage him in open debate.
At Coushatta, according to a Populist account, Bailey's
invitation was accepted by an elderly Bourbon who refused to
believe that any post-1877 issue had relevancy.

The old

gentleman "foamed and stewed over the 'wah,1 . . . and . . .
tore his shirt over the old twaddle of 'negro domination,"

30

Indeed, Bourbon memories of the past became increasingly
vivid whenever economic issues were discussed.

31

Bailey and Benoit also challenged their Democratic
opponents to submit to a white primary.

The two Populists

agreed to withdraw' from the race if they were beaten by a
vote of the white adult males of their respective districts;
the Democrats, of course, were supposed to make the same
28

Bastrop Morehouse Clarion, quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Advocate, February 27, 1898.
^Bastrop Clarion-Appea1 . quoted in Shreveport
Evening Judge. April 6, 1896.
30
Louisiana Populist. October 19, 1894.
31

Some Bourbon leaders seemed to fear above all else
the possibility that younger voters might be getting bored
with the old shibboleths. Major Hearsey expressed himself
on the problem in this fashion:
"Accursed by the generation
that grows up in ignorance of the significance of 1hese old
war-whoops and cries. Better that such boys should have died
in their infancy." New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Baton
Rouge Daily Advocate. December 5, 1897.
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pledge.

This Populist proposal was logically inconsistent

with their stated adherence to the principle of universal
manhood suffrage, and no one realized it better than the
Populists themselves.

As Hardy Brian wrote, they were

"compelled by the intolerant course of the party in power
to adopt the same narrow policy."

The Populists were

confident that they had a majority of the white voters of
North Louisiana on their side; they were equally certain
that the Democratic planters along the Mississippi, Red, and
Ouachita Rivers would stop at nothing to prevent Negro
tenants from voting the People's party ticket.

However, the

third party stood firm against constitutional suffrage re
striction.

And, more important, nearly all the Louisiana

People's party leaders stood up for the right of the Negro
to vote as long as that vote would be freely cast and
honestly counted.

Many Populists put free elections above

the cause of free silver.

33

In retrospect, the efforts made

by southern Populists to obtain legal justice and political
rights for the Negro were unequalled by any other native
white political movement in the region's history.^

"The

'iO
Louisiana Populist. June 21, 1895.
33
J.A. Tetts to Marion Butler, October 3, 1986, in
Marion Butler Papers (Southern Historical Collection, Uni
versity of North Carolina Library), Cited hereafter as
Butler Papers.
^ C . Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History
(Baton Rouge, 1960), 157.
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People's party," one of its Alabama leaders wrote in later
years, "brought to the South . . . the only democracy the
South has ever known."

35

Bailey, in 1894, received 5,932 votes against 12,257
36
for Ogden.
The Comrade editor carried six of the twelve
parishes of the District, and despite the wide margin, a
study of the returns--and Democratic admissions, for that
matter— justifies the Populist contention that the election
was stolen for Congressman Ogden.

In five of the six

parishes carried by Ogden, no Populist commissioners were
allowed at the polls; these parishes gave Ogden 9,621 of his
total.

In Caddo, where Bailey was beaten 2,097 to 66, a

northern visitor asked a Democratic official to estimate the
number of votes which would be polled at a certain precinct.
"Just as many . . .

as we need," was the laconic reply.

37

In Rapides Parish, nearly one third of Ogden's 3,097 votes
came from a single Negro precinct; De Soto Parish Negroes
reportedly were told that midnight visits would be paid
their cabins if they persisted in trying to vote for
Bailey.

38

A Democratic newspaper in Shreveport termed

35

Joseph Columbus Manning, The Fadeout of Populism:
Pot and Kettle in Combat (New York, 1928), 5.
^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 557.
37

Indianapolis Daily Journal, quoted in Shreveport
Progress. November 24, 1894.

^^Louisiana Populist. November 23, 1894.
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Ogden's total "outrageous," and admitted that Bailey "was
honestly and fairly e l e c t e d . B u t

another Democratic

organ of the city treated the lopsided returns with levity:
"B. W. Bailey; where is he, up a pine tree?" chortled the
Daily Caucasian.
Benoit, in the Fifth District, received 4,549
against Boatner's 14,755 vote t o t a l . O n l y three parishes
reported a Populist majority.

As did Bailey, Benoit in

sisted that an honest count would show the incumbent Demo
crat the loser.

Relatively speaking, Benoit had the weaker

of the two Populist claims to victory.

But he had one ad

vantage which Bailey lacked; he possessed the necessary funds
to contest the Democrat's election.

When Boatner returned

to Washington in 1895, Benoit was at his heels to lay the
case before the House of Representatives.

40

Benoit charged

gross frauds in ten of the fifteen parishes; in four of
these, he received a mere 81 votes against Boatner's 7,124,
In one parish Boatner's vote exceeded the whole regis
tration (which was padded to begin with) by about
^Shreveport Progress. November 10, 17, 1894.
4^Shreveport Daily Caucasian, quoted in Louisiana
Populist. November 16, 1&94.
^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902,
577.
42

John Ray to William E. Chandler, February 21,
1896, Chandler Papers.
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1 , 0 0 0 . The congressional committee which examined the
returns found the Populisms charges sustained, but instead
of seating the contestant, the majority of the committee
decided that "no valid election had taken place," and the
seat was declared vacant.44
a new election.

Boatner had to return and face

Benoit was again the opponent.

Typical of

conservative reaction in the Fifth District was that of the
Richland Beacon, which thought that Boatner was entitled to
the remainder of the term because "to oppose him would be
tacitly admitting that the election was a fraud, which we
cannot afford to do."

Predictably, the special election

of June 10, 1896, sent Boatner back to Congress.

Benoit

contested again, but had to be content with seeing the in
vestigating committee cut the Bourbon*s legal majority down
from above 6,000 to 802.4^
Elsewhere in the state, the People*s party obtained
a majority in two southeastern parishes in 1894; its candi
date in the Sixth District, M. R. Wilson, carried poor white
Livingston and Washington Parishes over incumbent
43chester H. Rowell, A History and Legal Digest of
All the Contested Election Cases in the House of Repre
sentatives of the United States From the First to the FiftySixth'Congress. 1789-1901. H. R. Doc. No. 510. 56 Cona. 2d
Sess. (Washington, 1901), 519-20.
44Ibid.
45R a w i l l e Richland Beacon. May 9, 1896.
46Rowell, A History and Legal Digest of All the Con
tested Election Cases . . . 1789-1901. 526.
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Congressman Robinson.

But the Sixth District went 7,981 to

2,230 against the P o p u l i s t . W i l s o n * s largest vote came
from his home parish of St. Landry; his supporters claimed
they would have carried the parish except for the fact that
their three strongest precincts were closed on election day
through Democratic machinations.

48

In Southwest Louisiana*s

Third District, Populist John Lightner posed only feeble
opposition to the Democratic incumbent, whose real antago
nist was Republican candidate Taylor Beattie.
ning," as amused Democrats called him,

4Q

"John Light-

polled most of his

641 votes from Calcasieu and Vermillion Parishes.

Inde

pendent workingmen1s tickets in New Orleans, Populist en
dorsed, ran James Leonard in the First and J. M. Callaghan
in the Second Congressional District.
representation at the polls.

Neither was given

Leonard came out with 370

votes out of 20,000 cast; Callaghan did even worse, with 166
out of 22,000 in the Second District.^
Thus the Populists of Louisiana emerged from the
1894 campaign frustrated but not entirely discouraged.

They

were positive that they had elected two congressmen in North
^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902,
578.
4^Louisiana Populist. July 12, 1895.
4^Morqan City Review, quoted in ibid., November 16,
1894.
^Louisiana, R eport of the Secretary of State, 1902,
577; Daniel, "The Louisiana People*s Party," 62.

351
Louisiana, and the rank frauds perpetrated by the cotton
parish oligarchy was beginning to repulse middle-class Demo
crats; a number of the latter were expressing an interest in
Populism.^
ana.

But the picture was quite dark in South Louisi

Seemingly, almost no impression had been made upon the

French Catholic voters; Lafayette and St. Martin Parishes,
for example, reported not one Populist ballot in 1894.

The

fact that Bailey, the Brians, and most People,s party men
were Baptist in religion was a serious drawback to the third
party cause among rural Acadians, and Catholics around Baton
Rouge were informed that Parson Brian and son were “driving
Catholics” out of Grant and Winn Parishes; this news, said
the Weekly Truth, should be “highly gratifying" to those
members of the Mother Church who were sympathetic to Popu
list i d e a s . ^

In the North Louisiana Catholic outpost of

Natchitoches Parish, John Scopini, an active Populist and a
Catholic, felt it his duty to warn his fellow parishoners
about the lies which "low down, thieving Democrats" were
53
telling on the Protestant Populist leaders.
Despite the fact that they had failed thus far to
create a workable statewide organization, the Pelican State
^ Louisiana Populist. October 19, 1894-April 19,
1895.
P .O

Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. August 4, 1894.
^ L e t t e r from John Scopini, “a Catholic," published
in Louisiana Populist. October 11, 1895.
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Populists had solid reasons for hoping, by 1895, that they
were on the threshold of success.

For one thing, other

southern states were in formidable revolt.

North Carolina*s

Populist-Republican fusionists had taken over all branches
of the government in 1894, and their legislature elected
Marion Butler to the United States Senate; fusion tickets
in Alabama and Georgia had obtained more than forty per cent
54
of the vote.
Nationally, third party statisticians could
add up almost 1,500,000 ballots in 1894--forty-two per cent
above Weaver*s presidential total two years before.

The

success of the party elsewhere, it was assumed, would encourage membership in Louisiana.
Worsening economic conditions also fanned the flames
of agrarian radicalism.

The great depression of the 1890*s

dropped cotton and sugar prices ever lower.

Middling cotton

prices, which hovered around ten cents per pound at the
beginning of the decade, dropped to seven arri then six cents
by late 1893.

Mid-November of 1894 brought the lowest price

recorded by the New Orleans Cotton Exchange in a half
century— four and seven-eights ce n t s . ^

The tenants and

5^Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 333-39.
^Haynes, Third Party Movements. 281; Louisiana
Populist. January 18, 1895,
^Boyle, Cotton and the New Orleans Cotton Exchange.
183; New Orleans Tinges-Democrat, quoted in Colfax Chronicle.
November 17, 1894.

353
small farmers of North Louisiana began to experience pri
vation as severe as that suffered during the depression of
the 1870*3.

"None can tell if we have reached rock bottom,"

one agriculturist wrote in 1895.

"I fear if there is nothing

done to alleviate the suffering among the people, that we
will have a revolution. . . . The people are restless.
."

57

. .

In the hill country, by the next year, a Democratic

newspaper admitted that Democrats were "as scarce as
dollars."58
The sugar planters of South Louisiana were also
feeling the sting of depression.

Domestic prices of raw

sugar fell from almost six cents per pound in 1889 to an
average of three cents by 1894.

From 1890 until 1894, how

ever, the price decline was cushioned by a two cents per
pound bounty provided by the Republican-sponsored McKinley
tariff; the Louisiana planters received, in four years, a
total of $30,000,000 from the Federal government,5^

But

President Cleveland*s return to office in 1893 meant trouble
for the bounty.

Cleveland*s low tariff views, embodied in

the Wilson-Gorman tariff of 1894, repealed the two cent
^Louisiana Populist. January 18, 1895.
58Alexandria Town Talk, quoted in ibid.. January 3,
1896.
5^Sitterson, Sugar Country. 303, 328; Louisiana
State Agricultural Society, Proceedings of Sixth Annual
Meeting. 6-7.
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bounty and substituted instead an ad valorem duty on foreign
sugar which, because of current low prices, was deemed in
sufficient protection by the planters.^

A sizeable number

of the Louisiana planters had always voted Republican in
national elections.

But reaction to the Wilson-Gorman

tariff caused a majority of the state*s larger sugar
planters to announce their intention "of voting the Republi1
can ticket in all national matters in the future."
On
fii

September 17, 1894, at Washington Artillery Hall in New
Orleans, the planters organized the National Republican
+ 62
party.
A serious division within the ranks of Louisiana's
economic elite had taken place.

The newly organized National

Republicans (better known as the "Lily Whites") were willing
to cooperate with the Kellogg and Warmoth factions of the
Regular Republicans; at least, the planters were interested
in cooperation for the purpose of electing protectionists to
Congress from the First, Second, and especially the Third
Districts.

There was little indication that the planters

intended, at first, to meddle with the Democratic status quo
^ T h e Louisiana Planters: A Formidable Revolt
Against the Free Trade Democracy (Boston. 1894). 11-13.
63-Ibid.. 9.
fsO
Ibid., 14-17; New Orleans Times-Democrat. October
18, 1894.
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on local and state matters.^*3
coming.

But this step was not long in

The National Republican's three congressional
f\A

candidates were all beaten in the November, 1894 election. H
Vote frauds in New Orleans helped account for two of these
defeats, and Democratic Congressman Andrew Price's pro
tectionist views helped keep National Republican Taylor
Beattie's record of political losses unbroken in the Third
District.
Heresy against the Democratic party did not usually
go unpunished in Louisiana.

This fact was soon impressed

upon a number of planters in the southern parishes.

Gover

nor Foster, though himself a sugar planter, was plainly
shocked by the conduct of those of his wealthy neighbors who
65
had drifted away from the true Democratic faith.
The
hitherto lenient tax assessment rates on certain sugar lands
were revised upward.

John N. Pharr, of Foster's home parish

of Sti Mary, complained, in 1896, that his taxes had shot up
about twenty per cent within the last two y e a r s . ^
Mutual grievances drew the Populists and sugar
planters together as the state election of 1896 approached.
^3Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 149-50.
64
Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902,
557.
^“’Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII,
1169-70.
^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. March 12, 1896.
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Both relished the prospect of unseating Governor Foster.
Both deplored the suffrage amendment:

the Populists, because

it would wreak havoc among the poor white registration; the
National Republicans, because their Negro laborers were
generally amenable to voting any ticket not labeled Demo
cratic.

Both Populists and Republicans felt that honest

election laws would enhance their political power.

And, not

least important, each was strongest where the other was
weakest.

"The little one to five bale farmers"^ who were

said to make up the body of North Louisiana Populism would
not ordinarily support wealthy sugar planters for office;
the Populists, on the other hand, had failed to make the
slightest impression upon sugar parish voters in previous
elections.

And the South Louisiana Republican planters

possessed one commodity which made fusion more tempting to
the eyes of the upcountry agrarians.

As one cynical Bourbon

accurately remarked, "the Populist wampum was distressingly
short. . . ."6®
Three-way negotiations, involving the Warmoth wing
of the Regular Republicans, the "Lily White" National R e 
publican planters, and the Populists, commenced in the late
summer of 1895.^9
67

Both Regular and National Republican

Shreveport Evening Judge. February 12, 1896.

68Ibid.
^^Warmoth to Chandler, February 4, 1896, Chandler
Papers.
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emissaries were dispatched to the People's party state
meeting at Alexandria in August of 1895.

The Populists

made no public commitments on fusion at that time, but merely
issued a manifesto urging "the good people of Louisiana to
proceed at once in forming such a compact organization as
will prevent . . . outrages of their rights of suffrage."

70

A Democratic organ in Shreveport expressed horror at the
Populist manifesto:

"They even go so far as to say that

they are in favor of voting the negro honestly.
of this, Louisianians!

. . . Think

Are you willing to go this far with

them?"71
On November 26, 1895, the People's party executive
committeemen again met with National and Regular Republi
cans; this time, however, a public statement regarding their
plans for cooperation in the forthcoming state election was
announced.

Both Republican groups agreed that if the

People's party nominating convention, scheduled for January
8, 1896, would nominate a state ticket which would be
"representative," and be made up of men who opposed the
suffrage amendment, then the Republicans would support it.
The Populists sealed the bargain by affirming their oppo
sition to said amendment, and promising a ticket "liberal
^Daniel, "The Louisiana People's Party," 67-68;
Louisiana Populist. August 16, 1895.
71

Shreveport Evening Judge. August 9, 1895.
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and broad gauged"; moreover, the agrarian leaders added that
free silver and honest election demands would be major
planks in the platform.

72

Louisiana, as a prominent New

Orleans Republican predicted, would see "pretty lively
times" as the April election approached.

73

Andrew Augustus Gunby, Monroe attorney and newspaper
publisher, was considered the most likely Populist nominee
for Governor.

Gunby had been a "fretful porcupine" in the
^y
l

Democratic party for a number of years;

he endorsed the

third party platform as early as 1892; his increasing
affinity for Populism eventually caused the "one hundred
planters" who controlled the Democratic party, and the
election returns, in Ouachita Parish to formally denounce
him as "unworthy of the notice of decent people."

75

Nor did

the Republican sugar planters care for Gunby*s liberal
notions.

On January 2, 1896, four days before the Populist

nominating convention, the National Republicans violated the
spirit of their pledge with the upcountry agrarians by
assembling at the Hotel Royal in New Orleans and nominating
E. N. Pugh, a conservative Ascension Parish planter, for
72

Louisiana Populist. December 6, 1895, January 17,

1896.
73

H. Dudley Coleman to William E. Chandler, Novem
ber 2, 1895, Chandler Papers.
^Shreveport Evening Judge. September 22, 1895;
Louisiana Populist. January 17, 1896.
"7R

Lake Providence Banner Democrat. April 25, 1896.
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Governor.*^

The

planters* intentions were clear.

They

planned to stage a coup by presenting the Populist con
vention with a ready-made candidate.

But, as the Daily Advo

cate observed, the Populists had no taste for this proffered
"sugar teat."^^
The People’s party nominating convention, meeting
at Alexandria, opened and closed on notes of mingled anger
and confusion.
accept Pugh.

Almost none of the delegates were willing to
But preparations to nominate Gunby stopped

when the Monroe publisher, though pledging himself to
support the third party ticket, asked that his name not be
70
presented before the convention.
This Populist gathering,
according to a cruel but probably accurate Bourbon commen
tator, included among the delegates "many old hacks

[ such

as Guice ] with lightning rods up praying to get struck""^
with the nomination; but none of the hopefuls had either the
money to help finance a state campaign or a statewide repu
tation upon which to draw contributions and votes.

Out of

desperation, party leaders put the name of State Chairman
Andrew Booth before the convention.

Booth himself instigated

7^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. January 7, 1B96.
^ I b i d .. January 8-9, 1896.
^Louisiana

Populist. January 17, 1896.

^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. January 10, 1896.

the move.®^
The "hayseed from New Orleans/' as Booth was sometimes called,

81

out opposition.

received the gubernatorial nomination with
Candidates for other state offices were

also selected; no sugar planter was included.

Later that

day, to the "utter mortification and surprise" of Brian,
Benoit, and other convention managers, the nominee pri
vately asked their help in "preparing the convention" to
accept his resignation as head of the ticket so that Pugh,
QO
the Republican, might take his p l a c e . B o o t h ' s proposal
infuriated the third party chiefs.

They immediately placed

the story of the New Orleanean's apparent treachery before
the convention, and it was soon impressed upon Booth that
his unconditional resignation as the nominee and as state
Chairman would be eagerly accepted.
to comply.

However, Booth refused

He insisted that, until such time as Pugh was

nominated, he was the legally designated Populist candidate.
Faced with this wretched situation, the convention adopted
a resolution empowering the fifty-three members of the
Central Executive Committee of the Louisiana People's party
to fill any vacancy which might occur on the state ticket
through resignations "or otherwise [sic] ,"83
^Louisiana Populist. January 17, 1896.
8^Shreveport Evening Judge. February 12, 1896.
^Louisiana Populist. January 17, 1896.
83Ibid.
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The Populist state committee met on January 23 and
replaced Booth and almost every other member of the impro
vised Alexandria ticket.

Shortly before, a compromise with

the sugar planters had been reached.

Though none revealed

the details, it is clear that the mutually awkward situ
ation was resolved by an arrangement in which the People *s
party would select all the nominees, but the positions of
Governor, Auditor, and Attorney General must be filled from
the ranks of Republican sugar planters.

In return, the

planters whom the Populists selected for these positions
would espouse all planks in the agrarians1 platform and,
with the help of other wealthy National Republicans, would
furnish the bulk of campaign funds for the crusade to unseat
Foster and kill the suffrage amendment.

The gubernatorial

candidate selected by the Populist committee was John Newton
Pharr of St. Mary Parish.®^
Pharr, whose political past included ventures into
the Whig, Democratic, Prohibition, and Republican parties
was one of the largest sugar planters of St. Mary and one
®4Besides Pharr, the sugar planters on the ticket
were: H. P. Kernochan, for Auditor; L. F. Southon, for
Attorney General. The other four positions went to Popu
lists;
J. B. Kleinpeter, for Lt. Governor; J. W. M c
Farland, for Secretary of State; John Pickett, for Treasurer
(incumbent); G. A. M. Cook, for Superintendent of Education.
New Orleans Times-Democrat. January 22-25, 1896.
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OR
of Louisiana's wealthiest man. ^

Sixty-seven years of age

in 1896, his real estate and manufacturing equipment was
valued at over $700,000; bank accounts probably ran Pharr's
total worth to well above $1,000,000.®^

But his espousal

of free silver and other Populistic demands--temporary
though it was— met enthusiastic reception in the North
Louisiana hills.

87

In fact, some Republicans thought of him

as more of a Populist than anything else.®®

And a sudden

blossoming of Populist newspapers indicated that Pharr's
ample purse had come to the aid of the state's struggling
third party journalists.
No political movement in the South ever produced a
more colorful press than did the People's p a r t y . L o u i s i 
ana was no exception.

Beginning with the Winnfield Comrade

in 1890, no less than fifty Populist weekly newspapers were
^^Chambers, A History of Louisiana. II, 15; Daily
Picayune. April 26, 1886.
8f i

°ttRecapitulation and Valuation of the Properties of
John N. Pharr, April 5, 1898," in John N. Pharr Papers
(Louisiana State University Archives). Cited hereafter as
Pharr Papers. Unfortunately, the Pharr Pipers contain little
of a political nature.
®^By the fall of 1896, Pharr had returned to his
gold standard views and was supporting the McKinely ticket.
Marshall J. Gasquet to John N. Pharr, September 10, 1896,
Pharr Papers; James C. Murphy to John N. Pharr, August 22,
1896, Pharr Papers.
®®J. G. R. Pitkin Letter, addressee's name illegi
ble, March 20, 1896, copy in Chandler Papers.
®9woodward, Origins of the New South. 247.
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published in twenty-five or more parishes, at one time or
the other, by 1900.

Many of them were ephemeral journals,

cropping up during a campaign and then dying for want of
advertisers and subscribers.

Grant Parish led the list with

seven Populist newspapers during the d e c a d e , ^ followed by
St. Landry with f i v e , ^

Calcasieu with f o u r , ^ and Catahoula

and Natchitoches parishes with three each.
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Two People’s

party papers appeared in each of the following parishes:
Lincoln, Ouachita, Rapides, Sabine, Webster, and Winn.^4
Grant: Colfax The Ocala Demand (1891-92); Col
fax New Era (1892-93); Colfax Pe o p l e d Demands (1895-98);
Montgomery Mail (1892-93): Pollock News t1896-97): Pollock
P e o p l e d Demands (1898-99;; Pollock The People’s Voice (18991900).
Information on these and other Louisiana Populist
newspapers was obtained from the following sources: Penny,
"The People’s Party Press," passim; Colfax Chronicle. 1890 1900; Louisiana Populist. 1894 - 99; Baton Rouge Daily Advo
cate. May 27, 1896; Shreveport Evening Judge. August 18, 1895.
Dates given for the Populist newspapers refer to the known
years of publication under Populist affiliation.
^ I n St. Landry: Opelousas St. Landry Clarion (1892);
Opelousas People’s Tribune (1896-98): Washington People's
Party Tribune ( 1 8 9 5 - 9 6 ) Washington Post (1896); Washington
Advocate (1896).
92jn Calcasieu: Lake Charles Patriot (1894-95);
Lake Charles New Road (1895-98); Oberlin Calcasieu Reformer
(1895-97); Jennings Record (1896-98).
*^In Catahoula: Trinity Farmers* Advocate (1895-96);
Olla Signal (1895-97); 011a Free Silver Advocate (1898-99).
In Natchitoches, Robeline Battle Flag (1892-96): Robeline New
Era (1895); Natchitoches Louisiana Populist (1894-99).
^4In Lincoln: Ruston Caligraph (1892); Ruston
Progressive Age (1892-99).
In Ouachita: West Monroe
Alliance Forum (1894): Monroe Bulletin (1896-1900).
In
Rapides: Alexandria Age of Reason (1896): Alexandria
Louisiana Reformer (1896).
In Sabine: Many Sabine Banner
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Parishes with one Populist newspaper were;

Bienville,

Caddo, Caldwell, Cameron, Claiborne, De Soto, East Baton
Rouge, Iberia, Jackson, Livingston, Orleans, Tangipahoa,
Union, and Vernon.

Vague references were found regarding

two Populist journals which had a brief existence, though
no specific place of publication was mentioned, Acadia and
Vermilion parishes would be the most likely locations.

96

This list of fifty includes only those newspapers
which were avowed Populist organs.

Not included are pro-

Republican papers which happened to support Pharr or other
fusionist candidates from time to time.

In almost every

case, the men listed as editors were also politically active
in the third party.

Most of them either ran for local

(1896); Many Sabine Free State (1898).
In Webster: Minden
New Forum (1896): Minden Banner of Liberty (1896-97).
In
Winn: Wlnnfield Comrade (1890-1900); Winnfield Southern
Sentinel (1898).
95
In Bienville: Arcadia Alliance Forum (1894-96).
In Caddo: Shreveport Progress (1894).
In Caldwell:
Columbia Caldwell-Watchman (1894).
In Cameron: Lakeside
Review (1892-96).
In Claiborne: Homer Alliance Farmer
(1892-94). In De SotO: Grand Cane Beacon. (1896).
In East
Baton Rouge: Baton Rouge Capital Item (1896-98).
In Iberia:
New Iberia Enterprise (1897-98).
In Jackson: Jonesboro
Jackson Parish Appeal (1896).
In Livingston: Springfield
Bee (1896).
In Orleans: New Orleans Issue (1891-96).
In
Tangipahoa: Amite People*s Call (1895-96).
In Union:
Farmerville Herald {1895-96). "in Vernon: Leesville People *s
Friend. (1891-97).
96

The Louisiana Mentor (1893-94)
which was probably published at Crowley,
the Southern Record, published somewhere
tor iaTHSIsTrlc'tT^wa^ probably located at
Vermilion Parish.

was a Populist paper
m Acadia Parish;
in the Tenth Sena
Abbeville, in
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offices or served on state party committees.

In all proba

bility, an exhaustive research into Louisiana Populist
journalism would turn up at least three or four more papers
not mentioned in this study; Hardy Brian, who regularly
published a list of third party organs in the state, noted
that "several" which he did not cite by name had "gone down
for want of support" by 1895.
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No more than twenty, how

ever, were ever published at any one time.

This maximum

number was reached during the spring of 1896.

98

By 1899

no more than five or six Populist papers were being pub
lished in the state.

All, apparently, had expired or be

come Democratic by 1901.
Hardy Brian

stood at the forefront of Louisiana’s

third party journalists.

He edited the Comrade from 1890

until 1894, and then moved to the town of Natchitoches, to
99
take charge of the Louisiana Populist.

The latter paper,

published until 1899 (the name was shortened to Populist in'
^Louisiana Populist. April 5, 1895.
^®Ibid., March 27, 1896. Two of the papers listed
as Populistic were with the third party for a very brief
period only: the Opelousas St. Landry Clarion and the
Shreveport Progress. Both were normally Democratic. The
New Iberia Enterprise, on the other hand, was a journal
istic curiosity; it was jointly owned by Democrats and
Populists and had two editorial pages of widely divergent
viewpoints.
^ Louisiana Populist. August 24, December 28, 1894.
Brian did not own the Natchitoches paper at first, but did
possess it when he sold the plant in 1899.
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1898), attempted for a time to act as the official state
organ of the party.

Its approximately 1,200 subscribers

must have exceeded in number any other Populist paper in the
state.

However, as early as August of 1895 Brian was forced

to admit that he had failed to attract statewide reader
ship.

Brian was able to retort in kind to Bourbon

attacks upon himself and his party; at one election, he com
pared Democratic voters to "a sow returning to her wallow, a
dog to his v o m i t . H e

described President Cleveland as

"bovine necked, big bellied Grover, our most excellent
majesty and tub of fat who reigneth in Washington.

..."

102

On ocassion, Brian urged his fellow partymen to go to the
polls armed, and if Democrats were caught stealing votes:
"Kill them on the S p o t ! " * ^
J. A. Tetts's Robeline Battle Flag was another often
quoted Populist organ.
Bloody Flag.104

Democrats sometimes called i t .the

In the same shop was published the Robeline

New Era, a children's weekly made up by Tetts's three
daughters:

Eunice, Lillian, and Ollie.

The New Era was

supposed to entertain, give moral instruction, and
IQQlbid.. March 29, August 23, 1895.
^•^Ibid.. September 4, 1896.
102Ibid., September 28, 1894.
•^^Ibid.. December 20, 1895.
■^^Shreveport Evening Judge. August 19, 1895.
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incidentally sow Populistic doctrines among young people.

105

As,had always been his lot, Tetts continued to meet with one
failure and frustration after the other.

He became secret

ary of the state Populist party in 1896, ran for the legis
lature in Natchitoches Parish, and lost by four votes after
the Democrats threw out the returns from his home precinct.-^
Pressed by creditors he was unable to pay, Tetts had to
close his newspaper office later that

year.

-*-07

For a time,

in 1896-97, he wandered about the state attempting to arouse
interest in reviving the nearly deceased Farmers' Union; his
efforts were in vain, the Union held its last state meeting
in August of 1897.^08

Now past fifty, Tetts tried to make a

new beginning as a Populist editor in 1898.

He moved to

Sabine Parish and began issuing the Many Sabine Free State
in February of the latter year.

1 OQ

As the twentieth century

began, and Populism died, Tetts joined the Republican party.^0
105Ibid.. October 22, 1895.
l^Ibid., September 4, 1896.
107

J.A. Tetts to Chaplin, Breazeale, and Chaplin,
April 8, 1896, in Chaplin, Breazeale. and Chaplin Papers
(Louisiana State University Archives).
See also Louisiana
Populist. September 4, 1896.
^ * *Louisiana Populist. September 25, 1896, July 30,
1897.
~*~^Ibid.. February 4, 1898.
■^^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 542.
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The most radical of third party voices in Louisiana
was that of the New Orleans Issue.

Unlike the rural Popu

list press, the Issue expressed disdain for any farmer who
hired tenants or laborers, and urged Populists to investi
gate the doctrines of socialism and "aye, even communism."^-1
Vulgarity, too, was'no stranger to the New Orleans weekly.
Commenting upon the Populist notion that the Democratic and
Republican parties would someday merge, the Issue suggested
that they were "already snoozing in the same bed. . . .
What we object to is the fornicabuggery [sic] part of it.
They ought to get married and save themselves . . . the disgrace."

WO

The paper also suggested that Louisiana®s work

ing people seemed not as intelligent as bees, for bees were
smart enough to kill the parasitic drones in their hives.

113

Pharr, the "Old Swamper," as his supporters affection
ately called him, received the National Republican and the
Regular Republican nominations shortly after the Populists
approved of him on January 23.

However, Warmoth had to

fight hard to obtain the Regular's endorsement for Pharr;
and even then, William P. Kellogg and Negro legislator
Thomas A. Cage refused to go along with the fusion ticket
■^^New Orleans Issue. October 4, 13, 1894, July 13,
1895.
112Ibid., October 13, 1894.
U 3 Ibid.
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and worked openly for Governor Foster during the c amp aig n^4
Democrats were eager to create dissension among Republican
ranks by reminding Negroes that Pharr was one of the sugar
planters who ejected laborers from the plantation cabins in
1887.

However, the charge that Pharr was the champion

Negro-flogger of South Louisiana, that "scores of old gray
headed negroes . . . can testify to the terrors of a bullwhip wielded by his lusty arms,"

115

that "several have went

[ sic] to their happy hunting ground through Pharr's mani
pulations ,"116
place.

was not backed up by references to time or

Pharr was unquestionably a white supremacist, though

not of the rabid Bourbon variety.

His present position, if

nothing else, led him to give absolute endorsement of the
117

Negroes' right to vote and to secure justice in the courts.
This was enough to prompt Democrats into calling Pharr and
his allies the "Populist-negro social equality ticket.
^ 4Warmoth to Chandler, February 4, 1896, Chandler
Papers; Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 154-55.
^^Colfax Chronicle. March 14, 1896.

l-^Lake Providence Banner Democrat. April 18, 1896.
11 7
Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 1, 1896; Louisi
ana Populist. February 14, April 10, 1896. "I was reared
with the negro and worked side by side with him for twenty
odd years," said Pharr.
"I never have found him other than
a good laborer and as honest as most other men.
If he has
cut a bad figure in politics, we are to blame for it."
Quoted in Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana
(Louisiana State University Studies. Social Science Series.
No. 5, Baton Rouge, 1957), 98-99.
•^^Shreveport Evening Judge. February 16, 1896.
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Another Bourbon analysis of the fusion party described its
component parts as:

"The wild-eyed bilious pop, the odori-

ferous coon and the pampered and succulent sugar teat."

119

For once, the Bourbon oligarchy of Louisiana was
confronted with the distinct possibility of defeat.

Dis

content over Foster's platform, which evaded the currency
question and supported the suffrage amendment as a means to
"insure the control of affairs to the intelligence and
virtue of the state,"
Republican ranks.

120

was not confined to Populist and

As one suspicious Democrat wrote,

Foster's next legislature might take a sweeping and arbi
trary view of who should be disfranchised as "poor white
trash."

121

The seriousness of the crisis prompted one con

cession from Foster.

Shortly before the election, Demo

cratic leaders began soft peddling the suffrage amendment
and finally dropped it from the platform entirely.

122

Fosterites were also worried over the situation in New
Orleans.

The recently organized Citizens' League, headed

by a number of prominent businessmen and social leaders of
H ^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. February 2, 1896.
120
Shreveport Evening Judge. December 20, 1895.
121
^ ^ M a n y Sabine Banner, quoted in ibid., December 30,
1895.
Shortly thereafter, the Sabine Banner renounced the
Democratic party and joined the Populists.
eveport Progress. April 25, 1896. The suff
rage amendment was defeated in the April 19 election,
34,671 to 3,534.
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of the city, were placing an Independent ticket in the muni
cipal election; this contest would be held the same day
(April 21) as the state election, and the Citizens* League
was powerful enough to prevent the customary ballot box
stuffing in at least half the city's precincts.

123

The

urban League announded its neutrality in the Foster-Pharr
state campaign.

But Mayor John Fitzpatrick, the prime

target of the Citizens* League, was openly supported by
Governor Foster; when Fitzpatrick's city Democratic machine
insisted upon naming most of the poll commissioners for the
election a number of the "best people" in the League made
1OA
"intemperate threats" to support Pharr. ^
The Democratic cotton planters seemed to be experi
encing an unusual amount of difficulty in discouraging Negro
participation in the approaching election.

"The poor igno

rant, deluded negro has gone into spasms over the name of
Pharr," grumbled a Morehouse Parish Democrat.

125

And in

East Carroll, where the colored population made up over
ninety per cent of the total, the Banner Democrat listed the
names of Negroes who were "brewing up trouble" by talking
for the fusion ticket, and advised them to "leave politics
•^^Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans. 27.
*^4New Orleans Times-Democrat. March 31, 1896.
^Bastrop Clarion-Appeal. quoted in Lake Providence
Banner Democrat. March 7, 1896.
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severely alone . . .

if they want to live. . .

then,

in the next issue, observed that "you might as well talk to
a brick wall as to try and make the nigger believe who his
127
best friend is."
The colored people, however, understood
which of the two candidates had sponsored the "sufferings
amendment," as they called it.

128

Meanwhile, in the New

Orleans area, a recently established Negro paper called the
Daily Crusader promoted the Pharr cause with noticeable
effect.^2^
At least, the Democrats were not furtive about their
election day plans.

A grass roots rebellion against the

Bourbon regime and its methods had cost Foster the support
of thousands of white farmers who voted for him in 1892; New
Orleans could no longer be considered safely Democratic; the
depression, combined with Foster’s known predelictions for
the gold standard, increased the governor’s unpopularity;
nevertheless, the incumbent administration still held abso
lute control of the election machinery in about a dozen
black belt parishes, and intended to make the most of it.
The following statement, from a leading North Louisiana
l ^ L a k e Providence Banner Democrat. March 28, 1896.
127Ibid.. April 4, 1896.
^2^Farmerville Gazette. April 22, 1896.
■^2^New Orleans Daily Crusader, quoted in Louisiana
Populist, March 6, 1896.
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Democratic daily, was not intended for humor.

It was simply

frank:
It is the religious duty of Democrats to rob
Populists and Republicans of their votes whenever and
wherever the opportunity presents itself and any
failure to do so will be a violation of true Louisi
ana Democratic teaching. The Populists and Republi
cans are our legitimate political prey. Rob them!
You bet! What are we here f o r ! 130
Hearsey of the Daily States, whose maledictions
against the "carpetbag, scalawag and nigger buzzards" helped
]0 I
keep up the fighting spirit among his planter-subscribers,
prophesied that even if Pharr did come through with a
majority the "better element" of Louisiana would be likely
to inaugurate a "bloody revolution" to keep him out of
office.

132

The Daily Advocate also endorsed the idea of a

right wing revolt; but if war should come, the official
journal of the state government added, John Pharr would be
wholly responsible:

"This ignorant and low bred boor pro

ceeds from place to place scattering his fire-brands among
the rabble and inciting the baser passions of the populace.
. .

133

But at least the fusion ticket was permitted to

speak at New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and most communities in
130

Shreveport Evening Judge. December 15, 1895.

■*-^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Lake Provi
dence Banner Democrat, February l f 1896.
•^^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Bayou Sara
True Democrat. April 18, 1896.
133

Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 4, 1896.
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the state.

Shreveport, on the other hand, was such a bastion

of reaction that John Pharr cancelled a speaking engagement
there, fearing that the Board of Health planned to throw him
and his "political menagerie" into the Municipal Pest
House.
In the meantime, individual acts of reprisal were
carried out against the fusionists.

One Populist candidate

in Baton Rouge was shot and another had his barn burned; the
printing shop of a third party newspaper in Minden was
wrecked by Democrats; and economic pressure was applied
against white and Negro Populists a l i k e . W h e n

trouble

arose in St. Landry Parish over Populist attempts to regis
ter Negroes, Governor Foster dispatched state troops,
equipped with a gatling gun, to the scene.

The bitter

passions unleashed by the Foster-Pharr campaign helped give
the state one more unenviable niche in the record book of
violence.

In 1896 Louisiana recorded twenty-one lynchings.

This figure exceeded the combined total for every other
state and territory west of the Mississippi River for 1896,
and also accounted for twenty per cent of all lynchings in
the United States that year.^^*^
-^-^Shreveport Sunday Judge. March 15, 1896,
^ ^ouisiana Populist. February 28, 1896; Farmerville Gazette. April 16, 1896.
•^^Shreveport Evening Judge. April 6, 1896.
^3^Work (ed.), Negro Year Book . . . 1918-19. 374.
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Official returns following the April 21 election
showed Governor Foster as the victor over Pharr, 116,116 to
87,798.

Excluding the thirteen river parishes which Demo

cratic planters firmly controlled, and where the fusionists
were denied representation at the polls, Foster obtained
138
81,589 to Pharr*s 83,538.
Hardy Brian predicted shortly
before the election that it would take "a gigantic piece of
stealing” to count Pharr o u t , ^ ^ and the Democrats proved
equal to the task.

Of the thirteen parishes where the

grossest frauds occurred, six in particular aroused the ire
of the Pharr people:

Foster

Pharr

White
Adult Males, i
Census of 1890

Bossier

3,464

58

1,005

Concordia

3,013

80

609

East Carroll

2,635

0

310

Madison

1,803

0

340

Tensas

1,968

0

401

West Feliciana

3,093

1

613

Totals

15,976

139

3,278

^^Louis ian a. Official Journal of the Senate. 1896
22: Louisiana. Report of the Secretary of State. 1902. 554
^Louisiana Populist. March 20, 1896.
^4<\j.S., Compendium of the Eleventh Census. I, 78283; Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902, 554.
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Though the thirteen plantation parishes had provided
Foster with his margin of victory, they did not have a mo
nopoly on fraudulent returns.

In the four coastal parishes

of Cameron, Jefferson, Plaquemine, and St. Bernard, which
the fusionists had expected to carry, Foster won by a vote
of 6,337 to 3,050; the total adult male population of these
four parishes (native white, foreign, and Negro) was 1,240
less than the number of votes returned.*4 *

Frauds occurred

in New Orleans, too, though not on previous levels of in
tensity.

A number of cases were reported throughout the

state of supervisors of elections who refused to count
precincts in which the fusion ticket was known to have a
majority.

In Rapides, where Foster's 4,373 votes came

almost entirely from Negro precincts, a disgusted Populist
thought that the Governor might demand a recount:

"He

should have carried this parish by at least 500,000.M*4^
White registrants were in a majority in thirty-two
of Louisiana's parishes.

Pharr carried twenty-five of

these, and also obtained a majority in four predeminately
Negro parishes in South Louisiana.

Governor Foster won a

majority in only seven white parishes, and carried twentythree where Negro voters predominated.*43

Of the three

141Ibid.
*4^Louisiana Populist. July 17, 1896.
*43Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1896,
22; Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902, 554.

377

urban centers in Louisiana, Foster narrowly won New Orleans,
26,330 to 21,683, and obtained a runaway majority in Shreve
port (Caddo Parish), 3,210 to 277.

Pharr took the parish

which included the city of Baton Rouge, 4,859 to 1,470.
Since East Baton Rouge Parish was heavily Negro, and
factional fights among the Democrats permitted colored men
to vote freely there in 1896,^44 this latter figure indi
cates what the fusion ticket might have accomplished had
honest elections been permitted in other Negro parishes.
Also, it is interesting to note that in parishes where the
fusion ticket won handily, local Democratic leaders did not
accuse the agrarians of fraud.

The major accusation hurled
«

at the Populists was that they were trying to let Negroes
cast a free ballot.

145

Not since Reconstruction, and perhaps not since the
Civil War, had the people of Louisiana been confronted with
a crisis as grave as that which developed between April 21
and the convening of.the new legislature on May 1

4

.

Im

mediately after the election, Governor Foster ordered state
troops to Natchitoches and St. John the Baptist Parishes.
In Natchitoches, 500 armed and angry white Populists were
144

Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. February 27, March

4, 1896.
145Ibid., April 26, 1896.
^4^White, Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. V,
1 4 -1 5 .
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threatening to assault the parish seat of government, where
Democratic election supervisors had refused to count the
ballots from Negro Populist precincts; news of the militia’s
approach scattered the f a r m e r s . T h e

trouble in St. John

began when Negro fusionists seized a ballot box which they
believed had been stuffed by white Democrats.

The militia

unit which Foster hurried to the scene used field artillery
to disperse the Negroes.

148

These events, thought a number

of citizens, were only the beginnings of trouble.

Even the

staid Daily Picayune envisioned "war and rapine, and . . .
blood from the Arkansas line to the Gulf of Mexico," if the
Populists and Republicans did not submit to the announced
returns.
The fusionists claimed that Pharr had beaten Foster
in actual votes cast by at least 20,000. ^

Democratic

spokesmen, some of them rather proud of their work in over
coming majority opinion, did not deny that fraud had oc
curred; their justification for stealing the election was
perhaps most succinctly expressed by a Bastrop Democrat who
proclaimed that "a vast majority of the very best people"
l47Louisiana Populist. May 1, 1896.
^■4®Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 160.
l49paily Picayune, quoted in Shreveport Evening
Judge. May 8, 1896.
^^Monroe Bulletin. May 16, 1896, clipping in Pharr
Papers.
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stood behind the Mbrave young Governor." ^ 1
Bourbon explained:

another

the opinion of property, intelligence

and virtue must take precedence over the desires of the
"corrupt mass."-^2
Both the fusionists and the Democrats issued blood
thirsty manifestos shortly after election day.

Hardy Brian,

who had succeeded Booth as party chairman, called upon ’’the
white men of the state" to assemble in Baton Rouge and use
force, if legal methods failed, to see that Pharr received
legislative recognition of the g o v e r n o r s h i p . T h e Demo
cratic proclamation bore the imprint of Henry J. Hearsey;
it described the "monster, horrid, formless and crowned with
darkness" which was threatening to overthrow orderly Demo
cratic government and place in power the "great horde of
ignorant blacks who yearn for social equality."

And "woe

betide" those who might try to prevent Foster*s second in
augural; cost what it must, "this land shall not be a Hayti
or San Domingo."154

indeed, it did seem for a time as if a

civil war within a state was building up.

Nine thousand

Populists from North Louisiana were said to be preparing to
^-^Bastrop Clarion-Appeal. quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Advocate. June 30, 1896.
l ^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. July 1, 1896.
^ • ^ L o u i s i a n a

154

Populist. May 8, 1896.

Shreveport Evening Judge. May 6, 1896.
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march upon the state capitol;

and what the Daily Advocate

described as "a boat load of sugar-teats," equipped with
provisions and munitions of war "sufficient to accomplish
the successful bombardment and siege of Baton Rouge" lay at
1
anchor in the Mississippi.
Democratic stalwarts in Baton
Rouge and the Florida parishes organized into militaristic
units and made preparations to defend the Foster govern
ment.^5^
The fusionists had some hope of unseating Foster
through a legislative investigation of the returns.

Fifty-

five members of the General Assembly had been elected in
opposition to the Foster Democracy:

the Populists numbered

nineteen, the Republicans thirteen, the Citizens' League
nineteen, and Independents, four.

158

Although this still

^55Colfax People's Demands. quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily A dvocate. May 5, 1896.
l ^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate. May 12, 1896.
157Ibid.. May 7-14, 1896.
•^•5^Louisiana Populist. July 10, 1896; Reynolds,
Machine Politics in New Orleans, 28-29.
There were two
Populists in the Senate and seventeen in the House of Repre
sentatives.
The Senators were:
J. P. Patton, of Winn; M.
R. Wilson, of St. Landry.
The Representatives were:
J. W.
Bailey, Jr., of St. Landry; Henry Breithaupt, of Catahoula;
J. M. Brown, of Natchitoches; J. E. Bullard, of Sabine;
Patrick Donahay, of St. Landry; C. L. Gunby, of Union; I.
D. Hogan, of Jackson; D. E. James, of Winn; Josiah Kleinpeter, of East Baton Rouge; R. P. LeBlanc, of Vermilion; S.
J. Meadows, of Claiborne; T. W. Pipes, of Lincoln; A. W.
Stewart, of Grant; W. L. Truman, of St. Landry; J. W.
Williams, of Vernon; J. W. Young, of Acadia.
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left the Democrats with a majority of twenty-six, the chance
for enough defections among them to swing the balance of
power to Pharr seemed, for a time, to be good.

Even a

representative from East Carroll, who along with Foster had
benefitted from the 2,635 to 0 vote in that parish, decided
as a matter of conscience to vote with the Populists and
Republicans.
On May 14, a joint session of the legislature re1£
fused, by a vote of 86 to 48, to go behind the returns.
Nor did the rumored Populist army from the uplands arrive.
Heavily armed Democrats, however, were visible all around
the State House.

The "Pharr Man-of-War" in the river
IfLI
weighed anchor and departed,
and only a fistfight or two
on the streets of Baton Rouge marred the restoration of
quiet to the city.

Before the end of the week, Governor

Foster delivered his second inaugural address, in which he
spoke of the need for "some action" in the direction of
suffrage, restriction, and promised that "the rich man in his
palace and the poor man in his humble home shall be pro
tected," as far as it was within the power of the state to
grant such protection.

1

After the inaugural ceremony, a

l ^ L a k e Providence Banner Democrat. May 23, 1896;
St. Joseph Tensas Gazette. May 22, 11396.
■^^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. May 15, 1896.
161Ibid.

162Ibid., May 19, 1896.
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grand ball was held in the Governor’s mansion, where a "vast
concourse of the elite from every parish" gathered.

The

first set was danced by Governor Foster and Mrs. Samuel D.

McEnery.^^
The state election of 1896 and the legislative
session which followed broke the back of Louisiana Populism.
The General Assembly, during the month of June, compensated
for the failure of the suffrage amendment by approving a
strict registration and election law; both were designed, as
the official journal of the government freely admitted, to
eradicate the votes of the illiterate of both races as well
as reduce the electoral participation of timid folk of
moderate learning who might hesitate to register or cast
their ballots because of the confusing p r o v i s i o n s . ^ 4
measures were to go into effect by 1897.

These

Significantly, the

same session which passed the restrictive laws declined to
increase the state’s appropriations to public schools.
The General Assembly also passed an administration
bill which would place before the reduced electorate, early
in 1898, the question of holding a constitutional con
vention.

By that time at least ninety per cent of the Negro

vote would be off the rolls, along with a good portion of

164Ibid.. August 19, 1896, December 26, 1897.
165Ibid.. July 3, 1896.

383
the poor white vote.
list protests,

The convention bill, passed over Popu

stated that if the voters agreed to the

calling of a convention then the work done by the delegates
chosen would be final--the new constitution would not be
submitted to the people for ratification.'*'^

Earlier, in

the first month of 1896 session of the legislature, a new
United States Senator for Louisiana had been chosen.
Governor Foster's approval,
all,

. . . that peerless

With

"that noblest Roman of them

. . . champion of the plain

people,"16*7 Samuel D. McEnery, was selected by the General
Assembly.

In July the legislature adjourned.

Governor

Foster, wearied by the events of the past few months, de
parted for an extended vacation into the Dakotas.
Louisiana Populist remarked, hopefully:

The

"If the Indians will

only scalp him they will be gratefully remembered by our
people."16®
The Presidential election and congressional races of.
1896 aroused little enthusiasm among the dwindling ranks of
the Louisiana agrarians.

The state Democratic regime,

realizing the inevitability of the free silver tide in the
■*-^Edwin Aubera Ford, "Louisiana Politics and the
Constitutional Convention of 1898" (unpublished Master's
thesis, Louisiana State University, 1955), 69-99.
16 7
Baton Rouge Daily A dvocate. May 28-29, 1896;
Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII, 1184.

•^^Louisiana Populist. July 29, 1896
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national party, sent a silverite delegation to the Chicago
convention which helped nominate William Jennings Bryan.-^9
After the People's party convention at St. Louis had also
endorsed the Democratic nominee, Hardy Brian, urged on by
North Carolina Populist Senator Marion Butler, approached
the Louisiana Democracy with the proposal to issue a joint
ticket in the national campaign.

170

As in other states,

the Louisiana Populists hoped to get their vice-presidential
nominee, Tom Watson, on the Democratic ticket in place of
the conservative who had been selected at Chicago to run
with Bryan.

To the surprise of many, Louisiana's Democratic

leaders agreed to let the Populists have half- the electors
for the second place on the national t i c k e t . S e n a t o r
Butler complimented the Louisiana Populist editor by writing
that "there is no State in the Union where we have done as
i70
well as you have done."
Yet, in fact, nothing of value
from the third party standpoint had been accomplished in
Louisiana.

The Watson fusion was the only concession the

Bourbon Democracy ever made to Hardy Brian's party, and it
^ ^ B a t o n Rouge Daily A d v ocate. June 16, 1896; Daily
Picayune. August 5, 1896.
^■^Marion Butler to H. L. Brian, September 26, 1896,
Butler Papers.
^•^H. L. Brian to Marion Butler, September 2b, 1896,
Butler Papers.
■^^Marion Butler to H. L. Brian, September 30, 1896,
Butler Papers.
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was made for the obvious purpose of enticing them back into
the Democratic fold.

Many diehard Populists disliked doing

business with the Bourbons under any conditions.

From

Monroe, A. A. Gunby warned his fellow party members:
you dance with a bear watch your partner.

. . .

"When

173

Though fusion was arranged at the national level,
Populist congressional candidates ran against Democratic in
cumbents in four of the statefs districts.
lists were thoroughly beaten.

All four Popu

The new registration and

election laws had not yet taken effect; the black belt sent
in the customary overwhelming Democratic returns.

Bailey,

in the Fourth, received 4,726 out of approximately 15,000
votes cast; Benoit, in the Fifth, obtained 4,870 out of
about 15,000.

The Third District Populist obtained a mere

195 ballots, and the Sixth District sent in only 924 Popu
list votes.
The registration law went into effect January 1,
1897.

It required no property qualifications and, strictly

speaking, no literacy qualifications; however, certain
information had to be recorded on the r e g i s t r a r s rolls.
If the prospective voter could not give this information to
the satisfaction of the registrar, then that person was not

173

Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Louisiana Populist.
October 9, 1896; Tetts to Butler, October 3, 1896, Butler
Papers.

■^^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 580.
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entitled to vote.

One Lincoln Parish Populist sadly

announced that his party*s vote was being cut "at least two
I*~7fi
thirds" by the Democratic registrars.
The Daily Advocate
noted that the new registration was "death on niggers and
the kind of Pops who will be inclined to vote
Negroes ] ."

177

[ with

Many small farmers who could have regis

tered refused to make the effort.

As one of them explained,

their candidates had been counted out so often and so
thoroughly that they were tired of "going to the election
and losing valuable time without any valuable result.
Late in 1897 the Populists held a state "mass
meeting" at Monroe, and issued a platform which declared for
universal manhood suffrage and denounced the call for a
constitutional convention.

Though the Populist platform

drawn up at Monroe called for a poll tax as a prerequisite
for voting, this, in the manner it was proposed, would not
have restricted the electorate.

The state already had a

compulsory poll tax on all male adults, dating from the
constitution of 1879.

If such a tax were collected by law,

17S
Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Louisiana Populist.
January 8, 1897; Louisiana Populist. January 7, 1898;
Colfax Journal. quoted in Shreveport Progress. January 1,
1898.
l ^ R u s t o n Progressive A g e , quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Ad v o c a t e . December 12, 1897.
■^^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. December 12, 1897.

^Louisiana Populist. May 15, 1896.
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as the Populists urged, it would disfranchise no one and
would add much needed money into the state's educational
system.

The Populists, said Hardy Brian, were "in favor of

manhood suffrage as against $ $ suffrage."1^9
Though opposing the holding of a constitutional
convention, the third party felt that it must offer a slate
of delegates for the election which would decide upon the
holding of the convention as well as selecting its personnel.
Included on the Populist ticket were a number of Republicans.
These latter were not sugar planters, who had meantime
generally endorsed the idea of Negro disfranchisement, but
rather the white leaders of the Regular, or so-called "Negro
wing" of the Republican party.

Democrats laughed at the

slate but were puzzled by it.

What had the Populists to

gain by drawing closer to the Negro, at this late date?

180

Colored voters had been hurt worst of all by the new regis
tration.
Even the most active of Populists, such as Gunby,
admitted the obvious.

With or without the Negro, they

^7^Ibid.. August 27, December 24, 1897.
Yet a
recent study of Louisiana political history erroneously
assumed that the Populists of the state gave "cheers" for
Negro disfranchisement.
See Allen P. Sindler, Huev Long's
Louisiana:
State Politics. 1920-1953 (Baltimore, 1956),

21- 22.
180

Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Louisiana Populist.
January 8, 1897.
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could not stop the convention or dominate its personnel,
Therein, perhaps, lay the key to the puzzle.

As Populist

ranks thinned, those who remained, realizing the hopeless
ness of the struggle and finding the Bourbon hand more
oppressive than ever, were simply making a last, extreme
protest.

State Party Chairman Hardy Brian even went so far

as to say that the "better than thou" Louisiana aristocracy
would not rest content until it owned slaves again.

"The

whole effort to qualify suffrage," he said, was aimed toward
that goal.*®^
The election for the constitutional convention, on
January 11, 1698, proceeded according to Democratic plans.
The official ballot was almost four feet long, 252 candi
dates were listed, and voters were allowed only three
minutes in the booth.
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Among those too befuddled to

finish voting was an associate justice of the Louisiana
1R4
Supreme Court.
Less than 50,000 votes were counted:
l®lfc/lonroe Bulletin, quoted in Louisiana Populist.
January 8, 1897.
• ^ ^ L o u i s i a n a

Populist. August 27, 1897.

*^ L o u i s i a n a , Official Journal of the Constitutional
Convention. 1898, 3-6; Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. January
8, 1898. The 252 names included the 92 listed as candidates
for "delegates at large,", and the remainder ran from indi
vidual parishes. Thus, no single ballot would list over 100
names. To add to the confusion, many of the candidates were
listed two and three times.
^•®^New Orleans Daily Item, quoted in Louisiana Popu
list. January 14, 1898. The Judge was Joseph A. Breaux of
New Iberia•

389
36,178 for the convention, 7,578 against.

Bryant W. Bailey,

editor of the Comrade, was the only Populist to gain a
185
seat.
He did little at the sessions but vote "no" and
refused to sign the completed document.
Not without reason did the President of the con
vention call it "little more than a family meeting of the
Democratic party of the State of Louisiana."
siding officer was Ernest B. Kruttschnitt.

186

This pre

His more famous

uncle, Judah P. Benjamin, had personified the Whiggish
coalition of planters and urban conservatives in ante bellum
187
Louisiana.
Kruttschnitt continued the family tradition
into the Bourbon period.

Especially did Kruttschnitt glory

in the fact that the convention, by legislative provision,
was not to be submitted to the people for ratification.

"We

have absolute and despotic power," he told the assembled
delegates.

"The people

[ have ] protected themselves against

l^^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Constitutional
Convention. 1898, 4. Seven parishes:
Bienville, Jackson,
Lincoln, St. James, Vernon, and Winn, voted against the
calling of the constitutional convention of 1898. St.
James,, despite recent legislative restrictions, still listed
a majority of Negro voters at the time. The other anti
convention parishes were in the North Louisiana hill
country.
See official returns in Baton Rouge Daily Advocate.
January 27, 1898.
^■®^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Constitutional
Convention. 1898, 8-9.
187
Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana.
136, 155.
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themselves."^®®

Fittingly, the man who was perhaps Louisi

a n a ^ most venomous and implacable bigot, Henry J. Hearsey
of the Daily States, was awarded the lucrative printing
contract for the convention.

189

What emerged from the convention of 1898 was virtu
ally the constitution of 1879 drawn up anew, with the ex
ception of suffrage restriction.
on state taxation was retained.

190

Even the six mill limit
As to suffrage, voters

had to demonstrate the ability to read and write in their
native language, or, as an alternative, show a property
assessment of not less than $300.^9^

Supposedly, the

"grandfather clause," as it was called, allowed a loophole
for poor whites.

Those who had voted before 1867, or whose

ancestors had so voted, were exempt from the above re
strictions.

But the intent of this proviso may be

questioned.

Only three and a half months were allowed for

qualification.

Many prominent Democrats took the view that

the clause was merely an "evasion," and, at any rate, the
^®®Louisiana, Official Journal of the Constitutional
Convention. 1898, 379.
189Ibid.
^^Louisiana, Constitution of 1898. Art. 232.
^ ^ Ibid.. Art. 197. Besides the "grandfather
clause" exception, naturalized citizens were also permitted
to vote without literacy or property qualifications. See
J. L. Warren Woodville, "Suffrage Limitation in Louisiana,"
Political Science Quarterly. XXI (June, 1906), 177.
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United States Supreme Court would declare it invalid.

Both

of Louisiana*s national senators put themselves on record
192
to this effect.
However, about 40,000 individuals did
register under the "grandfather clause."

One hundred and

193
eleven of them were Negroes. 7
The demoralized remnants of the Louisiana People*s
party entered candidates in both the congressional races of
1898 and the gubernatorial election of 1900.

In 1898,

their candidate who polled the highest vote was Hardy Brian
in the Fourth District.

Yet he obtained a mere 1,476, and

carried only Grant and Winn.*-94

With the Negro vote re

moved, the Democratic total in the Fourth and other
Districts had fallen below the level that Populist candi
dates had attained four and even two years before; even so,
the Bourbon party still won by a margin of four to one or
better.

"The great bulk" of what; once had been the People’s

party, said Hardy Brian, "stayed at home in sullen despair."
They felt that "it was no use, the Democrats would count
them out. . . ."195
192shreveport Evening Journal. March 13, April 6,
1898; Nation. LXVI (May 19, 1898), 374; William A. Mabry,
"Louisiana Politics and the Grandfather Clause," North
Carolina Historical Review. XIII (October, 1936), 30d>.
193Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 558.
194Ibid.. 580.
^^Natchitoches Populist. November 11, 1898. The
Louisiana Populist title was shortened beginning March 18,
1898.
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In 1900, Donelson Caffery, Jr., a conservative,
gold standard Democrat who was at odds with Governor Foster,
accepted the nomination of both the People's party and the
"Republican-Fusion ticket," the latter made up of G. 0. P.
remnants within the s t a t e . O n

the Populist ticket

Caffery obtained 4,938 votes and failed to carry a single
parish.

On the fusion ticket, Caffery's state total was

9,277, and he carried only St. James Parish.

The state

total for W. W. Heard, the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, was 60,206.

197

Thus the Democratic vote in 1900 was

almost 30,000 less than John Pharr received four years
earlier.

A. A. Gunby,

surveying the ruins of Populism,

attributed his party's decline to a deadening of political
spirit as well as the restrictions on suffrage.

"Apathy,"

he wrote, "seized the majority and they are willing that the
minority should r u l e . " ^ ®

Never again did the People's

party run candidates in Louisiana.
Bourbonism once again ruled serenely.

A few

planters, perhaps, missed the old excitement of stuffing
•l-^Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 179-83;
Franklin St. Marv Banner. March 10, 1900; Shreveport Evening
Journal. April lb, 1900; Nation. LXX (January 18, 1900), 4243.
197

Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.

1902, 564.

^■^^Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Shreveport Evening
Journal. April 22, 1900.
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ballot boxes; Negro registration, by 1900, was down to four
1QQ

per cent of its 1896 figure.

And, though white regis

tration slowly climbed back toward previous levels, the
agrarian spirit had seemingly been crushed.

"The people are

thoroughly cowed," observed one man who had been associated
with the third party movement in the northern parishes; the
people "are under complete subjection.

They will bow the

knee, receive the yoke and pass on, hewers of wood, drawers
of water, beasts of burden; without spirit, without com
plaint."^^

But the most fitting epitaph for Louisiana

Populism was written by Hardy Brian.

In March of 1899, in

the last issue of his newspaper, he wrote:
take up the gun

"We refused to

[ and ]

won some day, but by

so we lost. . . . The fight will be
ooi
[ unchristian] methods. . .

Brian’s parting words attracted little attention.
Neither was much notice given, later that year, to the
futile efforts of a Winn Parish man to be elected as an
Political Science Quarterly. XXI, 18889; Paul A. Kunkel, "Modifications in Louisiana Negro Legal
Status Under Louisiana Constitutions:
1812-1957," Journal
of Neoro History. XLVI (January, 1959), 21.
• ^ ^ W o o d v i l l e ,

^^Shreveport Progress. April 2, 1898.
201Natchitoches Populist. March 10, 1899. Brian
left Natchitoches after the March 3, 1899 issue of his paper
was destroyed by C. V. Porter, who worked for the rival
Democratic newspaper in town, the Enterprise. The affair
was kept out of the city papers, lowing to Mr. Porter having
lately been appointed District Attorney." See Colfax
Chronicle. March 11, 1899.

Independent to the state legislature.
Long.

His name was H. P.

Huey, and Earl, were the names of two of his small

children.

^Colfax Chronicle. December 9, 1899-April 14,
1900. Long's announcement was carried in the Colfax news
paper, which was in the same state senatorial district as
Winn, Long's platform, as announced in the December 9
issue, was Populistic, although Long claimed that he had
always been a Democrat.
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